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PREFACE
A two-way procedure of reading
In view of its interdisciplinary character, this book allows the reader to read
it in two ways: Parallel or serial. Parallel reading is intended for scholars of
literature and psychologists who are not interested in each other's field of
study. Serial reading is for those who are interested in the empirical study of
literature.
This book consists of seven Chapters, an introduction and a conclusion.
Each Chapter addresses a specific issue of metaphor theory. Chapters 1 up
to 3 have four Sections, which are fully theoretical, while Chapters 4 up to 7
have seven Sections, including tests and discussions. The Sections in each
Chapter address the steps taken in the research cycle to investigate the issue
of a Chapter. Each Section number has the following:
.0 : Outline of a general problem in metaphor theory. (Questions
asked about metaphor)
.1 : Theoretical approaches of the problems under .0 in the study of
literature
.2 : Theoretical and experimental approaches of the problems under
.0 in psychology
.3 : Presentation of the theories used in the present study, based on
.1 and .2 and their predictions
.4 : Tests on the predictions in .3 and their results
.5 : Discussion of the results for psychological theory
.6 : Discussion of the results for the theory of literature
Traditional scholars of literature are advised to read the Sections .0, .1, .3,
and .6 of each Chapter, parallel to psychologists with no interest in the
theory of literature, who are advised to read the Sections .0, .2, .3, .4, and .5.
Those who are interested in the empirical study of literature are advised to
read all Chapters in serial order, that is, in order of appearance.
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INTRODUCTION*
Metaphor and the brain
Organisms with a central nervous system have specialized areas in the brain
that can detect features. These features can be lines, edges, light contrasts,
sounds, or, even hands and faces in monkeys and probably in humans as
well. Any two central nervous systems of the same species can com-
municate. Humans do this predominantly by means of language. Language
starts by uttering sounds in response to the world, or to the concept of this
world. This concept of the world is gradually established and refined as
stable and coherent patterns of features. These patterns are made known to
the brain as neuron-firing frequencies from perception cell to brain cell.
According to this view, learning what an object is, is to distinguish it from
another object through its features, evoking a unique pattern of firing fre-
quencies, which target at the appropriate feature-detection cells. Thus, the
concept is formed by unique frequency patterns, which repeatedly stimulate
a combination of detection areas. In line with this idea, it could be that
anything evoking a unique combination of firing frequencies is called an ob-
ject. If the unique frequency pattern of an object matches the expected
pattern of a concept, the object is judged as 'true' or 'real'. If it does not
match the concept at all, it is judged as 'false' or 'unreal'. If the pattern of fre-
quencies matches partly, as it does most of the time, it is judged as 'probable'
or 'may be'. An evolving change of the concept passes through the latter
possibility. A sudden change, or revolution, skips this, what may be called,
'metaphorical phase'.
Literal expressions move in the area of 'true' and 'real'. Journalism and
science pretend to operate in this area by trying to make their statements fit
the world as closely as possible. These statements need thorough research
and ample discussion to make the concept fit the object. Metaphoric
expressions move in the area of 'probable' or 'may be'. If a scientific state-
ment is still debated, it is half a metaphor. 'Man is a machine' is a fine
example. Metaphoric expressions are neither 'true' nor 'false'. Therefore,
metaphors can be viewed as a continuum between 'highly probable' and
'highly improbable'. Scientific metaphors, such as process models of the
brain, move in the area of 'probable' and 'true'. Literary metaphors, such as
those found in poems and novels, move in the area of 'improbable' and
'false'. This is the reason the poet's claim is correct that he 'lies the truth'. In
literature, metaphors need the artifice of the logical predicate [IMAGINE],
to avoid it from being 'false' and 'unreal', this is, the area of the anomalies
(cf. Levin 1977: 119). This does not mean that the [IMAGINE] predicate
states 'this is a metaphor', but rather that metaphors need the conception of
an imaginative world to be acceptable.
Notes are on page 11.*
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Metaphor founds poetry
If poetry is not characterized by the predicate [IMAGINE], it could be taken
literally, and therefore, easily rejected by the reader as pure nonsense. This
explains why readers with little imagination do not like to read literature
(this implication cannot be reversed). People who buy a novel that says
'novel' on the cover, buy a book with the predicate [IMAGINE] on the
hardback. Any writer who wishes to violate the genre has to change this
predicate.
Poetry often tends to be highly imaginative, and because a metaphor is
neither 'true' nor 'false', it is an outstanding instrument for enhancing
imaginativity and avoiding poetry from the claim of truth value. Since poets
do not wish their poems to be rejected on these grounds, the area of rejection
moves to beauty, imaginativity, or 'figurativeness'.
In the past, the study of literature has focused on metaphor, because it is
seen as a founding feature of literature. This focus is so strong that metaphor
became the pre-eminent instrument for describing and analyzing literature.
Traditional approaches, such as Russian Formalism, Prague Structuralism,
Semiotics and Reception Aesthetics, never took much trouble about
validating their theories. Consequently, their statements are neither 'true' nor
'false', which render these theories highly metaphorical, closer to art than to
science. Since poetry and metaphor are described by these highly metaphoric
meta-languages, the paradox occurs that the unvalidated theoretical state-
ments are neither 'true' nor 'false'. On the other hand, they are not poetry
either, because they lack the [IMAGINE] predicate. Thus, the study of lit-
erature so far is a highly philosophical one.
However, through the ages, various groups of metaphor theories have
emerged, based on different assumptions about the textual function of meta-
phor. One issue that has always remained implicit in the theory of literature,
is that the textual function of a metaphor (connections between metaphors
and other textual elements) depends on cognitive processes involved in
understanding the metaphor (how the metaphor is interpreted). Reading is
cognitive processing. Hence, any theory about the textual function of the
metaphor is implicitly a cognitive theory about processing metaphors.
In this study, the three most important theoretical approaches to metaphor
processing are analyzed and formalized in three competitive models: Com-
parison theory, anomaly theory and interaction theory. Chapters 1, 2, and 3
will discuss these models.
Metaphor as an understanding device
The best way to get acquainted with a new concept is through an old one. If
someone wants to learn about elementary particle physics and does not
know what 'quarks' are, a basic understanding of it can be formed by
4
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presenting 'quarks as building blocks' (Huang 1992: 25). Building blocks
actually are parts of houses and offices. However, used as a metaphor, they
may explain something about the function of quarks in an atom.  To give a1
further example of metaphor as a means of explanation, a yet unknown
phenomenon of lightning flashes above the clouds was described by E.
Westcott of the Alaska University as giant 'roots' or 'jelly-fishes' (October,
1993). Westcott reported that the flashes were brightest at the top, about
sixty kilometers above the ground - where the head of the jelly-fish was
sited - with its tentacles hanging down. 'The lightning flash is a jelly-fish' is
a nice example of utilizing metaphor as an understanding device. The topic
is yet unknown to the audience, because the lightning flash is not an ordi-
nary one. It has uncommon features, which are quite difficult to describe lit-
erally. Instead, the researcher uses a concept that is already known in detail
to the audience: The jelly-fish. Features such as 'round at the top' (the head),
'long flexible forms hanging down' (tentacles) are activated by the concept
of a jelly-fish, so that a first idea about the new lightning type can be
formed.
Metaphors can also help science to form a new concept about an entity it
is in search of, but which has not yet been found (for example, 'the wonder
tissue' in the brain). Chemists speak of 'the magic island in a sea of
instability', when referring to superheavy nuclei of atoms which can be
manufactured artificially. These elements are heavier than uranium and hard
to stabilize.
The three-dimensional map (...) shows very clearly how the stability of
atomic nuclei varies as the numbers of protons and neutrons increase.
There is a "mountainous peninsula" of stability running diagonally
across the map. In the lower part of the map, stable nuclei have
roughly equal numbers of protons and neutrons. Further up, they have
more neutrons. The mountain peaks are the so-called magic numbers -
numbers of protons and neutrons producing the extra stable closed
shells. Surrounding the peninsula is a sea of instability. At the far end,
at atomic number 114 is the "island of stability" (...) (Loveland &
Seaborg 1991).
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The first three metaphors in this quote are based on the knowledge that
chemistry does have about atomic nuclei. The first says that 'the range of
stable nuclei is a mountainous peninsula'. The second, 'mountain peaks are
magic numbers' actually is constructed from two metaphors, where 'magic
numbers' is a metaphor for the number of protons and neutrons to make an
extra stable nucleus, and 'mountain peaks' is a metaphor for 'magic
numbers'. The elements that are not stable are called the 'sea of instability' in
which the 'mountainous peninsula' lies. 'The sea of instability' is a mixture of
experimental knowledge and speculation about the elements that already
proved to be unstable, and those that are expected to be, but are not
produced yet. Together, the three metaphors form the overall metaphor, that
the variety of proton and neutron combinations can be represented as a geo-
graphical 'map'. The fourth metaphor on this 'map' is the most interesting
one. It is a concept legitimized by the map-metaphor, yet without having a
real reference. The 'island of stability' or 'magic island' is a belief about those
extra heavy elements which are expected to be stable, but which are not
proven to be as yet. Features from the already known range of stable nuclei
(the 'mountainous peninsula') are expected to be found for the 'magic island'.
It should have a mountain peak, similar to the ideal number of protons and
neutrons in the stable nuclei. And although the magic island lingers in the
realm of the unknown, the chemists 'have been trying to make a leap to this
island, hoping to make a new range of elements'. When the attempts to make
this 'leap' fail, they are 'crashing into the sea of instability' (Loveland &
Seaborg 1991).
Thus, metaphors may be used to launch a hypothesis about an unknown
world, conceptualizing the features of what should be found. These concepts
could turn out to be a unicorn. Something which is sought, but which can
never be found, because the concept has no reference to a 'real' object. The
object of reference needs the predicate [IMAGINE] to justify its existence
and thus the concept enters the realm of metaphor. Metaphors can become
literal statements after testing, so that a truth value can be associated with
them.
Cognitive psychologists are becoming increasingly aware that metaphors
are a way of understanding the world, as alternative to 'true' statements.
Also, cognitive psychologists are becoming aware that language is highly
metaphoric, because the internal concept never fully describes the object.
Even scientific languages describe their objects in terms of mathematical
metaphors.
Cognitive psychology has been concerned with the empirical study of
language, and has a well established experimental tradition. One goal of
psycholinguistics is to investigate the basic elements of understanding lan-
guage, before entering into the complicated matters of full text processing.
This means that their studies mostly concern issues such as word fre-
quencies, phonological encoding, lexical ambiguity and, recently, word
priming in short sentences. Psychologists lay the bricks, before building the
6
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house. To investigate the fundamentals of language processing, artificial
stimuli are used, which manipulate the linguistic aspects of interest. This is a
perfectly legitimate way of achieving one's scientific goals. However, the
problem with studying literature is that the object of study is always a
'natural' text; in other words, a text not written for experimental purposes.
One way of dealing with the problem is to cease studying literature until
more is known about reading. The other way is to use natural texts in con-
trast to artificial ones and to investigate their different effects. This also
means that literary texts which are used in experiments must be submitted to
a series of tests, before a set of useful replications can be carried out.
Aims and definitions
(...) the main problem is to know what happens when actual recipients
attribute meaning to texts which they conceive of as literary texts. This
question must be answered with as much precision as possible before
any claim can be made as to the supposed function and effect of
literature. (Ibsch 1991: 4)
The aim of this research is not to describe the social function or cultural role
of metaphors, but to study metaphor processing in different textual con-
ditions. In metaphor theory, three directions are much in evidence: Com-
parison theory, anomaly theory, and interaction theory.  In Chapter 1, 2, and2
3, these three theories are treated as three competing models of metaphor
processing. The predictions deduced from the theories are tested in Chapter
5 up to 7, in order to evaluate their adequacy for processing (literary) meta-
phors.
The theoretical study is based on the work of some major scholars of lit-
erature, and on more detailed psychological studies into metaphor
processing. The road of heuristic study is left explicitly, subscribing
Jakobson, Fant & Halle's statement on the study of phonetics that language
research:
(...) requires experimental verification and further elaboration. The
nature of these problems calls for coordinated research by linguistics,
psychologists, experts in the physiology of speech and hearing,
physicists, communications and electronics engineers, mathe-
maticians, students in symbolic logic and semiotics, and neurologists
dealing with language disturbances, as well as the investigators of the
poetic use of speech sounds. (Jakobson, Fant & Halle 1963: v)
Therefore, the experimental research of the present study is based on psy-
chological investigations, such as set theoretical approaches to similarity,
7
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reaction time (RT) studies into metaphor processing, and event related brain
potential (ERP) studies into semantic anomalies.
In the next Sections, certain concepts are defined: Literal, metaphoric,
and anomalous expressions, features, context and priming. These definitions
are formulated without intentionally biasing one of the metaphor theories.
Definition 1: A-, B-, and C-term
The literal, metaphoric and anomalous expressions in this research, consist
of three parts: An A-term, a B-term, and a C-term. The A- and B-term are
always explicitly present in the text, and are connected by the auxiliary 'to
be' (A is B). The C-term is the great unknown. Most theories claim that it is
the basis on which the A- and B-term are compared (traditionally, the
'tertium comparationis'). According to certain theories, the C-term is based
on or even identical to the set of features that is shared by A- and B-term.
What is considered the C-term strongly depends on interpretation. In a meta-
phor, such as 'love is a rose', the A-term is 'love'. The thing with which love
is compared is the B-term, 'rose'. The C-term may be something like 'beau-
tiful, red, tender, and thorny' (see Figure below for this triangle relation).
The triangle relation among the elements of a metaphor. The A-term is the main issue of the
sentence, not necessarily its grammatical subject. The B-term is the image in which the A-
term is perceived. The C-term is the meaning of the sentence, i.e. the solution to the
metaphor. Which term is seen as A- or B-term, or what the C-term might be, is a matter of
reader interpretation.
8
Introduction: Definition 2: Literal, metaphoric, and anomalous expressions
In all cases, the A-term is the central issue of the expression, and the B-term
is the frame of reference, while the C-term is the basis on which the
comparison between A- and B-term is legitimatized.  Notice that A- and B-3
term do not necessarily coincide with grammatical subject and nomalized
predicate (although often, they do). In other words, a fixed order of A- and
B-term may not be assumed a priori. Therefore, reader judgements should
decide which word in an expression is the A- or B-term (cf. Table 4.1,
Chapter 4).
Definition 2: Literal, metaphoric, and anomalous expressions
Three expression types will be investigated: Literals, metaphors, and anom-
alies. Merely tentative definitions are in place here, because the very
characteristics upon which the expression types are identified is the object
under study.
A literal expression usually matches an instance with an appropriate
category ('love is an emotion'), and depends on a truth value, whereas a
metaphor usually matches inappropriate instances and/or categories, and is
independent of truth value. An anomaly may also match inappropriate
instances and categories. However, it is not a metaphor, but is 'beyond
imagination'.
For most philosophers and literary theorists, 'literal' expressions do not
exist. Since truth cannot be obtained, they believe that 'all is metaphoric'. In
this study, 'literal' is defined as language that is conventionalized and
lexicalized as describing the 'real world'. In the experiments, however,
subjects will judge for themselves what is understood as describing the 'real
world'. In other words, 'literal' is defined subject-dependently, and not in
absolute terms.
As in psychology, the theory of literature distinguishes between idiomatic
and novel metaphors. Idiomatic metaphors are commonplaces, such as 'love
is a rose', 'this boy is as obstinate as a mule' or 'she fought like a lion'.  The4
novel metaphor is newly created and has not yet come to stay (e.g., 'poetry is
a matador and metaphor its bull'). This study is restricted to the novel meta-
phor in literary texts. A metaphor is emphatically not defined as a logical
proposition, because a logical proposition presupposes a fixed division
between subject and predicate and claims a truth value.
'A rose is a blip' may be an example of an anomaly, and is the mismatch
of a word with contextual expectations, which renders the expression highly
nonsensical. This mismatch can be formed in many ways, one of which is a
between-category mismatch. In the case of 'a rose is a blip', the term 'rose'
originates from botany and 'blip' from radar technique, two categories which
are unlikely to be connected. However, a within-category mismatch also
may lead to anomalous language use. In 'a rose is a tulip', the category of
both exemplars is 'flower', and putting on a par two exemplars of the same
9
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category, apparently results in a semantic violation. An explanation may be
that the features which distinguish both exemplars within the common cat-
egory are erroneously equalized by the suggestion of identity, thus making
the distinction fail (Sections 4.2, 4.5 and 4.6 will further discuss the relation
between category verification and semantic deviations). Whether or not an
expression is judged literal, metaphoric or anomalous, strongly depends on
the individual's own level of tolerance, so that in this respect, decisions
should be left to subject groups.
Definition 3: Features
Every word has meaning connections with other words. All the meanings,
words, and associations which a word evokes are called 'the features' of this
word. These features may be on a formal level (syntax, morphology, spel-
ling, phonology) as well as on a meaning level (symbols, semantic con-
nections). The combined features of a word make up the feature set of that
word. The feature set of a word, thus can be seen as a long list of words
summed up by readers in response to a word.5
The feature set of a word has common and personal components. The
common components refer to the meaning of the word according to the
dictionary, the standard language shared by most members of a speech com-
munity. These are the high-frequent associations, or high-frequent features
in the feature list of the word.
The personal components are the idiosyncratic meanings and associations
that an individual member of the speech community attaches to a word.
These are the low-frequent associations, or low-frequent features in the
feature list of the word. Thus, in a metaphor, the features of the A- and B-
term may be any (formal or semantic) association activated (or created) by
any member of a speech community.
Definition 4: Context = text
Context is usually described as all the social and cultural conventions in
which a text functions. In this study, the word 'context' is not used in that
way. Context will be used for the notion of text; one or more sentences, or
even one word, which spatially and/or semantically neighbours another
word. Context in this sense is understood as linguistic context. Therefore, in
this study, the notions 'linguistic context', 'context' or 'text' all mean the
same. An experimental trial may occur under three conditions. If the trial
consists of an isolated A- or B-term, the condition is called a single term
condition. If an experimental trial consists of a single expression, the con-
10
Introduction: Definition 5: Priming; Notes
1. M. Gell-Mann - one of the most important post-war particle physicists - claimed to have
taken the term 'quark' from James Joyce's novel Finnegans Wake (Nambu 1985: 104-105).
2. Mooij (1976) offers a review of the philosophical literature on the three prevalent
schools. Verbrugge & McCarrell (1977) and Tourangeau & Sternberg (1982) offer a review
of the psychological literature.
3. In metaphor theory, the terminology for the A-, B-, and C-term is rather confused. The
A-term is, among others, also called 'tenor' (Richards 1965: 96), 'topic' (e.g., Verbrugge &
McCarrell 1977), or 'focus' (M. Black 1980: 28). The B-term is often called 'vehicle'
(Richards 1965: 96), or 'frame' (M. Black 1980: 28). The C-term  is also referred to as
'ground' (e.g., Tourangeau & Sternberg 1982) or 'tertium comparationis' (e.g., Verbrugge &
McCarrell 1977; Wolff 1977: 54).
4. Henle (1966: 187) states that "metaphors of this type tend to vanish, not in the sense that
they are no longer used, but in the sense that they become literal, so that today no one would
think of saying that 'plastron of a turtle' or 'hood of a car' were metaphors". Indeed, there is
psychological evidence that idiomatic metaphors like 'bury the hatchet' are understood as
easily as a literal expression. Activation of the original figurative meaning of the idiomatic
metaphor slows down the understanding (Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds & Antos 1978; Estill
& Kemper 1982).
5. In the relevant literature, features are also called 'properties' (e.g., Beardsley 1982: 271)
or attributes (e.g., Gentner 1988).
dition is called an expression condition. If an expression is presented as part
of a larger text, this is called a context condition.
Definition 5: Priming
Priming is an important function of context. Priming refers to the whole of
textual elements that favors one interpretation of the B-term of an
expression and thus, favors one interpretation of the whole expression (e.g.,
a literal or a figurative meaning). The priming effect of the original literary
text is unknown. In expression and context conditions, targets are always
formed by the B-term, while the A-term and all other text form the prime.
Notes:
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CHAPTER 1: THE COMPARISON MODEL*
1.0 Comparison theory
Metaphor theories attempt to explain how a metaphor is understood. This is
usually done by proposing a set of processes that are supposed to underly the
interpretation of a metaphor. Some theories state that the 'false', 'figurative'
B-term is nothing but a substitute for the literal term. These substitution the-
ories claim that a metaphor does not express more or something different
than a literal expression about the same issue.
However, substituting terms without changing the meaning only holds if
the meaning of the substituting term is identical to the substituted term. In
'the boy is a weasel', 'weasel' can be replaced by 'coward', although 'weasel'
is not identical to 'coward'. Usually, a substitute is a similar term, not an
identical one. A substitute can be identical, but not necessarily. Unless they
have exactly the same features, substitutes do not express identical
meanings.
Comparison theory does not share the idea that a metaphor is merely
another form of literal speech. The comparison view usually sees a metaphor
as an implicit simile. Similes are comparisons, marked by an explicit 'as' or
'like' construction.  Comparison theory claims, that in order to understand a1
metaphor, the two terms of a metaphor are compared to find common
features. Sections 1.1 and 1.2 will focus on the core assumptions of the com-
parison theory. These assumptions will be formalized in Section 1.3 in a
comparison model of metaphor understanding, in which the perceived simi-
larity of a metaphor is an assigned value based on frequencies of shared
features.
1.1 Comparison theory in literature
The first traces in Western philosophy of a comparison view of metaphor
understanding are found in Aristotle's Poetics and Rhetoric. In Poetics,
Aristotle spent just a few lines on metaphors, but they summarize the com-
parison view quite accurately:
Metaphor is the transference of a term from one thing to another:
whether from genus to species, species to genus, species to species, or
by analogy. (Halliwell 1987: ch. 21, 55)
(...) the successful use of metaphor entails the perception of similar-
ities. (Halliwell 1987: ch. 22, 57)
Notes are on pages 24-25.*
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In the above quotations, several mechanisms are offered to explain metaphor
understanding: 'Transference of a term', 'analogy', and 'perception of
similarities'. First, some confusing terminology should be clarified. In the
quotation, 'term' does not mean A- or B-term, but 'feature'. Thus, the
mechanism is 'feature transfer'. By 'similarities' is meant 'shared features',
which may cause the perception of similarity or semantic relatedness. Thus,
the mechanism is 'finding the shared set'.
'Feature transfer' means that the B-term adds a feature to the A-term that
was not pre-existent in the A-term set. In 'the boy is a rat', the features 'nasty'
and 'sneaky' are taken from the B-term and added to the A-term set, so that
the A-term ('boy') is also qualified by the features 'nasty' and 'sneaky'.
'Shared set' means that the feature sets of A- and B-term are compared to
find common features between 'boy' and 'rat'. In this approach, 'nasty' and
'sneaky' are already present in the A-term set, although this may be on a low
activation level; as latent or 'possible' features. Sometimes, finding the
shared set is understood as finding the common category. In that case, 'boy'
and 'rat' both belong to the category of 'treacherous creatures'.
The notion of analogy is not pursued is this Chapter, because it is the
principal mechanism proposed by the interaction theory (Chapter 3).
However, Section 1.3 gives a short account of the idea.
All these mechanisms should lead to an increase in the semantic relatedness
(hence similarity) between the A- and B-term. In the comparison theory, the
perception of similarity is seen as an immediate occurrence to, rather than a
creation of the mind. An example of this view is found in Middle Eastern
philosophy on metaphor. Influenced by the work of Aristotle, a major phil-
osopher on poetic syllogism,  Farabi (870-950), stated:2
For [poets] compare A to B to C, because there exists between A and
B a close, fitting, and familiar likeness, and there exists as well
between B and C a close, fitting, and familiar likeness. So they
gradually unfold their words until they make occur to the listeners'
minds a relation of likeness between A and C, although originally they
were remote. (D.L. Black 1990: 214-215)
The quotation above states that there is a likeness between A and B and
between B and C. This likeness (or similarity) is close, fitting and familiar
and it already 'exists'. In other words, the similarity between two terms (A-B,
B-C) is not created, but is fixed and already present. Since one way or the
other, similarity is supposed to be related to the feature sets, the relevant
aspects of these feature sets should also be fixed and pre-existent. For
instance, if similarity is dependent of the shared features, then these features
do not need to be created by the listener or reader; they just need to be
found. If shared features already exist and just need to be found, this means
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that they are always the same in a metaphor, independent of context. Conse-
quently, if the shared set remains the same under all conditions, it follows
that all terms activate (at least partly) fixed feature sets, which do not change
as a function of context.
In more modern approaches to metaphor understanding, remnants of the
comparison view are still met. Often, the modern approaches are mixtures of
comparison theory, and notions of anomaly theory or interaction theory.
Mooij (1976), in arguing against the comparison view, reluctantly admitted
the merits of comparison theory in the course of his discussion on metaphor:
(...) metaphors are often said to be based on similarity and analogy.
However, I shall not make use of the last mentioned assumption.
(Mooij 1976: 22)
(...) the idea that metaphors are based on similarity or analogy entails
the disadvantage that it seems to favour a certain view on metaphor,
viz. the view that metaphor is a shortened comparison. Strictly
speaking, one can accept similarity and analogy as a basis without
attaching the said consequence (Mooij 1976: 23).
It is easy to understand, (...), that similarity and analogy have often
been considered the basis of metaphor. It is undeniable that similarity
or analogy is hidden in many metaphors. (Mooij 1976: 23)
In a pure form, comparison theory is hardly found in modern metaphor the-
ory. The more modern examples are discussed in Chapter 2 (on anomaly
theory) and Chapter 3 (on interaction theory). In these Chapters, however,
anomaly theory and interaction theory will be discussed in the light of com-
parison theory to point out the close relationship with this older view.
1.2 Comparison theory in psychology
As mentioned in 1.1, the comparison view can be traced back to the
Aristotelian approach as described in Poetics and Rhetoric (Rhys Roberts
1966; Halliwell 1987). The comparison view sees a metaphor as an implicit
simile, which is a comparison with 'as' or 'like'. The two terms of the meta-
phor, the A- and B-term, have a certain 'similarity', which is supposed to be
the solution to the metaphor, its C-term. When a C-term is found, the meta-
phor is understood. Comparison theory suggests the following mechanisms
that could underlie the forming of the C-term.
'Feature transfer'. Comparison theory claims that sometimes features are
transferred from one term to another. If a term of a metaphor is not very well
known to the reader (most of the time, this is the A-term), features of the
other term (usually the B-term) are transferred to the first to improve
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understanding. In 'he is a weasel', the feature 'cowardice' is assumed to be
transferred from 'weasel' to the unknown 'he'.
'Shared set'. Another idea is that the terms activate two fixed feature sets.
Between those sets, identical features must be found to form the C-term. Ex-
perimental studies on similarity perception often opt for the 'shared set'
approach (e.g., Tversky 1977; Malgady & Johnson 1980). According to the
comparison view, shared features form a fixed set. The feature sets activated
by the A- and B-term are fixed as well. If the activated features and the
shared set are always the same - regardless of any other factor - context
should not influence the number and kind of features that are activated or
overlapping. 'Finding the shared set' is sometimes exchanged by 'finding the
common category', in which case 'he' and 'weasel' both should be a member
of the category of 'cowards'. 'Metaphor by analogy' is the basic principle of
the interaction theory (Chapter 3), and will be shortly discussed in Section
1.3.
Witness to his ideas how the B-term is associated with the A-term,
Skinner (1957) may be seen as a representative of the comparison view on
metaphor processing in psychology.  By emphasizing the importance of3
similar properties (features) between terms, he took a comparison point of
view:
We do not need to say that the speaker "discovers a similarity and
expresses it by transferring a response." The response simply occurs
because of the similarity (Skinner 1957: 92).
The similarity to which Skinner referred is a 'similar stimulation', produced
by two objects (the object the A-term refers to and the object the B-term
refers to). This similar stimulation leads to the response that the second (the
B-term object) 'is like' the first. The point is illustrated by two examples:
In Juliet is [like] the sun we must explain the appearance of the re-
sponse sun when no sun is actually present. We do so by noting that
Juliet and the sun have common properties, at least in their effect upon
the speaker. (Skinner 1957: 93)
If we first acquire the response leg in connection with animals and
extend it to legs of tables and chairs on the basis of geometrical and
functional similarities, the properties common to all these cases
acquire control of the response and are subsequently respected by the
community. (Skinner 1957: 94-95)
In other words, Skinner sees the B-term as an almost necessary response to
the A-term, because of its similar properties (or features). If this is true, con-
text cannot have a dramatic effect on the activated feature sets, because then,
the B-term is not automatically associated with the A-term any more.
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   According to Skinner, processing literal and metaphoric expressions is
basically the same. It is represented by the 'three-term relation' stimulus-
response-reinforcement. Skinner did not see metaphor processing as a kind
of analogical reasoning. Special features in the A-term decide, whether the
associated B-term is literal or metaphoric:
A second type of extension takes place because of the control
exercised by properties of the stimulus which, (...), do not enter into
the contingency respected by the verbal community. This is the
familiar process of metaphor. Traditional accounts, from Aristotle on,
have generally assumed that, like generic extension, metaphor is a
special achievement requiring a special faculty of analogical thinking.
But the basic process is again adequately represented by our three-term
relation; the only difference between metaphorical and generic
extension is in the kind of property which gains control of the
response. (Skinner 1957: 92)
This would lead to the consequence that not every two words can be inter-
preted as a literal or metaphoric expression, but that some words are better
suited to become a metaphor, and others to become a literal statement.
Again, if metaphoricity is demanded from the isolated A-term, contexts will
not have a great influence on which A-term features 'cause' the B-term.
Some words would lead to a metaphor and others to a literal expression.
Unfortunately, Skinner was not explicit on the context matter, and did not
explain which kind of feature gains control of the response.
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1.3 A formalized model of the comparison theory
In summary, the core assumptions of comparison theory are (cf. Section 1.1
and 1.2):
1. A metaphor is not a literal statement
2. The surface form of a metaphor consists of two terms
3. A metaphor is an implicit comparison A is like B
4. Transformation into an explicit comparison is a one-stage process
5. Each term evokes a fixed feature set
6. These terms share features, which form the C-term
7. The shared features form a fixed set
8. Given this, there should be a criterion for the number of
shared features that makes an expression literal, metaphoric or
anomalous
9. There is no effect of context on the (shared) feature sets
Regarding point 4, the comparison theory is not explicit about the decisive
criterion to transform an expression into the form 'A is like B'. If someone
reads an implicit comparison, it may also be a literal expression. Therefore,
point 4 induces that some criterion is met to signal the encounter of an
implicit comparison, and not of a literal expression. The problem may be
solved by starting the process with the activation of the two feature sets, the
number of shared features between which meets a certain criterion to decide
whether an expression is literal or metaphoric.
Theories of metaphor are - sometimes implicitly - based on the contrast with
a theory of literal expressions. Literal expressions are usually seen as
descriptors of the 'real' world. Words which are not marked by an
[IMAGINE] predicate - such as 'man', 'woman' and 'child' - are seen as lit-
eral. Only if the [IMAGINE] predicate is active, 'man', 'woman' and 'child'
could turn out to be a centaur, a mermaid, and a will-o'-the-wisp. A
somewhat more complex descriptor, such as a definition, uses at least two
descriptive words, for example, 'a ring is a circle'.
According to the comparison view, a metaphor has a certain similarity
between the two descriptive words, but this similarity is insufficient to make
the expression literal. Thus, the insufficient literal expression needs the
[IMAGINE] predicate to save it from being erroneous or anomalous. Com-
parison theory solves this problem by the introduction of a nondefining
device. The 'as if' construction makes the expression a comparison, rather
than a definition. Owing to this, the insufficient literal expression has
become a simile, and is acceptable again. Despite the smaller number of
shared features, this is not a reason to read the expression as an anomaly,
rather to read it as a metaphor.
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In the comparison theory, the similarity between the terms of a literal ex-
pression is high. Therefore, the feature sets of a literal expression should be
almost identical. Its extreme is a tautology. If not in its extreme, an ex-
pression needs a sufficient number of shared features to be literal.4
The shared set of literal expressions should be large. A metaphor has a
certain similarity between the two terms, but this similarity is insufficient to
make the expression literal. Despite the smaller number of shared features,
this is not a reason to read the expression as an anomaly. An anomaly shows
the least similarity, so that the shared set should be smallest.
Figure 1.0 shows a Venn diagram representation of the comparison the-
ory for a two sets overlap of fixed features in literal, metaphoric and
anomalous expressions. Figure 1.0 represents the A-term feature sets as
smaller sets than those of the B-terms. It may be argued that the A-term is
the focus of the comparison; the term of which something new is said. It
may be that the A-term is less familiar, because it is clarified by the B-term,
which functions as the frame of reference. Taking into consideration that the
more one knows about an object, the more one can say about it (cf. Raaijma-
kers 1984: 177), familiarity may be correlated with the number of features
that can be summed up. Thus, it would follow that the B-term evokes more
features than the A-term. If the results are contrary to expectations, then, of
course, the size of the feature sets are different from that suggested in Figure
1.0.
Figure 1.0: Comparison model for a two sets feature overlap in literal, metaphoric and
anomalous expressions.
Figure 1.1 shows a flow diagram for processing literal, metaphoric and
anomalous expressions, conform the eight assumptions of comparison the-
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ory. The model consists of three phases: Encoding, comparing and re-
sponding.
In the encoding phase, the expression is perceived. The A-term is read,
followed by the B-term. The A-term activates a feature set. The feature set of
the A-term is called X. The size of the feature set X is designated by #X (the
cardinal number of X). The A-term activates as many features as possible,
which are indexed by n. Every time a new feature is found, the value of n is
augmented by 1: n = n + 1. If no further features are activated, the activation
of the B-term features starts.
The B-term feature set is called Y, and its feature set size is called #Y.
Again, as many features as possible are activated by the B-term, and every
new feature augments #Y by 1: m = m + 1. Both loops for the feature activa-
tion of A-term and B-term express no more than 'get the first feature, get the
second, get the third, etc., until there is no feature left' (end of file).
The encoding phase is represented by a fixed order serial process, as if
the A-term feature set must be filled completely, before the B-term set is
activated. Of course, it may be that the B-term set is activated in parallel
with the A-term set. While the A-term is activating features, the B-term is
read and activates its features synchronously.
When the feature sets X and Y have been activated, the comparison phase
is entered. The search for shared features is performed by comparing each
feature x in the A-term set X with each feature y in B-term set Y, to
determine whether they match. As long as no common features are found,
the shared set X 1 Y (S, for short) contains no features. Thus, the shared set
size #S is zero: #S = 0. To compare the features of X and Y, the features x
receive the index i and the features y the index j. The first feature x (i = 1) is
i jcompared with the first feature y (j = 1). The features x  and y  are compared:
i j i jx  = y  ?. If x  and y  match, one shared feature is found: #S = #S + 1. If they
do not match, #S is not augmented. The search for shared features is also re-
presented as a serial process. However, it is possible that all the loops of the
model occur (partly) in parallel. For the train of thought, this is not im-
portant.
Next, the second feature of the B-term set is compared with the first fea-
ture of the A-term set. Therefore, the decision must be made if there are any
features left in the B-term set Y: j < m ?. If there is a feature left, j = j + 1,
this B-term feature is compared with the first A-term feature. If they match,
the second shared feature is found. This loop continues, until there are no B-
term features left in set Y: j = m. If there is more than one feature in the A-
term set X, the same procedure starts all over again for all B-term features,
until there are no A-term features left to compare.
After the completion of the comparison phase, the value of #S is the size
of X 1 Y or the number of common A- and B-term features. According to the
comparison view, X 1 Y is the C-term of the metaphor, now expressed by a
value which should correspond to the height of the perceived similarity
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between the terms. If there are no more A- and B-term features left to be
compared, the response phase is entered.
In the response phase, the number of shared features is checked against a
certain criterion that determines whether the expression is literal, metaphoric
or anomalous. The criterion q is an internal 'threshold' value, corresponding
to the Venn diagram for literal expressions in Figure 1.0. Criterion q
demands a large feature overlap, so that the value of #S must equal or
excede q, #S $ q ?, to evoke the response 'literal'.
The criterion p corresponds to the Venn diagram for metaphors in Figure
1.0. Criterion p is also a 'threshold' value, but a lower one than criterion q.
Criterion p demands a partial overlap of features, so that the value of #S
must equal or excede p, #S $ p ?, to evoke the response 'metaphor'.
   If #S is smaller than p, the overlap of A- and B-term features is insuffi-
cient, and the expression becomes an 'anomaly'. The value of the criteria q
and p is, of course, an empirical question. Since more criteria have to be
checked, metaphors and anomalies are processed slower than literals. This
ranking should make itself manifest in the respective response times.
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Figure 1.1: Serial process comparison model for metaphor understanding (fixed order).
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In summary, the formal representation of the serial process comparison
model looks like this:
1 n1. encode A-term: X = {x .....x }
1 m2. encode B-term: Y = {y .....y }
3. compute S = X 1 Y
if #S $ q respond 'literal'
else if #S $ p respond 'metaphor'
else respond 'anomaly'
4. stop
q = number of elements needed in X 1 Y to respond 'literal'
p = number of elements needed in X 1 Y to respond 'metaphor'
The model can be refined by using weighted features. This means that some
features of a term are more important (e.g., more prototypical or higher
frequent) than others. The weighing of the features, thus could lead to a
different value of #S. A weight may be assigned to a feature by a scale
value, or the frequency of occurrence.
XHence, if u is a feature in X or Y or in the shared set S, w (u) is the weight
Yw of feature u in set X. Likewise, w (u) is the weight w of feature u in set Y.
Therefore, the size (W) of the weighted feature set X may be described as the
sum of all weights w of all features u in X:
X XW  =   3 w (u) ,
 u å X
while the size of the weighted feature set Y may be described as:
Y YW  =   3 w (u) .
 u å Y
Consequently, the weight w of feature u in S is a function g of the weight of
S X Yu in X and in Y: w  (u) = g(w  (u) , w  (u)). This means that the shared set S
may contain features that are differently weighted in X and in Y. For
instance, the feature 'red' may be mentioned once for 'love' and twice for
'rose'. How the different weights of shared features should be treated
arithmetically (summated, multiplied or divided) - in other words, how
function g should be conceived of - will be discussed in Chapter 5.
It follows that the shared set size #S, now can be rewritten as the
weighted set size (W) of all shared features u, which is the sum of all
Sweights w  (u) of every feature u in S:
S SW  =   3 w (u) .
 u å S
23
Comparison model: Formalized comparison theory
The model in Figure 1.1 is designed as a fixed order process between feature
activation and comparison. However, the weighing could change the rank
order for the comparison of features, so that, e.g., high-salient features are
compared before low-salient ones. As a consequence of this preferred order
of comparison, the search does not need to be exhaustive to reach criterion q
or p. In that case, these criteria should be checked first, before another com-
parison loop starts.
Another point is that the model suggests a time delay between checking q
and p, yielding slower decision times for metaphors than for literals.
However, it could be argued that q and p are checked at the same time, so
that RT differences between literals, metaphors and anomalies will fail. The
model should then be revised such, that the arrow from the comparison
phase splits in two, and points at the decision diamonds for q and p in
parallel.
Although Figure 1.0 suggests larger shared sets for metaphors than for
anomalies, Figure 1.1 does not translate this into an RT difference. Both
responses ('metaphor', 'anomaly') follow from the same decision diamond.
This may be regarded as a shortcoming of the model - and so it is. It would
be desirable also to differentiate metaphors from anomalies in response
times (anomalies slower than metaphors). However, as the empirical find-
ings show (Chapter 6), this question will turn out to be purely academic.
From the model in Figure 1.1, predictions can be made about the pro-
cessing of metaphors, according to the comparison view. These predictions
compete with those in Section 2.3 (anomaly model) and Section 3.3
(interaction model).
The predictions derived from the comparison view are:
1. A metaphor activates two feature sets
2. These two feature sets are always fixed
3. A literal expression has more shared features than a metaphor and
a metaphor has more shared features than an anomaly
4. The set of shared features is fixed (and thus, can be predicted
from the sets of single terms)
5. The response time to understand a literal expression is shorter
than for metaphors, which are equally fast as anomalies
6. There is no electrocortical 'shock' for metaphors (cf. anomaly view,
Chapter 2)
7. Context has no effect on 1 to 6
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1. For example:
We are deep in the rain like small insects in high grass (Wij zijn diep in de regen als kleine
insekten in hoog gras). Elburg, J.G. (1958). Niemands huis. Hebben en zijn. De Bezige Bij,
Amsterdam, 12.
The sun plays at my feet like a serious child (De zon speelt aan mijn voeten als een
ernstig kind). Rodenko, P. (1975). Februarizon. Tulpensnijder, orensnijder, verzamelde
gedichten. De Harmonie, Amsterdam, 36.
The day opened like an oyster shell (De dag ging open als een oesterschelp). Snoek, P.
(1982). Georgië 1. Verzamelde gedichten. Manteau, Antwerpen, Amsterdam, 121.
2. A poetic syllogism has the form indicated below:
A swan is white A = B
Everything white is a light ( x) B = C
Therefore, the swan is a light 6 A = C
Notice that a poetic syllogism does not necesserily claim truth value. The example is based
on an example drawn from D.L. Black (1990: 212).
3. Although Skinner is not known for this, in Verbal Behaviour (1957) he tried to give a
full account of ordinary and literary language with the tripartite relation stimulus-response-
reinforcement. In The mand in literature (p. 49), Multiple causation in literature (p. 239),
Formal strengthening in prose and poetry (p. 246), Style (p. 282), Witty and stylistic effects
(p. 305) and Composition and its effects (p. 344), Skinner accounted for poetic instruments
such as metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, oxymoron, rhyme, humor, satire, in the work of
such different authors as Shakespeare, Milton, Wilde, Joyce, Huxley, Eliot, and Pound.
Mand, tact and multiple causation are his tools for the study of ordinary and literary texts.
His statistical approach to alliteration is quite similar to the approaches seen in modern em-
pirical studies into literature: 
 
The customary practice in literary criticism is to demonstrate such formal properties
of poetry and prose by pointing to instances. There is justification for this when we
consider the effect upon the reader or listener, of whom the critic is an example. But
before inferring any process in the behaviour of the writer, it is necessary to allow
for the patterning of his verbal behaviour to be expected from chance. In no case,
perhaps, can we say that any one instance of alliteration or other formal similarity is
due to a special process, but a general pattern may be demonstrated. Alliteration, for
example, may be detected by a statistical analysis of the arrangements of initial
consonants in a reasonably large sample. A tendency to alliterate is shown by the
extent to which the initial consonants in a given literary work are not distributed at
random (Skinner 1957: 247).
4. The range between tautology and anomaly may be seen as a continuum from total simi-
larity to total dissimilarity between the two terms, which may be explained by the de-
creasing size of the shared feature sets (cf. Malgady & Johnson 1980):
tautology            literal expression            idiom            metaphor            anomaly
total similarity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>    total dissimilarity
Notes:
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2.0 Anomaly theory
The anomaly theory of metaphor is a comparison view with certain ad-
justments. Analogous to the comparison theory, the core assumption is the
comparison of the A- and B-term, and the prominent role of similarity.
However, anomaly theory also stresses the importance of dissimilarity
between the A- and B-term. An expression is initially perceived as literal.
However, if the expression cannot be interpreted literally, it is perceived as
an anomaly. In an attempt to rectify this anomaly, a second, figurative, inter-
pretation is commenced, to test if the expression can be interpreted as a
metaphor. When the figurative interpretation also fails, the expression
remains an anomaly.
The theoretical advantage of the anomaly view over the comparison view
is the explanation why an implicit comparison is transformed into a meta-
phor. The reason is that the implicit comparison cannot be interpreted lit-
erally, and therefore, it must be transformed into the 'is like' form to interpret
the expression figuratively. Additionally, anomaly theory considers the
effect that a metaphor may have upon a reader. As a result of being a
restored anomaly, a metaphor evokes a kind of 'shock effect'.
2.1 Anomaly theory in literature
Richards is among the first literary scholars of this century to reflect on the
consequences of the surrealist's poetics for the theory of metaphor. On the
one hand, he rejected the extreme surrealist view that any two semantically
unconnected words still form a good metaphor, on the other hand, he
stressed the importance of dissimilarities (disparities) in metaphor
understanding and the 'baffling' effect it brings about:
In general, there are very few metaphors in which disparities between
tenor and vehicle are not as much operative as the similarities. Some
similarity will commonly be the ostensive ground of the shift, but the
peculiar modification of the tenor which the vehicle brings about is
even more the work of their unlikenesses than of their likeness.
(Richards 1965: 127)
Richards, in the above quotation, provisionally describes a two-stage model
of metaphor processing. The search for similarities forms the ostensive
ground (C-term) of understanding, which is the first stage of the model.
However, the number of dissimilarities causes a shift of meaning, so that the
Notes are on the pages 42-44.*
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expression is interpreted in a new way, which forms the second stage of the
model. Which features, then, are compared in the first stage of
understanding a metaphor, and which in the second? It may be assumed that
the features of the second stage are responsible for the final understanding of
the metaphor:
Whether, therefore, a word is being used literally or metaphorically is
not always, or indeed as a rule, an easy matter to settle. (...) If we
cannot distinguish tenor from vehicle then we may provisionally take
the word to be literal; if we can distinguish at least two co-operating
uses, then we have metaphor. (Richards 1965: 119)
Two uses of a word (or expression) are distinguished by Richards: A literal
and a metaphorical one. If tenor (A-term) and vehicle (B-term) cannot be
distinguished, the expression is literal. In other words, if A- and B-term
cannot be identified as different, then they must share many features. The
literal interpretation of an expression would then be caused by the almost
complete overlap of features between A- and B-term. As argued above, this
is the first stage of the process. Further, the metaphorical interpretation of
the expression would follow from 'two co-operating uses'; these are the lit-
eral and the metaphoric use. Metaphoric use can be seen as the activation of
the figurative features of A- and B-term, and thus, understanding the meta-
phor in the second stage of the process would be accomplished by the com-
parison of the figurative feature sets of A- and B-term. On the effect this
shift from literal to figurative meaning causes, Richards states:
The mind is a connecting organ, it works only by connecting and it can
connect any two things in an indefinitely large number of different
ways. (...). As the two things put together are more remote the tension
created is, of course, greater. That tension is the spring of the bow, the
source of the energy of the shot, but (...) bafflement is an experience of
which we soon tire, and rightly. (Richards 1965: 125)
Therefore, Richards favors a milder form of anomaly theory, and opposes
the extreme form, represented by André Breton and Eastman, the latter
whom he quotes:
The poet communicates a kind of experience not elsewhere accessible.
The poet must arouse a reaction and yet impede it, creating a tension
in our nervous system sufficient and rightly calculated to make us
completely aware that we are living something - and no matter what.
(Eastman, The Literary Mind: 205, quoted in Richards 1965: 124)
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Eastman represents the extreme of anomaly theory, which shows a certain
resemblance with an arousal theory. Nervous tension in the brain would lead
to higher cortical activity in response to a metaphor.
Anomaly theory is mixed up easily with comparison theory, because
some of their basic characteristics are identical. In the classification of meta-
phor theories by Mooij (1976: 37), for instance, Henle was considered
among the comparison theorists. Indeed, like Richards, Henle (1966) saw
the perception of similarity as an important feature of metaphor, and to this
extent he fitted in with the comparison view:
In the metaphor, it is not merely that there are parallel situations - the
same elements in the same arrangement, but also that there is a felt
similarity between corresponding components. (Henle 1966: 180)
It is also correct that Henle (1966: 173) used Aristotle's theory of metaphor
as a starting point. On the other hand, Henle adjusted the comparison view,
by making the idea of the 'duality of sense' more precise. Henle stated:
Each of these words appears in a double role - first in its conventional
sense such as it might have in other contexts and second in a sense
characteristic of this metaphor. This is what is central in Aristotle's
statement.
This duality of sense is characteristic of metaphor and some
terminology will make reference to it easier. By the literal sense of a
word we may mean the sense which a word has in other contexts and
apart from such metaphoric uses. By figurative sense we may mean
that special sense on which the metaphor hinges. (Henle 1966: 174)
This precision in how the double meaning of a metaphor is understood is a
main characteristic that distinguishes comparison theory from anomaly the-
ory. In Aristotle's view, no distinction was made between literal and figurat-
ive senses of a metaphor; the interpretation of a metaphor is merely a
transfer of meanings (features), or the finding of common features,
irrespective of literal or figurative meaning.
According to Henle, however, the literal sense of a metaphor is 'the
meaning of a term given by a dictionary'. And, 'it is only through the literal
sense that one arrives at the figurative' (Henle 1966: 175). This means
something else than just finding similarity. Henle's statement implies that
two attempts are made to understand a metaphor. First a literal interpretation
is undertaken, before the figurative meaning of the metaphor is captured. In
the comparison view, no second attempt is made, because the understanding
of a metaphor is merely based on finding sufficient overlap to make the ex-
pression figurative. Ranking Henle's ideas among the comparison theories -
as Mooij did - can only be justified by neglecting the difference between a
one-stage and a two-stage model of metaphor understanding.
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Rather, in a line with Richards, Henle emphasizes that the most important
stimulus for making a second interpretive attempt is the psychological shock
effect:
(...) metaphor may be considered from the point of the listener. Here
its outstanding characteristic is the sort of shock which it produces.
Ordinarily one takes words in their literal sense and this is impossible
in a metaphor. This impossibility in fact is what drives one on to seek
a figurative sense. (Henle 1966: 182)
More explicitly than Henle, another theorist of literature - Beardsley - turned
away from comparison theory to anomaly theory. He advocated the 'verbal-
opposition theory'. In this theory:
(...) no such importation or comparison occurs at all, but instead a
special feat of language, or verbal play, involving two levels of mean-
ing in the modifier itself. When a predicate is metaphorically adjoined
to a subject, the predicate loses its ordinary extension because it
acquires a new intension - perhaps one that it has in no other context.
And this twist of meaning is forced by inherent tensions, or
oppositions, within the metaphor itself. (Beardsley 1982: 264)
The verbal-opposition theory - as Beardsley called it - can be seen as a form
of anomaly theory. The core assumptions of his theory are couched in the
following three points. First, there are two levels of meaning: The ordinary
extension and a new intension. Second, there is a change from the one level
of meaning to the other, the 'twist of meaning'. Third, the 'twist of meaning'
is forced by inherent tensions or oppositions.
Now what is the ordinary extension and the new intension? According to
Beardsley (1982: 265), the ordinary extension of a word is 'what is generally
true of the objects'; 'objects' here meaning all the concrete things in the
world. By way of comparison, this is corresponding to what Henle calls 'the
meaning of a term given by a dictionary' or 'the literal sense' (Henle 1966:
174). The new intension is formed through the connotations of the word.
These 'not common accidental features of the objects denoted' can also
include the false features of the object, the 'beliefs' about it (Beardsley 1982:
265). Beardsley did not state whether these 'marginal meanings' (Beardsley
1982: 266) are the same as the figurative meanings that Henle distinguishes.
A clue to an answer can be found in the following lines:
(...) we must look for the metaphoricalness of the metaphor, so to
speak, in some sort of conflict that is absent from literal expressions.
(Beardsley 1982: 269)
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Although tautological, the metaphor would have some 'metaphoricalness',
and it stands in some sort of conflict with the literal sense of an expression.
Thus, metaphorical is not literal. Moreover, if an expression is the contrary
to literal, it is, in a word, figurative.
What did Beardsley (1982: 264) mean by 'inherent tensions', which - as in
Henle (1966: 182) - are the driving force behind the second interpreting
attempt? Beardsley discussed Henle's view on readers' responses in this
respect. He stated about Henle:
His version of the verbal-opposition theory, however, is described in
terms of the reader's response - his 'shock' at the 'clash of meanings'. I
prefer to state the theory as a theory not about the effect of metaphor,
but about the linguistic structure that causes the effect - about the
'clash of meanings' itself. (Beardsley 1982: 267)
The important thing about Beardley's statements on Henle is that the 'in-
herent tensions' are the same as Henle's 'shock', caused by the 'clash of
meanings'. The twist of meaning Beardsley (1982: 264) mentioned, is forced
by tensions or oppositions. According to Beardsley, these oppositions are
created by the mismatch of property sets:
(...) the possibility of the metaphorical performance (...) depends on a
felt difference between two sets of properties that (...) are taken to be
necessary conditions for applying the term correctly in a particular
sense (these are the defining, or designated, properties, (...)); second,
those properties that belong to the marginal meaning of the term, (...).
I said that when a term is combined with others in such a way that
there would be a logical opposition between its central meaning and
that of the other terms, there occurs that shift from central to marginal
meaning which shows us the word is to be taken in a metaphorical
way. It is the only way it can be taken without absurdity. (...) The
logical opposition is what gives the modifier its metaphorical twist.
(Beardsley 1982: 270)
Apparently, a logical opposition is the main factor that urges the reader to
understand an expression as a metaphor. What are these logical oppositions,
and how are they formed?
Beardsley distinguished two sets of properties (or features), which are
activated by a term (or word). One set consists of the defining, or designated
features, in other words, the literal ones. The other set consists of the
marginal properties, or, as argued above, the figurative features. As another
implicit assumption of anomaly theory, it follows that a metaphor of the
form 'A is B' activates four feature sets: A literal and a figurative set for both
A- and B-term.
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Although Beardsley (1982: 264-266) strongly argued against a compari-
son view of metaphor understanding, he used the comparison idea im-
plicitly. If a metaphor is read, Beardsley argued, a logical opposition is
formed. This means that the two literal feature sets - which describe the
'real', 'logical', world - probably do not match. If they do not match, it
follows that they have been compared before the logical opposition could
occur. It also follows that not-shared features (enhancing dissimilarity) can
be identified only if a search for shared features preceded.
The logical opposition is formed, when too many literal features are
outside the shared set. This 'absurdity' can be reduced, if the marginal, or
metaphorical (i.e. figurative) feature sets are activated, and the expression
can be understood as a metaphor. Thus, logical oppositions are formed by
the distinctive features in the literal feature sets of A- and B-term. In
addition, dissimilarity is the result of comparing the feature sets in a search
for common features, which are not found after all.
In anomaly theory, the role of context in understanding a metaphor is
limited to an effect 'within the expression'. The shift from one meaning to
another - from literal to figurative - could be seen as a context effect of the
B-term. Only seldom, anomaly theory focuses on the function of
surrounding text, and if so, no attempts are made to explain how this text
influences the shift. Anomaly theory does not clarify the problem whether
the size and contents of the literal or figurative overlap changes because of
larger context. Moreover, if the anomaly claim is true that the stage of literal
interpretation always precedes the stage of figurative interpretation, context
should not have any influence on the serial order of this process.
2.2 Anomaly theory in psychology
According to the anomaly theory, metaphors are processed in two stages.
First a literal interpretation of the expression is performed, and if it fails, a
figurative interpretation takes place. Therefore, the literal, 'normal',
procedure would take less time to understand than the figurative.
(...) all semantically unacceptable sentences may be interpreted as
metaphors. This, of course, does not imply that such sentences always,
or even regularly, will receive a metaphorical interpretation. A meta-
phor in this view is, therefore, a semantically unacceptable sentence
that has been inferentially interpreted. The interpretation consists of
elaborating the metaphor in such a way that an explicit comparison is
being made, involving only semantically acceptable sentences and
replacing the original unacceptable sentences. (Kintsch 1974: 37)1
Unlike the theory of literature, psychology has frequently tried to test the
anomaly model (e.g., Harris 1976; Glucksberg, Gildea & Bookin 1982).2
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These tests usually focused on the time relations predicted by the anomaly
view, dependent on whether the literal and figurative stages could be
represented by a serial fixed-order model or by a model of parallel stages.
Ideas about the contents of these stages were adopted from linguistics, or the
theory of literature. A literal interpretation of a metaphor would involve the
activation of features describing the actual, 'real' world,  whereas figurative3
interpretation would reflect the activation of the symbolic, imaginitive fea-
tures of the metaphor (for a linguistic discussion on this matter, see Section
2.1).
Ortony (1979) tried to explain literal features in terms of high-salient or
high-frequent predicates, and figurative features in terms of low-salient or
low-frequent predicates. Ortony used this frequency criterion for the
classification of literal comparisons, metaphors and anomalies. In literals,
similarity is thought to be the result of matching high-frequent features; in
metaphors, high-frequent B-term features would match with low-frequent A-
term features, and in anomalies, no high-frequent feature of the B-term
would match an A-term feature at all (Ortony 1979: 194-196).
Since psychology tested the presumed two stages in the anomaly theory
usually by means of reaction time experiments, these stages were never
represented by a feature activation and comparison model. The model
presented in Section 2.3 provides for this neglect. Based on the assumptions
of the nature of the activated feature sets, it follows from the theory of lit-
erature that in the literal interpretation, literal features - initially evoked by
A- and B-term - are compared to form a literal C-term, after which figurat-
ive, or symbolic, features are activated and compared in the figurative inter-
pretation to form a figurative C-term. Thus, while processing the metaphor,
four feature sets are activated and compared, namely a literal and figurative
feature set for A- and B-term. As argued in Section 2.1, anomaly theory does
not mention whether context has an effect on size or contents of the feature
sets. If the claim is valid that the stage of literal interpretation always pre-
cedes the stage of figurative interpretation, context should not have any
influence on the serial order of this process. 
In the theory of literature, the anomaly view on metaphor processing
assumes that metaphor evokes some sort of shock effect (see the discussion
on Richards, Henle and Beardsley in Section 2.2). In psychology, this view
is sometimes translated into terms of arousal-potential. For instance,
Anderson (1964) proposed a cognitive model based on the assumptions of
Berlyne's arousal theory.
In his discussion of Berlyne's (1960) theory, Anderson related the effect
of metaphor with a special cortical activity. The quotations below are drawn
from Anderson. The page numbers are Anderson's references to Berlyne:
Berlyne demonstrates that certain stimulus variables (novelty,
"surprisingness", incongruity, ambiguity and uncertainty, and com-
plexity) activate the orienting reflex, or vigilance (pp. 83-86) and
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thereby induce a degree of arousal that forces the individual to reduce
that arousal back to a tolerable level. This maintenance of an optimal
arousal or steady state (p. 200) is carried out largely by cortical activity
(p. 181), although the nature of this interaction between cortex and
arousal system has still to be settled.
 According to Berlyne's model, all reinforcement is primary and
takes the form of arousal-reduction; the organism has neither a need
for, say, good nor for achievement, but only for a reduction in the
arousal that it has learned to associate with absence of good and of
achievement. Occasionally, the organism will seek incentives with
arousal value, incentives which will provide "arousal jags" (pp.
198-199), but only provided the arousal-increase is moderate and has a
high probability of being followed by arousal-decrease. (Anderson
1964: 59-60)
This motivational theory describes the need for the human cortex to be
moderately excited. Anderson puts this idea in use for an assumption
originating from surrealist art theory, that metaphor evokes a mild form of
'bafflement' (see Section 2.2). Anderson thus procedes:
The converse of the arousal jag is boredom, which occurs when there
is a rise in arousal with no available means of arousal-reduction. In the
case of the experiments on sensory deprivation, the rise in arousal
level is explained as a product of the fact that inhibiting impulses from
the cortex, which normally dampen arousal, are inactivated as a result
of the monotonous stimulation, an event that releases the arousal
system from cortical restraint (p. 191).
According to this motivational model, a desirable incentive is an
incentive that can provoke an arousal jag: i.e. an incentive that can
induce arousal and guarantee its immediate reduction. The metaphor
can certainly be categorized in this way. By its linkage of normally
disparate states or events, the metaphor is characteristically novel and
incongruous; hence it induces arousal. And by the provision of some
conceptual resolution in the opposite and appropriate use of this blend
of the disparate, it sets off arousal-reduction. (Anderson 1964: 60)
In this view, metaphor is supposed to evoke mild cortical excitement, which
should be absent in literal statements and should be paramount during the
reading of anomalies.
2.3 A formalized model of the anomaly theory
From the above review (Section 2.1 and 2.2) it follows that the core assump-
tions of anomaly theory are:
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1. A metaphor is not a literal statement
2. The surface form of a metaphor consists of two terms
3. A metaphor is understood in two steps
4. In the first step each term activates a literal feature set
5. In metaphor, the number of shared features - the C-term - between
the literal sets is insufficient
6. In case of a metaphor this causes an absurdity
7. Therefore, two extra, figurative, sets are activated and matched to
find the shared set
8. In metaphor, the number of shared features - the C-term - between
the figurative sets is sufficient
9. Context has no effect on 1 up to 8
Anomaly theory relies heavily on the distinction between literal and figu-
rative features. Literal features are viewed as the concrete, describing
properties. For instance, 'fist' may evoke the features 'thumb', 'fingers',
'knuckle', 'ball of the thumb', 'palm' and 'nails'. Figurative features of 'fist'
may be 'anger', 'resistance', 'strength', 'aggression', or even 'strike' and
'demonstration'. They are symbols, sometimes drawn from personal fantasy.
Anomaly theory claims that a metaphor will be read first as a literal ex-
pression. If the overlap between literal features is insufficient during the lit-
eral reading - as can be expected of metaphors - the expression is considered
invalid or anomalous. To reduce the relative number of distinctive (literal)
features, a figurative interpretation is performed, which involves the match-
ing of two new (figurative) feature sets.  If the relative dissimilarity cannot4
be reduced - because too little a degree of figurative similarity is found - the
expression is considered anomalous. Since the extreme form of anomaly
theory claims that the stage of literal interpretation precedes the stage of
figurative interpretation, context should not have any effect on the serial
order of this process.
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Figure 2.0: Anomaly model for a four sets feature overlap in literal, metaphoric and anom-
alous expressions.
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It is reasonable to assume that the initial literal interpretation of an ex-
pression is based on the literal features of the A- and B-term. Readers will
try to find common literal features first, and only if it is impossible to find
them in sufficient numbers, figurative features are activated. In the case of a
metaphor, insufficient literal features may be found to decide in favor of a
literal expression. When the overlap of literal features is too small for a lit-
eral interpretation, a figurative interpretation is performed, in which the
distinctive literal features are neglected, and figurative features emerge. It
also seems reasonable to assume, that the figurative features constitute the
figurative interpretation.
However, the anomaly theory may be interpreted in two ways. First, the
figurative feature overlap may be additional to the literal. Due to literal and
figurative overlap, the ratio between shared and distinctive features is
positively influenced, so that the expression is interpreted as a metaphor. In
this case, similarity in an expression is estimated as a measure of overall fea-
ture overlap. However, in that case, anomaly theory would merely restate a
principle from comparison theory, while loosing a distinctive characteristic.
Anomaly theory would really differ from the comparison view, if literal
overlap was not passed on to the later stage. In the second stage, then, the
shared and distinctive literal features are neglected, and the feature sets of
the A- and B-term are newly declared with figurative features, the sole
overlap size of which would be enough to make the expression metaphoric.
Anyhow, the anomaly view implies that every expression activates four fea-
ture sets. A literal and a figurative set for the A-term, and a literal and a figu-
rative set for the B-term.
Figure 2.0 shows the Venn diagrams for literal, metaphoric and anom-
alous expressions, according to the anomaly view. In a literal expression
only the literal features are activated and compared, the overlap of which is
sufficient to understand the expression. In its extreme form, the complete lit-
eral feature set of the A-term is found in the literal set of the B-term (cf. a
tautology). The figurative sets are not compared in literal expressions, and
thus, show no matches. In a metaphor, the understanding of the expression
takes place only through the figurative features. In its extreme form, the
figurative set of the A-term is completely matched by the B-term. The fea-
ture overlap of the literal sets, therefore, should be very small or even
absent. In an anomaly, neither literal nor figurative feature sets provide
sufficient overlap to understand the expression. In its extreme form there is
no feature overlap at all.
Figure 2.1 shows a two-stage serial process anomaly model. The com-
parison model, as presented in Section 1.3, can fully represent the anomaly
assumptions, provided that some adjustments are made. The principal point
is that the stages in the anomaly model are both an
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Figure 2.1: Two-stage serial process anomaly model for metaphor understanding (fixed
order).
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Aristotelian comparison and thus, that each stage in the anomaly model may
be represented by a comparison model. In the description of the anomaly
model, the discussion will be limited to those aspects which differ from the
comparison model. For the arithmetical procedures, see Section 1.3.
In the encode phase of the first, literal, stage of the anomaly model
l(Figure 2.1), feature set X  of the A-term is completely filled with literal fea-
ltures. Feature set Y  of the B-term also consists of literal features only.
llThe number of shared literal features (#S ) in the comparison phase of
the anomaly model is calculated in exactly the same way as in the compari-
son model, but in this stage for the literal features only.
llIn the response phase, the value #S  for literal matches is tested against
l lan inner criterion q  for literal overlap. Criterion q  corresponds to the feature
overlap shown in the top Venn diagram of Figure 2.0, and must be met to
ljudge an expression as literal. If criterion q  is satisfied, the process stops
and no second stage is entered.
lIf q  is not met, in other words, if the number of shared features is not
satisfactory, too many distinctive features prevail. The expression becomes
an absurdity, and is judged as anomalous. The energetic effect (the 'shock')
provoked by this anomalous moment urges the reader to enter the second,
figurative, stage of the process.
The figurative stage of the anomaly model is a repetition of the first
f f fstage, in which two new feature sets X  and Y  are activated. Feature set X  of
the A-term is now filled with figurative features, together with the feature set
fY  of the B-term. Yet, the actual procedure in the brain can be viewed in
different ways. The literal features may be activated first, and only when
necessary, figurative features are activated, thereafter. Alternatively, literal
and figurative features may be activated at the same time, but the figurative
features may become dominant, only when the literal ones do not match.
In the second comparison phase, the number of shared figurative features
ff f#S  receives a value, which is tested against the 'threshold' criterion q  for
ffigurative feature overlap in the second response phase. Criterion q  is
linked to the feature overlap in the middle Venn diagram of Figure 2.0 for
fmetaphors. If q  is met, the initial anomalous expression is understood as a
metaphor. If not, the expression is still an anomaly. The values of the criteria
l fq  and q  , again remain empirical questions. To arrive at a decision for
'metaphor', inception of a new stage is demanded, thus increasing the
process time beween literals and metaphors. This increment is higher from
the anomaly than from the comparison point of view. Comparison theory
expects less time delay between literal expressions and metaphors, because
merely a simple criterion check separates the decisions. In contradistinction,
anomaly theory supposes the onset of a complete new stage between the
decisions for 'literal' and 'metaphor', which is probably a more time
consuming procedure. As in Figure 1.1 (Chapter 1), decision time dif-
ferences between metaphors and anomalies are not present, but in view of
the results in Chapter 6, the order of processing should be revised anyway.
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Computation of the two-stage anomaly model, involves the procedures as
described below:
l 1 n1. encode A-term: X  = {x .....x }
l 1 m2. encode B-term: Y  = {y .....y }
ll l l3. compute S  = X  1 Y
ll lif #S  $ q  6 respond 'literal' and stop
else go to 4
f 1 n4. encode A-term: X  = {x .....x }
f 1 mencode B-term: Y  = {y .....y }
ff f fcompute S  = X  1 Y
ff fif #S  $ q  6 respond 'metaphor'
else respond 'anomaly'
5. stop
l l lq = number of literal elements needed in X  1 Y  to respond 'literal'
f f fq = number of figurative elements needed in X  1 Y  to respond 'metaphor'
As suggested in Section 1.3, the model could be refined by using weighted
features. This means that some literal or figurative features u of a term may
be more important than others (e.g., more salient, more prototypical, more
frequently mentioned). The weighing of the features u could thus lead to a
preferred order of comparison within the literal or figurative feature sets.
Analogous to Section 1.3 (Chapter 1), the sizes of the weighted literal
l lfeature sets X  and Y  are described by:
Xl Xl Yl YlW  =   3 w (u) , and W  =   3 w (u) ,  respectively.
 u å Xl  u å Yl
f fThe sizes of the weighted figurative feature sets X  and Y  are described by:
Xf Xf Yf YfW  =   3 w (u) , and W  =   3 w (u) ,  respectively.
 u å Xf  u å Yf
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1. Kintsch's (1974) model on sentence comprehension can be seen as an anomaly theory, as
well as an interaction theory. Metaphor is a semantically unacceptable expression (an
anomaly), which is resolved by 'inferences', a notion of the interaction theory (cf. 'analogical
reasoning'):
 
The model for semantic memory, (...), combines the virtues of network models (that
is, their generative capacities) with those of set-comparison models (that is, their
flexibility). The measure of semantic distance derived from the model is a function
llAgain in correspondence with Section 1.3, the shared literal set size #S  and
ffshared figurative set size #S  can be rewritten as the weighted set size (W) of
llall shared features u, which is the sum of all weights w of all features u in S
ffand S  , respectively:
Sll Sll Sff SffW  =   3 w (u) , and W  =   3 w (u) .
 u å Sll  u å Sff
lThe model in Figure 2.1 suggests that when criterion q  is not satisfied, a
second, figurative, stage is started, before another stop criterion is found.
This need not be the case. Subjects could decide that if the expression is not
literal, it is thus an anomaly, and cancel all further processing. If so, another
ldecision diamond ought to follow (or be in parallel with) q  , predicating that
after the conclusion for anomaly, the process halts, unless a minimum
criterion of overlapping literal features urges the subject to activate figurat-
ive ones.
From the model in Figure 2.1, predictions about metaphor processing can
be derived, in agreement with the anomaly assumptions. These predictions
are competitive with the predictions in 1.3 (comparison model) and 3.3
(interaction model).
The predictions in accordance with the anomaly view are:
1. A metaphor activates four feature sets
2. These four feature sets are always fixed
3. A literal expression has more shared literal features than a
metaphor and an anomaly; a metaphor has more shared figurative
features than a literal and an anomalous expression
4. The set of literal and figurative features is fixed, and thus, can be
predicted from the sets of the isolated words
5. The response time for understanding a literal expression is less
than for metaphors and for metaphors equal to that for anomalies
6. Metaphors and anomalies show electrocortical effects for semantic
mismatches
7. Context has no effect on 1 to 6
Notes:
42
Anomaly model: Notes
of both the amount of inferential processing that is performed in comparing two
concepts and their element overlap (Kintsch 1974: 211). 
Metaphor understanding involves simple feature matching as well as inferencing. This
brings Kintsch close to Gentner's (1989) position, who claimed that metaphors are con-
stituted by shared attributes and shared analogical relations (see section 3.2).
To treat Kintch's theory as an anomaly model is rather arbitrary, of course. However,
this decision is based on the idea that Kintsch's ultimate ground to calculate distance is still
feature overlap, and that inferences are weighted less over time:
It is assumed that in calculating an over-all semantic distance measure subjects com-
bine overlap and inferential information so as to weigh inferred information less and
less (Kintsch 1974: 212). 
Kintsch then developed a two-stage model for sentence processing:
Stage 1 processing consists first of (...) translating from sentence into proposition.
Next a check is made on whether the test proposition is already stored in semantic
memory, in which a fast "true" response occurs. (...) If the proposition is not found in
memory, the semantic distance between its arguments is computed. If this distance is
zero or close to zero, a fast "false" response occurs, as in the case of the nonsense
sentences (...). If, however, the semantic distance is above a critical value, further
processing is necessary. (...) this may be very time consuming (...). In principle
Stage-2 processing consists of determining whether or not the test proposition is
semantically acceptable (...). The model is incomplete in that it does not fully specify
how this is done; it merely claims that the production rules that are part of a person's
semantic memory are used to generate inferences from the material directly stored in
memory (Kintsch 1974: 212-213). 
Despite the problem that the model does not account for the determination of semantical ac-
ceptability in Stage-2, it suffers from other problems as well. In Stage-1, a full set of already
stored propositions is assumed. First of all, this means that the brain conserves an
exhaustive set of fixed word combinations (the propositions), which must be checked com-
pletely, before the 'true' response occurs. Thus, the older one gets, the longer it takes to
check the set completely. Besides, the brain is known to remember only the relevant parts of
a sentence and to forget surface forms, in this case, the fixed propositions. Kintsch tried to
account for this problem by assuming a noun-hierarchy deletion operator, which deletes
redundant propositions (Kintsch 1974: 26). However, this deletion operator was never
investigated experimentally.
The model Kintsch advocated can hardly explain the quick understanding of newly
heard sentences, because the sentence has to be translated into a proposition, which must be
checked against a set of already learned propositions, after which a distance is calculated,
which, in turn, must meet a certain critical value. Although parsimony is not an argument to
Kintsch (1974: 202), a much simpler model presented in Section 2.3 can account for
Kintch's assumptions as well.
2. The anomaly model is sometimes referred to as the Standard Pragmatic Model (cf.
aGerrig 1989 ).
3. In this connection, the Clark & Lucy (1975) study into indirect requests speaks of literal
meaning as lexeme meaning.
4. Steen (personal communication) stressed the point that anomaly theory does not
envision two figurative sets in the second stage, but only one for the B-term , so that matches
occur between the literal A-term  set and the figurative B-term  set (cf. Beardsley 1982: 264-
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265).
Although strictly speaking, this is a valid comment, the models try to make the sharpest
distinctions possible among the theories. The assumption of three feature sets would
intersect with three sets for the interaction theory (next Chapter). Moreover, the results in
Chapter 5 will show that the model should be revised in favor of, indeed, matches between
literal and figurative features. However, these are not only matches from the figurative B- to
the literal A-term set, but also from the figurative A-term  to the literal B-term  set. In other
words, the four feature sets assumption is essential to explain the results.
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CHAPTER 3: THE INTERACTION MODEL*
3.0 Interaction theory
Interaction theory is the most recent of the dominant views in the theory of
literature. It has the most advanced, but also the most vague assumptions of
the three competitive theories. Similarity and dissimilarity between A- and
B-term are equally important for the processing of a metaphor. In addition,
interaction theory claims that the search for similarity is not the most
important mechanism. Above all, reasoning by analogy is the way in which
meaning is created for a metaphor. The reader tries to invent a relationship
between the B-term and one of its activated features. This relation is then
transferred to the A-term. In the A-term set, a feature is sought that fits this
transferred relation, supposedly resulting in a reasonable solution to the
metaphor. Some examples in the Sections 3.2 and 3.3 will illustrate this
point.
3.1 Interaction theory in literature
In Poetics, Aristotle discriminated between two ways in which a metaphor
may be understood. By searching for similarities (Section 1.1) or 'by
analogy':
Metaphor 'by analogy' is a case where the relation of b to a is the same
as that of d to c: the poet will use d instead of b, or the reverse.
Sometimes they add to the metaphor something to which it is related
(...).
For some analogies there is a missing term, but the metaphor will
still be used. (Halliwell 1987: ch.21, 55-56)
Interaction theory is greatly indebted to this idea. The 'founding father' of the
interaction view, M. Black, spoke of a projection mechanism that maps a set
of 'associated implications' from the B-term upon the A-term. This is 'a set of
what Aristotle called endoxa - current opinions shared by members of a
certain speech-community' (M. Black 1979: 29). M. Black stressed that this
set may be 'novel and nonplatitudinous' (ibid.). The mechanism he offered,
looks like this:
A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects, to be identified as
the "primary" subject and the "secondary" one. (...). The secondary
subject is to be regarded as a system rather than an individual thing.
(...). The metaphorical utterance works by "projecting upon" the
The Note is on page 61.*
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primary subject a set of "associated implications," comprised in the
implicative complex, that are predicable of the secondary subject. (...)
The maker of a metaphorical statement selects, emphasizes,
suppresses, and organizes features of the primary subject by applying
to it statements isomorphic with the members of the secondary
subject's implicative complex. (...) In the context of a particular meta-
phorical statement, the two subjects "interact" in the following ways:
(a) the presence of the primary subject incites the hearer to select some
of the secondary subject's properties; and (b) invites him to construct a
parallel implication-complex that can fit the primary subject; and (c)
reciprocally induces parallel changes in the secondary subject. (M.
Black 1979: 28-29)
To summarize the theoretical considerations outlined above, M. Black main-
tained that the B-term (the 'secondary subject') activates a set of 'associated
implications'. These associated implications can be viewed as features
connected to the B-term by some sort of relation. An example given by
Tourangeau & Sternberg (1982) says that 'king' may activate the feature
'empire' and the corresponding relation between king and empire may be
'power'. This relation, 'power', is then linked to the feature set of the A-term
(the 'primary subject'), which may be 'teacher'. In the A-term set of 'teacher',
a feature should be found that fits the relation 'power'. This could be the fea-
ture 'class' or 'children'. The metaphor 'teachers are kings' is solved, then, by
the analogy of teachers having power over their classes, like kings have
power over their empires (teachers : classes :: kings : empires).
M. Black went even as far as to state that the relation is 'mapped' upon,
rather than added to, the A-term set. Here the premise is that the A-term has
activated the relation, before it can be mapped by the B-term:
I have said that there is a similarity, analogy or, more generally, an
identity of structure between the secondary implication-complex of a
metaphor and the set of assertions - the primary implication-complex -
that it maps. In "poverty is a crime," "crime" and "poverty" are nodes
of isomorphic networks, in which assertions about crime are correlated
one-to-one with corresponding statements about poverty. (M. Black
1979: 31)
If this mapping is one-to-one, there will be fewer possibilities to find a sol-
ution to the metaphor. Not only a fitting feature should be found in the A-
term set, a similar relation should also be present beforehand, rather than
transferred from the B-term. This assumption impoverishes the freedom of
interpretation for the reader. However, if the assumption is valid, the inter-
pretation is almost automatically cued in the right direction. M. Black's
regulation of metaphor understanding is less rigid, when it comes to the
number of relations that can be mapped by the B-term:
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Let us now idealize the connection between the two implication-com-
plexes (G and M) in the following way: G consists of certain state-
ments, say Pa, Qb,..., and aRb, cSd,..., while M comprises cor-
responding statements P0a0, Q0b0,..., and a0R0b0, c0S0d0,..., (where P is
uniquely correlated with P0, a with a0, R with R0, and so on). Then the
two systems have, as mathematicians say, the same "structure"; they
are isomorphic (...). One important deviation from the mathematical
conception is that G is linked with M by a "mixed lot" of projective
relations, (...), and not (as typically in mathematical contexts) by a
single projective relation. (...) G is precisely what I have called in the
past an "analog-model". (M. Black 1979: 30-31)
What may be learned from this quotation is merely that the B-term (G) is not
linked to the A-term (M) by just one relation, but by a 'mixed lot' of many
(one-to-one) relations. This improves of course, the freedom of inter-
pretation for the reader. The problem M. Black signaled that A- and B-term
in metaphors are connected by more than a 'single projective relation' can be
solved by introducing a procedure in the metaphor model that allows any
member of a relation set to be compared with any member of the other set.
The B-term, then, generates two types of feature sets: A feature set of
'normal' B-term properties, which may be called Y, and a feature set of
rrelations, which may be called Y  . In parallel, let the feature set of the A-
rterm be X and the feature set of A-term relations X  . The contents of the fea-
ture sets X and Y are the same as in the feature sets of the comparison model.
M. Black's view on the connection between the two sets of relations may
r r1 rm r1 rn rthen look as follows: Y  = {y  , .... , y } = {x  , .... , x } = X  , allowing for
rj riat least one relation Y  to connect with X  . M. Black stated, however, that
this connection is insufficient, if the linkage cannot be made by a 'mixed lot',
r ri.e. if X  1 Y  Ý 1. The model presented in Section 1.3 provides a procedure,
ri rjwhich solves this problem in a simple way, so that any X  and any Y  can be
ri rj i jcompared in any direction: X  = Y  , if r  # n and if r  # m. In other words,
rj ri rrelation Y  can be compared with any relation X  as long as relation set Y  is
ri rjnot empty. Similarly, any relation X  can be compared with any relation Y  ,
rif feature set X  is not empty. This procedure is demonstrated in Figure 3.1,
Section 3.3.
r rM. Black suggested that the relations in X  and Y  may be identical. How-
ever, as argued above, this limits the possibilities for interpreting the meta-
phor. The interaction view is made more powerful, if a relation is transferred
from the B-term to the A-term, so that one or more features in X can be
found that fit the transferred relation. The formal representation of the inter-
i rjaction view can then be simplified by searching a feature x  so that it fits Y  .
rThus, X  can be rewritten as X, which leaves the interaction view with three
feature sets: One normal feature set for the A-term (comparable to the kind
activated in the comparison model), and two feature sets for the B-term (one
normal set of the comparison model type and one relation set). A literal
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statement will be understood by activating the feature sets as described in
the comparison model, since the relation inference is supposed to be special
to metaphors.
Unlike comparison theory and anomaly theory, interaction theory seri-
ously considers the role of context. In the comparison view, the similarity of
two terms is pre-existing, and merely has to be found. Context is not
believed to affect its magnitude. Anomaly theory also does not mention a
context effect, other than within the expression (the B-term influencing the
A-term). Interaction theory, on the other hand, really insists on the role of
context: "At the level of interpretation, text-understanding gives the key for
metaphor-understanding" (Ricœur 1974: 105). Ricœur did not think of text
and metaphor processing as a simple succession of meanings, which lead to
the proper interpretation. However, he saw it as a construction, a holistic,
and therefore creative, process:
Now a work has to be constructed because a text--especially if it is a
literary work--is more than a linear succession of sentences. It is a
cumulative, holistic process. (Ricœur 1974: 104)
The reader lacks the knowledge about the writer's intention, so that he has to
'guess'. The way the reader 'guesses' the meaning of a metaphor is even
exemplary for the way a literary text is understood:
(...) As concerns the place of guessing in the construction it follows
from what we said about the absence of the author's intention as a
guideline and the character of a work as a system of whole and parts.
We may summarize in this way the corresponding features which are
the grounds for the analogy between the explication of a metaphoric
statement and a literary work as a whole. (Ricœur 1974: 104)
The explication of metaphor as a local event in the text contributes to
the interpretation itself of the work as a whole. We could even say
that, if the interpretation of local metaphors is enlightened by the inter-
pretation of the text as a whole and by the disentanglement of the kind
of world it projects, the interpretation of the poem as a whole is
controlled, reciprocally, by the explication of metaphor as a local
phenomenon. (Ricœur 1974: 109-110)
Ricœur assumes that text cues (or 'clues') influence the guess of the meta-
phorical meaning. In terms of the interaction theory; what has to be guessed
is the sort of relation that is activated and transferred (or mapped).
In both cases the construction relies on the "clues" contained in the
text itself: a clue is a kind of index for a specific construction, both a
set of permissions and a set of prohibitions; it excludes some unfitting
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constructions and allows some others that make more sense of the
same words. (Ricœur 1974: 104)
3.2 Interaction theory in psychology
Interaction theory criticizes the comparison view for its simple ideas about
the search for similarity. For instance, Tourangeau & Sternberg (1982)
enumerated mechanisms they considered more important, among others 'ab-
straction' and 'natural association'. Unfortunately, they did not work their
handful of alternatives into the model they proposed.
According to Tourangeau & Sternberg, similarity does not play a vital
role in metaphor comprehension, and its pre-existence between A- and B-
term should be denied. Instead, the B-term forms a frame in which the A-
term can be newly interpreted. Since the B-term features do not immediately
have to fit the A-term features, a 'reorganization' may be required; a
reinterpretation of one part of the metaphor in terms of the other.
These ideas were extracted from M. Black (1979) (see Section 3.1), who
posited that the interpretation of a metaphor is not so much the comparison
of A- and B-term on existing similarity, but the renewed construction of A-
and B-term to create similarity. In this view, understanding a metaphor
strongly depends on the competence of the reader.
To support their claims, Tourangeau & Sternberg cited a study by Ortony
(1979), who stated that the feature lists summed up by his subjects showed
25% overlap of salient features (salience indicated by the subjects) for literal
expressions, and 1% for similes. Tourangeau & Sternberg explained the low
percentage of salient shared features for similes as a result of 'reshaping' the
shared set into a new concept. Owing to the fact that this new concept
evoked new features, none of the original A- and B-term features could be
recovered in the shared set.
However, it can be objected that the results in Ortony (1979) do not
demonstrate that the search for similarity or the matching of features did not
take place, or at least, was not important for creating meaning. It could be
argued that one shared feature is enough to form an interpretation, without
the necessity to be a highly salient feature. This means that matching fea-
tures sets may still be crucial for forming meaning, although the responsible
features may not be recovered, and the full interpretation may not be
explained by it.
To underscore their point, Tourangeau & Sternberg cited the study of
Verbrugge & McCarrell (1977), in which subjects performed a recall task
with the A-term, B-term or C-term as cue (C-term seen as the solution to the
metaphor). The results showed that the shared features served as a prime for
memorizing the metaphors equally well as the A- and B-term. Unfortunately,
this study is also hardly decisive. Verbrugge & McCarrell's finding does not
support the premise that the C-term was not formed by shared features of A-
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and B-term. The authors themselves indicated that their data are open to
various explanations.
Tourangeau & Sternberg's claim was that reinterpreting a feature from the
A-term in terms of the B-term changes the whole domain of A-term features.
According to this 'domain interaction' theory, every activated feature evokes
a feature set that is included in the comparison. Such a feature maintains a
specific relation with the feature set, for instance, when a feature is
prototypical for a category. If an expression is identified as a metaphor, the
reader searches the B-term set for a feature that holds such a special relation
with the B-term. If this relation is found or created, it is relocated to the A-
term, where it is used as a search light to find an appropriate completion in
the feature set of the A-term, thus creating the C-term.
However, it is a misconception that such a relation of 'feature-to-feature
set' would separate interaction theory from a comparison view, as
Tourangeau & Sternberg declared. Such a relation can be seen as a feature in
its own right, belonging to a feature set of relations. This relation set - for
instance of the B-term - may be compared with the relation set of the A-term
and the matches may establish the C-term (the solution to the metaphor). If
relations do not match, the relation set of the A-term may be changed until
they do. 'Teachers are kings', then - the example is by Tourangeau & Stern-
berg - would transport the relation of 'power' between 'kings' and 'empires' to
'teachers' and 'classes'. In other words, interaction theory also may envision a
role for feature mapping - in the form of relations - and for searching the
shared (relation) set. This shared set does not need to be fixed and may be
created by adjusting the feature sets. 
Ultimately, Tourangeau & Sternberg did not deny that A- and B-term can
share features and can show similarity, but they did not find it important.
Nevertheless, the alternative mechanisms they proposed (abstraction, natural
association) were weakly explicated, and did not return in their processing
model.
This model, then, states that first, the encoding of an expression takes
place. The terms are identified as A- and B-term and activate feature sets.
Next, the features are mapped, in particular, the relation of a B-term with its
domain is delivered to the A-term. This B-term relation is then applied to the
A-term set, which is checked for a well fitting completion (making up the
same relation). Subsequently, A- and B-term are compared with respect to
this completion, to verify whether the relations really correspond, after
which the response selection is justified. If the answer is 'not metaphoric',
reinterpretation takes place (in which stage the process restarts, is not
mentioned). If the answer is 'yes', the response is 'metaphor'.
Ortony's (1979) study was used by Tourangeau & Sternberg to sustain the
relational thrust of metaphor understanding, although Ortony himself
objected to such an interaction point of view:
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(...) relations are no more nor less important to the nature of metaphors
than are objects. Both are important in that they constitute the kind of
things that tie language to reality, but neither of them are powerful
tools for explaining specific linguistic phenomena. (Ortony 1979: 187)
Ortony pointed out that, rather than relations, literal falsehood transforms an
expression into a metaphor, thus bringing metaphor understanding back to
the tenets of anomaly theory:
Clearly, part of what is involved in understanding this is the solution
of the analogy of the form "X is to ? as Y is to Z." What makes it a
metaphor is not the fact that common relations are involved, but
rather; the fact that, literally interpreted, the assertion is false. It is
false because the relations that are allegedly similar, are not in fact
similar at all. (Ortony 1979: 188)
Yet, Ortony was not so radical as it seems from the above quotation. He left
room for relations as well as for simple feature sharing, taking a moderate
interaction view eventually:
(...) some analogies are literal analogies and some are not. In either
case, they involve alleged similarities - similarities between relations
between objects, rather than between objects themselves. (Ortony
1979: 188)
In line with Ortony, Gentner (1988, 1989) advocated an intermediate po-
sition in the interaction view. She said that metaphors stretch from mere
resemblances (simple similarity in the Aristotelian way) to highly relational
commonalities. According to Gentner, many relational predicates and many
object attributes are mapped for literal similarity. In anomalies, few
attributes and few relations are mapped (Gentner 1989: 206). For metaphors,
the range varies from mapped attributes to mapped relations, thus forming
an intermediate class of expressions between analogy, anomaly and mere
appearance (Gentner 1989: 207).
The model Gentner (1989) proposed, is in line with the one presented by
Tourangeau & Sternberg, which is a form of structure mapping, or, for that
matter, analogical reasoning. The process starts by accessing the 'system' (of
relations) of the B-term. Then, the mapping between B-term and A-term is
performed, the match evaluated, and inferences are stored in the A-term.
Only seldom, are commonalities extracted (Gentner 1989: 200).
Finally, an important insight of interaction theory is that feature sets do
not need to be fixed and similarity does not need to be present already.
Interaction theory also stresses the importance of the linguistic context for
the possibilities and limitations of the features to connect with other feature
sets.
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3.3 A formalized model of the interaction theory
Giving the chief points of Section 3.1 and 3.2, the interaction theory
assumes that:
1. A metaphor is not a literal statement
2. The surface form of a metaphor consists of two terms
3. A metaphor is understood in two steps
4. In the first step each term activates a normal feature set
5. In metaphor the overlap - the C-term - between the feature sets is
insufficient
6. An extra relational set is created from the B-term and matched for
shared relations with the A-term, or a fitting A-term feature is
found for the B-term relation, forming the C-term
7. In metaphor, the number of shared relations, or the number of
relation-fitting A-term features is sufficient
8. Context cues influence step 4 up to 7
Where literal expressions are concerned, interaction theory does not deviate
from the comparison view. Whether features are literal or figurative is not
considered important, and relations do not come into play, unless the feature
overlap is insufficient. In that case, a third feature set is activated (or
created) for the B-term, and mapped onto the A-term area. The relation set,
therefore, accomplishes a bridge function between the A- and B-term feature
sets. If the relations are appropriate, a metaphor is formed. If not, the
expression is perceived as an anomaly. Figure 3.0 shows the Venn diagrams
for the activated feature sets, modeled in the interaction way. For literal ex-
pressions, the normal feature overlap between first and second term is suffi-
cient. The feature-poor first term is probably fully covered by the fea-
ture-rich second term. In metaphor, the overlap is created through relations.
Thus, metaphors show one extra set of features. Anomalies share neither
normal features, nor relations.
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Figure 3.0: Interaction model for a three-sets feature overlap in literal, metaphoric and
anomalous expressions.
In Figure 3.1 a flow-diagram is presented for a two-stage serial order inter-
action model. Analogous to the anomaly model in Section 2.3, the stages of
the interaction model can be represented by the comparison model, as shown
in Section 1.3, Figure 1.1. The two main differences between the anomaly
and interaction model are the mixture of features in the first stage of the
latter, in contrast with the literal determination of the former. Secondly, the
relational shift in the second stage of the interaction model contrasts with
the figurative shift of the anomaly model. The presence of a cortical 'shock
effect', urging the reader to enter the second stage, is not raised as an issue
by the interaction theory.1
In the first stage of the interaction model, A- and B-term evoke features as
in the comparison model. Subsequently, they are matched for feature
overlap. Below, the description of the first stage in Figure 3.1 is picked up
when the criterion q is not satisfied (see the comparison model in Section
1.3) and the number of shared features (#S) is
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Figure 3.1: Two-stage serial process interaction model for metaphor understanding (fixed
order).
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insufficient to make a decision for 'literal'. The philosophy of the interaction
view on the special role of the B-term may now be unscrambled in a model
of arithmetic procedures.
In the encode phase of the second stage in the interaction model, the A-
r r1 rmterm set remains untouched. A new feature set Y  = {y  , .... , y } for the B-
term is declared, which contains relations among the features in Y.
 The procedure in the comparison phase can be modeled in two ways,
depending on the kind of interaction view taken. In M. Black's view, both X
r rand Y should be supplied with X  and Y  in the second stage. In this four-sets
model, only a relation match would be appropriate to augment #S.
Figure 3.1, however, models the three-sets view of Tourangeau & Stern-
r rjberg, who claim that only Y  is created. A relation y  is transported to the A-
term, and a fitting feature in X should complete the relation. How this link is
established remains unclear. Tourangeau & Sternberg prefer to speak of
'creation' of meaning, and dismiss the search for shared features as an
adequate alternative.
Nevertheless, subjects do not link any relation with any feature in a ran-
dom guess. There is a decision criterion. This may yet be the size of the
overlap between relations and features, causing a higher activation level
between these two, than between any other features. Also if the link is
rj j rj iunderstood as a substitution of (y  + y ) by (y  + x ), the connection may be
j ibased on the overlap between the meanings of y  with x  , making them
exchangeable. In other words, the value of #S could be calculated as the
r rj i(partial) identity of a relation in Y  with a feature in X, #S = y  = x  , or the
j i j j rj(partial) identity of two features (#S = y  = x ), provided that y  = y  + y  . The
value of #S thus may be calculated in various ways. It could be the overlap
rr r rbetween relations (M. Black): #S  = X  1 Y  ; it could be the overlap
rbetween relations in Y  with normal features in X (Tourangeau & Sternberg):
xr r#S  = X 1 Y  (cf. Figure 3.1), or it could be any other combination. These
alternatives for calculating #S in agreement with interaction theory will be
discussed in Chapter 5.
xrIn the response phase, #S  has been assigned a value, and the number of
r rshared (or fitting) relations is compared with the 'threshold' criterion q  . If q
ris met or exceeded, the expression is read as a metaphor. If #S  is smaller
rthan q  , the expression is an anomaly. Regarding response times, the inter-
action model does not compete with the comparison and anomaly model.
There is a difference in RT between decisions for 'literal' and 'metaphor',
whereas there is none between 'metaphor' and 'anomaly'. The latter is absent,
since the responses come from the same decision diamond.
A difference between the models is accomplished, only if a variant of the
anomaly model is operative (Section 2.3). After the decision 'not literal', the
conclusion of 'anomaly' may stop the entire process, without further checks
on metaphoricity. In that case, the anomaly model predicts that RTs for
(certain) anomalies lie between those for literals and metaphors, whereas the
interaction model predicts that RTs for anomalies always equal those for
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metaphors. Interaction theory does not predict special electrocortical effects
for metaphors.
Some summarization of the above may lead to the following formal com-
putation of the two-stage interaction model:
1 n1. encode A-term: X = {x .....x }
1 m2. encode B-term: Y = {y .....y }
3. if #S = X 1 Y $ q 6 respond 'literal' and stop
else go to 4
r r1 rm4. construct relations for B-term features Y  = {y .....y }
r5. apply Y  to X
xr r rif #S  = X 1 Y  $ q  6 respond 'metaphor'
else respond 'anomaly'
6. stop
q = number of elements in X 1 Y needed to respond 'literal'
r rq = number of relation elements in X 1 Y  needed to respond 'metaphor'
As already indicated in Section 1.3 (Chapter 1) and 2.3 (Chapter 2), a more
subtle version of the model provided in Figure 3.1 uses weighted features
and relations. High frequency, prototypicallity, or context cueing, could lead
rto a preferred order of comparison. The weighted relation set Y  can be
characterized as:
Yr YrW  =   3 w (u) .
 u å Yr
The weighted feature set X is described in Section 1.3. The size of the
rweighted shared set between normal features in X and relations in Y  is:
Sxr SxrW  =  3 w (u) .
 u å Sxr
The interaction theory is the only theory that considers the role of context
for the processing of a metaphor. Therefore, a flow-diagram for precues
(Figure 3.2) is presented in this Section. In principle, this diagram can also
be integrated with the comparison and anomaly model. Yet, precues lead to
other predictions in the interaction model exclusively.
Figure 3.2 provides a model for (pre)cues in the creation of the C-term.
Certain properties of this precue-model are inspired by the ideas
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Figure 3.2: Serial precue-model for the calculation of associative power between cue and C-
term .
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that underlie the SAM-model ('search of associative memory') by Raaijma-
kers & Shiffrin (1980, 1981).
The three metaphor theories suggest that one or more features in the
interpretation of the 'A is B' expression should be considered the C-term.
The comparison theory, for example, states that the interpretation of 'love is
a rose' is identical to finding the shared set (for instance, 'red', 'tender',
'thorny'). These features are considered the C-term. The other theories
device slightly different mechanisms. However, they all claim that there is a
feature z in the interpretation set Z that may be considered the C-term. The
paramount assumption in Figure 3.2 is that the power of association between
a cue and the C-term depends on the number of matches between the
features that the cue activates and the features of which the C-term consists.
The process begins with the search phase, in which a cue should be
found that is useful in the interpretation of the expression. This cue can be
anything: Word morphology, phonology, orthography, syntax, semantics,
title or author. The cue activates features, forming 'a kind of index for a
specific construction, both a set of permissions and a set of prohibitions', as
Ricœur (1974: 104) puts it. Figure 3.2 is illustrated by the example of one
cue only, activating feature set V. Obviously, the number of cues can be ex-
tended infinitely. If there are no features activated by the cue(s) anymore, the
permissions and prohibitions for the C-term are set. The C-term is found in
three different ways, according to the comparison, anomaly or interaction
view. In the search phase of the precue-model, 'find C-term' can be
substituted by one of the models in Figure 1.1 (Section 1.3), Figure 2.1
(Section 2.3) and Figure 3.1 (this Section). 'Find C-term' should not be read
as if the C-term itself activates features. However, it is only an inventory of
the features in Z that are supposed to form the C-term (C-term d  Z).
The associative power of the cue, justifying the appropriateness of the C-
term, is assumed to depend on the ratio of shared and distinctive features.
Thus, the comparison phase calculates #S as the number of shared features
i j i jbetween cue (v ) and the C-term (z ): v  = z  ? . If there is a match, #S is
augmented, if there is a mismatch, a new feature is compared. The loops
continue exhaustively, until there are no features left in either set.
In the reinforcement phase, the associative power of the cue - expressed
1by a value for #S - is checked against the principle q  . If #S is greater or
1equal to q  , the C-term will be reinforced. This means that many features of
the cue are also found in the C-term, so that the latter is strongly supported
1 2by the cue. If #S is less than q  , a second criterion q  is employed. If #S is
2greater or equal to q  , the C-term will be maintained, which means that the
cue is plausible, but not decisive for the interpretation. Further cues will be
2needed to lend their support. If #S is less than q  , the C-term is refuted,
which means that the cue lacks associative rigor for the justification of the
C-term.
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1 n1. encode (pre)cue V = {v .....v }
2. encode C-term C-term d  Z
3. compute #S = V 1 Z
1   if #S $ q reinforce C-term
2   else if #S $ q maintain C-term
   else delete C-term
4. stop
1   q  = number of elements needed in V 1 Z to reinforce the C-term
2   q  = number of elements needed in V 1 Z to maintain the C-term
Note that if certain cue-features or aspects of the C-term are seen as more
important than others, again weights can be employed.
From the models offered in this Section, test predictions for the interaction
theory of metaphor processing can be derived. These predictions are partly
competitive with the predictions derived from the comparison model
(Section 1.3) and the anomaly model (Section 2.3).
1. A metaphor activates three feature sets
2. These three sets need not be fixed
3. A literal expression has more shared normal features than a
metaphor and an anomaly; a metaphor has more shared (or
fitting) relations than a literal and an anomalous expression
4. The set of shared features or relations is not fixed and therefore,
cannot be predicted from the single terms
5. The response time to understand a literal expression is shorter
than for metaphors and for metaphors as long as for anom-
alies
6. No special electrocortical effects are expected for metaphors
7. Context precues influence 2, 4, and 5
Outlook on the next Chapters
In the Chapters 1, 2, and 3, the various metaphor theories were analyzed as
formal models of computational rules. Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 shall be more
empirically oriented. Chapter 4 centers upon the question - which metaphors
should be selected for the tests on the metaphor models. Apparently, none of
the models allows for factors such as word frequency, lexical ambiguity,
rhyme, and category verification. Nonetheless, these basic linguistic
properties might affect metaphor processing, and perhaps, even explain the
differences between expression types. The stimuli thus should be matched
on these variables, which form the constraints on the selection.
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1. Steen (personal communication) objected to a two-stage model for the interaction view,
since features cannot be separated from their relations. They are activated together and are
interconnected.
However, the interaction view stressed that what makes a metaphor different from any
other expression type is the activation and connection of relations. Thus, literal and
anomalous expressions do not activate and connect relations as much as metaphors. Ideally
(Figure 3.1), they do not at all. Since the creation of relations is a special trait of metaphors,
it is unnecessary for processing literal expressions. There is no need to activate relations
immediately when a metaphor is encountered, because it should be checked first, whether
the expression is literal or not. Else, every metaphor would be recognized as a metaphor in
advance, which is circular.
About their interconnectedness, Chapter 5 offers a solution by matching every possible
combination of feature type that the interaction theory distinguishes. Subjects wrote down
relations behind the features (these features were considered grounds), and the fixed
rg rgcombinations were matched: X  1 Y  . However, the result of this analysis was that the
shared sets remained empty.
Whereas Chapter 4 provides pretests on the stimulus materials, Chapter 5
puts the metaphor models to their first test. The activation and comparison
of features were captured in the associative flow of subjects who summed
up features for the three expression types in three different conditions: For
the single terms, the expressions, and for the expressions in context.
Moreover, this Chapter examines and amends the concepts of similarity,
identity, and salience of features.
Chapter 6 tries to track down the time course of metaphor processing, by
that investigating the effects of experimental design on reaction times. In the
experiments described in this Chapter, the completion of the A-term by the
B-term made an expression either literal (L), metaphoric (M) or anomalous
(A). Subjects were asked to make speeded decisions in a two-choice (L-M,
L-A, M-A) and three-choice task (L-M-A). Similar experiments were
performed with similes.
The three-choice task exploited in Chapter 6 was replicated in the experi-
ments on the electrocortical effects of metaphor processing in Chapter 7.
While subjects performed a reaction time task, the EEG was sampled during
the presentation of the B-term. The event-related brain potentials (ERPs)
derived from the raw EEG were investigated on their sensitivity for
processing literal, metaphoric and anomalous expressions. ERP waveforms
were supposed to change as a function of expression type. The following
Chapter, however, first examines the stability of the stimulus set.
Note:
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CHAPTER 4: STIMULUS SELECTION*
4.0 The research units
Tricky problems in this field are the methods suitable to give access to
knowledge of reading processes (whether on-line or off-line) as well
as the samples of texts to be chosen. (Ibsch 1991: 4)
In this Chapter, the stimulus materials are developed to test the metaphor
models. What type of metaphor should be chosen? A simple 'A is B'-form or
an elaborate Homeric comparison?  From what kind of poem? Rhyming or1
nonrhyming? Basic linguistic properties, such as rhyme, spelling, and
number of syllables may affect the processing of a metaphor, and thus,
should be kept constant.
In the Sections 4.1 and 4.2, various linguistic properties are discussed
which may interfere with metaphor processing. They are seen as constraints
a priori on the stimulus selection. Section 4.4 presents tests on the stability
of the expression types, while in 4.5, post hoc controls are performed on, for
instance, word frequency. Section 4.6 discusses the relevance of this
investigation for the theory of literature.
It could be argued that no matter how complex a metaphor is, or in which
form it is written, it can always be reduced to a simple 'A is B'-form (Burke
1945: 503-504; Mooij 1976: 26; M. Black 1980: 25; Beardsley 1982: 268).
For instance, a genitive construction such as 'a fleece of fog'  may be re-2
written as 'the fog is a fleece'; 'donut shaped accelerators' (Nambu 1985:
126) may be rewritten as 'accelerators are donuts' (where 'shape' is the C-
term).
It is sensible to understand the processing of a basic metaphor form first,
before further factors are engaged. The limits of this study are set, by using
metaphors of the form 'the A is a B',  with further restrictions on rhyme,3
syllables, orthography, word class, function and lexical ambiguity. On the
other hand, these metaphors are selected from existing literary texts, so that
they are valid for a natural reading situation.
4.1 The theory of literature: Analysis of linguistic properties
Since the work of the Russian Formalists, the theory of literature showed a
profound awareness of the text constituting function of linguistic properties.
Today, it closely examines the complexity and interrelationships of rhyme,
spelling, syllables, syntax and lexical ambiguity in individual works of art.
These exhaustive descriptions of the linguistic properties usually serve one
purpose only, namely, pointing out how they are responsible for a particular
Notes are on the pages 101-114.*
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interpretation of the work; what their effect is on constituting meaning for
the individual.
In this Section, the theory of literature is discussed with respect to formal
properties such as spelling, rhyme, syllables, and lexical ambiguity. The sole
purpose of this discussion is to make an inventory of linguistic aspects that
may influence the processing of a metaphor. To isolate what is unique for
metaphor processing, all other aspects of normal reading - such as the
influence of rhyme or spelling - ought to be avoided in the experiments. The
effects of these linguistic properties are interesting in their own right. How-
ever, if they are not kept under control, they are obfuscating what is specific
to metaphor processing. Put more technically, the effects of basic linguistic
properties could covary with effects of metaphor processing, and thus,
should be eliminated. Whereas Section 4.1 is an inventory of what is
considered important for constituting poetic meaning, Section 4.2 is a
display of what is found out about these linguistic properties in psychology.
Section 4.3 considers these findings for the selection of metaphors, literals
and anomalies, and provides further tests on their linguistic characteristics,
before they are submitted to the experiments in the Chapters 5 up to 7.
Constraint 1: Spelling and rhyme
An analysis of any linguistic sign whatever can be performed only on
condition that its sensible aspect be examined in the light of its
intelligible aspect (...) and vice versa. The indissoluble dualism of any
linguistic sign is the starting point of present-day linguistics in its
stubborn struggle on two fronts. Sound and meaning - both these fields
have to be thoroughly incorporated into the science of language:
speech sounds must be consistently analyzed in regard to meaning,
and meaning, in its turn, must be analyzed with reference to the sound
form. (Jakobson 1971: 104)
The practice of literary interpretation usually maintains the firmly rooted
principle that where the text provides formal correspondence, semantic
correspondence also is intended. Although formal equivalences may
establish a close link among semantic units, this does not lead to the
conclusion that they always do establish them, let alone that they have to.
Taken as a prescriptive theory on how to interpret, such a formal-semantic
equivalence theory may well function. However, taken as a descriptive
theory of reader interpretation, it is too meager, and its generalizing power is
highly overestimated, as will be shown in Section 4.2.
An outstanding and often quoted advocate of the formal-semantic equiv-
alence view is the above cited Jakobson. He pressed the point that an
equivalence on any linguistic level (which may be spelling, rhyme, meter,
grammar) leads to a linkage in meaning.
64
Stimulus selection: Spelling and rhyme in literature
Briefly, equivalence in sound, projected into the sequence as its con-
stitutive principle, inevitably involves semantic equivalence, and on
any linguistic level any constituent of such a sequence prompts one of
the two correlative experiences which Hopkins neatly defines as "com-
parison for likeness' sake" and "comparison for unlikeness' sake".
(Jakobson 1981: 40; Hopkins 1966, originally 1865: 106)
Words that rhyme, often look alike. Owing to the fact that the formal-sem-
antic equivalence theory is not limited to rhyme, Lotman (1976) considered
its value for orthography:
In cases where we detect in the graphics an intentional organization
we are justified in speaking of their poetic meaning in that everything
that is organized in poetry becomes meaningful. (...) It may be
assumed that in those cases where the graphic system coincides with
the phonological system and they are both present in the mind of the
native speaker as a single system, graphics more rarely become a
bearer of poetic meaning. But in cases where the automatic character
of their association is disrupted and a conflict is felt between these
systems, the possibility of imbuing the graphics with poetic meaning
arises. (Lotman 1976: 71)
Thus, in normal rhyme situations (e.g., match-patch: Polich, McCarthy,
Wang & Donchin 1983), phonology rather than orthography constitutes
poetic meaning. When words rhyme, but do not look alike (e.g., blare-stair),
orthography may bear poetic meaning as much as phonology. Consequently,
in word pairs that graphically match but do not rhyme (e.g., catch-watch),
orthography should be strongest in conveying poetic meaning. Word pairs
that do not rhyme and do not match orthographically (e.g., shirt-witch)
should have the least poetic meaning.
Accordingly, the processes described by the metaphor models may be
disrupted by any word in the text (which also may be the A-term) that
rhymes with, is spelled equivalent to, or is put in a corresponding gram-
matical position with the B-term of the metaphor. In cases where the formal-
semantic equivalence theory is operative, formally equivalent terms are
enriched with semantic features - or certain semantic features are
highlighted - due to the extra correspondence that is created.
Thus, the chance to become metaphoric is higher for an expression with
two rhyming terms than for an expression with nonrhyming terms. Apart
from the semantic correspondence, a phonological correspondence is
established as well for a rhyming expression. Therefore, the number of
shared features (semantic plus phonological) is higher for a rhyming
expression than for a nonrhyming expression (only semantic), so that the
'threshold' criterion for metaphoricity is more easily met.
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Consider also the following. Suppose that a reader encounters an en-
veloping rhyme pattern in a poem with quatrains. Every fourth sentence
ending, thus rhymes with the first sentence ending of each verse. Suppose
also that the last word of the fourth sentence is the B-term of a metaphor.
The similarity between A- and B-term is based on semantic correspondence -
they share semantic features. However, this similarity may be eclipsed by
the similarity between the B-term in the fourth sentence and the last word of
the first sentence. The rhyme, bringing these words together, ensures a set of
shared semantic features that is augmented by the shared phonological
features.
Furthermore, rhyming could cause an advantage for one of the meta-
phor theories. As argued above, shared semantic sets of formally equivalent
terms may be enlarged by shared formal features (equal phonology, ortho-
graphy, etc.). Thus, an expression shares more features when the formal-
semantic equivalence theory is operative, than when it is not. Due to the
accumulation of shared semantic and formal features, the inner 'threshold'
criteria are more easily met. In other words, under the parameters of the
formal-semantic equivalence theory, anomalies become metaphors, and
metaphors become literals, much quicker than outside this theoretical
framework. Unintentionally, formal-semantic equivalence theory favors
comparison theory, because more expressions will satisfy the inner threshold
criterion for literals, so that a second stage - as presumed by the anomaly
and interaction model - will hardly ever occur.
Following in Jakobson's wake, Wellek & Warren ticked off another range
of formal aspects involved in rhyme, which could also cause unwarranted
intrusions on the 'normal' process of understanding metaphors.
We may ask what is the semantic function of the syllables which
rhyme, whether rhyme is in the suffix (character: register), in the roots
(drink: think), or in both (passion: fashion). We may ask from what
semantic sphere rhyme-words are selected: whether, for example, they
belong to one or several linguistic categories (parts of speech, different
cases) or groups of objects. We might want to know what is the
semantic relation between the words linked by rhyme, whether they
belong to the same semantic context as do many of the common
doubles (heart: part, tears: fears) or whether they surprise precisely by
the association and juxtaposition of completely divergent semantic
spheres. (Wellek & Warren 1955: 161-162)
Preferably, although hardly avoidable, effects of rhyme should not be
evoked by the stimulus set. Line-end rhymes are probably the most con-
spicuous, but rhymes in morphological aspects of the words (cf. Wellek &
Warren) should be eluded as well. Yet, if rhyme effects are in the stimulus
set, the most important thing should be that they are not systematic. Put
differently, that they are interrupted by sufficient cases of nonrhyme.
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A fact seldom explicitly brought out (perhaps just because it is taken
for granted as obvious) is that the role played by rhyme in the design
of verse is determined no less by the distribution of rhymes in a text
than by that of its nonrhymes: both positive and negative constraints
are operative in poetry. Clearly this has to be so if rhyme, viewed as a
paradigmatic relation, is to perform effectively a syntagmatic
organizing function. Otherwise, the positive pattern would be subject
to obliteration by casual accumulation of structurally irrelevant factors
- the signal would tend to be drowned out by the noise. (Abernathy
1967: 1)
Here, Abernathy stated that rhyme (the signal) is not perceived as such, if its
distribution is not systematic; if it is interrupted by accumulative nonrhymes
(drowned out by the noise). If this is correct, the effect of nonrhymes is
extremely useful to create an unbiased stimulus set. By selecting metaphors
from free verse, rhyme may not form the signal in an expression, but
spotting its metaphoricity may.
In this connection, Hoorn (1996) conducted a pilot experiment on the
electrocortical effects of rhymes and nonrhymes on semantics, while
subjects read alternating rhyming verses. It was found that systematic
expectations of rhyme interacted strongly with semantics, particularly when
these expectations were frustrated by nonrhymes.
The solution to the rhyme problem should be that subjects do not antici-
pate systematic rhymes. Therefore, the first constraint on the stimulus
selection is that the effects of phonology and orthography are reduced
to random noise by selecting nonrhyming metaphors from nonrhyming
poems (i.e. free verse).
Constraint 2: Syllables and letters
Syllables are converted into units of measure, and so are morae or
stresses. (Jakobson 1981: 27)
Words with more than one syllable will differ in the stress patterns within
the word boundary, which is said to be important for the poetic function of
the word: 'In poetry one syllable is equalized with any other syllable of the
same sequence; word stress is assumed to equal word stress, as unstress
equals unstress' (Jakobson 1981: 27).
Syllable patterns may be seen as more than mere outer form. Lotman
(1976) discussed the semantic importance of syllable structure in Tyutchev's
poem 'Last love':
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Let us look first at the problem of isometrism insofar as in
Lomonosov's syllabo-tonic system, metrical ordering also specifies the
recurrence of the number of syllables in a line.
The first stanza affords a certain inertia of expectation by creating
the correct alternation of the number of syllables: 8-10-8-10. True,
there is already an anomaly here: habit in reading Russian iambic
tetrameter, the most widespread meter in post-Pushkin poetry,
disposes one to expect the correlation 8-9-8-9. The extra syllable in
the even lines is distinctly heard by the ear. Thus, against the
background of preceding poetic tradition, the first stanza is a violation.
But from the point of immanent structure, it is ideally ordered, and this
forces us subsequently to expect precisely this type of alternation.
(Lotman 1976: 48)
(...) each of the two combined types of lines, counter to our ex-
pectation, is lengthened by a syllable that is also extremely noticeable
to the ear. The 10 syllable line is replaced by the 11 syllable, and the 8
syllable line by the 9 syllable. Here an additional variation is
introduced: in the long lines the syllable is lengthened in the first of
them (the second is perceived as shortened), and in the short lines-in
the first (the second is perceived as lengthened).
The diverse violations of the established order in the second stanza
require in the third stanza a resurrection of the inertia of expectations:
the inertia 8-10-8-10 is reintroduced. But here too there is a disruption:
in the second line instead of the expected 10 syllable unit, there are 9
syllables. (Lotman 1976: 48)
In the syllabo-tonic line the disposition of stresses is just as important
a factor as the number of syllables. (Lotman 1976: 49)
These quotes from Lotman illustrate that expectations of syllabic patterns
(and thus stress patterns) are important to the skilled poetry reader. Certain
violations may be disturbing or surprising. When a B-term occupies a
position in the meter that expects more syllables than the B-term provides, a
disruption and an effect of surprise may hinder the normal processing of the
metaphor.
Thus, for a fair test on the metaphor models, the selected expressions
should not be part of poems that provide expectations about the syllable
pattern or contain predictable meter. Analogous to rhyme, syllable effects
should be reduced to random noise. 'Frustrated expectations' (Jakobson
1981: 33) at the wrong level of processing (i.e. other than those the meta-
phor models hinge on) ought to be avoided.
In some patterns of versification the syllable is the only constant unit
of verse measure, and a grammatical limit is the only constant line of
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demarcation between measured sequences, whereas in other patterns
syllables in turn are dichotomized into more and less prominent,
and/or two levels of grammatical limits are distinguished in their
metrical function, word boundaries and syntactic pauses.
Except the varieties of the so-called vers libre that are based on
conjugate intonations and pauses only, any meter uses the syllable as a
unit of measure at least in certain Sections of the verse. (Jakobson
1981: 29)
Resuming, free verse seems to be the proper kind of poetry to select the
metaphors from, because it avoids the use of syllables as a unit of measure
for meter, and discourages systematic rhyme expectations.
What is said for the number of syllables in a word is closely related to the
number of letters. With the increase of syllables, the number of letters
increases as well. However, more or fewer letters within the syllable may
have different effects; they may become more or less prominent:
In quantitative ("chronemic") verse, long and short syllables are mu-
tually opposed as more and less prominent. This contrast is usually
carried out by syllable nuclei, phonemically long and short. (Jakobson
1981: 30)
It may make a difference, whether we read 'love is a rose' or 'love is virtu-
ousness'. Although the first expression may be judged as a metaphor, and the
second as a literal expression, the latter could be more 'foregrounding' (more
salient), simply because it is a longer word. In terms of psychological
measurement, processing the latter expression may take more time than the
first, because longer words are more time consuming than shorter words (see
Section 4.2). A longer processing time for 'love is virtuousness' is not
expected by the metaphor models, and may be caused by the larger number
of letters and syllables for 'virtuousness'. In other words, the B-terms, which
form the target stimuli of the experiments, should consist of equal numbers
of syllables and letters.
Regarding context, choosing expressions from free verses, again, is the
best solution to avoid expectations about syllable number and word length,
because it might just be that 'prosodic long is matched with long, and short
with short; word boundary equals word boundary, no boundary equals no
boundary' (Jakobson 1981: 27). Thus, the second constraint on the
stimulus selection is that particularly the words that make an ex-
pression literal, metaphoric, or anomalous (the B-terms) should have
equal numbers of syllables and letters.
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Constraint 3: Word frequency
Although a major field in (psycho)linguistic research, word frequency is
never considered important in the theory of literature. The main focus on
'meaningful' aspects of language made word frequency a subordinate
research object, a 'minor linguistic technicallity'. Only an inferential detour
may bring to light that the theory of literature indirectly does speculate about
effects of word frequency.
In the theory of foregrounding (cf. Šklovskij 1965), automatized language
is transgressed by salient, aberrant words. Assumingly, normal words have
less importance for the poetic meaning than unusual ones. Within this
framework, word frequency differences could be the explaining factor
behind this effect. Ordinary language tends to use high-frequent words,
familiar to most language users. If such language is disturbed by interjecting
a 'strange', 'unusual', element, this word is an infrequent word for that
sociolect or for that context. It may even be argued, that theories of surprise,
salience, or foregrounding are implicit theories on frequency of use in a
particular context. Anything atypical, novel, peculiar, rare, singular,
uncommon, or unique, is then a measure of the low frequency of occurrence
subtracted by the high-frequency of occurrence of surrounding phenomena.
The first half of a sentence primes the meaning of the second half. Un-
expectedness induced by an inadequate sentence ending (e.g., a deviant
word), thus may be a function of the low-frequent use of that word in the
context of that particular sentence.
To tackle the problem from the opposite angle, repetition of a deviant
word (or the reintroduction of a character in a novel) may take away all of
its 'strangeness'. Since repetition augments the frequency of use by 1, each
time the word is repeated (or the character presented), its strangeness is
attenuated accordingly. Taking into account Lotman's (1972: 125) statement
that 'repetition is equally important as equivalence', word frequency as an
equivalent of repetition probably is fundamental to language perception,
including the perception of literature.
In a way, word frequency is relative to the position in the text. Three
factors may be distinguished in this respect. Firstly, the position of the word
in the text, either with many, few, or no preceding words. Secondly, the high
or low frequency of the word in the speech community. Thirdly, the sort of
priming, which may be correct or incorrect. If the strange word is in the first
position of the text, no priming occurs, and a potential surprise effect may
be fully ascribed to the infrequency of the word. If the strange word is not in
first position, the priming effect increases with the number of words that
precedes it. The effect of infrequency becomes higher, accordingly as the
prime is less correct. The effect of infrequency decreases in proportion to the
correctness of the prime. Rereading the text, and then interpreting the
strange word in the first position, is the same (in the sense of a 'backward
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prime') as interpreting a word with many preceding words, enhancing the ef-
fect of priming.
The further a word is positioned, the higher the priming effect of the
preceding words (either correct or incorrect). A correct prime of a high-fre-
quent word renders no surprise (ordinary language). A correct prime of a
low-frequent word also renders no surprise, or perhaps a little, due to the
infrequency. An incorrect prime of a high-frequent word does render a
surprise effect, due to the prime (effect of context). An incorrect prime of a
low-frequent word renders the largest surprise, because both factors add, or
interact.
B-terms are primed by the A-term, and by the surrounding context. In
résumé, the third constraint is that B-terms ought to be in the same
word frequency bandwidth, to avoid word frequency effects relative to
expression type. Metaphoricity, literalness, or anomality should not be
explained by systematic word frequency differences among the expression
types, but by their presumed special processes.
Constraint 4: Lexical ambiguity (homonymy)
Homonyms are the mimicry of meaning. When a word takes on one mean-
ing, it is not the other; when it takes on the other meaning, it is not the first.
A simple example is the word 'bank', which lies alongside a river, or is an
establishment for keeping money. Hardly ever does context allow all
meanings to be active (cf. Section 4.2), unless there is no context available.
For the receiver the message presents many ambiguities which were
unequivocal for the sender. The ambiguities of pun and poetry utilize
this input property for the output. (Jakobson 1961: 249)
Ambiguity is an intrinsic, inalienable character of any self-focused
message, briefly, a corollary feature of poetry. Let us repeat with
Empson: "The machinations of ambiguity are among the very roots of
poetry". (Jakobson 1981: 42)
The problem with lexical ambiguity in the study of metaphor is the doubt of
the reader. In choosing for one of the meanings of an ambiguous B-term, the
continuation of the process may be impeded in comparison with an
unambiguous B-term. On the other hand, when the B-term is ambiguous,
chances improve for expressions to become metaphoric, because more
candidates are available for establishing figurative meaning. According to
the fourth constraint, ideally no lexical ambiguities are allowed to enter
the experimental expression set. However, in natural language and
specifically in poetry, lexical ambiguity is hardly avoidable. Expressions
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containing lexical ambiguities are listed in Table 4.3. After the experiments
have been run, these expressions are checked for deviant results.
Constraint 5: Linguistic categories
With words the world is described, with words categories are formed to
describe the world by. Greimas put this nicely, when he stated:
(...) les classèmes (...) rendait compte de la linéarité sémantique,
relativement homogène, du discours. (...) un nouveau rôle qu'on peut
attribuer aux classèmes (...) est de constituer le cadre de l'organisation
de l'univers sémantique. (...) C'est ici qu'apparaît une nouvelle
fonction, classificatoire, d'une certaine espèce de sèmes. (Greimas
1966: 78-79)
People use semantic categories to structure their world. These categories are
not formed randomly. In fact, Section 4.2 reviews research that shows that
people use categories according to certain psychological principles. At least
at the theoretical level, it must be understood how metaphor processing may
be intertwined with category verification. A metaphor that combines an
instance as the A-term with a category as the B-term (e.g., 'love is botany')
may be processed differently from a metaphor that combines a category as
the A-term with an instance as the B-term (e.g., 'emotion is a rose'), just
because the instance-category distribution differs. In a semiotic study of
language, Greimas proposed how to systematize the species-genera
(instance-category) relationship between words, which will be used in this
Section to form a basic understanding of what the problematic is about.
On voit que les classèmes
objet vs animal vs humain
semblent pouvoir être articulés en un système sémique, qui serait
peut-être plus explicite si on le présentait ainsi:
inanimé vs   animé
+)))2))),                       
animal vs humain
La généralisation que nous voulons proposer dès maintenant serait
la suivante: si les figures sémiques, simples ou complexes, relèvent du
niveau sémiologique global, dont elles ne sont que des articulations
particulières prêtes à s'investir dans le discours, les classèmes, de leur
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côté, se constituent en systèmes de caractère différent, et appartiennent
au niveau sémantique global, dont la manifestation garantit l'isotopie
des messages et des textes. (Greimas 1966: 54)
First, Greimas illustrated that objects can be ordered hierachically. There are
higher-order categories, such as 'inanimate' vs 'animate', which can be
subdivided in intermediate categories ('animate' e.g., contains the
intermediate categories 'animal' and 'human'). It is easily understood that
these intermediate categories themselves can be subdivided into lower-order
categories, such as 'monkeys' and 'horses' for the animals, and 'man' and
'women' for the humans. Of course, these subdivisions can go on infinitely,
resulting in all species (objects) that belong to the category.
In set theoretical terms, a category is a set of elements that share the cat-
egory-specific features, i.e. those features not shared by any other category.
The frequency of category-specific features shared by all members is higher
than the frequency of those features in other categories. This may be thought
of, when Greimas mentioned 'the isotope of messages and texts'. The next
paragraph will explain the idea.
Greimas posited that when a category-word is encountered, appropriate
instances of the category are evoked - this is the paradigm - which may be
affirmed by the text with relevant instances. Thus, in the text, selection from
the paradigm (here, the category members) created a 'linked chain of
associates', which is called an isotope. An isotope, then, is a set of features
(associates) connected by, in this case, category membership. In other
words, when people read a category-word, it is likely that they associate
instances with category-specific features, thus forming a paradigm.
Reversely, when people read an instance-word, it is likely that they associate
the category-word. Thus, the frequency of mentioning these words in
response to each other will be high. Henceforth, the likelihood that an
instance is associated, given the category word is called the 'instance
dominance' of a word. The likelyhood that a category is associated, given the
instance is called the 'category dominance' of a word. Chapter 5 will draw on
this matter again.
The fifth constraint states that expression types should not differ in
the way instances and categories are distributed over A- and B-term. In
Section 4.5 and 4.6, however, it is argued that literals, metaphors and
anomalies show systematic differences in the way in which categories are
distributed. Therefore, category verification may systematically differ
among expression types, thus forming an alternative explanation for the
metaphor models.
73
Stimulus selection: Syntax in literature
Constraint 6: Syntax
Analogous to rhyme, grammar may also function according to the formal-
semantic equivalence assumption, in that 'syntactic pause equals syntactic
pause, no pause equals no pause' (Jakobson 1981: 27). Parallel syntactic
structures in a poem could bear semantic parallels as well.
Jakobson stated that rhyming words link up more closely when they share
grammatical aspects, such as word class and syntactic function. Considering
metaphor processing, A- and B-terms may be liable to the same effect.
Rhyme is usually defined as correspondence in terminal sounds, but at
the same time it always matters whether the rhyming elements are
merely homophonous or whether they are grammatically identical -
whether the rhyme links identical formal units or different formal units
but belonging to words of one and the same word-class. Do the
rhyming words have similar or different syntactic functions? The
rhyme technique of diverse poets and poetic schools can be
grammatical or antigrammatical, but it cannot be agrammatical. This
means that the relation between the phonemic and grammatical
structure of rhyme always remains pertinent. (...) Both rhyme and
grammatical parallelism necessarily and simultaneously present both
of these aspects, but with the difference that in rhyme the emphasis is
on the phonemic structure and in parallelism the predominant role
belongs to the grammatical aspect. (Jakobson 1971: 111)
What may be valid for rhyme, may also apply to metaphors. The similarity
between A- and B-term may be upgraded when equal word classes are used.
The A- and B-term in 'war is a sword' combine two nouns and may be
judged as more equivalent than in a combination of a personal pronoun and
a noun ('she is a sword'), or a proper name and a noun ('Anna is a sword').
Likewise, the more the syntactic functions in A- and B-term differ, the
more their degree of similarity may differ. 'War' and 'sword' maintain a
subject-nomalized predicate relation in 'war is a sword', and the A- and B-
term may be said to be functionally in balance. When e.g., an adjunct is
added ('war is a sword of ice'), then the B-term has a nomalized predicate,
containing a prepositional phrase, while the A-term still has the one function
of subject. Similarity ratings may now be different from 'war is a sword', not
only because more semantical information is incorporated in the B-term, but
also as a consequence of more syntactical functions in the B-term. In other
words, when a term is semantically upgraded, it automatically receives more
syntactical features as well.
Similarity in syntactic function may be restored, when the A-term also
receives a prepositional phrase, as in 'beauty as weapon is a sword of ice'. It
may be, then, that 'beauty' is matched against 'sword', as 'weapon' is against
'ice', simply because of the functional equivalence. When another
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prepositional phrase is added in the A-term, as in 'beauty as weapon against
war is a sword of ice',  it may even be argued that the imbalance of the two4
prepositional phrases in the A-term ('as weapon', and 'against war'), and the
one in the B-term ('of ice'), overpowers the balance between the subject
nucleus ('beauty') and predicate nucleus ('sword'). Matching the secundary
syntactic functions (prepositional phrases) may become more important than
the primary functions of subject nucleus and predicate nucleus, thereby
changing the focus of the comparison from the semantics of the words in the
primary functions, to those occupying the secundary functions.
The sixth constraint, then, proclaims that expressions included in the
experiments should not differ in word class and grammatical function
for the A- and B-terms. Tense and person of the verb also should be
equal for all expressions. To achieve a high syntactical consistency within
and between each stimulus group (literals, metaphors, anomalies), A- and B-
terms will be singular nouns in present tense sentences of the form 'the A is a
B'. In Section 4.2, it is discussed that the A- and B-term distribution does not
follow the subject-first, nomalized predicate-last order per se. In Section 4.4,
a test is provided to control for that.
Summarizing Section 4.1, it could be argued that understanding a metaphor
in a literary text may involve more than finding similarity between A- and B-
term, changing from literal to figurative meaning, or creating relations, as
suggested by the metaphor models. Other linguistic aspects could influence
the assumed processes. Phonological anticipations, orthographical
(mis)matches, category verification, lexical ambiguity, and word frequency
may disturb the expected processes. The basic linguistic properties should
be kept under control by selecting expressions checked or tested on all these
dimensions. Put differently, the linguistic properties should not become
covariates (should not explain the differences) of processing different ex-
pression types.
In the next Section, studies on the cognitive effects of the linguistic prop-
erties are discussed. As to the question which expression should be
considered a metaphor, and which elements can be regarded as A- or B-term,
a test is provided in Section 4.4 on the categorization of the expressions, and
A- and B-term distribution.
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4.2 Psychology: Effects of linguistic properties
Processing a metaphor can be seen as a 'higher-order' cognitive activity.
Therefore, it is important to know the extent to which linguistic properties -
i.e. the sentence characteristics on word level - contribute to the processes
suggested by the three metaphor models. In this Section, psychological
studies on linguistic properties will be discussed. The results will be used
for the selection of stimulus materials, on the dimensions of orthography,
phonology, syntax, and word frequency. The actual test on this selection,
and on the A- and B-term distribution within the expressions, will be
performed in the categorization experiment, described in Section 4.3.
Controlling lexical ambiguity (homonymy), instance-category distribu-
tion, instance-category dominance, and again, word frequency will be post
hoc, because uniformity on these criteria beforehand, left too small a
stimulus set. Moreover, instance-category dominance can only be
determined after a feature elicitation experiment. The above criteria will
serve as a check list to account for possible covariances in the feature
elicitation, RT and EEG experiments.
Constraint 1: No expectations for spelling and rhyme
Reading rhyme in writing is not only the matching of words in a pure
phonological comparison, but also an implicit spelling or typographical
check in an orthographical comparison. Consequently, a match on the
phonological level, supported by a match on the orthographical level, could
reinforce the perceived similarity between the A- and B-term (cf. Jakobson
1981: 40).
The mingling of phonology and orthography may also be illustrated by
the findings of orthographic effects on rhyme monitoring, and of phono-
logical effects on visual word recognition. Seidenberg & Tanenhaus (1979)
reported that subjects showed no awareness of having accessed orthographic
information in a rhyming task. Reversely, Meyer, Schvaneveldt & Ruddy
(1975) showed that phonological information also was activated in visual
word recognition. In a Stroop paradigm used by Tanenhaus, Flanigan &
Seidenberg (1980) the same results were obtained for color naming
latencies.
Polich, McCarthy, Wang & Donchin (1983) and Kramer & Donchin
(1987) also found interactions between the effects of orthography and
phonology. In their studies, subjects compared visually presented word pairs
(e.g., match-patch, blare-stair, catch-watch, shirt-witch) for similarity on
orthographical and phonological dimensions. Subjects were asked to make
rapid decisions (match/no-match?), when word pairs were orthographically
and/or phonologically same or different. Polich et al. and Kramer et al.
found in RT as well as in the recorded EEG, that subjects were able to
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identify the orthographical and phonological characteristics of a word within
260 ms. Analyses of RT and EEG showed that readers were not able to skip
the orthographical analysis when asked to ignore the orthographical differ-
ences, but that they could skip the phonological analysis, when asked to
ignore phonological differences. Differences of one letter did not show any
significant effect on RT or EEG. Additional evidence for phonological and
orthographical interactions in the EEG was found by Rugg & Barrett (1987).
Rugg (1984) in a study on rhyme judgement, and Hoorn (1996) in a study
on interactions between phonology and semantics in reading small verses,
showed that one component in the EEG (the event related brain potential
N400) is also influenced by phonological mismatches, although it was
supposed to be sensitive to semantic mismatches only. Negative shifts in the
EEG - similar to N400 - were also found for phonological mismatches by
Sanquist, Rohrbaugh, Syndulko & Lindsley (1980). Rugg & Barrett (1987)
discriminated between a unilateral, right hemispheric, rhyme sensitive
N450, and a more bilateral, semantically sensitive N400, but they stressed
that these components can also be regarded as one, influenced by different
sources of information.
In short, orthographical encoding interacts with phonological encoding,
and both interact with semantic processing. For a fair test of the metaphor
models, the first constraint on the stimulus selection is that rhyme and
spelling anticipations for the B-term, based on the A-term or
surrounding context, ought to be eliminated. As suggested in Section 4.1,
this is best achieved by choosing expressions from poems written in free
verse, which have no predictable rhyme or spelling patterns.
Constraint 2: Small numbers of syllables and letters
Flesh (1948) presented a statistical formula for the measurement of
readability (comprehension difficulty), based on the number of words per
sentence and the number of syllables per word, the Reading Ease formula
(R.E.):
  Systematically select 100-word samples from the material to be rated
l  Determine the number of syllables per 100 words (w )
l  Determine the average number of words per sentence (s )
l l  Apply in equation R.E. = 206.835 - .846w  - 1.015 s
According to Flesh, the measurement of word length is an indirect measure-
ment of word complexity, which is, in turn, an indirect measurement of
abstraction. The more syllables the word has, the more complex the
abstraction level of the word is.  Stevens & Stone (1947) demonstrated the5
predictive power of this formula, yielding scores that correlated .7 with
subject ratings. Klare (1963: Table 1, 76-80) showed a summary of
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readability formulas, all focused on average sentence length in words, and
average word length in syllables. Differences of one letter in word length
usually have no effect on readability (Polich, McCarthy, Wang & Donchin
1983; Kramer & Donchin 1987).
Number of syllables within a word, and number of words within a sen-
tence can influence readability. Therefore, the second constraint on
stimulus selection demands that the number of letters and syllables in
the B-term, and the number of words in the expression are equal.
Constraint 3: Equal word frequency bandwidths
Literary metaphors consist of words. Two theories of metaphor processing,
comparison theory and anomaly theory, claim that the C-term of a metaphor
can be predicted from the feature sets of the single words. If this is valid,
familiarity of the word is a relevant variable. Since familiar words usually
describe familiar objects, they activate the largest feature sets. In turn, word
frequency is an aspect of familiarity. Familiar objects are often encountered,
so that the corresponding words are frequently used. As a rule of thumb,
words frequently used in a speech community refer to objects (or concepts)
that are highly familiar to that community.
  If the C-term of a metaphor can be derived from the isolated words, word
frequency might have an effect on the probability that the C-term will be
established at all. When a metaphor consists of two low-frequent words, the
chance that a C-term is formed may be reduced, because a smaller number
of features can be matched, or a smaller number of relations can be created.
In contrast, the probability of forming a C-term increases, when two high-
frequent words are used in the metaphor. As a consequence, word frequency
should be reflected in the feature elicitation rates and expression judgement
time. Note, however, that context may affect the identification of low-fre-
quent words and the elicitation of features.
The classic word frequency effect is that high-frequent words are recog-
nized faster than low-frequent words (Solomon & Postman 1952; Postman
& Conger 1954; Morton 1969; Rubenstein, Garfield & Millikan 1970;
Rubenstein, Lewis & Rubenstein 1971). Likewise, high-frequent meanings
of lexical ambiguities are recognized faster than low-frequent meanings
(Simpson 1981; Jastrzembski 1981). Furthermore, high- and low-frequent
meanings of lexical ambiguities evoke different electrocortical effects (Van
Petten & Kutas 1987).
However, a number of semantic variables overrule this straightforward
effect. Jastrzembski (1981) showed that a low-frequent word with multiple
meanings (or with a large cluster of meanings for an etymological derivation
of the word), is recognized faster than a high-frequent word with only one
meaning (or a small cluster for a derivation). Number of meanings or
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number of related meanings of a word, therefore, is more important to
lexical access than mere word frequency.
Moreover, tasks with high semantic loading also reduce the word fre-
quency effect. Balota & Chumbley (1984) showed that word frequency had
no influence on RT in a category verification task, which is supposed to
involve lexical access. Subjects matched a category name (e.g., bird) with an
exemplar of that category (e.g., robin), or with an exemplar of a different
category (e.g., sofa). Instance dominance (likelihood of producing the
exemplar given the category name) and category dominance (availability of
the category name given the exemplar) had strong effects on verification
time. However, there was no effect of word frequency on either correct yes-
or correct no-responses.6
Another factor that overrules the frequency effect is semantic priming.
Balota & Chumbley (1984) primed instances by their correct category,
which reduced the word frequency effect in correct yes-responses. Low-fre-
quent words were processed faster with an appropriate prime. Earlier
evidence for the effect of semantic priming on word frequency and lexical
access was found by James (1975), Becker (1979, 1980), and Whaley
(1978). However, Balota & Chumbley noticed that also correct no-responses
to inappropriate primes did not show word frequency effects. In other words,
correct verifications were insensitive to word frequency differences. Further
evidence was provided by Millward, Rice & Corbett (1975), finding word
frequency effects, neither for instance-category nor for category-instance
correct no-decisions. Balota & Chumbley argued that these results were not
predicted by older lexical access models. If in a verification task, a mis-
primed category evokes a correct no-response, these models expect word
frequency to independently affect response time, because the verification
requires lexical access.
In other words, subjects are able to make a 'short cut', deciding that if the
target (either an instance or a category) is not in the feature set of the prime
(category or instance), the expression is incorrect. Applied to metaphor pro-
cessing, subjects may not have to activate the B-term features, if the B-term
is not a feature of the A-term set. For anomalies, low frequency of the B-
terms possibly has no effect on response times for correct 'anomaly'
decisions, because the B-term is not in the A-term set, so that further pro-
cessing can be cancelled. If so, the variant of the anomaly model becomes
operative, suggesting that after 'not literal' decisions, anomalies are not
necessarily passing through the figurative stage of processing.
Lexical decision tasks (is the stimulus a word or not?) involve single
word recognition, without being primed by a context. In using a lexical
decision task, Balota & Chumbley elicited the classic finding, that word fre-
quency has a large effect on RT. On the other hand, category dominance and
instance dominance of the word also influenced RT in the lexical decision
task, and in fact, independently from variation in word frequency. They
argued that this is odd, because lexical access models assume that no
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semantic processing takes place before lexical access. Balota & Chumbley
suggested that the lexical decision task may be the wrong tool for studying
lexical access, because semantic processing clearly influences the effect of
word frequency on lexical access.
The conclusion as to the effect of word frequency on lexical access is that
there is an effect on the single word level. However, this effect may be
overruled by context priming, the number of meanings or related meanings
of a word, category dominance or instance dominance. In the feature
elicitation experiment described in Chapter 5, a single term condition is
employed, which may yield smaller feature sets for low-frequent words.
Therefore, the third constraint on stimulus selection is that particularly
the B-terms should have equal word frequency bandwidths. Section 4.5
shows that this is a problem for anomalous B-terms.
Constraint 4: Priming dissolves lexical ambiguity (homonymy)
Almost any word has multiple meanings, or at least activates more than one
related meaning, and often, ambiguity is intended in metaphors or poetry. If
response times slow down by unscrambling lexical ambiguities (e.g., 'star' in
'the sun is a star'), this could interfere with the processes of interest. The
point is that the metaphor theories have different assumptions on the
encoding phase. Word encoding starts with lexical access ('find A-term',
'find B-term'), which is followed by feature activation.
As mentioned, comparison and anomaly theory claim fixed feature sets.
Encoding the terms remains unaffected by prior knowledge, comprehension
of the context, or any other concept-driven analysis. In contradiction with
the findings of Balota & Chumbley, variation in lexical access of the B-term
as a function of (instance or category) dominance in the A-term set is not
expected. Feature activation in the comparison and anomaly view implies
automatic processing in the encoding phase, which is in line with theories of
lexical access, put forward by Posner & Snyder (1975), Posner (1978),
Shiffrin & Schneider (1977), Hasher & Zacks (1979), and Forster (1979). 
Contrariwise, interaction theory insists on the creativity of the reader, the
bias of context, the individual's world knowledge and controlled processing,
which implies a less data-driven analysis. These ideas are more in line with
the results reported by Meyer, Schvaneveldt & Ruddy (1975), Rumelhart &
Ortony (1977), and Fischler & Bloom (1979). Feature activation in the inter-
action view implies nonautonomous lexical access, which means that the
multiple meanings of, for instance, lexical ambiguities are solved by the
context, while in the comparison and anomaly view, multiple meanings
would survive.
In the lexical ambiguity literature, there is evidence for both automatic
activation and controlled selection of meaning. The crucial question seems
to be which moment in the encoding phase is broached by the experiment,
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i.e. the moment of measurement defined by the inter-stimulus-interval
between a contextual prime and an ambiguous target. The initial encoding of
a word on the orthographical and phonological level, and the access of
multiple meanings, take place between about 150-300 ms. after word
presentation (Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman & Bienkowski 1982; Polich,
McCarthy, Wang & Donchin 1983; Kramer & Donchin 1987; Till, Mross &
Kintsch 1988). Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman & Bienkowski (1982)
reported six experiments, in which subjects responded almost immediately
(within 200 ms) to both meanings of an ambiguity. For ambiguities
consisting of two nouns, or a noun and a verb as their competitive meaning,
this result was found in various conditions, among which were priming con-
texts. In other words, in the early encoding of the word, subjects did not use
context primes, world or language knowledge, to select a meaning from a
lexical ambiguity, thus, showing almost immediate multiple access of mean-
ings. The only exception - selective access - was found by Seidenberg et al.
(1982) for noun-noun ambiguities in strong priming contexts. However, the
authors did not explain this result in terms of top-down analysis, but as a
result of different activation levels, because the nonpriming context
condition still yielded multiple access. Context-independent access of
multiple meanings in sentences was also found by Swinney (1979),
Tanenhaus, Leiman & Seidenberg (1979), Onifer & Swinney (1981) and
Kintsch & Mross (1985). Lexical ambiguities embedded in sentences
facilitated lexical decisions for related targets, even if these targets were
related to meanings that were different from those implied by the sentence
context.
Evidence for meaning selection as a function of context priming on
longer latencies (500 ms.) in the encoding phase, was also reported by
Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman & Bienkowski (1982), using, among others,
noun-noun ambiguities in contextually appropriate and inappropriate
contexts. At short latencies both meanings were accessed, independent of
the type of context prime, whereas at longer latencies only the contextually
appropriate meaning was facilitated. Further support for these results is
found in Glucksberg, Kreuz & Rho (1986) and Schvaneveldt, Meyer &
Becker (1976).
Reasoning from these data, the comparison and anomaly model could be
said to describe the initial, early, encoding of words. The assumption of
fixed feature sets is supported by the finding that multiple meanings and
related meanings are automatically accessed. It seems an overlearned
operation, perhaps anchored in physiology. The interaction model, on the
other hand, could be said to describe the final part of this operation: A rapid
selection, which occurs at the end of the encoding, sensitive to contextual
information and other concept-driven analysis.
With respect to the stimulus materials, the fourth constraint declares
that lexical ambiguities should be excluded from the set. Lexical
ambiguities in the stimulus materials may remain active in single term
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conditions, and in conditions of weak (metaphors) or inappropriate
(anomalies) priming. The only disambiguating contexts are literals in ex-
pression conditions. In Section 4.5 which of the selected stimuli might
suffer from lexical ambiguity will be discussed.
Constraint 5: Category verification could intermingle
Metaphors consist of words, and words establish elementary categories with
which people structure their world (Rosch 1973; Rosch & Mervis 1975;
Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Braem 1976). Boddy & Weinberg
(1981) reported that response latencies are shorter and brain potentials (N1-
P2) larger for responses to positive than to negative instances of primed cat-
egories. Polich (1985) reported negative shifts (N400) for instance-category
mismatches in comparison with matches.
Literal expressions, such as 'the monkey is an animal', might include cat-
egory verification, matching the positive instance 'monkey' with the category
'animal'. In 'the monkey is a cauliflower' the incorrect instance 'monkey' is
applied to the category 'vegetables', but the expression might also be judged
as a metaphor. If metaphor processing can be explained by category
verification and by finding or creating similarity, how then, are these
dimensions related? How homogeneous should the stimulus groups be in
terms of instance-category distribution or instance-category dominance?
Certain aspects of category verification, such as dominance, appropri-
ateness, and category hierarchy, have an effect on sentence processing. As
stated earlier, instance dominance and category dominance influence the
processing time of category verification (Balota & Chumbley 1984). Both
phenomena can be explained in terms of feature elicitation.
Instance dominance is defined as the likelihood of producing the
exemplar given the category name, and category dominance as the availabil-
ity of the category name given the exemplar (Balota & Chumbley 1984).
Thus, if a literal expression combines a nondominant instance with a
nondominant category, the processing of this expression could take much
longer than a metaphor that uses a dominant instance and a dominant cat-
egory. This can be controlled by searching the feature set of the A-term for
the presence of the B-term, and searching the feature set of the B-term for
the presence of the A-term. The relative frequency of mentioning will ex-
press the power of dominance, and indicates their mutual associability. In
this respect, it can be decided whether the stimulus groups are
homogeneous. Chapter 5 describes the results of such an analysis.
Other aspects, such as category hierarchy, could also influence the re-
sponse to an expression. Higher-order categories, such as 'furniture', have
instances ('chair' and 'table'), which themselves could be seen as in-
termediate categories for very specific instances, such as 'rocking chair' or
'kitchen table'. The latter could be viewed as the lowest category. Rosch
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(1973), Rosch & Mervis (1975) and Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson &
Boyes-Braem (1976) showed ample support that the intermediate categories
are preferred to the higher- and lower-order categories for the semantic
organization of the world. The higher-order categories are too abstract, and
the lower-order categories too specific, to be frequently used in daily
situations.
Reasoning from these results, preference to the intermediate categories
may increase their frequency of use. Furthermore, the repetitive use of these
categories may influence the degree of familiarity. Repeating a word - in this
case a category name - has shown to increase its familiarity and
meaningfulness (FM-value), which in turn, decreases recognition speed
(Scarborough, Gerard & Cortese 1979). It is stressed by Balota & Chumbley
(1984) that higher-order semantic processing is influenced by the familiarity
and meaningfulness of a word. As this FM-value is increased, RT is
speeded, irrespective of the initial low word frequency. In contrast, RT
slows down when the FM-value is lower, despite a potential high word fre-
quency. The FM-value can be increased by contextual priming (using appro-
priate categories and instances) or by repetition. As pointed out earlier, fam-
iliarity also may have a strong effect on feature elicitation. The more famili-
ar an object is, the more features may be produced.7
It appears, then, that expressions which combine intermediate categories
with higher-order categories ('the monkey is an animal', 'the monkey is a
fish') will elicit more features for the A- than for the B-term. These
intermediate categories can be an instance from either an appropriate or
inappropriate higher-order category. Furthermore, expressions that combine
higher-order categories with instances from these categories ('emotions are
love') or instances from other categories ('emotions are roses'), will elicit
fewer features for the A- than for the B-term.
Thus, the fifth constraint on the stimulus selection is that expression
types should not differ in the instance-category distribution over A- and
B-term. However, the results of the expression categorization experiment
(Section 4.4) show that subjects reliably differentiated among the expression
types, only if a particular instance-category distribution coincided with an
expression type. Therefore, instance-category distribution may be a decisive
aspect for distinguishing among literals, metaphors, and anomalies.
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Constraint 6: Equal syntax and fixed A- and B-term distribution
It is not self-evident that the compounds of an expression are analyzed in
one unique way. The sentence 'the evening is a rooster...'  may be analyzed8
syntactically as subject - auxiliary verb - nomalized predicate (evening is
rooster). However, the same sequence of words can also be read as
nomalized predicate - auxiliary verb - subject, although the articles in the
above example are strong cues for the first reading. Nonetheless, the second
reading is possible, and in a metaphor with e.g., equal articles ('the raspberry
is the heart', Table 4.0), the problem is less hypothetical.
 In the second reading 'evening' becomes the nomalized predicate and is
stressed by inversion (a well known poetic tool).  In that case, the metaphor9
may also be read as if a rooster is like the evening and not, as in the subject-
first reading, the evening is like a rooster. In line with this idea, it is also not
self-evident that the A- and B-term distribution follows the syntactical
analysis, where subject = A-term and nomalized predicate = B-term. It could
be argued that people sometimes read 'the evening is a rooster...' as subject -
auxiliary verb - nomalized predicate, and still interpret the comparison
between the A- and B-term the other way round. This would suggest that the
A- and B-term distribution does not necessarily depend on grammar, and is
influenced by other mechanisms as well. Table 4.0 gives three examples of
ambiguous A- and B-term distributions, not reaching significance (p > .05)
in a two-tailed sign test. How these data were obtained is described in
Section 4.3.
It is also not necessarily, that A- and B-term distribution simply follows
the plain order of appearance. Feature set size may be a factor of influence
as well. Malgady & Johnson (1980) reported that 70% of the subjects
preferred a low-salient term (poor of distinctive features) in first position,
and a high-salient term (rich of distinctive features) in second position, as
the right order of comparison for maximizing rated similarity in a metaphor.
In other words, if a metaphor com-
Table 4.0: Three examples of ambiguous A- and B-term distribution (N = 10). Original
versions in bold print.
_________________________________________________________________________
judged as A-term
de stilte is jouw stem silence 30%10
the silence is your voice voice 70%
de framboos is het hart raspberry 70%11
the raspberry is the heart heart 30%
de regen is mijn bloed rain 70%12
the rain is my blood blood 30%
_____________________________________________________________
bines a high-salient term in first position, and a low-salient in second
position, the order of comparison might just be reversed, despite the order of
appearance or grammatical constraints. Although articles are expected to
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help determine A- and B-term, the number of activated features can interfere
with this.
In other words, the sixth constraint emphasizes that A- and B-term
distribution ought to be fixed for all expressions (A-term first, B-term
second), which can only be determined by testing. Section 4.3 discusses
such a test.
Summary statements as to the effects of the basic linguistic properties are
that orthography interacts with phonology, which sometimes interacts with
meaning. Therefore, nonrhyming metaphors are selected from poems
without systematic rhyme patterns (constraint 1). The number of syllables
and letters influences readability, therefore, metaphors are selected that have
monosyllabic B-terms with no more than four or five letters (constraint 2).
Word frequency probably shows severe effects in single term conditions, so
that metaphors are selected with B-terms in the same frequency domain
(constraint 3). Lexical ambiguity may inhibit meaning selection, unless the
ambiguity is dissolved by the context. However, in this stimulus set, lexical
ambiguities will probably remain active, because poems are rather weak
primers. Controls will be provided for deviant results (constraint 4). Cat-
egory verification may be systematically correlated with the expression
types, although this is not allowed (constraint 5). However, instance-cat-
egory distribution may be a defining feature for different expression types.
Finally, the selected metaphors should have the 'A is B'-form, here, a
nomalized predicate (two nouns). Since A- and B-term may not be
distributed in agreement with syntactical analysis, their distribution has to be
tested (constraint 6).
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4.3 A priori stimulus selection on linguistic properties
Fifty one metaphors were selected from (fragments of) modern Dutch and
Flemish poetry, written between 1920 and 1991. They consisted of two
nouns, the second of which was monosyllabic and 4 or 5 letters long, in
principle nonrhyming, without systematic spelling matches, and tentatively
matched on word frequency.  The simple form 'A is B' was chosen, so that13
the syntax of the expression would not suggest a metaphor. In a simile, the
comparison is marked by the word 'like', which allows subjects to
immediately perform a 'figurative strategy'. By omitting similes, subjects
still may expect literal or anomalous endings. From the 51 metaphors, 51 lit-
eral expressions were constructed, by choosing a higher-order category for
the second term, of which the first term was an instance (e.g., 'their house is
a premises'). Fifty one anomalous expressions were formed, by substituting
the B-term for a word that has meaning in one context only (e.g., in proverb
like expressions and stock phrases), although it is not a nonword. Excluded
from the selection were metaphors with rhyming or orthographically
matching B-terms, such as 'de held is een speld' (the hero is a pin),  or 'de14
slaap is een slaaf' (the sleep is a slave).15
4.4 Test on the selection: Expression categorization and A- and B-
term distribution
As described in the previous Section, 51 metaphors were matched on the
relevant variables. For each metaphor, having the 'A is B'-form, a literal and
an anomalous version were constructed, by substituting the B-term for a
word, which was supposed to make the expression literal or anomalous.
This set of 153 expressions was doubled, by reversing the sentence order of
each expression. Thus, all the expressions that had an 'A is B'-form, also had
a 'B is A'-counterpart. The total list consisted of 306 expressions.
Five groups of subjects took part, all undergraduates in literature and
modern languages, Dutch native speakers, between 20 and 28 years old.
They volunteered in a selection task, in which they decided whether an ex-
pression was 'literal', 'metaphoric' or 'anomalous'. As a second task, subjects
judged which of the two terms (A or B) was the focus in the expressions and
which was the term of comparison.
   The expressions were displayed on a monitor. Each expression was pres-
ented in two orders (never appearing after each other): 'the A is a B', and 'a B
is the A'. This was done to avoid subjects from developing a simple strategy
in the second task, namely, indicating the first term of all expressions as the
A-term. All expressions were presented in pseudo-random order and
stimulus sets were randomly distributed over subjects.
Subjects categorized the expressions by typing an 'L' for literal, 'M' for
metaphor and 'A' for anomaly at cursor position, behind the expression. In
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the subsequent task, subjects underlined the focus term of the expressions,
and put the term of comparison between brackets. In the instructions, ex-
pression types were exemplified by 'the monkey is an animal' for literals,
and 'love is a rose' for metaphors. Anomalies were defined as neither literal
nor metaphoric, but nonsensical expressions, without giving an example.
For the second task, the A-term was described as 'the focus term of an ex-
pression' and the B-term as 'the term that the focus term is compared with'.
The words 'A-term' and 'B-term' were not used in the instructions. It was
stressed that the focus term was not necessarily identical to the grammatical
subject, to avoid that subjects merely performed a syntactical analysis.
After testing in a first group of 10 subjects, metaphors were removed that
scored poorly (p >> .05) on category judgement or A- and B-term distribu-
tion in a two-tailed sign test. Their literal and anomalous counterparts were
removed accordingly. Metaphors that were marginally significant (p . .05)
were considered for retesting. Literal and anomalous expressions that did
not reach significance were repaired. Metaphoric, literal and anomalous ex-
pressions were counterbalanced and the experiment was repeated with
another group of 10 subjects as described above. This procedure was
repeated exhaustively with more groups of 10 subjects, until three category
sets were formed of 29 metaphors, 27 literals and 27 anomalies. In these last
categories, two expressions fewer survived, because it was impossible to
find words within the word frequency boundaries that were monosyllabic,
not rhyming, and yet acceptable for the subjects. Fortunately, these missing
expressions were the counterparts of metaphors with identical first terms
('death is a door' vs. 'death is a wall'; 'life is a bread' vs. 'life is a journey').
For the experiments described in Chapter 5 up to 7, this implies that these
missing cases can be replaced by repeating a counterpart of a metaphor with
an identical A-term. 
Thus far, the conditions under which the expressions were tested, differed
for every norm group. The number of expressions varied, because poorly
performing expressions were removed, and the context for making the
judgements changed, because other poorly performing expressions were
altered. Finally, a group of 18 subjects judged the 29 metaphors, 27 literals
and 27 anomalies that remained from the previous experiments. For the last
two categories, two extra filler expressions were inserted, which were
judged as literal or anomalous in the previous experiments, although the
matching metaphor was not judged as metaphoric. In Table 4.1 the results
for expression categorization, and A- and B-term distribution are presented
for the last norm group of 18 subjects, showing that all selected expressions
reached significance on both categorization and A- and B-term distribution.
The Notes 16-44 show (fragments of) the poetic contexts.
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Table 4.1: Expression categorization, and A- and B-term  distribution results for expressions.
Decisions for 'metaphor' are indicated by 'M', for 'literal' by 'L' and for 'anomaly' by 'A'. For
all selected expressions p < .05, according to a two-tailed sign test (N = 18). For p < .001,
rows are left empty. Superscripts refer to the literary sources.
     Expressions     Translation M L A p = focus p =
de dood is een
deur16
feit
bubs
death is a
door
fact
bunch
18
 2
17  1
16 .002
death
17
18
17
de dood is
een muur17
het eind
een kien
death is
a wall
the end
a bingo
18
 2
 1
16
17
.002
death
18
18
17
de dood is een
reis18
death is a
journey 18
death
18
ons hart is
ons park19
een spier
een zier
our heart is
our park
a muscle
a whit
14
 2
18
4
16
.030
.002
heart
17
18
17
de haven is een
mond20
oord
snars
the harbor is a
mouth
place
know nothing
16
 1
 2
 2
17
16
.002
.002
harbor
18
18
17
de haven is een
tuin21
plek
plop
the harbor is a
garden
place
pop
18
 1
 1
17
17
harbor
17
18
17
ons hoofd is een
berg22
ding
gooi
our head is a
mountain
thing
throw
16
 1
 3
17
 2
15
.002
.008
head
18
17
17
mijn hoofd is een
haan23
deel
trant
my head is a
rooster
part
trend
14
 2 16
 4
18
.030
.002
head
18
17
18
de huid is een
vrouw 24
laag
taks
the skin is a
woman
layer
tax
17
 2
 2
16
 1
16
.002
.002
skin
16
18
16
.002
.002
hun huis is een
graf25
pand
wrik
their house is a
grave
premises
jerk
17
 1
 1
18
17
house
17
18
17
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het kind is een
maan26
mens
slip
the child is a
moon
human being
slip
14
 3
18
 4
15
.030
.008
child
17
18
17
zijn lach is een
lied27
klank
prak
his laughter is a
song
sound
left over
18
 3
 2
15
16
.008
.002
laughter
17
18
17
het leven is een
brood28
feit
lurf
life is a
bread
fact
collar
17
 2
 2
 1
16
16
.002
.002
life
18
18
16 .002
het leven is een
reis29
life is a
journey 18
life
18
de maan is een 
dier30
ding
piel
the moon is a(n)
animal
thing
fumbler
16
4
18
 2
14
.002
.030
moon
18
17
17
de mens is een
steen31
soort
snap
man is a
stone
species
snap
17
 1
18
 1
17
man
18
18
17
deze middag is een
mand32
tijd
krats
this afternoon is a
basket
time
cheap buy
14
 2
15
 4
 3
16
.030
.008
.002
afternoon
18
18
17
je mond is een
huis33
plek
rats
your mouth is a
house
place
hotchpotch
16
 3
 2
15
16
.002
.008
.002
mouth
18
18
17
de nacht is een
vrouw 34
tijd
dunk
the night is a
woman
time
estimate
18
 2
18
16 .002
night
17
18
17
de poëzie is een
beer35
taal
brui
poetry is a
bear
language
give up
16
 3
 1
15
 2
17
.002
.008
poetry
18
18
18
poëzie is een
beest36
kunst
klak
poetry is a(n)
beast
art
clack
17
 1
 2
17
 1
16 .002
poetry
18
18
17
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de poëzie is een
mens37
tekst
snars
poetry is a
human being
text
know nothing
18
 1
 2
17
16 .002
poetry
15
17
16
.008
.002
de stilte is een
brug38
feit
lurf
the silence is a
bridge
fact
confusion
17
 2
 1
16
 1
17
.002
silence
18
16
17
.002
mijn toekomst is een
hart39
feit
kluts
my future is a
heart
fact
confusion
17
 3
15
 1
 3
15
.008
.008
future
18
18
18
onze vrede is een
huid40
recht
pats
our peace is a
skin
right
slap
16
 2
 1
16
 2
17
.002
.002
peace
18
18
17
de woede is een
slang41
drift
zwik
rage is a
snake
temper
bunge
17
 3
 3
15
 1
15
.008
.008
rage
17
18
17
de zanger is
zijn lied42
een mens
zijn keer
the singer is
his song
a human being
his turn
14
 2
 3
18
 1
16
.030
.002
singer
18
18
16 .002
de zee is een
buik43
plek
gros
the sea is a
belly
place
gross
17
 2
17
 1
 1
16 .002
sea
17
18
16 .002
de zon is een
druif44
ster
drom
the sun is a
grape
star
mob
16
 2
 3
16
 2
15
.002
.002
.008
sun
17
18
17
In Section 4.2 it was argued that A- and B-term distribution (which term is
the A-term, which is the B-term?) does not necessarily follow syntactical
analysis (subject = A-term, nomalized predicate = B-term), or the plain order
of appearance (first term = A-term, second term = B-term). Expressions with
an ambiguous focus (p > .05) were sifted out. They appeared to be ex-
pressions with either equal articles ('the wind is the tree'),  or combinations45
of definite articles and possessive pronouns (cf. Table 4.0, Section 4.2).
Table 4.1 shows that the selected expressions mostly combine definite
articles or possessive pronouns for the A-term with indefinite articles for the
B-term. In these cases, the deictic element of the definite articles and
possessive pronouns, and the syntactic subject in first position, coincide
with the A-term focus. Therefore, probably no asymmetries between
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syntactical analysis and A- and B-term distribution will occur, which
otherwise, might have obstructed the understanding of the expressions.
There are two exceptions to the demand of novelty in the metaphor set:
'Death is a journey' and 'live is a journey'. Although these metaphors are not
idiomatic, they are already quite conventional. There are also two exceptions
to the demand of free verse. The contexts of 'the harbor is a mouth' and 'the
harbor is a garden' show end rhyme and sonnet form. Yet, analysis of the
data in Chapter 5 and 6 without these stimuli did not alter the effects.
Steen (personal communication) stated that no checks are provided on the
effects of the context on the expressions (Note 16-44). There may be unwar-
ranted differences in the way A- and B-term are primed. Thus, the way in
which the one expression is interpreted, may differ from the other, and
therefore, obfuscate the results.
True as this may be, in the next Chapters, effects are controlled by quasi-
F to see whether they are systematic on the stimulus level, also in context. If
the effects that are predicted by the theories are not robust, they may be
unimportant. On the other hand, these effects may be so subtle that
uniformity of the contexts is a must (yet impossible to establish in natural
texts).
In this study, context should be seen as a diffuse primer, in which the
processing of the stimuli may differ from the more clear priming in
expression. In a way, context could be viewed as adding extra noise to
expression to see whether the effects still hold. Yet, if there are differences,
it cannot be told exactly which aspects of context are responsible. The
precise effects of context require much more preliminary research. The only
question that will be answered here is whether there is a general tendency in
adding poetic context or not.
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4.5 Discussion for psychology: Post hoc controls of the constraints
3, 4, and 5
Word frequencies per expression type
Table 4.2 shows the mean word frequencies, which are calculated over all
unique terms per term type (A-term, literal, metaphoric, and anomalous B-
term). The values are sampled from the 42,380,000 words in the CELEX
lexical database (Baayen, Piepenbrock & Van Rijn 1993). They consider the
frequencies (frq) available for wordforms (CELEX list dfw), and their
logarithmic transformation values (lgv), the latter of which emphasizes that
the difference between a frequency of one and two is psychologically greater
than between 1000 and 1001 (Burnage 1990: 3-101). Since the expressions
were selected from natural texts (not designed for experimental purposes),
certain words appear more often within a term type. For this reason, the
number (N) of unique terms differs.
Table 4.2: Mean word frequencies (frq) and logarithmic transformation
values (lgv) calculated over all unique terms per term type. Frequencies and
logarithmic values are drawn from the 42,380,000 words in the CELEX
lexical database.
_____________________________________________________________
frq lgv
Term type mean sd mean sd N
A-terms 7824.32 7444.00 2.03 .54 22
literal B-terms 6354.21 9662.39 1.73 .65 19
metaphoric B-terms 5191.77 7060.17 1.76 .54 26
anomalous B-terms  768.76 3601.55   .21 .56 25
_____________________________________________________________
Could the four term types in Table 4.2 be different word frequency groups,
which might interfere with the responses predicted by the metaphor models?
Or can the word frequency differences among the four term types be
ascribed to random variation? A Oneway-ANOVA (Scheffé and LSD)
showed that certain word frequency differences among the means of the four
3,88term types were not coincidental, neither for frq (F  = 4.38, p = .006), nor
3,88for lgv (F  = 51.00, p = .000). According to Scheffé, the effect on frq was
due to the difference between A-terms and the lower-frequent anomalous B-
terms. Least squares differences (LSD) - which allow between-groups differ-
ences to appear very quickly - found that all other term types were higher-
frequent than the anomalous B-terms. With regard to lgv, both Scheffé and
LSD indicated that anomalous B-terms were low-frequent compared to A-
terms, literal and metaphoric B-terms. Comparable results were obtained
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while using the data for lemmas (CELEX list dfl) and two subsets from Uit
den Boogaart (1975), each consisting of 120,000 words: Literary novels and
short stories, and total written language.
Thus, systematic differences in word frequency were mainly caused by
the anomalous B-terms, which can be regarded a separate word frequency
group. Hence, word frequency may have an effect on the differences in
feature set size and shared set size (Table 5.11, Appendix Chapter 5), reac-
tion times (Table 6.3, Appendix Chapter 6), and electrocortical effects
between the anomalous B-terms in comparison with all other term types.
It may be asked why these low-frequent words were used to create anom-
alous B-terms. The reason is simply that subjects - students of literature -
recognized an intended anomaly as a metaphor as soon as a higher-frequent
word was employed for the B-term. In other words, it was unavoidable to
rely on more extreme cases to obtain a stable anomaly set.
Lexical ambiguities per expression type
What is the criterion for lexical ambiguity? Lexical ambiguous terms may
be those words with more entrances (irrespective of part of speech) in the
dictionary. In the Dutch dictionary Van Dale (1984), lexical ambiguities
(homonyms) are indicated by Roman numerals. Table 4.3 shows the thus
defined ambiguous terms in the expression set of Table 4.1.
Table 4.3: Lexical ambiguous terms in the stimulus set, as indicated by Roman numerals for
homonyms in Van Dale (1984). L = literal, M = metaphor, A = anomaly. Translations of
terms are found in Table 4.1.
_________________________________________________________________________
A-terms B-terms 
L M A
dood eind deur kien
hart spier muur gooi
maan ding reis taks
deel park prak
laag berg lurf
pand maan piel
klank dier snap
recht beer krats
ster beest rats
oord hart dunk
slang klak
kluts
pats
zwik
gros
drom
_________________________________________________________________________
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What may the effect be of ambiguous terms for the experiments to come? In
the feature elicitation experiment (Chapter 5), average feature set size for
ambiguities may be larger, because more meaning layers are present. Lexical
ambiguous terms probably increase sentence verification times as well.
Subjects may check which meaning of the ambiguous term is appropriate to
the expression, before making a decision. Thus, lexical ambiguity must be
controlled for in explaining variances for terms within expression type.
These controls are found in Table 5.12 (Appendix Chapter 5), and Table 6.5
(Appendix Chapter 6).
Instance-category distribution per expression type
Instances of higher-order categories may be categories themselves for in-
stances of a lower order. 'Botany' may be a higher-order category for the
instances 'plants' and 'flowers'. 'Flowers', on the other hand, may be
considered an intermediate category for the instances 'tulips' and 'roses'. In
turn, 'roses' may be lower-order categories for the complete variety of
existing roses. Theoretically, the subdivision is infinite and arbitrary. How-
ever, empirically, subjects prefer to use intermediate categories over higher
and lower-order categories (Rosch & Mervis 1975).
Regarding the instance-category distribution of the expression types in
Table 4.1, all literal expressions consist of an instance as A-term and an ap-
propriate category as B-term. The literal B-terms are the widest categories in
the expression set, such as 'fact', 'sort', 'time', and 'place'. This may be
demonstrated by making a simple inversion. In 'the harbor is a place', all
harbors are places, but not all places are harbors; in 'the sun is a star', all
suns are stars, but not all stars are suns; in 'our heart is a muscle', all our
hearts are muscles, but not all muscles are hearts. The A-terms of the ex-
pressions thus can be regarded as intermediate categories, which are appro-
priate instances of the higher-order categories of the B-terms. Hence, pro-
cessing the literal expressions will probably involve category verification
from an instance to a category.
Processing the metaphors (e.g., 'my head is a rooster') will probably in-
volve the matching of an instance in the A-term ('head') with an instance
from an inappropriate category in the B-term ('rooster'). Since instances from
higher-order categories ('body parts' and 'animals') are intermediate cat-
egories themselves, two inappropriate intermediate categories are matched. 
The compounds of the anomalies are an intermediate category for the A-
term, which must be compared with an inappropriate instance for the B-
term. This instance is very specific, in that it has a strong contextually bound
meaning in the Dutch language. It is hard to think of any more specific
instances belonging to these lower-order categories, because the words
themselves are almost meaningless.
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In short, Table 4.1 shows literal expressions that match an instance with
an appropriate higher-order category, metaphors that match two inappropri-
ate instances (or two inappropriate intermediate categories), and anomalies
that match an intermediate category with an instance from an inappropriate
lower-order category.
For the feature elicitation experiments, discussed in Chapter 5, this prob-
ably means that the A-terms and metaphoric B-terms evoke the largest
number of features. According to Rosch (1973), the intermediate categories
are the best known, and are used most often. It could be argued, then, that
subjects will sum up the most features for what they know best. Since the
anomalous B-terms (lower-order categories) are the least frequently used
words (cf. Table 4.2), they probably evoke the least features. The higher-
order categories of the literal B-tarms supposedly take a position in between,
evoking moderate numbers of features. Since the literal expressions are the
only stimulus type with appropriate instances and categories, instance and
category dominance will be highest for these expressions, probably affecting
the response times (cf. Balota & Chumbley 1984) in the RT experiments
(Chapter 6). The distributions of instance-category dominance are found in
Table 5.13, Chapter 5.
4.6 Discussion for the theory of literature
The research discussed in Section 4.2 was not designed to investigate ques-
tions raised by the theory of literature. Nonetheless, the results can shed
some light on certain issues. The experiments discussed in Section 4.4
sorted out which expressions were considered metaphors, literals or anom-
alies, and how A- and B-term were distributed. In this Section, the ins and
outs of the selected expressions presented in Table 4.1 will be discussed,
and aspects which are of relevance to the theory of literature will be
stressed.
Reconsidering spelling and rhyme
Word pairs, similar to those suggested by Wellek & Warren (1955: 161-162)
(heart: part, tears: fears), were investigated by Polich, McCarthy, Wang &
Donchin (1983), and Kramer & Donchin (1987). These researchers studied
word pairs such as 'match-patch', 'blare-stair', 'catch-watch', 'shirt-witch',
which differed systematically in the congruency between the rhyme- and
spelling-dimension, thereby, emerging into 'the special problem of the eye-
rhyme' (Wellek & Warren 1955: 162).
The results of the studies by Polich et al. and Kramer et al. indicated that
the recognition of rhyme in such word pairs depended foremost on the
recognition of spelling matches (the eye-rhyme), after which the
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phonological rhyme was recognized. Thus, it may be concluded that reading
rhyme in writing is probably not the matching of words in a pure
phonological comparison, but also an implicit spelling or typographical
check in an orthographical comparison.
On the question whether rhyme interacts with meaning, studies by
Sanquist, Rohrbaugh, Syndulko & Lindsley (1980), Rugg (1984), Rugg &
Barrett (1987), and Hoorn (1996) might be of interest, in showing that
particularly rhyme mismatches (nonrhymes where rhymes were expected)
interacted with semantics. This is interesting, because from the point of view
of Wellek & Warren (1955) and Jakobson (1981), the largest interactions
with semantics are to be expected in rhyming conditions, not in nonrhyming
conditions.
Reconsidering meter as syllable count
Jakobson (1961: 252) reported that already in the beginning of this century,
statistics were employed for the investigation of poetry. This concerned the
count of syllables as a predictor for anticipation and surprise.
The Russian school of metrics owes some of its internationally echoed
achievements to the fact that some forty years ago such students as B.
Tomashevskij, expert both in mathematics and philology, skillfully
used Markov chains for the statistical investigation of verse; these
data, supplemented by a linguistic analysis of the verse structure, gave
in the early twenties a theory of verse based on the calculus of its
conditional probabilities and of the tensions between anticipation and
unexpectedness as the measurable rhythmical values, and the
computation of these tensions, which we have labeled 'frustrated
expectations', gave surprising clues for descriptive, historical,
comparative, and general metrics on a scientific basis (Jakobson 1961:
252).
In Wellek & Warren (1955), a review is given of these statistical methods.
However, their criticism of these methods is focused on the neglect of the
semantic aspect of detecting meter. Wellek & Warren (1955) state:
We may be doubtful about a good many features of the Russian the-
ories, but one cannot deny that they have found a way out of the
impasse of the laboratory on the one hand, and the mere subjectivism
of the musical metrics on the other. Much is still obscure and
controversial; but metrics has today restored the necessary contact
with linguistics and with literary semantics. Sound and meter, we see,
must be studied as elements of the totality of a work of art, not in
isolation from meaning (Wellek & Warren 1955: 176).
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How then, does this Russian meter statistics work, and how can it be con-
nected to a 'meaning count'? To start with the first question, Wellek &
Warren (1955: 174) stated that 'the statistical method used is very simple'.
In each poem or Section of a poem to be analyzed, one counts the
percentage of cases in which each syllable carries a stress. If, in a
pentameter line, the verse should be absolutely regular, the statistics
would show zero percentage on the first syllable, 100 per cent on the
second, zero on the third, 100 on the fourth, etc. This could be shown
graphically by drawing one line for the number of syllables and
another, vertically opposed to it, for the percentages. Verse of such
regularity, is of course, infrequent, for the simple reason that it is
extremely monotonuous. Most verse shows a counterpoint between
pattern and actual fulfillment e.g., in blank verse the number of cases
of accents on the first syllable may be rather high, a well-known
phenomenon described either as the "trochaic foot," or "hovering"
accent, or "substitution." In a diagram, the graph may appear flattened
out very considerably; but if it is still pentameter and intended as such,
the graph will preserve some general tendency toward culmination
points on syllables 2, 4, 6, and 8. This statistical method is, of course,
no end in itself. But it has the advantage of taking account of the
whole poem and thus revealing tendencies which may not be clearly
marked in a few lines. It has the further advantage of exhibiting in a
glance the differences between schools of poetry and authors (Wellek
& Warren 1955: 174).
The Russian meter statistics, in short, can be expressed as the average num-
ber of similar stress patterns (the 'feet') per sentence of a poem. This 'meter
value' of the poem, obtained by the syllable count of the Russian Formalists,
may be combined with a syllable count that expresses certain semantical
aspects of the poem, for instance, its readability, or understanding ease.
Flesh (1948) developed a measure for readability, which expresses the
reading ease of a text as a measure of the number of syllables per 100 words
and the number of words per sentence. The validity of Flesh's formula for
real readers is rather high, as investigated by Stevens & Stone (1947). Flesh
pointed out that word length is an indirect measurement of word complexity,
which is in turn an indirect measurement of abstraction. Generally speaking,
the more syllables the word has, the more the abstraction level of the word is
rated as complex by the reader.
How can these two syllable-counts - the Russian meter statistics and
Flesh's readability measure - be combined in a single study? Suppose, a
connection is assumed between a formal aspect of poetry e.g., a certain verse
foot (the anapaest 'cc!' versus the dactyl '!cc'), and a semantic aspect, its
abstraction level. The research could start with a statistical inventory of the
stress-patterns in poetry, which should result in a group of poems with a
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high average of anapaest meter for every poem, and a group of poems with a
high average of dactyl meter for every poem. A second statistical inventory
describes the average readability for every poem, as described by the Flesh
(1948) formula. Correlations could now be calculated between calculated
readability and calculated meter type, to see which meter type is connected
to what abstraction level.
An empirical control for this statistical correlation can be provided by
two groups of readers, one of which rates the readability of both the
anapaest and dactyl poems, and the other reads aloud these poems, while an
oscilloscope registers the stress patterns of the voice. The statistic inventory
of verse feet should now highly correlate with the voice stress patterning.
Similarly, the calculated readability should be highly correlated with the
reader's rated readability. Moreover, in a regression analysis, the correlation
between calculated readability and calculated meter type should be similar
to the correlation between rated readability and voice stress patterning, to
supply a full control of the assumed connection between meter and
abstraction level in semantics.
Klare (1963) provided a review of readability formulas, among which
Flesh's is one of the most popular. In connection to the study of literature,
Note 3 at the bottom of this Chapter could be of interest, where a sample of
literary metaphors is presented with a systematic difference in number of
letters and syllables of the B-term. An extended and adapted version of this
set could be used to further investigate the correlation between number of
syllables and degree of complexity, as predicted by Flesh's formula.
A connectionist model of meter is proposed by Hayward (1996), in which
the statistical (ir)regularities of poetic meter are analyzed by the computer.
With a fair degree of success, this model is capable of distinguishing, for
instance, Pope and Tennyson from Donne and Wordsworth in the way they
use poetic meter.
Reconsidering word frequency
Word frequency - the number of times a word is used by a speech com-
munity - is of interest to the comparison and anomaly view on metaphor
processing. These theories claim that the C-term of a metaphor can be
predicted from the single words. Seldomly used words are more difficult to
recognize than highly familiar words. The expressions in Table 4.1 are
checked and matched as much as possible on word frequency, because if the
literals would use very low-frequent words and the metaphors only high-fre-
quent ones, the differences in processing between the two expression types
could be explained in terms of word frequency, and not in terms of the
special metaphoric processes that the theories assume.
Furthermore, things of which we know little probably elicit fewer asso-
ciations (features) than familiar things. Thus, it could be argued that word
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frequency is correlated with feature elicitation, because frequency of use
might indicate a degree of familiarity to the speech community. Again, dif-
ferences in word frequency could lead to differences in the number of
features. In turn, this would have consequences for the metaphor theories in
that the chance to form a C-term changes. If high frequency of use is
connected with strong feature activation, the features of an A-term have
higher probabilities to be matched with B-term features, because the B-term
is feature-rich. Furthermore, a metaphor with a high-frequent B-term would
be processed easier than a metaphor with a low-frequent B-term. Things
could get complicated, if the processing of an anomaly with a high-frequent
B-term would be compared with the processing of metaphors with low-fre-
quent B-terms.
Psychological research discussed in Section 4.2 showed that, indeed,
word frequency has an effect on word recognition. Statistical analysis in
Section 4.5 on the word frequencies of the term types in Table 4.1 showed
that only the anomalous B-terms can be regarded as a separate word fre-
quency group, which may influence the number of elicited features (Table
5.11, Appendix Chapter 5), reaction times (Table 6.3, Appendix Chapter 6)
and EEG.
Reconsidering lexical ambiguity (homonymy)
Wellek & Warren (1955: 162) stated that 'the rhyming of homonyms (...) is a
form of punning'. Lexical ambiguities are words with multiple meanings,
and actually almost any word is somewhat ambiguous. Usually, context
primes the appropriate meaning, but in literature, this priming is often left
open, thus letting multiple meanings remain active. The psychological lit-
erature discussed in Section 4.2 showed that unscrambling an unprimed
ambiguity influences the processing of a word.
This effect of lexical ambiguity will probably be found in every condition
in the experiments to come. Table 4.3 in Section 4.5 summarizes the lexical
ambiguities in Table 4.1, showing that the anomalous B-terms count the
highest number of lexical ambiguities. As to the effects of ambiguity in
understanding these expressions, ad hoc controls will be performed in Table
5.12 (Appendix Chapter 5) and Table 6.5 (Appendix Chapter 6).
Another point of interest prompted by the psychological research into
lexical ambiguity is that in the early encoding of a word, all meanings of the
word become active - independent of contextual bias - after which the ap-
propriate meaning is selected with the help of contextual cues. The compari-
son and anomaly view assume that the encoding of a word results into a
fixed feature set. All meanings are activated, independent of context. The in-
teraction view, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of context in priming
the meaning of a word. Since none of the theories describe the time series of
the encoding phase (or any other phase for that matter), it is argued in
99
Stimulus selection: Reconsidering categories and groups of objects
Section 4.2 that both points of view could be right. The comparison and
anomaly view may describe the initial, early, encoding of words, in which
the fixed feature sets are automatically activated. This would support the
ideas of Šklovskij (1965) that normal speech activates highly automatized
meanings. The interaction view would describe the end product of this
encoding, where a rapid selection from the automatically accessed meanings
takes place. This selection would be sensitive to contextual information,
world and genre knowledge, which is in line with Šklovskij's idea that the
automatized meanings are renewed and made unfamiliar in literature.
Reconsidering categories and groups of objects
Wellek & Warren hinged the category membership of words as a part of
their semantic nesting; 'whether, for example, they belong to one or several
linguistic categories (parts of speech, different cases) or groups of objects'
(Wellek & Warren 1955: 161-162). In other words, when a word is a cat-
egory name, then the 'semantic sphere' of that word, consisting of a feature
set, will probably contain an appropriate instance. Reversely, when the word
is an instance, the 'semantic sphere' (the feature set) will probably contain
the category name. The probability that an instance is associated with a cat-
egory name is called instance dominance. The probability that a category
name is associated, given the instance, is called category dominance.
Instance and category dominance can be either high or low, and is expressed
by the average naming frequency of instance or category in a feature
elicitation experiment (Table 5.13, Chapter 5).
Psychological research as discussed in Section 4.2 showed that high cat-
egory and instance dominance in word combinations led to quick processing
of these combinations. The expressions shown in Table 4.1, are also word
combinations in which category verification (are instance and/or category
appropriate?) might play a role.
Psychological research also made clear that there are three types of categ-
ories that people use to organize the world. Lower-order categories (e.g.,
'panegyrics'), which are instances of intermediate categories (e.g., 'poetry'),
which are instances of higher-order categories (e.g., 'literature'). The
intermediate categories are most frequently used by the speech community.
In Section 4.2, it is argued that they can be assumed to elicit the highest
feature rates, and that they are processed the fastest. It is necessary,
therefore, to analyze the expression set of Table 4.1 (Section 4.5), to find out
if an expression type is systematically connected to a specific instance-cat-
egory distribution.
Table 4.1 shows literal expressions that match an instance for the A-term
with an appropriate higher-order category for the B-term (e.g., 'this
afternoon is a time', 'rage is a temper'). The metaphors consist of two inap-
propriate instances, or, put differently, two inappropriate intermediate categ-
100
Stimulus selection: Notes
1. A Homeric comparison combines several metaphors on different levels, often embedded
in the main sentence:
Like the sheep of the heath, pass
Late through the green evening light, so that who stands
On a moss-grown hill, sees them go
From the moor-edge and into a dark alley,
Around the corner - thus left that dark troop
Which she stood watching as long as the cries
Of birds still rose, the outstretched beach.
The above (own) translation is from the Dutch:
Zooals de schapen van de heide, laat
Door 't groene avondlicht gaan, dat wie staat
Op een bemosten heuvel, ze ziet gaan
Van den heizoom en in een donkre laan,
Den hoek om - zoo verliet die donkre troep
Die zij nazag zoolang nog het geroep
Van vogels opging, het gerekte strand.
Gorter, H. (1940). Mei, een gedicht. In: Herman Gorter, Mei, een gedicht. P.N. van Eyck
(Ed.). Elsevier, Amsterdam, 21.
2. 'Een vlies van mist'. Nijhoff, M. (1993). Midzomer. In: Gedichten, Deel 1, Teksten. W.J.
van den Akker & G.J. Dorleijn (Eds.). Van Gorcum, Assen, Maastricht, 228.
3. In the table of metaphor types drafted by Genette (1972: 30), this kind of metaphor is
classified as 'not motivated identifications'. These consist of A- and B-term , without 'like' or
'as'. Unlike the examples below, they also lack adjectives or verbs that might motivate the
metaphor:
ories. The anomalies match an intermediate category for the A-term, with an
instance from an inappropriate lower-order category for the B-term, which is
a very specific word, extracted from a proverb or stock phrase.
As discussed in Section 4.5, this probably results in high feature rates for
the literary metaphors, which use the best known, intermediate categories.
Intermediate feature rates will probably be found for the literal expressions,
which use less well known, higher-order categories for the B-term. The least
features will be activated by the anomalies, which combine a very specific
instance of even less well known, lower-order categories (here, usually stock
phrases) as a B-term.
Since the literal expressions are the only stimulus type that combines ap-
propriate instances and categories, instance and category dominance will be
the highest for this expression type, which also might have an effect on the
response times (see Balota & Chumbley 1984) in the RT experiments
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.
Notes:
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'My eye is an insatiable spider' (mijn oog is een onverzadigbare spin). Lucebert (1980).
Parcival. Val voor vliegengod. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 35.
'The eye is scientifically a repulsive apparatus' (Het oog is wetenschappelijk een weer-
zinwekkend apparaat). Lucebert (1993). Het oog. Van de roerloze woelgeest. De Bezige
Bij, Amsterdam, 11.
4. Schoonheid als wapen tegen oorlog is een zwaard van ijs. Enquist, A. (1991).
Chambord. Soldatenliederen. Amsterdam, De Arbeiderspers, 25.
5. This finding could be tested for the comprehensability of B-terms, with the set of literary
metaphors presented below. These metaphors are ordered from the B-term 's smallest
number of syllables to the B-term 's largest number of syllables. Within an equal-syllable
group, metaphors are ranked from the smallest number of letters to the largest. The B-terms
in the top section should thus be judged as easier to comprehend than the ones in the bottom
section of the list. For a more sophisticated test, equal replications for each group should be
found, matched on the relevant variables as discussed in Section 4.2.
One syllable, three letters width:
God is een pop, de duivel een mot (God is a puppet, the devil a moth) 
mijn keel is een pad (my throat is a trail)
de vaalt is zijn zee (the dunghill is his sea)
de dichter is een koe (the poet is a cow)
One syllable, four letters width:
de dag is zand (the day is sand)
de hond is taal (the dog is language)
de wind is de boom (the wind is the tree)
het huis is een veld (the house is a field)
angst is de veer (fear is the spring)
de smart is een ring (grief is a ring)
de etna is de zuil (the etna is the column)
de nevel is een boom (the haze is a tree)
de herder is de deur (the shepherd is the door)
onze vreugde is een huis (our joy is a house)
uw gezicht is een haan (your face is a rooster)
het gedicht is een zwam (the poem is a fungus)
poëzie is een cent (poetry is a penny)
de ontzetting is de gast (the appal is the guest)
de ontzetting is een stad (the appal is a town)
de ontzetting is een kies (the appal is a molar)
One syllable, five letters width:
hun oog is een steen (their eye is a stone)
mijn mond is nacht (my mouth is night)
jouw ziel is beeld (your soul is image)
de angst is een lucht (the fear is a sky)
de Lente is 'n feest (spring is a feast)
driekantige dame is een zwijn (three-sided lady is a swine)
de ontzetting is de bruid (the appal is the bride)
Two syllables, four letters width:
mijn stap is de adem (my step is the breath)
de gedachte is mijn echo (the thought is my echo)
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Two syllables, five letters width:
de dag is een wagen (the day is a coach)
de mens is mijn koude (man is my cold)
een hand is een leven (a hand is a life)
het hart is een hamer (the heart is a hammer)
je stem is een aster (your voice is an aster)
Two syllables, six letters width:
de zee is moeder (the sea is mother)
de koude is mijn kennis (my cold is my knowledge)
de liefde is een moeder (love is a mother)
het licht is de liefde (the light is the love)
zijn wekker is oorlog (his alarm-clock is war)
Eenzaamheid is een woning (lonelyness is a dwelling)
Two syllables, seven letters width:
de maan is de spiegel (the moon is the mirror)
poëzie is een stuiver (poetry is a penny)
de ontzetting is een bloedbad (the appal is a massacre)
de stem is een kiesschijf (the voice is a dial)
Three or more syllables, seven or more letters width:
onze duisternis is een obelisk (our darkness is an obelisk)
het water is een winterdas (the water is a winter tie)
het badzand is nu kolengruis (the bath sand is now coal-dust)
de zon is een hatende catalaan (the sun is a hating catalonian)
de duivel is een fonofaag, (the devil is a phonophage,
een cacafonofaag  a cacaphonophage)
Literary sources of the above metaphors (in order of appearance):
Claus, H. (1966). In het museum van Chicago. Gedichten 1948-1963. De Bezige Bij,
Contact, Amsterdam, Antwerpen, 216.
Lucebert (1974). Nympholalie. Verzamelde gedichten. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam,
235.
Ter Balkt, H.H. (1982). De vaalt. Machines! Maai ons niet, maai de rogge. Bloem-
lezing gedichten 1969-1979. De Harmonie, Amsterdam, 12.
Achterberg, G. (1985). De dichter is een koe. Verzamelde gedichten. Querido, Am-
sterdam, 101.
Campert, R. (1976). Vogels vliegen toch. Alle bundels gedichten. De Bezige Bij, Am-
sterdam, 33.
Elburg, J.G. (1975). Geen tijd. Gedichten 1950-1975. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam,
237.
Schierbeek, B. (1978). De derde persoon. Het boek ik; De andere namen; De derde
persoon. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 438.
Ter Balkt, H.H. (1978). 8 Het huis. Waar de burchten stonden en de snoek zwom .
De Harmonie, Amsterdam, 73.
Lodeizen, H. (1969). Angst. Nagelaten werk, gedichten 1948. Van Oorschot, Amster-
dam, 36.
Lodeizen, H. (1969). De hemel is een cirkel rondom mijn ellende. Nagelaten werk,
gedichten 1948. Van Oorschot, Amsterdam, 22-23.
Schierbeek, B. (1981). De gestalte der stem. De gestalte der stem; Het dier heeft een
mens getekend; Ezel mijn bewoner. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 40.
Campert, R. (1976). Een dag op aarde. Alle bundels gedichten. De Bezige Bij, Am-
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sterdam, 71.
Schierbeek, B. (1981). Het dier heeft een mens getekend. De gestalte der stem; Het
dier heeft een mens getekend; Ezel mijn bewoner. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 155.
Lucebert (1974). V. Verzamelde gedichten. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 125.
Lucebert (1974). Romance. Verzamelde gedichten. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 33.
Claus, H. (1966). Spreken 10. Gedichten 1948-1963. De Bezige Bij, Contact, Amster-
dam, Antwerpen, 185.
Habakuk II de balker (1970). Poëzie. Uier van het oosten. De Bezige Bij, Amster-
dam, 43.
Ter Balkt, H.H. (1986). De ontzetting. Verkeerde Raadhuizen. Nova Zembla, Arn-
hem, 34.
Ter Balkt, H.H. (ibid.).
Ter Balkt, H.H. (ibid.).
Nooteboom, C. (1984). Een doorregende landstreek. Vuurtijd, ijstijd, gedichten 1955-
1983. De Arbeiderspers, Amsterdam, 159.
Schierbeek, B. (1978). De derde persoon. Het boek ik; De andere namen; De derde
persoon. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 402.
Simpelaar, P. (1975). De Elyzéese velden van Zeeland. Verzamel de wolken op je ge-
mak. De Arbeiderspers, Amsterdam, 54.
Andreus, H. (1975). De sonnetten van de kleine waanzin, 3. Gedichten 1948-1974.
Uitgeversmij. Holland, Haarlem, 112.
Van Ostaijen, P. (1952). Music-Hall. Verzameld werk / poëzie. De Sikkel, Daamen,
Van Oorschot, Amsterdam, 13.
Simpelaar, P. (1975). Wees gerust 't is zoet volk. Verzamel de wolken op je gemak.
De Arbeiderspers, Amsterdam, 21.
Ter Balkt, H.H. (1986). De ontzetting. Verkeerde Raadhuizen. Nova Zembla, Arn-
hem, 34.
Van Ostaijen, P. (1952). Herinnering. Verzameld werk / poëzie. De Sikkel, Daamen
Van Oorschot, Amsterdam, 64.
Elburg, J.G. (1975). Astarte 1. Gedichten 1950-1975. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam,
237.
Elburg, J.G. (1975). Détour de france. Gedichten 1950-1975. De Bezige Bij, Am-
sterdam, 125.
Elburg, J.G. (1975). Leven is in strofen geschreven 2. Gedichten 1950-1975. De Be-
zige Bij, Amsterdam, 198.
Marsman, H. (1979). De hand van de dichter. Verzamelde gedichten. Querido, Am-
sterdam, 69.
Rodenko, P. (1975). Besneeuwd landschap, III, Woorden van brood. Tulpensnijder,
orensnijder, verzamelde gedichten. De Harmonie, Amsterdam, 81.
Lucebert (1974). V. Verzamelde gedichten. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 125.
Hillenius, D. (1971). De zee is een buik vol embryos. Tegen het vegetarisme. Van
Oorschot, Amsterdam, 46.
Elburg, J.G. (1975). Leven is in strofen geschreven 2. Gedichten 1950-1975. De Be-
zige Bij, Amsterdam, 198.
Elburg, J.G. (1975). Om met penselen op te tekenen. Gedichten 1950-1975. De Be-
zige Bij, Amsterdam, 191.
Lucebert (1974). Tajiri. Verzamelde gedichten. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 204.
Elburg, J.G. (1975). Leven is in strofen geschreven 2. Gedichten 1950-1975. De Be-
zige Bij, Amsterdam, 198.
Claus, H. (1966). Het klemwoord: huis, 12. Gedichten 1948-1963. De Bezige Bij,
Contact, Amsterdam, Antwerpen, 164.
Elburg, J.G. (1975). Om met penselen op te tekenen. Gedichten 1950-1975. De Be-
zige Bij, Amsterdam, 191.
Habakuk II de balker (1970). Poëzie. Uier van het oosten. De Bezige Bij, Amster-
dam, 43.
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Ter Balkt, H.H. (1986). De ontzetting. Verkeerde Raadhuizen. Nova Zembla, Arn-
hem, 34.
Vinkenoog, S. (1972). Een wereld: audio-visueel gedicht. Wonder boven wonder. De
Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 29.
Lucebert (1974). V. Verzamelde gedichten. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 125.
Lucebert (1974). Het orakel van monte carlo. Verzamelde gedichten. De Bezige Bij,
Amsterdam, 112.
Lucebert (ibid.).
Elburg, J.G. (1975). Ik zeg: de zon is een druif, nee een meloen. Gedichten 1950-
1975. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 126.
Lucebert (1980). Voorwoord voor val voor vliegengod. Val voor vliegengod. De Bezi-
ge Bij, Amsterdam, 11.
6. Word frequency may not affect category verification times, but it could still be
influential on surprise effects (cf. Section 4.1 on word frequency).
7. Conclusively, it could be argued that high frequency of a word is positively correlated
with high familiarity values and strong feature elicitation, but negatively with number of
syllables.
8. 'De avond is een haan, vanwege driemaal Petrus'. Claus, H. (1966). Tancredo Infrasonic
8. Gedichten 1948-1963. De Bezige Bij, Contact, Amsterdam, Antwerpen, 107.
9. For instance:
'A black discotheque is the sleep' (een zwarte discotheek is de slaap). Vinkenoog, S. (1966).
Tweespraak. Eerste gedichten 1949-1964. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 167.
'A sigh is man' (een zucht is de mens). Vinkenoog, S. (1972). Drugsong. Wonder boven
wonder. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 97.
'A wandering bird is the poet' (Een zwervende vogel is de dichter). Vinkenoog, S. (1972).
Strijdlied en liefdesgedicht. Wonder boven wonder. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 136.
'O a noise filter is death' (o een ruisfilter is de dood). Schierbeek, B. (1981). Het dier heeft
een mens getekend. De gestalte der stem; Het dier heeft een mens getekend; Ezel mijn
bewoner. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 45.
10. Habakuk II de balker, (1987). Panter en krekel (Script). Aardes deuren. De Har-
monie, Amsterdam, 15-16.
11. Schierbeek, B. (1978). De derde persoon. Het boek ik; De andere namen; De derde
persoon. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 518.
12. Claus, H. (1970). 17. Heer everzwijn, zijn nota's bij "Genesis I, 1". Gedichten. De
Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 61.
13. A more extended analysis of the word frequency distribution in the stimulus set is
provided by Table 4.2, after the categorization of the expressions by the subjects.
14. Kouwenaar, G. (1968). Zoals Van Speyck zei:. De stem op de derde etage. Querido,
Amsterdam, 50.
15. Vinkenoog, S. (1972). Wonder boven wonder, gedichten 1965-1971. De Bezige Bij,
Amsterdam.
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16. Vinkenoog, S. (1972). Drugsong. Wonder boven wonder, gedichten 1965-1971. De
Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 100.
Drugsong 2
van wat ons hier vandaag tesamenbrengt:
een zingende muze, muziek die ontspringt
aan liefde en kennen en herkennen,
ach, ware het leven zo zoet
als de dood die ons allen verenigt -
Niets kon ik haar zeggen,
niets dat haar kon troosten
of op weg kon helpen -
want de dood is een reis
die ieder zelf moet maken,
de dood is een deur
die je zélf moet ontsluiten...
17. Andreus, H. (1975). Muur. Gedichten 1948-1974. Uitgeversmij. Holland, Haarlem,
79-80.
Muur
Wij hebben een holte in onze borst
van gemis, wij en eenieder, maar
wie waagt zich daaraan?
Wie leeft zich ten dode uit?
Alleen de lafste leugens
worden rijkelijk betaald.
Wat moeten wij met leven
voor die muur en het vraag-
teken erna?
Liefde werd ons genomen
zoals men een appel schilt,
Uit. De dood is een muur.
18. Vinkenoog, S. (1972). Drugsong. Wonder boven wonder, gedichten 1965-1971. De
Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 100.
Drugsong 2
van wat ons hier vandaag tesamenbrengt:
een zingende muze, muziek die ontspringt
aan liefde en kennen en herkennen,
ach, ware het leven zo zoet
als de dood die ons allen verenigt -
Niets kon ik haar zeggen,
niets dat haar kon troosten
of op weg kon helpen -
want de dood is een reis
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19. Campert, R. (1976). Zwanen. Alle bundels gedichten. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam,
57.
Zwanen
Er wordt geschreven aan vele boeken;
in groepjes wandelen we pratend naar een nieuw hoofdstuk toe
of ook wel alleen. En hoe makkelijk niet
springen we van de ene alinea op de andere.
Ons hart is ons park, nietwaar?
en ons lichaam een mooi jong traliehek
en zie: zwanen, schitterend van vuil, drijven
in onze stinkend geprezen maag.
20. Snoek, P. (1982). De haven, II. Verzamelde gedichten. Manteau, Antwerpen, 655.
De haven is een mond
die drinkt aan alle glazen,
waar vreemde schepen grazen
als koeien op een fond
van groen en in het rond,
op stalen boegen, lazen
wij land, zonder verbazen,
dat nooit zijn grenzen vond.
Er liggen vastelanden
en bloed van vele handen
gestapeld op de ree,
die als een kleine aarde
het onbegrip bewaarde
dat aanwaaide uit de zee.
21. ibid. III, 656.
De haven is een tuin,
waar alle mooie kleuren
en alle sterke geuren
gedijen in een puin
vol vreemde rassen. Bruin
zijn openstaande deuren,
waar hoerenwaarden leuren
met vrouwen zacht als schuim.
Een kind geeft witte rozen
met vreugde in, aan matrozen,
die dronken zijn en rood.
Maar allen daar vergeven
de vreemdeling, wiens leven
zal reven naar de dood.
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22. Schierbeek, B. (1981). Ezel mijn bewoner. De gestalte der stem; Het dier heeft een
mens getekend; Ezel mijn bewoner. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 289.
onze handen zijn zo klein dat zij niet kunnen vallen
niemand zou onze handen horen vallen
zo klein zijn onze handen
dat is over 100.000 jaar
maar ons hoofd is een berg vol geweld
gestileerd naar het ei
en net zo ingewikkeld
de ongeziene draden die er lopen zien wij
de relaties en het schaduwpatroon van ons krachtveld
onzichtbaar
23. Lucebert (1974). gedicht voor een zeer hoofd. Verzamelde gedichten. De Bezige Bij,
Amsterdam, 327.
gedicht voor een zeer hoofd
de wind verft mijn ogen om
tot spitse witte vlaggen
en ik geef mijn hoofd over
aan de grote verre wolken
in de grote verre wolken
zitten maanzieke honden
als door de ramen de zon schijnt
zijn de honden zonzieke poezen
mijn benen jengelen uit de verre wolken
als van processies verstoken klokken
maar mijn hoofd is een haan tussen de honden
en brult en balkt en blaast en blaft
terwijl de honden huilen
24. Schierbeek, B. (1978). De derde persoon. Het boek ik; De andere namen; De derde
persoon. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 440.
o heer ik schilder huizen en ik wil van het hart van de aarde
van u los zijn o heer
en van het hart van de aarde de riem snijden
die mij mijn middel meet o heer
want weet ik bid met een dier om de aanwezigheid
in ben o heer als de huid van een rubberboom zo menselijk
en de huid is een vrouw
en de vrouw ging uit
zij staat op de gloeiende brug van het zijn
met de kapotte stad die zij is
in de geroosterde menselijke huid die ik zing
25. Nooteboom, C. (1984). Een doorregende landstreek. Vuurtijd, ijstijd. Gedichten
1955-1983. De Arbeiderspers, Amsterdam, 159.
Een doorregende landstreek
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Een doorregende landstreek
een verroest zwaard. Een opgebruikte mythe.
De onsterfelijken zijn gestorven en vergeten,
hun huis is een graf.
Hun oog is een steen waar ze alles mee zien:
dit punt en zijn afstand,
en alle lengtes van tijd daartussen -
de wellust die hun lichaam steeds verder insluit
in een corrupte beweging.
26. Schierbeek, B. (1981). Ezel mijn bewoner. De gestalte der stem; Het dier heeft een
mens getekend; Ezel mijn bewoner. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 37.
maar ook en hetzelfde is:
dat de vogel zingt
de tak breekt
de vogel valt
en de boom ontwaakt
ik zeg
als de ochtend valt
op het eerste gezicht van de zee
ziet het strand groen
en zingen wit de dode bloemen
want
het kind is een maan
een sikkel in morgen en nacht
en verdeelt de stam
tot kruin van verwarring
maar het kind spreekt
en praat verder
27. Marsman, H. (1975). Seine-et-Marne. Verzamelde gedichten. Querido, Amsterdam,
60.
Tussen Marlotte, Montigny en Grez
staat op een heuvel een klein houten huis.
een stem vraagt loom: is de zon wit of grijs?
wordt de dag snikheet?
en de stem van den jongen die buiten staat
en de reis verspiedt van het vroege licht,
lacht en zijn lach is een lied.
28. Coninck, H. de (1986). Met de vedel, 5. De lenige liefde. Manteau, Antwerpen, 31.
o, ik weet het niet,
maar besta, wees mooi
zeg: kijk een vogel
en leer me de vogel zien.
zeg: het leven is een brood
om in te bijten en de appels zien rood
van plezier, en nog, en nog, zeg iets.
leer me huilen, en als ik huil
leer me zeggen: het is niets.
109
Stimulus selection: Notes
29. Vinkenoog, S. (1972). Rolling Stone. Wonder boven wonder, gedichten 1965-1971.
De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 50.
Rolling Stone
ZET JE AAN HET ROLLEN.
Wees niet bang voor grensoverschrijdingen,
je valt van deze wereld heus niet af,
de wereld is rond, je kunt blijven rollen,
ga en ga en ga en ga en zet je ogen wijd open,
want het leven is een reis die je maar één maal kunt maken
30. Marsman, H. (1975). De dierenriem, VI. Verzamelde gedichten. Querido, Amster-
dam, 149.
De dromen gaan door zijn slaap
als gedrochten door het heelal;
de maan is een dier dat vergaat
in het schaamteloos wolkendal;
en hem, wien het vuur van den geest
met den beet van een schorpioen
door het glad labyrinth van de schors
in het weke der hersenen drong
als gif in een gulzige spons,
breekt bij nacht in een doornenkroon
het zweet der gedachten uit
als een schimmel, een venuskrans.
31. Habakuk II de balker (1970). De steen. Boerengedichten. De Bezige Bij, Amster-
dam, 85.
De steen
De mens is een steen
Uit een steen gekomen
slaapt hij weer in onder een steen
Ringsteken en radslaan
Doodslaan is zijn opdracht is het niet?
Doorgesneden toont hij als een appel
een rode ster, een hartig centrum
Lust, list, schrift
O de eenzaamheid
van de steen langs de weg
onder de weegbree
32. Campert, R. (1976). Deze middag. Alle bundels gedichten. De Bezige Bij, Amster-
dam, 100.
Deze middag
Deze middag is een mand
waarin de dagen vallen en vormen maand voor maand,
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jaar na jaar, geleefd en nog te leven
De zon is van altijd
en van overal, van het groene gras van Ockenburg
van verleden jaren en van morgen's, overmorgen's witgekalkte dorpen
En de wind, een zacht knippen van de vingers
om de helmplant te herinneren, de tere zandstorm
in geboorte's tuin en dood's Sahara
33. Lodeizen, H. (1963). Hij of zij, 2. Het innerlijk behang en andere gedichten. Van
Oorschot, Amsterdam, 168.
deze zachtheid
is jou zo eigen, je mond
is een huis geweest waarin
wij woonden, slapend
en biddend.
door jou
heb ik de wereld genomen
heb ik de avond niet gewantrouwd
door jou heb ik geslapen
en geleefd.
door jou ken ik de liefde.
34. Claus, H. (1966). April in Parijs. Gedichten (1948-1963). De Bezige Bij, Contact,
Amsterdam, Antwerpen, 119.
de nacht is een vrouw
o honderdduizend lippen
en met de morgen komen twee gelijke treurige Chinezen
in ons wakkerwordend huis
en zeggen ongehoorde zinnen met hun handen
over kastelen of gevangenissen
(zij kijken door de tralies van hun vingers)
35. Vinkenoog, S. (1972). Drugsong. Wonder boven wonder, gedichten 1965-1971. De
Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 95.
Drugsong
Tuimel mij binnen in het dwangbuis van de tijd -
het laatste allerschandaligste rechteloze
krampachtig opgekropte stuiptrekken
de poëzie is een beer die zijn adem inhoudt,
een panter in zijn vaart gestopt,
een damhert met het oor te luisteren,
een diepe zuchtende ademhaling
36. Campert, R. (1976). Solo. Alle bundels gedichten. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 307.
Solo
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lang mee stil staan op deze plek bv.
hier en daar wat struikgewas
een enkele fietser die zijn weg zoekt
of weet laat ik nuchter beschrijven
een paar neonlampen een schutting
met reclame voor benzine en voor de voetbalwedstrijd
de rechte dode weg het verkeersbord en de witte
mijlpaal er trilt iets
iets trilt er de kunst
is op het punt van ontstaan haal diep
adem nu de adem maakt de regel en de regel
beïnvloedt de adem poëzie
is een beest op het punt van de sprong een golf
37. Polet, S. (1977). Poëzie, I. Gedichten I. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 138.
Poëzie
Hij had niets te eten.
Daarom at hij niets,
minutenlang.
Armoede is geen erfzonde.
Daarom gaat hij naar huis.
Ruimte genoeg in zijn hoofd, speelsel
en speling genoeg. Hier
hoeft hij niet om adem
te ruziën, de poëzie
is hij zelf, zelf
1 meter sterker, spier-
rijker. Ha,
de poëzie is een mens
-mits vergezeld van een mens.
38. Geel, J.C. van (1973). Vogel. Enkele gedichten. Atheneum, Polak & Van Gennep,
Amsterdam, 53.
Vogel
De stilte is een brug op vleugels.
Niet dat een vogel vliegt verbaast,
maar dat hij het geruisloos doet.
39. Snoek, P. (1982). Gedicht om de dag mee te beginnen. Verzamelde gedichten. Man-
teau, Antwerpen, 614.
Gedicht om de dag mee te beginnen
Soms hoor ik tussen mijn gewrichten
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het kraakbeen knerpen als piepschuim dat breekt,
als dikke sneeuw van vroeger maar dan dun
en hard geworden, scherper, droger en verouderd.
De gloed van het verleden is gekoeld.
Mijn toekomst is een hart vol lege zakken.
Ik heb nog hout voor vele lange winters
maar mijn lichaam heeft de koude aanvaard.
40. Lucebert (1974). V. Verzamelde gedichten. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 125.
V
onze vrede is een huid van vlammen
onze vreugde is een huis vol vuur
onze aandacht is kappen op valken
een opengespalkte angel is ons inzicht
onzichtbaar in mijn gezicht
maar in mijn gezicht
eetbaar zijn je ogen
groen smaakt de lente van je iris
en je stem is een aster in de eistille herfst
onze duisternis is een obelisk van regen
onze zachte stem is een warme ruiker
fluisteren en zwijgen maken een etmaal
en zon en maan ons zingend lichaam
41. Hillenius, D. (1971). De woede is een slang. Tegen het vegetarisme. Van Oorschot,
Amsterdam, 60.
De woede is een slang
die te lang slapen blijft
lijf open laat liggen voor pijn
De woede moet opgeroepen
uit haar kleine mand
zij is een goed vergif
tegen kleinerend verdriet
42. Claus, H. (1966). De zanger. Gedichten (1948-1963). De Bezige Bij, Contact, Am-
sterdam, Antwerpen, 129.
De zanger
Vrij is de zanger niet
Maar vlug en schamper en toppen scherend als een baard.
Vrij is hij niet want zijn doorboord geklater
En zijn sprekend wormhout hangen in zijn mond, huig en tong.
De zanger is zijn lied.
Losgelaten in zijn huid, dit huis,
Groet hij koekoek noch vinkenvanger.
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Noch de schuwe spieders in het laagland.
43. Hillenius, D. (1971). De zee is een buik vol embryos. Tegen het vegetarisme. Van
Oorschot, Amsterdam, 46.
De zee is een buik vol embryos
vol roeivoetigen, kopvoetigen, veelvoetigen,
vol voeten die 't lopen nog leren moeten,
niet verder zijn dan sierlijk bewegen van vinnen
(gedagwuiven is een restje van zwembeginnen)
de zee is moeder van koningen,
van zeepaardjes en malle ponen.
Van wieren is het oudste bewegen van leven
elk gebaar dat we namen gegeven
van strelen, protest, van vechten en vreten
is, buiten ons zelf bestuurd,
in af- en aanstromend water,
hetzelfde van vroeger gebleven.
44. Elburg, J.G. (1975). Gedichten 1950-1975. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 126.
Ik zeg: de zon is een druif, nee een meloen
een verse vijg, nee een inktvis een palmkruin.
ik zeg: de zon is een hatende catalaan.
nee een kruik vol wijn, nee een mes of een keisteen.
ik moet snel fotograferen met allebei mijn ogen
nemen met mijn handen, eten met mijn mond.
het zuiden komt op mijn gezicht over:
dikke lippen, oren van brons.
ik heb honger
een warmbloedig zeedier
ik kan veel vrouwen aan.
45. 'De wind is de boom'. Schierbeek, B. (1978). De derde persoon. Het boek ik; De
andere namen; De derde persoon. De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, 438.
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CHAPTER 5: FEATURE ELICITATION*
5.0 Feature sets and their comparison
In metaphor theory, the measure of overlap in meaning between A- and B-
term plays an important role. The interpretation of a metaphor is supposed to
be simpler when A- and B-term show a certain resemblance. How should
meaning correspondence be measured? Several methods are available (cf.
Miller & Johnson-Laird 1976: 237-260). One way is to compare association-
hierarchies in the form of feature sets. If two terms share many word
associations, they are often related in meaning. Although this is not
necessarily true, and theoretically not well understood, the method may have
certain validity as a means of measurement. Thus, the shared set will be
used to investigate the meaning relatedness of A- and B-term.
What should be considered a feature? In the strict sense, the features of a
doctor are, for instance, 'gives medical treatment' and 'cures'. 'Nurse' in this
sense is not considered a feature, although it may be one of the first
associations on 'doctor'. Nevertheless, 'nurse' as an association on 'doctor'
may be important to interpret a metaphor, such as 'love is a doctor'. In that
case, the message may not only be that love cures some existential pain - as
the doctor does. However, it may also say that love looks after those who are
hurt - as the nurse does. Put differently, the interpretation of a metaphor is
not necessarily only dependent on the features in the strict sense, but also on
the close associations. In this study, therefore, features are considered to be
all those words and associations that occur in response to a given A- or B-
term.
Disentangling the effects of linguistic and nonlinguistic associations is
a persistent headache in psycholinguistic experimentation; it would be
absurd to suggest that arbitrary responses are of no importance or that
linguistic analysis can somehow explain them away. (...) both
linguistic and nonlinguistic mechanisms are required (...). (Miller &
Johnson-Laird 1976: 249-250)
Section 5.1 argues that notions in the theory of literature, such as equival-
ence, opposition, paradigm, and isotope, can be restated as problems refer-
ring to set theory. Section 5.2 presents methods and research that is
concerned with association-hierarchies in the form of feature sets. In Section
5.3, new propositions are made with respect to feature salience and the
measurement of the shared set.
In Section 5.4, the metaphor models presented in Chapters 1 up to 3 are
studied in a feature elicitation experiment, utilizing a single term, an ex-
Notes are on the pages 205-206; an Appendix with statistics is on 207-225.*
Levelt is thanked for the first paragraph of 5.0.
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pression, and a context condition. Further, an experiment on interpretation is
conducted, as well as a rating experiment on similarity and figurativeness.
Section 5.5 and 5.6 end this Chapter with conclusions for psychology and
the theory of literature.
5.1 Theory of literature: Equivalence as similarity, opposition as
dissimilarity
What happens when we read a word? As Riffaterre (1980: 141) puts it,
'beneath the words there is nothing but more words'. In the Sections 1.3, 2.3
and 3.3, reading a word was modeled as the encoding of a word, indicating
that for every word a feature set of word associations is activated. In the
comparison view, the meaning of a word is unchangeable; it is independent
of context. For the sake of argument, this theoretical element was also
attributed to the anomaly theory, although certain anomaly theorists allow
context effects. When it comes to the encoding of words, Lotman could be
viewed as such an 'anomalist who considers context effects'. Lotman
affirmed that 'poetry consists of words', and reading a (literary) text thus
involves the encoding of the ensuing words (the syntagma) by generating the
formal and semantic features.
Poetry consists of words. Nothing could be more obvious. Nonethe-
less, taken by itself this assertion is capable of generating mis-
understandings. The word in poetry is a word from the natural lan-
guage, a unit of the lexicon, which can be found in a dictionary.
Nonetheless it is not equivalent to itself. It is precisely this similarity,
this coincidence of the poetic word with the "dictionary word" of a
given language that makes the difference between these units so
palpable; units that first draw apart and then near, but which are
separated and contrasted. (Lotman 1976: 84)
Lotman took a kind of anomaly point of view, in emphasizing that the en-
coding of a word in poetry is twofold. On the one hand, it is the activation of
the dictionary meanings. On the other, it is the activation of nondictionary
meanings, primed by the poetical context. In other words, more or other
(semantic) features are activated when a word is read in a poetical text. For
that matter, Lotman's statements suggest that in single term conditions, A-
and B-term only activate the dictionary meanings. In the context of the
poem, however, they would activate other (probably figurative) meanings as
well.
(...) a poem as an integral language resembles an entire natural lan-
guage but not a part of it. The fact that the number of words in this
language is reckoned in tens or hundreds and not hundreds of
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thousands changes the weight of the word as a meaningful segment of
the text. The word in poetry is "larger" than this same word in a
general language text. It is easily noted that the more concise the text,
the weightier the word and the larger the portion of the universe it
designates. (Lotman 1976: 84)
Here, Lotman stated that a word in poetry bears more meaning than in an
ordinary text. Supposedly, then, the size of the feature set is larger when a
word is part of a poetical text than when it is part of a paper article. Lotman
also stated that a word in a short text covers more meanings than the same
word in a larger text. Thus, readers should show greater associative response
(should elicit more features) for short texts than for long. Thirdly, the feature
set is probably larger for a word surrounded by text, than for that word in
isolation. Ergo, the number of features that readers elicit for a word in a
poem should be higher than the number they elicit in a single term condi-
tion. In Section 5.4, the last two assumptions are tested.
Lotman's anomaly view is further illustrated, in speaking of the 'conflict'
and 'tension' between the dictionary (literal) meaning and the meanings com-
pelled by the poem (the figurative meaning):
Words, while obtaining special meanings in the poetic structure, also
preserve their own dictionary meanings. Conflict, tension between
these two types of meanings, is all the more palpable in that they are
expressed in the text by a single sign, a given word. (Lotman 1976:
85)
Whereas Lotman showed an anomaly point of view where it concerns the
encoding of words, his opinion tends to be more interaction-like, when it
comes to the comparison of words, 'the concept of parallelism'.
In examining the role of repetition, the concept of parallellism should
also be considered. It has frequently been scrutinized in connection
with the principles of poetics. A. N. Veselovsky indicated the
dialectical nature of parallelism in art: 
It is not a matter of the identification of human life with nature nor of
a comparison that presupposes an awareness of the separateness of the
compared objects, but of comparison in terms of some feature of an
activity.
Thus, in parallelism, analogy rather than identity or separateness is
stressed. (Lotman 1976: 88)
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Lotman's ideas on parallelism could easily be applied to the functioning of
metaphors, resulting in the interaction position that features of two terms -
remote at first - are aligned by similarity through the creation of relations.
These properties of parallelism may be defined in the following
fashion: parallelism is a binomial wherein one of its members is
known through a second one that functions as an analogue in relation
to the first. This second member is neither identical to the first nor is it
separate from it. It is in a state of analogy having those common fea-
tures which are isolated in the recognition of the first member.
Recalling that the first and second members are not identical, we
equate them in some particular aspect and consider the first in terms of
the properties and behavior of the second member of the parallel.
(Lotman 1976: 88)
For Lotman, parallelism by creating relations in a metaphor is only one
instance of a general tendency in poetry, which is to create similarity and
contrast through analogical reasoning. The comparison of the
'object-member' (the A-term) with the 'model-member' (the B-term) and the
resulting transfer of meaning are a matter of analogical reasoning.
Moreover, analogy is fundamental to the creation of similarity in poetry:
 
Where we are dealing with parallelism on the level of words and word
combinations, a trope relationship arises between the object-member
and the model-member, since so-called "transferred meaning" is the
establishment of analogy between two concepts. This is the source of
that "imagery" traditionally considered a basic property of poetry, but
which, as we have seen, constitutes only a manifestation of a more
general regularity in a comparatively limited sphere. In fact, it might
be said that poetry is a structure all of whose elements on all levels are
in a state of mutual parallelism and which, consequently, bear a
particular semantic load. (Lotman 1976: 89)
The question could be raised how this parallelism is captured in the study of
reader interpretation. According to Lotman (1976: 18) 'words are the most
widespread type of conventional sign', and 'in the semiotic sciences,
language is defined as a mechanism of sign communication serving the
goals of storage and transmission of information' (Lotman 1976: 17). In
other words, semiotics involves the study of language storage in memory
and the psycholinguistic study of information processing. How did Lotman
perform this task in analyzing a real example, and what can
methodologically be learned from that? On Mayakovsky's poem 'And could
you?' Lotman stated:
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Insofar as the text is immediately assigned the opposition "I-you," the
interpretation of this opposition presents itself for consideration:
I - You
poetry everyday reality
vividness banality
Mayakovsky's text first evokes this organizational system of the text's
"world of words" in the reader's memory and then rejects it. In the first
place, the entire verb system that links the noun-concepts in the poetic
picture points not to the delimitation of the "mundane" and "poetic"
semantic fields, but rather to their fusion. (Lotman 1976: 87)
What Lotman tentatively formulated here is the process that the words 'I' and
'You' activate feature sets ('world of words', in this case, the 'mundane' and
the 'poetic'), which are manifested in the form of word associations ('poetry,
vividness' and 'everyday reality, banality'). The feature sets of the 'mundane'
and the 'poetic' are compared, and at first, they are in opposition (show many
distinctive features). This is the representation of the first stage in the
process. However, the 'verb system' forces the reader to connect these differ-
ent feature sets, so that a second stage is entered. Here, the two sets are
fused, which leads to an interpretation. Probably, Lotman would argue that
this interpretation is established through analogical reasoning:
(...) a single poetic phenomenon may manifest first its integrating and
then its relational associations in relation to various units. On the other
hand, both of these types are mutually alternative and, consequently,
form a certain diversity of association. At the same time both together
are alternative to linguistic associations insofar as they form a meaning
according to a different synthetic principle and are not analyzable into
the mechanical sum of meaningful units. By virtue of the fact that this
series of meanings does not abolish linguistic meanings but co-exists
with them forming a mutually correlated pair, we are dealing here with
an increase of diversity. (Lotman 1976: 100)
Lotman stated that the activated feature sets are compared on the level of
linguistic meaning (the literal meaning). The number of shared features
between the feature sets is incremented by creating relations, thus raising the
perceived similarity. Here, Lotman actually advocated an interaction point
of view. Whether similarity can be treated as the function of a mechanical
sum of (shared) meaningful units (features) will be tested in Section 5.4.
Thus, for [a] word (...), a particular sequence of (...) phonemes and a
certain morpho-grammatical structure constitute its expression, and
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the lexical, historical, cultural, and other meanings, its content.
(Lotman, 1976: 17)
This content is recorded in Section 5.4, as feature lists in an association
production task (feature elicitation task). Subjects are asked to generate the
lexical, historical, cultural, and other meanings for the words in the meta-
phoric, literal and anomalous expressions.
The previous paragraphs clarified that the traditional practice of interpre-
tation is based on the creation of feature sets through the association of
words. To connect these sets, a comparison takes place that detects
parallelism (similarity) and opposition (dissimilarity):
Le langage poétique connaît un procédé élémentaire: le rapprochement
de deux unités. Les variantes sémantiques de ce procédé sont: le
parallélisme, la comparaison (cas particulier du parallélisme), la
métamorphose (parallélisme projeté dans le temps), la métaphore
(parallélisme réduit à un point). (Jakobson 1973: 21)
In poetry not only the phonological sequence but in the same way any
sequence of semantic units strives to build an equation. Similarity
superimposed on contiguity imparts to poetry its throughgoing symbolic,
multiplex, polysemantic essence which is beautifully suggested by
Goethe's "Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichnis" (Anything transcient
is but a likeness). Said more technically, anything sequent is a simile. In
poetry where similarity is superinduced upon contiguity, any metonymy
is slightly metaphorical and any metaphor has a metonymical tint.
(Jakobson 1981: 42)
As indicated by Jakobson, the ultimate poetic tool is the mutual connection
of units through parallelism, which may be found in comparisons and meta-
phors. This parallelism - 'the units that strive to build an equation' - is
accomplished when 'similarity is superinduced upon contiguity'. This idea
goes way back to the theoretical writings of the poet Hopkins (1966,
originally 1865), stating that metaphors are based on perceiving parallels
and contrasts, likeness and unlikeness, in a word, on the perception of simi-
larity and dissimilarity between two units.
The artificial part of poetry, perhaps we shall be right to say all
artifice, reduces to the principle of parallelism. The structure of poetry
is that of continuous parallelism, ranging from the technical so-called
Parallelism of Hebrew poetry and the antiphons of Church music up to
the intricacy of Greek or Italian or English verse. But parallelism is of
two kinds necessarily - where the opposition is clearly marked, and
where it is transitional rather or chromatic. Only the first kind, that of
marked parallelism, is concerned with the structure of verse - in
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rhythm, the recurrence of a certain sequence of syllables, in metre, the
recurrence of a certain sequence of rhythm, in alliteration, in asso-
nance and in rhyme. Now the force of this recurrence is to beget a
recurrence or parallelism answering to it in the words of thought and,
speaking roughly and rather for the tendency than the invariable result,
the more marked parallelism in structure whether of elaboration or of
emphasis begets more marked parallelism in the words and sense. (...)
To the marked or abrupt kind of parallelism belong metaphor, simile,
parable, and so on, where the effect is sought in likeness of things, and
antithesis, contrast, and so on, where it is sought in unlikeness.
(Hopkins 1966: 84-85; Jakobson 1981: 39)
How then, does the theory of literature account for this perception of
(dis)similarity in poetry? What model is offered to explain how parallelism
functions in (poetic) language, and how should it be measured?
What is the empirical linguistic criterion of the poetic function? In
particular, what is the indispensable feature inherent in any piece of
poetry? To answer this question we must recall the two basic modes of
arrangement used in verbal behavior, selection and combination. If
"child" is the topic of the message, the speaker selects one among the
extant, more or less similar nouns like child, kid, youngster, tot, all of
them equivalent in a certain respect, and then, to comment on this
topic, he may select one of the semantically cognate verbs - sleeps,
dozes, nods, naps. Both chosen words combine in the speech chain.
The selection is produced on the basis of equivalence, similarity and
dissimilarity, synonymy and antonymy, while the combination, the
build-up of the sequence, is based on contiguity. The poetic function
projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the
axis of combination. (Jakobson 1981: 27)
Central to the mechanism Jakobson proposes are the notions that selection is
based on (dis)similarity, and combination on contiguity. Underlying the idea
of selection is that a noun, such as 'child', is chosen from a noun set that re-
fers to children (the paradigm). This implies that the sender of a message ac-
tivates nouns that refer to children, before selecting the appropriate one.
Reversely, reading the word 'child' probably activates similar nouns, such as
'kid', 'youngster' and 'tot'. Therefore, the paradigm should be represented in
the feature set of 'child'. The paradigm words are thought to maintain a high
degree of similarity. In other words, each word in the 'child'-set shares many
features, thus forming a noun-set with high inner-group similarity. Indeed, in
this connection the same mechanism applies to the set of verbs, such as
'sleeps', 'dozes', 'nods', 'naps'. This verb-set also has a high similarity within
the group, and each of its members has a high probability to be evoked by
any other member of the set.
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Furthermore, Jakobson assumes that if two members from different sets
(e.g., 'child' and 'dozes') are combined in normal speech, these words should
be cognate. In order to be combined, they should have a great deal in com-
mon. It could be easily argued, that Jakobson's notion of combination is also
based on (approximate) similarity. In ordinary speech, only those verbs
which apply to 'child' are likely of being a feature of a child. Put differently,
'sleeps' has a high probability of being incorporated in the feature set of
'child'. In turn, 'child' has a high probability of being in the feature set of
'sleeps', at least in contrast with other verb-sets, such as 'soldiering' or 'to
preside at'. Neighbouring words in a sentence, therefore, will probably also
have a high proximity in feature sets. They should share many features, or at
least incorporate each other in their sets. Contiguity in Jakobson's sense,
then, is also based on similarity, particularly, between words from different
linguistic categories, such as nouns and verbs. Barthes would agree on this:
Similarity and dissimilarity; difference: The system constitutes the
second axis of the language. Saussure has seen it in the shape of a
series of associative fields (...). Each field is a store of potential terms
(since only one of them is actualized in the present discourse). (...) The
terms of the field (or paradigm) must at the same time be similar and
dissimilar, include a common and a variable element (...). (Barthes
1970: 71-72)
From this quotation, it readily follows that neighbouring words in normal
speech should show a high similarity within and between the members of
the different paradigms (e.g., a noun-set and a verb-set). Poetic language,
however, in connecting unexpected, improbable members of each other's
feature sets, should show high similarity within the paradigm, and low (or
less) similarity between paradigms.
To relate the above to a real example, Section 5.4 describes an experi-
ment in which literary students associated on the single words of the ex-
pressions from Table 4.1 (Chapter 4). One metaphor ('the child is a moon')
contained the word 'child' as the topic of the message. To illustrate how
Jakobson's and Barthes' assumptions can be controlled, the data obtained for
this metaphor are contrasted with those for its literal counterpart ('the child
is a human being') in the next paragraphs.
From the quotations above, it can be predicted that in the single term con-
dition, 'child' activates within-paradigm words, such as 'tot', 'youngster', 'kid'.
Perhaps, it will even activate without-paradigm words, such as 'sleeps', and
'dozes', because they are closely related. It is also predicted that the number
of shared features between 'child' and 'human being' is higher than between
'child' and 'moon', because the first pair lies within the same paradigm,
whereas the second lies outside (essentially, Jakobson maintains a com-
parison view, here). Moreover, 'child' and 'human being' are probably
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included in each other's feature set, so that the shared feature set includes
features of
Table 5.0: The frequencies of features mentioned in a sample of 20 subjects, for the words
'child', 'moon', and 'human being', in the single term  condition of the feature elicitation
experiment. From these lists, feature overlap was calculated. Frequencies preceed the fea-
tures. Frequencies smaller than 2 are only tabulated for the shared sets. Double numbers in
front of the shared features indicate the frequency of occurrence in response to the A- and
B-term , respectively. Translation from the Dutch.
_________________________________________________________________________
feature set feature set feature set shared set shared set
child human being moon child - human being child - moon
13 small 12 animal 14 night 1 1 birth  1 2 blue
 9 young  9 man  9 full 1 2 clothing  1 1 love
 8 parents  9 woman  6 shine 1 1 colors  1 1 sleep
 7 baby  7 walk  6 stars 1 1 eyes 13 1 small
 7 mother  7 war  6 sun 1 1 friends
 7 play  6 live  6 werewolf 1 5 I
 6 school  5 earth  6 white 1 1 ignorant
 5 sweet  5 I  5 crater 1 1 in love
 5 tot  5 monkey  5 man in the moon 1 6 live
 4 father  4 child  5 round 1 2 love
 3 girl  4 talk  5 saint nicolas 1 1 much
 3 later  4 think  4 beautiful 2 4 talk
 3 nice  3 bad  4 heaven 1 7 walk
 2 annoying  3 beast  4 landing
 2 baby sitting  3 civilization  4 romantic
 2 boy  3 evolution  4 yellow
 2 care-free  3 feet  3 far
 2 cheerful  3 many  3 light
 2 cry  3 peace  3 planet
 2 fun  3 world  3 rocket
 2 half-grown  2 adam  3 space
 2 human  2 body  3 star
 2 innocent  2 communication  3 universe
 2 learn  2 clothing  2 armstrong
 2 nipper  2 dumb  2 blue
 2 outside  2 god  2 crescent
 2 playful  2 house  2 dark
 2 play ground  2 humain  2 earth
 2 pregnant  2 love  2 ebb
 2 read  2 robot  2 flood
 2 talk  2 society  2 full
 2 sort  2 half
 2 up-right  2 high
 2 satellite
 2 space traveling
 2 teath
_________________________________________________________________________
high-frequent mentioning (the readily available ones). The shared set be-
tween 'child' and 'moon' should not necessarily include high-frequent fea-
tures, and should thus show a larger percentage of low-frequent features in
the overlap. In Table 5.0, the feature sets are printed for 'child', 'moon' and
'human being', along with the two sets of shared features.
Table 5.0 shows that certain features - apparently belonging to the para-
digm of 'child' - are present in the 'child' set (baby, tot, nipper, kid). Indeed,
some of these features are even the higher-frequent ones (those with a
frequency, higher than 1). 'Baby' is mentioned 7 times, 'tot' 5 times, and
'nipper' twice. The paradigms of 'child' and 'to sleep', however, are but
weakly cognate. Only once 'sleep' occurred as a feature of 'child'.
Being one of the readily activated, higher-frequent features, 'child' was
mentioned 4 times in response to 'human being', whereas 'human being' was
mentioned twice in response to 'child'. Contrariwise, 'moon' did not occur in
the feature set of 'child', nor did 'child' in the 'moon' set. Thus, the
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assumption is illustrated that 'child' and 'moon' do not belong to cognate
paradigms. With reference to the Sections on category membership in
Chapter 4, 'child' is a good example of instance dominance (the availability
of the exemplar, given the category-name), and 'human being' of category
dominance (the availability of the category-name, given the exemplar).
Table 5.0 illustrates also that the feature overlap between the related terms
(child - human being) is larger (13 features), than the overlap between terms
from the metaphor (child - moon: 4 features).
The prediction that the feature overlap in 'normal language' contains a
larger percentage of high-frequent features than the overlap in poetic
language is not corroborated. Suppose that 'the child is a human being - as a
literal expression - is an example of normal language, and that 'the child is a
moon' - being a metaphor - represents poetic language. 'Child' and 'human
being' shared 13 features, of which six features received a frequency higher
than one. Thus, the portion of high-frequent features in the feature overlap
between 'child - human being' was 6 / 13 = 46%. For 'child - moon', four
shared features were found, and two times, these features were higher-fre-
quent. Thus, 2 / 4 = 50% of the overlap between 'child - moon' consisted of
high-frequent features, which is about the same as for 'child - human being'.
Of course, illustrating assumptions by analyzing one example is a naive
way of arguing. Moreover, taking together the features from different
subjects without considering individual differences has some disadvantages,
which are discussed in Section 5.2. Therefore, Section 5.4 demonstrates a
more rigorous approach to calculating feature overlap, thereby analyzing
feature sets and shared sets within subjects. Nonetheless, the analysis of
Table 5.0 shows that traditional assumptions in the theory of literature can
be quantified and controlled for fairly precisely and that predictions can be
derived that may hold for more than one example.
Thus far, it was pointed out that the primary semantic equivalences with-
in paradigms, and between the selected members from different paradigms
in the sequence of the sentence are based on similarity. However, this
mechanism also applies to the forming of text structures through the con-
nection of isotopes, which are defined as primary semantic equivalences
within a text. Isotopes also are thought to be based on equivalence, or on a
connective term (Greimas 1966: 71). This may be either an overall category
or a shared feature. However, as argued in Chapter 1, an overall category is
a shared feature. In the theory of literature, an isotope is a connective chain
of words across a text, which shows likeness among its members, either
formal or semantic. In other words, these words in the chain have a high
degree of similarity, thus, share with each other more, and more important,
features than with any other word in the text. What happens, when two of
these isotopes are compared?
Les deux isotopies sont reliées entre elles par le terme connecteur
commun. Dans les cas les plus simples (calembours, << esprit des
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mots >>, etc.), l'identité, ou même la simple ressemblance du formant,
suffit pour connecter le deux isotopies (...). Le plaisir << spirituel >>
réside dans la découverte de deux isotopies différentes à l'intérieur
d'un récit supposé homogène.
On voit, par conséquent, que le << bon mot >>, considéré comme
genre littéraire, élève au niveau de la conscience les variations des
isotopies du discours, variations qu'on fait semblant de camoufler, en
même temps, par la présence du terme connecteur (...).
La confrontation de deux isotopies met en opposition (...) non plus
seulement deux séquences possédent chacune un caractère isotope: ces
tranches du discours sont considérées, du point de vue de leur contenu,
comme représentatives de mentalités hétérogènes. (Greimas 1966: 71)
Greimas stated that two isotopes are connected by a common connective
term, by identity or by simple resemblance. These are all cases of the same
underlying idea that through the comparison of two word-chains, similarity
between the words of these chains is discovered. In line with Greimas, the
perceived similarity may be the result of a common connective term, which
can be seen as a common category for (some of) the words in the two
isotopes. The similarity may also be based on identity, in which case the two
isotopes share the same words. Similarity may also be found in resemblance,
which means that the feature sets of the words in the first isotope are com-
pared with the feature sets of the words in the other isotope, between which
shared features may be detected. In contrast, if the isotopes are in opposition
('isotopies met en opposition'), the degree of dissimilarity dominates the
perceived similarity. Many words, or features of words, form mismatches
between the two sequences.
From a perception point of view, a method should be postulated to in-
vestigate the relations of similarity and dissimilarity among signs and words.
Greimas defined the 'termes-objets' (words/lexemes) as their 'sèmes', as the
properties of the words, or their features, for that matter.
(...) on doit essayer maintenant de déterminer le rôle qui peut être
assigné (...) aux termes-objets, dont, au niveau de la perception, nous
avons postulé l'existence en même temps que celle de la relation.
Nous avons vu que cette dernière pouvait être analysée en sèmes,
que nous avons proposé de considérer comme des propriétés des
termes-objets.
(...) Tout cela ne fait que confirmer notre répugnance à l'égard d'une
sémantique qui aurait la prétention de décrire la << substance
psychique >>. Force nous est donc de rester sur le plan
phénoménologique, c'est-à-dire linguistique, et de postuler, avec
Russell, que les qualités définissent les choses, c'est-à-dire que le sème
s est un des éléments constituant le terme-objet [lexème], et que
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celui-ci, au bout d'une analyse exhaustive, se définit comme la
1 2 3collection des sèmes s  , s  , s  , etc. (Greimas 1966: 27)
To write a semantics for the 'psychic substance' of words, the things ('les
choses') should be defined as their qualities (Russell) or properties (which is
the same as 'sèmes', according to Greimas). Put differently, the
psychological contents of a word are found in the feature sets that result
from feature elicitation experiments with a representative sample drawn
from a speech community. This may be a dated and almost a behaviorist
approach to the psychological contents of word meaning, but it shows how
certain assumptions can be put in operation, which would be a gain for
semiotics.
1On the whole, then, each word evokes a collection (X) of semes, X = {s  ,
2 3 ns  , s  ,..., s }, which is a set of features. Such a feature set may be compared
with any other set to find the shared features, thus increasing similarity or
equivalence within and among sets. Consequently, the features that are not
shared by two words (the distinctive features) increase the dissimilarity or
opposition. Textual structures (e.g., isotopes) are established by the con-
trastive weight of the shared and distinctive features of the words in the text.
Words with high numbers of shared features are connected into an isotope,
and contrasted with other isotopes. Thus, isotopes may be defined by a
higher number of shared features within than among sets.
The interaction between syntactic morphologic and lexical equival-
ences and discrepancies, the diverse kinds of semantic contiguities,
similarities, synonymies and antonymies, finally the different types
and functions of allegedly "isolated lines", all such phenomena call for
a systematic analysis indispensable for the comprehension and inter-
pretation of the various grammatical contrivances in poetry. Such a
crucial linguistic and poetic problem as parallelism can hardly be
mastered by a scrutiny automatically restricted to the external form
and excluding any discussion of grammatical and lexical meanings.
(Jakobson 1981: 90-91)
To comply with the demands put forward by Jakobson, Chapter 4 described
how to minimize the interactions between syntactic, morphologic, and
lexical equivalences and discrepancies. By means of subject generated fea-
ture sets, Chapter 5 proposes a way to analyse systematically the semantic
contiguities and similarities between words. A further demand is also
incorporated in the tests on the metaphor models. Section 5.4 concerns the
conditions under which the semantics of the metaphors ought to be studied:
The single term, expression and context condition. The first condition
checks the comparison (and anomaly) presumption that context does not
change meaning. The second and third test whether metaphors in isolation
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are differently processed ('the different types and functions') from metaphors
in the poetical text.
To recapitulate the Section thus far, the terminology of the theory of
literature can be reduced to a convenient set of simple set theoretical
notions. The theory of literature reserves a primary role for the perception of
similarity (or equivalence). The theorists discussed above usually connect
similarity with 'chains of association', 'properties', 'paradigm words', etc. It
was deduced that the theory of literature envisions similarity as a function of
the number of shared features between two feature sets.
Jakobson's ideas, for example, can be restated as follows: A paradigm is a
set of words in the mental lexicon that reaches the highest within-set simi-
larity, compared to words excluded from this set. These within-set words
have high probabilities to be mentioned as features of any of the other words
within the set. They are the high-frequent features of any word in the set,
because they are easily activated by each other. Words selected from a set
are put in a sequential order (the syntagma, the combination of words in a
sentence) with words from other sets with high within-set similarity. In
poetry, the degree of between-set similarity may be less than in ordinary
speech.
'Equivalences', 'parallels', 'contiguities' are all tautologies for the notion of
similarity between two (or more) words. An isotope is a set of words in a
text with a higher within-set similarity than with any other word or word set
in the text. Comparison of isotopes may lead to the perception of, again,
similar words or identical features of words. Together with the distinctive
words, they form the text structure. Henceforth, the tripartite tool 'feature
set, similarity, dissimilarity' accounts for the full of intuitions formulated by
the theory of literature, thus offering a systematic and quantitative approach
to verify if:
In poetry, any conspicuous similarity is evaluated in respect to similar-
ity and/or dissimilarity in meaning. (Jakobson 1981: 44)
Indeed, the empirical investigation of similarity even drew on semiotics.
Referring to a famous study by Tversky (1977), Sonesson argued that the
relation between icon and sign may be based on similarity, but that this
similarity is not symmetric:
(...) iconicity cannot motivate a sign, for while similarity is symmetric-
al and reflexive, the sign is not. Pigments on paper, or carvings in a
rock, could stand for a man, but not the reverse; nor will they, in their
picture function, stand for themselves. This argument is quoted and
accepted by Groupe ì (...); yet, if it is not refuted, only nonsense will
remain of iconicity. The error consists in identifying the common
sense notion of similarity with the equivalence relation of logic. No
doubt, the equivalence relation, as defined in logic, is symmetric and
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reflexive, and thus cannot define any type of sign, since the sign, by
definition, must be asymmetric and irreflexive. But to identify
similarity with the equivalence relation is to suppose man to live in the
world of the natural sciences, when in fact he inhabits a particular
sociocultural Lifeworld. Similarity, as experienced in this Lifeworld, is
actually asymmetric and irreflexive. Indeed, this fact is not only
intuitively obvious, but has now been experimentally demonstrated
(notably by Rosch 1975 and Tversky 1977). (Sonesson 1996)
Thus, the notion of equivalence is too strict to describe what is meant by the
theory of literature. Equivalence is a logical term, demanding symmetry
between the compared terms (A = B). What the theory of literature envisions
is similarity (A is like B), leaving room for dissimilarity and asymmetry.
Tversky (1977) was the first to demonstrate asymmetry in judgements on
similarity. Subjects judged systematically that, for instance, 'the portrait
resembles the person' was a better comparison than 'the person resembles the
portrait'. In the next Section, Tversky's explanation of asymmetry in
similarity judgements is thoroughly examined, thereby relating his findings
to feature set differences. For now, as an example of similarity research in
the theory of literature, one of the scarce but laudable empirical explorations
of Jakobson's formal-semantic equivalence theory is discussed.
Wolff's (1977) investigation of Baudelaire's 'Les Chats' did not rely on
feature elicitation, but on categorization experiments. Following Miller
(1969), Wolff tried to determine the classes of semantic equivalence that
compose the poem by asking subjects to categorize those verbs, nouns and
adjectives that - according to their opinion - were semantically cognate. The
number of subjects that put the same words together was assumed to be an
index of the semantic equivalence of these words. The height of their
relative correlations was assumed to decide the cluster (or 'context-meta-
phor') to which they belonged. Although on a descriptive level this approach
was highly informative, certain flaws occurred that could have been avoided
by a feature elicitation experiment.
Above all, Wolff supposed that subjects were judging the words on sem-
antic equivalence, although equivalent spelling, rhyme or syntax could
interplay (cf. Chapter 4). No controls were offered on these factors.
Furthermore, equivalence matrices are hardly ever symmetric (correlating
completely on, and being equal above and below the diagonal). In addition
to the cluster analysis, then, arbitrary choices must be made ad hoc, to
determine in which cluster a doubtful case should be categorized. Moreover,
the equivalence matrix offered by Wolff (1977: 100-101) did not take into
account the correlation values above the diagonal, thus presuming that there
is no asymmetry in the semantic equivalence of the words in 'Les Chats'. It
could be ventured, however, that subjects judge the semantics of e.g.,
'sphinx' to be more similar to 'mystique' than 'mystique' to 'sphinx'. Tversky
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(1977) offers ample experimental support that subject judgements of equiv-
alence (or similarity) may be liable to such asymmetries.
In addition, it cannot be fixed precisely from an equivalence matrix,
whose features distinguish the one cluster from the other, and whose fea-
tures are shared by the words within the cluster. Usually, such results are
arrived at by a heuristic search through the raw material. It is assumed also
that the clusters derived from statistical analysis are ecologically valid,
thereby assuming that subjects will perceive fewer clusters than there are
words or semantic features of the words in the poem.
However, Wolff (1977: 54-55) was not unaware of the problem that lack-
ing knowledge of the semantic features of the words leads to a deadlock in
describing the semantic equivalence of words. In rejecting Eco's (1972: 116)
loose enumeration of features for different classes, Wolff saw no solution to
the problem that feature sets may be infinite and exchangeable. Another
problem which Wolff signaled was that the hierarchical models describing
the relations between features usually do not fit the data. This is not a pitfall,
but rather the very essence of scientific enquiry.
The first problem, on the contrary, is worth attending. Indeed, feature sets
may be infinite and interchangeable a priori. However, within a speech com-
munity, this is not a requisite. In other words, to know what a word means
according to a homogeneous group of people, the accumulated feature sets
generated by a random sample is sufficient to estimate the chance that a fea-
ture is mentioned. Put differently, statistics provides for the probability of
occurrence for each feature in an infinite sample, whereas the sample fences
off the feature set. The next Section will discuss how these considerations
are put into practice.
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5.2 Psychology: Studies on similarity
The issue of equivalence in forming connotative meaning was not only
pursued in the theory of literature. The concept of equivalence is also of
utmost relevance to the psychological study of similarity.
Similarity plays a fundamental role in theories of knowledge and
behavior. It serves as an organizing principle by which individuals
classify objects, form concepts, and make generalizations. Indeed, the
concept of similarity is ubiquitous in psychological theory. It underlies
the accounts of stimulus and response generalization in learning, it is
employed to explain errors in memory and pattern recognition, and it
is central to the analysis of connotative meaning. (Tversky 1977)
As argued in the Chapters 1 up to 3, the current theories of metaphor pro-
cessing attach a more or less central role to feature matching. Comparison
theory, for instance, concentrates on the size of the shared feature set
(overlap) to differentiate among expression types. Anomaly theory contrasts
the shared set with the distinctive features of the A- and B-term. If too many
literal features are distinctive, figurative features are activated to enrich the
shared set. Interaction theory claims that when the shared set is outweighed
by the distinctive features, relations are created to improve the semantic con-
nections. It should follow that similarity between terms - or 'equivalence' in
the theory of literature - depends on the size of the shared set. The more fea-
tures are shared, the more similarity.
In this respect, certain phenomena are of interest. Tversky has (1977)
pointed out that comparisons such as similes and metaphors should not be
assumed as symmetric by nature. However, others such as Gleitman,
Gleitman, Miller & Ostrin (1996) object to this idea - see Asymmetry in
judgements of similarity and figurativeness?. Tversky stated that the number
of features the A-term shares with the B-term equals the number of features
the B-term shares with the A-term. Consequently, similarity of the A-term
with the B-term should equal that of the B- with the A-term. Yet, this is not
always the case. Tversky found that subjects preferred phrases such as 'the
son looks more like the father' to 'the father looks more like the son' or 'an
ellipse resembles a circle' to 'a circle resembles an ellipse'. Although
logically invalid, subjects yet judged that the one term was more similar to
the other than conversely.
Tversky's explanation of this asymmetry (the focusing hypothesis) ran as
follows. The choice of the subject of a comparison (partly) depends on its
relative salience. The less-salient (less prominent) term is chosen as the
subject or variant (the son). The more salient term is seen as the referent or
prototype (the father). Since the less salient term (the subject) is put in
focus, its features are weighted more heavily than the features of the refer-
ent. Thus, shared as well as distinctive features of the subject are weighted
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heavier than those of the referent. Since the shared features are equal for
both terms, the distinctive features of the subject make the difference in the
weighing of both terms. If similarity judgements are connected to the
number of shared features in contrast to the number of distinctive features,
then the similarity of the comparison from subject to referent is less than
that from referent to subject. A comparison from subject to referent puts the
heavily-weighted distinctive features of the subject in focus and compares
them with the less-weighted distinctive features of the referent. As a result,
similarity is reduced more by the distinctive features of the subject than by
the distinctive features of the referent. Therefore, a comparison from subject
to referent is a comparison from low-to-high similarity (coinciding with
low-to-high salience), which is preferred to a comparison from high-to-low
similarity.
However, the role of salience is rather obscure. It is a container concept,
including notions of intensity, feature frequency, familiarity, good form, and
informational content. Others, such as Katz (1982), reckon in associative
dominance, typicality, fluency and imaginal distinctiveness. Because of this
inclusiveness, salience is as vague as 'foregrounding' in the theory of lit-
erature. It is unclear whether the composing elements of salience are com-
petitive or supplementary. Is salience an overall measure of the stimulus, or
is it the sum of salience estimates for each feature?
It all comes down to ascribing a weight to (the features of) a stimulus,
and most of the concepts assumed to contribute to this weight lack construct
validity. Exceptions may be feature set size and feature frequency, because
they are readily accessible from the feature sets. Feature set size may be a
knowledge index for a stimulus, while feature frequencies may indicate the
importance of a feature within this knowledge index. The next Section is
devoted to this option.
Salience and feature set size tie for explaining asymmetry
Tversky (1977) asked subjects to choose which comparison between coun-
tries they preferred: In an order from low-to-high or in an order from high-
to-low salience. Salience of countries was judged beforehand by a norm
group. It appeared that 'North Korea is similar to Red China' was preferred
to 'Red China is similar to North Korea'. The asymmetry was ascribed to a
higher salience for Red China than for North Korea. Identical results were
obtained for similarity ratings. Low-to-high salience orders yielded higher
similarity ratings than high-to-low orders.
In similarity judgments of geometric figures, salience was defined as
'goodness of form'. A 'good figure' (a simple line drawing) was considered
less-salient than a 'bad form' (a more complex line drawing). Tversky found
that the preferred order of comparison was from the less-complex to the
more-complex figure. This was interpreted again as a preference to a low-to-
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high salience ordering. Rating similarity for both directions of comparison
confirmed that similarity for the less-complex figure compared with the
more-complex figure was higher than vice versa. Unfortunately in this case,
the salience difference was defined a priori, and not derived from actual
judgements.
In comparing block letters, Tversky stipulated that a letter is more salient,
when it includes the letter it is compared with (e.g., I ! F ! E). Indeed,
subjects judged that, compared with 'including' letters, 'included' letters led
to more 'same'-responses than 'including' letters compared with 'included'
letters. However, as in the case of the geometric figures, salience was not
judged by the subjects.
In the same way, Tversky maintained that long Morse signals are more
salient than short Morse signals. In an analysis of Rothkopf's (1957) data, he
found that short signals compared with long signals produced more 'same'-
responses than comparisons from long-to-short signals.
For color comparisons, Tversky drew on the Rosch (1975) study, in
which subjects preferred a phrase like 'off-red is virtually pure red' to 'pure
red is virtually off-red'. Similar results were found for comparisons between
horizontal, vertical and diagonal lines and lines under different angles. The
variant (e.g., off-red / line under unusual angle) was preferred in the first
position, and the prototype (e.g., pure red / horizontal line) in the second.
Tversky claimed that the stimuli in first position were least salient.
Tversky observed that, for example, 'tiger' is a more likely associate to
'leopard' than 'leopard' to 'tiger'. For an explanation, he dismissed higher
'response availability' or 'commonality' and insisted on salience differences.
However, the methods to measure all these notions were not well
established, and to this extent, they merely remain words. Salience may
indicate how conspicuous a stimulus is, and perhaps explain asymmetry.
Alternatives such as 'commonality' or 'familiarity', however, may be equally
compelling.  The only direct measure is a rating of each feature or stimulus1
on certain dimensions. However, it is equivocal which one. Other direct
measures are the feature set sizes of the stimuli, and the frequency with
which a feature occurs. An advantage of these measures is that subjects are
unaware of what is measured, which is not the case in scaling experiments.
Moreover, feature set size may be related to asymmetry as well. Subjects
may prefer a certain order of comparison, not because the focused stimulus
is less salient, but because it is feature-poor, whereas the frame of reference
is feature-rich. Feature-richness, then, as an index of world knowledge may
be a serious candidate for explaining asymmetry.2
Hence, the question is whether Tversky's findings should be interpreted
from a different perspective. Subjects rated salience in one experiment only
(the 'overall salience' of the countries). They did not indicate the salience of
each particular feature, and thus, might have estimated the relative
importance of the countries by the amount of knowledge they had about
them. The unsalient, unimportant countries might have been the countries
132
Feature elicitation: Salience, feature set size, and asymmetry
they knew less about (North Korea, Poland). These countries might have ac-
tivated the smallest numbers of features. The salient countries (Red China,
USSR) coincided with the ones they knew best. In these cases, the feature-
poor, unfamiliar, countries were chosen as the focus of comparison, the fea-
ture-rich countries as the frame of reference. Asymmetry, then, might be
explained by the higher probability for a poor feature-set to share its features
with a feature-rich set. A comparison from the feature-rich set to the feature-
poor set leaves more distinctive features within the focus of attention than
the other way round. Psychologically, similarity for poor-to-rich compari-
sons is judged higher than from rich-to-poor. Relatively more features
intersect in the focus of attention, when the feature-poor stimulus is chosen
as the core of comparison.
From this perspective, Tversky's results can be perfectly explained by the
number of features that a stimulus activates ('feature-richness'). Complex
stimuli, such as 'bad' geometric figures or block letters that include other
letters are characterized by having more perceptual features. The 'bad'
geometric figures in Figure 3 (Tversky 1977: 335), for example, have more
edges, lines, and distance differences than the well-shaped figures.
Therefore, they have more perceptual features. For the same reason, the
'including' letters may have more features than the 'included' letters. On top
of that, they also have the 'included' letters as features. Tversky failed to
explain why short Morse signals are less-salient than long Morse signals. In
fact, short signals may have less perceptual features (a dot or a dash less). It
may also be argued that 'pure red', a horizontal or vertical line or a diagonal
with 45  angle are more familiar to the subjects than 'off-red' and lines under0
different angles, and therefore, evoke more features.
Contrary to Tversky's conception, it may even be argued that a pro-
totypical stimulus is less-salient, although it evokes more features. Tversky
does not explain when a stimulus or feature is more salient than another. It is
quite feasible that salience is a measure of infrequency. Something rare is
conspicuous. A low-salient stimulus might be a stimulus with a small set of
low-frequent features. A prototypical stimulus, however, is well known
(otherwise it would not be a prototype), and is probably not salient, because
it has large sets of high-frequent features. In addition, salience may also be
related to the number of distinctive features of a stimulus within its
category. Something deviant (something that shares few features with other
stimuli) is conspicuous. Since a prototypical stimulus shares more features
with its category members than a nonprototypical stimulus, it is best 'camou-
flaged', and probably has the least distinctive features. Considering that the
weight of the distinctive features (its 'deviation value') may be an indicator
of salience, a prototypical stimulus would be least salient.
Explaining asymmetry as a function of differences in feature set size is
more parsimonious than explaining it from salience differences. Salience is
a conglomerate of factors and cannot be secured without subject ratings. The
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frequency of features and feature set size are obtained without intentional
awareness of tracing salience.
Tversky arrived at the role of salience by a complex inference. First,
stimuli are supposed to activate features. The subject of the comparison is
chosen as the focus (Tversky did not explain why), and thus, its (distinctive)
features are weighted heavier (why?). Since subjects judge that the similarity
of the focused stimulus is lower, the frame of reference is more salient
(why?).
Feature set size is a simpler explanation. Stimuli activate features whose
set sizes decide about the focus of comparison (not necessarily the subject,
cf. Table 4.0, Chapter 4). The feature-poor stimulus is chosen as the focus,
because it has a better chance to match its features with the feature-rich, so
that the relative number of distinctive features is smaller. In this way, the
preference to comparison order is explained, and the concept of separately
weighing the focused stimulus can be dropped.
Moreover, Tversky treated salience as an overall property of the stimulus.
Since the salience of each feature was unknown, a perhaps interesting
specification might have been overlooked. It might be that the shared set is
not symmetric, as Tversky presupposed. If a shared feature is low-salient (or
low-frequent) in the one set and high-salient (or high-frequent) in the other,
asymmetry may be explained from salience (or frequency) differences within
the shared set (cf. Table 5.0). Salience or frequency of the distinctive fea-
tures, then, may even be ruled out as explanation for asymmetry.
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Several formulae to ascertain similarity
Broadly speaking, three approaches can be distinguished in determining
similarity: The calculation of distance, informational uncertainty, and the
shared set. One example of each option will be discussed here.
Distance metrics do not employ feature sets. Instead, Tourangeau &
Sternberg (1982) presumed a dimensional space in which similar stimuli
occupy adjacent regions. The dimensions were established by contrasting
antonyms on bipolar rating scales (e.g., noble-ignoble, warlike-peaceful).
Following factor analysis, the factor scores on the observed dimensions were
treated as coordinates, which - if approximately equally powerful - imply
that the vectors of the stimuli are more or less the same. The Euclidian dis-
tance d between stimuli A and B, then, is calculated as the root of the sum of
i isquares of differences between the m coordinates (a  - b ):
m   
i id(A,B) =s  3  (a  - b )    .2
    i = 1
In this way, Tourangeau & Sternberg estimated the mutual distances be-
tween categories (e.g., 'fish', 'birds', 'world leaders'), as well as the distances
between members within a category (e.g., 'shark', 'hawk', 'Castro'). A group
of subjects rated the category members on a range of bipolar scales and the
obtained factor scores decided about their distance. Another group of
subjects rated the same categories on similarity. This resulted in a set of
stimuli, belonging to more or less distant categories, and occupying more or
less similar positions within their respective categories. From these stimuli,
metaphors of the form 'the A is the B among C' were constructed (e.g., 'the
shark is the hawk among fish') and a third group of subjects rated the
aptness of these metaphors. Tourangeau & Sternberg found out that
closeness of within-category positions (shark-hawk) increased aptness,
whereas closeness between categories (fish-birds) decreased aptness.
Based on this and other experiments, Tourangeau & Sternberg suggested
that when interpreting metaphors, subjects see the factors that apply to one
category as analogous to those applying to the other category. Categories
should be sufficiently distant to make an apt metaphor. Within categories,
however, stimuli should occupy similar positions in the dimensional space.
Tversky pointed out that asymmetry is harder to represent by distance
than by feature metrics, although distance metrics that account for
asymmetry are found in Krumhansl (1978) and applied in multidimensional
scaling techniques. However, an optimal spatial fit of the data is usually
achieved by a host of transformations; the remaining stress is an effect of the
technique - not of the data - and the resulting model is interpreted fairly
intuitively. Moreover, distance is a cumbersome measure of similarity,
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because although stimuli may be close on several dimensions, they may not
look alike or have a similar function. For instance, 'death' and 'guilt' are
closely related, yet not similar. In other words, distance metrics are biased
towards identifying analogy, whereas feature metrics are biased towards
similarity. Since analogy is a core notion of interaction theory, distance
metrics favor the interaction view, whereas feature metrics favor comparison
and anomaly assumptions.
Malgady & Johnson (1980) expressed the influence of salience on simi-
larity in terms of the average information value of a stimulus. The concept
of uncertainty is concerned with redundancy of information. The
information of an expression such as 'the child is a human being' is
redundant in contrast with 'the child is a moon'. The first adds nothing to
what is already known, whereas the second provides new information. The
higher the redundancy of a stimulus, the less its salience. In other words, the
information formulae can be employed for estimating salience and surprise
effects.
Malgady & Johnson defined the salience of a stimulus in terms of feature
probability by way of the common information formula:
n
i 2 iU(X) =  - 3   p(x ) @ log  p(x )  (Garner 1962),
   i = 1
1 nwhere X = set of features {x , ... , x }
U = informational uncertainty in the feature set X
ip(x ) = probability of the i-th feature in X
n = number of features in X.
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To normalize the differences in feature set sizes, a summary measure of sali-
ence f(X) was calculated as:3
 U(X)
f(X) = ,___________
2  log n
where salience is highest, if f(X) = 1,
and salience is lowest,     if f(X) = 0.
The numerator U(X) is sensitive to the probability distribution of the fea-
2 tures, whereas the denumerator log n is not. As a consequence, salience de-
creases as U(X) becomes less. Put differently, for fixed n, the denumerator
2 log n is constant, so that the quotient is proportional to U(X). Moreover, the
probability of a feature is defined as the relative frequency of a feature.
Malgady & Johnson used this calculus to establish the salience of terms
in metaphors and similes. A group of subjects produced features for all
nouns in 12 pairs (= 24 nouns), originating from literary metaphors. This
resulted in open-ended feature sets, from which the informational
uncertainty was assessed for all nouns. Classified as high or low in salience,
the two nouns were used in two metaphors: One in the order from low-to-
high salience (A is B), the other in the order from high-to-low salience (B is
A).
A second group of subjects rated the similarity of the metaphors in both
orders (A is B, B is A) from 'the first term to the second'. Malgady &
Johnson confirmed Tversky's focusing and asymmetry hypothesis. In
judgements of similarity, the order of low-to-high salience was preferred in
70% of the cases. About 73% of the subjects reported that the metaphors
were understood better, when the A-term was less-salient than the B-term.
The strong connection between similarity and interpretability was also found
by Johnson & Malgady (1979).
A second experiment was conducted to study context effects on judge-
ments of similarity and figurativeness in similes (A is like B), which were
constructed from six selected noun pairs of experiment 1. The most salient
noun was used as the B-term. The similes were presented in six different
context conditions, either including adjectives and verbs that supposedly
added a feature to the A-term set, to the B-term set, or that enriched the
shared set. For instance, the adjective 'red' in 'Red blood pours like rain'  was4
assumed to add a feature to 'blood', not to 'rain'.  The verbs and adjectives5
were judged by a norm group for their 'adding value'.
One group of 25 subjects compared the six versions of every simile on
similarity between the terms, without instructions about the direction of
comparison. A second group judged the 'figurativeness' of the similes. 'Figu-
rativeness' was defined implicitly by contrasting a simile with a literal ex-
pression, and with an anomaly. Scale values for the six simile versions were
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calculated in every condition with Thurstone's case V model (Thurstone
1927).
The context conditions could be ranked by the obtained scale values. The
rank order of the conditions for similarity judgements confirmed Tversky's
contrast model that subjects focused on the nonsalient A-term. Contexts that
cued the shared features (X 1 Y) had a positive effect on judgements of simi-
larity, followed by those cueing a distinctive feature of the nonsalient A-term
(X - Y), followed by contexts cueing a distinctive feature of the salient B-
term (Y - X). For judgements on figurativeness, the focusing effect reversed,
because subjects focused on the salient B-term: (X 1 Y) > (Y - X) > (X - Y).
Malgady & Johnson concluded that A- and B-term in metaphor and simile
are judged differently for their contribution to similarity and figurativeness,
the difference lying in the switch of focus.
Until now, Tversky (1977) has only been discussed with regard to similarity
ratings. However, Tversky also supposed that similarity is a function of the
contrast between shared and distinctive features. Note that the A-term acti-
vates feature set X, the B-term set Y, and that u is a feature in X and Y. The
calculus for shared features looks as follows:
X Y uf(X 1 Y) = 3 u   @ u  / N  ,
where f(X 1 Y) denotes a salience measure for the sum of all features u in the
X Yshared set X 1 Y, and u  and u  denote the frequency of occurrence of feature
uu in response to stimulus A and B. The denumerator N  denotes the number
of stimuli that share feature u. In simpler terms, the shared set equals the
total number of common features, including their frequency of occurrence,
divided by the number of stimuli in the comparison. Note, however, that by
definition the salience measure f(X 1 Y) is equated with feature frequency
(frequency of occurrence), which - despite Tversky's objection - may be seen
as a stable indicator of response availability.
X YDistinctive features are calculated by f(X - Y) + f(Y - X) = 3 a  + 3 b  ,
which is a salience measure f for the features that belong to X, but not to Y,
plus the salience of features that belong to Y, but not to X. The sum equals
the total of distinctive features a in response to stimulus A, plus the total of
the distinctive features b in response to stimulus B. Thus, the salience of a
stimulus is defined as the summed frequencies of all its features, where dis-
tinctive features are calculated as the total number of features in a set
(including frequencies), minus the features (including frequencies) shared by
another stimulus in the comparison.
In other words, the calculus for the number of shared features replaces sa-
lience in terms of direct ratings by salience in terms of frequency of occur-
rence of features. The calculus for the distinctive features makes salience de-
pendent upon the total number of features (including frequencies) elicited by
the subjects.
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Tversky's calculus for the shared set offers appealing as well as dis-
advantageous aspects. The sum of products of the frequency of feature u in
X Yresponse to A with the frequency of u in response to B, (3 u @ u ), assigns
little weight to a feature with a low probability, which is a merit. For ex-
Yample, suppose that in a data set u  = 0, then u does not add to the shared
Yset. However, the frequency u  in an infinite sample may be greater than
Yzero (feature u may be occasionally mentioned). If u  = .001, then u does add
Xto the shared set, namely, with the value of .001 times u  . In other words,
Ythe value of u  is taken into account, but infrequent features are not weighted
utoo much. The denumerator N  in the formula for f(X 1 Y) denotes the num-
ber of stimuli that share feature u. As a consequence, rare (and supposedly
salient) features in the shared set are assumed to increase similarity more
than frequent ones. However, the premise that rare features have greater
importance for the shared set has no empirical support.
Two problems arise, then, when applying the calculus to feature elicita-
tion data. One concerns the loss of information, insidious in multiplying and
dividing the feature frequencies, the other concerns statistics. Tversky
stressed that the calculus for shared features is only applicable to symmetric
comparisons (A is B). The product in the numerator is an overall measure of
the frequency of a feature in the shared set. To determine the value of the
ushared set f(X 1 Y), the summed product is divided by N  , which makes f(X
1 Y) an overall value that cannot distinguish the frequencies in X and Y of
the shared features. Consequently, asymmetry cannot be investigated as a
function of frequency differences of features within the shared set.
Moreover, this type of data analysis induces a statistical problem. Feature
frequency is assessed by the number of times a feature is mentioned by a
group of subjects. In other words, feature sets accumulate across subjects, so
that the variance within subjects is neglected (this critique is also applicable
to Tourangeau & Sternberg and Malgady & Johnson).
Of course, feature frequency can hardly be obtained otherwise, because
subjects usually do not mention a feature more than once. On the other hand,
Xinaccuracies may be introduced to the shared set. Feature u  may be
Ymentioned by subject 1, whereas u  is mentioned by subject 2. If the sets are
joined across subjects, the shared set X 1 Y contains feature u. However, for
each individual subject 1 and 2, the shared set is empty. In other words,
when variance within subjects is respected, less feature overlap is found
than when the sets are accumulated, which may actually exaggerate the size
of the shared sets.
Notwithstanding the risk of data-sets with many zero-values, analysis of
feature elicitation data should respect differences between subjects. The gain
X Yis that feature u  mentioned by subject 1 cannot be compared with feature u
from subject 2, so that shared features refer only to individual subjects. The
loss is that frequency differences within the shared set will hardly ever oc-
cur.
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Hitherto, the studies discussed have been rather dated; however, more recent
studies on similarity come up against the same problems on salience and
weight of features (e.g., Goldstone, Medin & Gentner 1991). Recent studies
on salience and similarity tend to take Tversky (1977) as a starting point.
However, as Ortony put it:
The issue of whether or not salience of an attribute is independent of
the object that possesses it is an unsettled empirical question. Yet, it is
not at all easy to test. It is difficult to distinguish between the absolute
amount of salience an attribute contributes to an object and con-
founding variables such as the relative amount it contributes and the
amount of knowledge that subjects have about the objects.
(...) (presumably highly correlated) measures, such as frequency or
order of mention in an elicitation task, might do just as well. (Ortony
1979)
As indicated, various approaches are available, so that the most suitable to
the metaphor models should be selected. Since all models rely on activation
and comparison of feature sets, Tversky's approach seems most promising.
The adjustments are, however, that (1) the data analysis will respect subject
variability, (2) salience is conceived as feature frequency, and (3) the
frequencies of shared features may differ in X and Y and may explain
asymmetry as well. Section 5.3 proposes a calculus that meets these
demands, thereby giving account of the definition of features, and the
criteria for identifying shared features.
5.3 Three definitions for features, their formal and semantic
equality, resulting in three measures of feature overlap
Similarity judgements may sometimes be asymmetric (Tversky 1977). Sub-
jects judge that stimulus A looks more like stimulus B than inversely. A
major factor in materializing this phenomenon is supposed to be the salience
difference between A- and B-term. Section 5.2 argued that salience is a
problematic concept in comparison with feature frequency and set size.
Asymmetry, then, is supposedly caused by the term with a feature-poor set.
This term is preferred as the focus of comparison, so that relatively more
features are covered by the feature-rich set.
 Modifying Tversky's approach, the notion of feature salience is dropped,
and the simpler frequency of occurrence is maintained. The following de-
X Ypendent variables are investigated: The weighted feature set size (W  and W
X- see Chapter 1), and feature frequency differences within the shared set. W
Yand W  are defined as the sum of weights of all the features evoked by the A-
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and B-term, the weights of which are determined by their frequency of
occurence.
SThe weighted shared set size (W  - see Chapter 1) is the sum of the
Sweights w (u) of all features u in the shared set; weight being the frequency
with which a feature occurs. However, 'red' may be mentioned once as a fea-
ture of 'love' and twice as a feature of 'rose'. To allow for frequency differ-
ences within the shared set, the weighted contribution of X in X 1 Y is
established by:
X S XW  =  3 w (u) .
  u å S
In the same way, the weighted contribution of Y in X 1 Y is given by:
Y S YW  =  3 w (u) .
  u å S
The disadvantage of this approach is that the data set is now considered as
the population. The probability that a feature occurs in an infinite sample is
not considered. In other words, infrequently reported features receive a
relatively high weight.
In the same vein, an advantage of Tversky's calculus is the little weight it
accredits to features with a low probability by multiplying the frequency of a
feature in X with that in Y. In the case of a main effect of expression type,
however, the present approach calculates the size of the weighted shared set
as the frequency of shared features in X plus the frequency of shared features
S X S Y Sin Y: W  = W  + W  . However, when term is included as a factor, this ap-
X S Y Sproach is capable of identifying asymmetry within the shared set: W  - W  .
Thus, the function g (Chapter 1) - which should define how to treat the dif-
ferent frequencies in X and Y of a shared feature - simply is the sum in the
case that term is not a factor; it is a subtraction when term is a factor.
To ascertain the shared set, two questions should be answered. What are fea-
tures? When are features equal? If features are listed by the subjects, which
informational units should be analyzed: Lines, words, or letters? If two letter
strings are equal, are they also semantically equal? The feature 'street' is
formally found in 'street car', however, semantically, they do but partly
match. On the other hand, the feature 'car' is also found in 'street car', which
semantically, makes a better match. Likewise, is 'fisherman' equal to
'fishermen', psychologically speaking?
Similarly, homonyms have different meanings. They are two words, yet,
written exactly equal. In other words, formal equality does not necessarily
indicate semantic equality as formal inequality does not predicate semantic
inequality without more. The problem for any semantic analysis (either
heuristic or computational) is that meaning is derived from the form.
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Equality of features may be defined in the strict sense that formally and
semantically, they are identical. By this definition, 'fisherman' and 'fisher-
men' are not equal, the underlying assumption being that any formal
inequality is a semantic inequality. This definition is often implicit in
psychological and computational analysis of feature elicitation data.
Equality of features may also be defined in a more moderate sense. The
estimate of similarity may neglect formal properties of the features such as
affix, suffix, singular or plural. In that case, word-stems are equal to word-
derivations. Similarity estimates may be based on 'similitude', on the partial
resemblance between elements (Foucault 1988: 57). Using such an
intermediate definition, formal and semantic equality are allowed to be
somewhat divergent. Those features are the same that are 'approximately'
equal e.g., when the word-stems are equal. 'Child' then, is identical to
'children'. However, it is also identical to 'child's play'.
Semantic and formal equality are even farther apart, when it concerns
letter combinations within words. Features in the form of letter clusters are
of interest to scholars of literature who work in the line of Jakobson (1981:
40) and Lotman (1976: 71). They assume that any formal equality should be
considered a semantic match. From this point of view, semantic equality is
established when a random set of sequential letters is retrieved in any other
word, independent of normal meaning connectedness. It has become a com-
mon premise of analyzing poetry that meaning is 'created' between words -
however remote - when formal equivalences are found. Starting from this
definition, 'ear' is not only equal to 'ears' and 'ear ring', but is also equal to
'earl', 'early', 'bears' and 'rearmament'. Reversely, 'ear' is not the only
sequence that can be found in 'rearmament'; 'rear', 'arm', 'ma', and 'amen' are
also present. This definition of equality is lenient, because any formal
equality is conceived of as a semantic equality. Using such a definition, the
shared set is also composed of equal letter combinations, independent of
normal meaning relatedness.
In other words, the computer models of Figure 1.1, Figure 2.1, and Figure
3.1 might distinguish lines, words and letters as features. The line is defined
as the letter strings and spaces between two 'returns'. The word is defined as
a letter string between two blanks. A letter is every sign that is not a blank.
'Lines' in this sense are not to be understood as necessarily grammatical
correct or complete sentences. They may also be genitive constructions,
incomplete stock phrases, or chunks of clustered words. Likewise, words
may be letter strings not present in the dictionary.
Equality may be either complete or partial. Formally, equality is com-
plete, if each letter of a feature is exactly the same as the letter at the same
position in the other feature. Formal equality is partial, if a letter string is
equal to a string in another feature, irrespective of surrounding letters or
string position. Semantic equality may be found, either by consulting the
dictionary (the meaning definitions of the speech community), or by adding
a heuristic procedure to this consultation that is not part of the common
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procedure in the speech community (as in the case of Jakobson's formal-
semantic equivalence theory).
i jHenceforth, the question x  = y  ? in the decision diamond of the compari-
son phase may be rewritten with a combination of 2 formal and 2 semantic
equality criteria, calculating overlap for 3 different kinds of features.
However, because this would lead to 2*2*3 = 12 analyses for every meta-
phor model, a combination of feature type and equality criterion was chosen
such that the sharpest contrasts occured between measures.
Hence, the first measure (M1) combines the strict definition of equality
with lines as definition of features. When two feature sets are compared, this
measure tests every word in a line for exact formal equality with the word at
the same position in the compared line. In the application of the strict
i jcriterion to the computer models, the operator == tests for equality x  == y
?. This measure respects the way subjects have formulated their associat-
ions, and assumes that every formal difference is a semantic difference. M1
finds the smallest number of shared features. The feature set sizes are the
number of lines. By definition of the strict criterion, equality is a symmetric
relation between the feature sets, unless subjects associate the same feature
twice, for example, as both a literal and a figurative feature.
The measure M2 combines a word definition of features with the inter-
mediate criterion of equality. A partial letter string overlap, however, must
be meaningful. To decide what meaningfulness is, this measure uses a
thesaurus as 'mental lexicon', in which words with their derivations are
clustered. If a word in a feature set shows partial overlap with another (for
example, larger) word in the other set, then both words must be traced back
to the same thesaurus cluster, before they are regarded as a match. Formal
equality, then, is based on 'similitude', on the partial resemblance between
elements. This looser measure finds more shared features than M1, and
i jimplemented in the computer models, it uses the approximate sign x  . y  ?.
The feature set sizes are numbers of words. Frequency differences of fea-
tures in the shared set are guaranteed by the fact that one set may contain
only the word stem of all the derivations in the other set.
 The Jakobsonian criterion is made operative in measure M3. The search
is letter oriented, and the demand of meaningfulness is dropped. This
i jmeasure uses what are termed 'regular expressions' (/x / y  ?), and looks for
letter combinations within word bounderies. The lower limit for a letter
combination is the smallest word associated by the subject. Otherwise, every
single letter making a match excessively inflates the shared set. Due to its
letter orientation, this measure is 'equality-eager'. The number of shared fea-
tures is expressed as the number of equal letter combinations; the feature set
size is the total of letters. Frequency differences within the shared set are the
effect of features containing more identical letter combinations in the one
feature set than in the other.
To avoid the shared set from growing exorbitantly, a mitigating pre-
caution is taken for M2 and M3. The particles 'de', 'het' and 'een' ('the', 'a',
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'an'), the possessive pronouns 'dit', 'dat', 'die', 'deze' ('this', 'that', 'these',
'those'), certain prepositions 'van', 'in', 'om', 'aan', 'bij', 'te' ('of', 'from', 'in',
'on', 'by', 'to'), the logical operators 'en', 'of' ('and', 'or'), certain personal
pronouns 'je', 'me', 'we', 'ze' ('you', 'me', 'we', 'they'), the adverb of place 'er'
('there'), and the verb form 'is' ('is') are ignored by the program in counting
shared features. These small function words are also discounted for feature
set size.
These adjustments enable investigation of the differences in (shared) fea-
ture set size among expression types. Moreover, feature set size, or different
frequencies of features in the shared set may now explain asymmetry in
judgements on similarity. 
5.4 Test of the metaphor models: Feature activation and mapping
Three between-subject feature elicitation and categorization conditions were
administered (single term, expression, context), each containing three ex-
pression types (literal, metaphoric, anomalous - within subjects),
incorporating an A- and a B-term. This corresponds to three factors, with
three levels each, and two sub-levels within each level.
Subjects were undergraduates of language and literature, Dutch native
speakers, aged between 19 and 29 years, who had never previously partici-
pated in an experiment. They served as paid volunteers in a free association
production task in which as many associations as possible should be
generated in response to the terms of the metaphors, literals, and anomalies.
Subjects were seated in front of a text processor (486DX2), and reported to
have text processing experience. After stimulus presentation, subjects had
one minute association time. A tone was the cue to finish the last
association, before working on the next stimulus. The inter-trial interval
took about 10 to 12 seconds. Trials could consist of a single term (one
stimulus), an expression (both terms forming two stimuli), or an expression
in context (both terms forming two stimuli). When a trial consisted of an ex-
pression, the A-term was highlighted, prior to the start of the association
time. After the tone, the B-term was highlighted and the second association
minute began. In trials with context, subjects read the text at their own
speed, indicating by button press that the A-term could be highlighted.
Further procedures were identical to those for expressions. Associations
were automatically stored, every two seconds.
Subjects were asked to type as many associations as possible, with three
leads. They were asked to make meaningful associations, and avoid rhyme
associations or nonwords. They were also asked to avoid digressing from the
meaning of the term by means of 'chain-associations'. However, these rules
were not strict, and subjects were free to ignore them. Very personal
associations were allowed as long as subjects considered them meaningful
features of the stimulus. Subjects were asked to write their associations as
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catchwords and small sentences, with each new association on a new line.
They were unaware of the origin of the stimuli, their connectedness, or the
aims of the study. All subjects worked on five training stimuli unconnected
to the test set, before starting the actual experiment. Expressions, and their
context, were visible during the association period. Trials were mixed in a
pseudo-random order. No variants of an expression occurred after each
other, and no instances of the same expression type occurred more than
twice in a row. Moreover, literal, metaphoric and anomalous variants
appeared first, second and last in their relative order of presentation,
counterbalanced over expression types. Each subject within a group was
alloted a different order of presentation.
In the single term condition, twenty subjects received all 85 unique terms
from Table 4.1 (Chapter 4) as stimuli. After finishing the association task,
subjects decided for each feature whether it was literal or figurative. 'Literal
features' were defined as 'belonging to the real world' (as experienced by the
subject), and 'figurative features' as 'imaginitive, or symbolic features'. If
they felt that a feature was both literal and figurative, it could be copied to
the next line, each line receiving a different category letter. Subjects also
typed relations behind the features, which could connect a feature to another
feature, or to the term. 'Relations' were defined as 'semantic connections be-
tween words'. An example from Tourangeau & Sternberg (1982) was used
as an illustration. It said that the relation between teachers and kings may be
that they both have 'power', the first over his class, the second over his
empire. Features already listed as well as newly associated ones were
allowed to serve as relations. Subjects were free to write as many relations
as possible. However, they did not have to. In other words, features not
followed by relations remained 'attributive', whereas those receiving a
relation were considered 'grounds'. A feature list for a term thus appeared as
shown in Table 5.1.6
Ten new subjects also worked in the single term condition; however, they
neither categorized the features as literal or figurative in this condition, nor
did they create relations. After finishing single term, they entered the ex-
pression condition, in which they associated on all terms of all the 27 literal,
29 metaphoric and 27 anomalous expressions of Table 4.1. A trial consisted
of one expression, containing two stimuli (making 166 stimuli in total).
Subsequently, subjects carried out an expression interpretation condition, in
which they interpreted all expressions by eliciting features for the com-
bination of terms. A trial consisted of one expression, the combination of
terms forming one stimulus (making 83 stimuli in total). Thereafter, subjects
decided whether the features of each term and of each interpretation of an
expression were literal or figurative. Moreover, they constructed relations
between features or between stimuli and features.
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Table 5.1: Results for the stimulus heart by subject 5 in the single term condition, illus-
trating the creation of a small feature set, after categorizing the features for a term as literal
(l) and/or figurative (f), and making relations (r) between them. Feature elicitation was
performed before l- and f-categorization and relation creation. English translation from the
Dutch.
_________________________________________________________________________
heart
red l
body l
love f
blood l
bloodred l
nursery l sweet r
sweet f
valentine l
spear l death r
sword l death r
fight l death r
war l death r
cow's heart l
food l
dog l food r
passionate f
bosom friend f
fruit hearts l food r
_________________________________________________________________________
Another ten subjects also received the single term condition, whereupon
the same procedure was followed as described in the previous paragraph,
except that in context, the original poem was added to the expressions. A
trial consisted of an expression in context, containing the two terms as
stimuli. Similarly, in the context interpretation condition, the combination
of the terms in the expressions was interpreted in context. One trial was
composed of an expression in context, the combination of both terms
forming one stimulus. As described above, literal, figurative and relation
features were attached, thereafter.
A single term condition preceded expression and context, because in the
latter two conditions certain terms were repeated in the stimulus set (e.g.,
'death', 'heart'), whereas others were not (e.g., 'wall'). Moreover, all variants
of an expression repeated the A-term. This could lead to a learning
advantage for repeated terms over unrepeated terms. More features could be
activated, which increases the probability to form overlap. Presenting single
term in advance might spread repetition effects more equally over all terms,
so that if not eliminated, its effect was neutralized at least. Controls on the
repetition effect will be part of the discussion.
Before entering the analysis, the raw data were run through a spelling
checker; misspellings were repaired, and alternative spellings were made
uniform. The data were analyzed according to the metaphor models of Sec-
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tion 1.3, 2.3 and 3.3, using three measures of feature overlap: M1, M2, and
M3.
Deciding among the measures
As argued above, it is unclear beforehand what formally should be con-
sidered a feature in the association data (the lines, the words, the letter
clusters?), and what the criterion for feature equality should be (strict,
intermediate, lenient?). Which measure (M1, M2, M3) to use, then? In the
next paragraphs, a statistical test is exploited to decide among the measures.
The distinctive power of each measure was investigated, to opt for one
and to omit all others. Since the measures M1, M2, M3 are concerned with
six within-variables each (two terms and three expression types), 18 within-
variables were treated as repeated measures in a MANOVA. Discriminant
functions for M1, M2, and M3 decided which measure differentiated best
among conditions, expression types and terms. The measure with the highest
partial regression weight (or coefficient) was supposed to make the subtlest
distinctions among effects. When ties occurred between two or more
weights, the highest correlation was decisive.
Table 5.2 (see Appendix) exhibits the effects on the feature sets relevant
to the metaphor models, along with the discriminant functions and correla-
tions. For each effect, only the first discriminant functions were considered,
because potential functions for the residuals are equally or less important.
Bonferroni correction was disregarded, and marginally significant effects (p
/ .05) were analyzed for regression weights, to maximize the information
about the distinctive power of the measures. Measures with the highest dis-
tinctive power for an effect are labeled with an asterisk.
Reference to Table 5.2 reveals that *M1 = 9, *M2 = 20 and *M3 = 7. M2
most often received the highest partial regression weights (20 times). Thus,
the intermediate definition of equality combined with words as features
(M2) distinguished most factors within effects, whereas M3 distinguished
least. Therefore, the analysis of the feature elicitation data will be
performed only with M2.
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Results of feature elicitation, l-f categorization and r-creation
Feature sets and shared sets were not accumulated across subjects, but
analyzed within subjects. The data shown in Figure 5.0 up to 5.5 were
subjected to MANOVA (Appendix Table 5.3). For the main effects of con-
dition and term, unique sums of squares were computed, whereas all other
effects were determined by Pillai's Trace. To accommodate Clark's (1973)
critique on language statistics,  all effects significant with subjects as7
random factor were also tested against a quasi-F with stimuli as the random
factor. All significant effects were followed by parameter estimates.
As proposed in Hoorn (in press), F-values were tested against á = .05,
whereas t-tests according to Bonferroni handled an á = .05 for the
comparison of two means (main effect of term), an á / 3 . .0166 for clusters
of three related effects (main effect of condition, main effect of expression
type, condition by term, term by expression type) and an á / 9 . .0055 for
clusters of nine related effects (condition by expression type, condition by
term by expression type). Henceforth, * = p < .05, ** = p < .0166, *** = p <
.0055, unless indicated otherwise.
Results of weighted feature set size
X YFigure 5.0: Grand mean weighted feature set size W  (solid) and W  (dashed). Features are
words.   = literal expressions,   = metaphors,   = anomalies.
Figure 5.0 presents the total number of weighted features averaged over sub-
jects (grand means) for terms, expression types and conditions. The fol-
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lowing observations were derived from the significant second-order interac-
ation among these three factors (Appendix Table 5.3: Ø ).
(I) Expression tended to elicit fewer features than single term and context,
although only the difference with single term was statistically reliable. (II)
Metaphors benefited little from context. (III) A-terms tended to elicit more
features than B-terms, with the exception of metaphors in single term and
expression. (IV) Anomalous B-terms elicited the least features.
Xl YlFigure 5.1: Grand mean weighted literal feature set size W  (solid) and W  (dashed). Fea-
tures are words.  = literal expressions,   = metaphors,   = anomalies.
Figure 5.1 exhibits the grand means for those features classified as literal
Xl Yl(W  , W ). The following observations were derived from the significant ef-
fects in Table 5.3 (Appendix).
(I) Single term activated more literal features than expression and context.
However, only the difference with expression was reliable (main effect of
acondition: Ù ). (II) Anomalies yielded the least number of literal features,
whereas literal and metaphoric expressions were about equal (interaction of
aterm by expression type: Ú ). (III) There were more literal features for A-
than for B-terms in literal and anomalous expressions, whereas the differ-
aence reversed in metaphors (interaction of term by expression type: Ú ).
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Xf YfFigure 5.2: Grand mean weighted figurative feature set size W  (solid) and W  (dashed).
Features are words.   = literal expressions,   = metaphors,   = anomalies.
Figure 5.2 displays the grand means for those features classified as figurat-
Xf Yfive (W  , W ). According to Table 5.3 (Appendix), only the main effect of
aterm was significant (Û ), indicating that:
(I) A-terms raised more figurative features than B-terms. Although it seems
that more figurative features are activated when more context is added, the
main effects of condition proved unreliable.
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Xr YrFigure 5.3: Grand mean weighted relation set size W  (solid) and W  (dashed). Features are
words.   = literal expressions,   = metaphors,   = anomalies.
The application of relations was optional, so that certain features were fol-
lowed by relations (cf. Table 5.1), whereas others were not. Those features x
and y not ensued by relations r were considered 'genuine' attributes a; those
connected with relations were considered grounds g (note that the notion
'ground' only means that the subject connected this feature with a relation.
This is different from the conventional use of 'ground'). Thus, the following
Xr Yr Xg Yg Xa Yaweighted set sizes were analyzed: (W  , W ), (W  , W ) and (W  , W ).
Xr YrIn Figure 5.3, the grand mean weighted relation set size W  and W  are
plotted. Only one observation was siginificant, namely the main effect of
acondition (Ü ), showing that:
(I) The number of created relations increased with the increase of context.
Context evoked more relations than single term. Despite the apparent
sensitivity of metaphors for creating relations in expression and context, no
effects involved with expression type were statistically reliable.
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Xg YgFigure 5.4: Grand mean weighted ground set size W  (solid) and W  (dashed). Features are
words.   = literal expressions,   = metaphors,   = anomalies.
Xg YgFigure 5.4 shows the grand mean weighted ground set sizes W  and W  .
As in the case of the relations, only the main effect of condition was signifi-
acant (Ý ), showing that:
(I) The number of grounds increased with the increase of context. In context,
more grounds were found than in single term. Again, a special sensitivity of
metaphors was not materialized by a significant effect of expression type.
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Xa YaFigure 5.5: Grand mean weighted attributive feature set size W  (solid) and W  (dashed).
Features are words.   = literal expressions,   = metaphors,   = anomalies.
XaFigure 5.5 shows the grand mean weighted attributive feature set sizes W
Ya aand W  . The significant second-order interaction (Þ ) followed exactly the
same pattern as in Figure 5.0.
(I) In expression, fewer features were elicited than in single term or context.
However, only the difference with single term was significant. (II) Meta-
phors benefited little from context. (III) A-terms evoked more features than
B-terms, with the exception of metaphors in single term and expression. (IV)
Anomalous B-terms raised least features.
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Results of weighted shared set size
Analogous to Table 5.3, Table 5.4 (Appendix) contains MANOVAs for the
effects shown in Figure 5.6 up to 5.13.
S X SFigure 5.6: Grand mean weighted shared set size W  , using M2. W  (solid) is the number
Y Sof weighted features that the A-term  shared with the B-term. W  (dashed) is the number of
weighted features that the B-term  shared with the A-term .   = literal expressions,   =
metaphors,   = anomalies.
In Figure 5.6, measure M2 calculated the weighted shared set as the number
X Sof weighted features that the A-term shared with the B-term ( W ), and the
Y Snumber of weighted features that the B-term shared with the A-term ( W ).
(I) Single term shared fewer features than expression and context (main ef-
bfects of condition: Ø ). (II) Literal expressions and metaphors shared more
bfeatures than anomalies (main effects of expression type: Ù ). Moreover,
Figure 5.6 suggests that in single term, literals shared more features than
metaphors, which shared more than anomalies. By contrast, metaphors
yielded more shared features than literals, which shared more features than
anomalies in expression and context. However, these interactions of con-
dition by expression type remained unreliable. (III) Feature frequency
differences in the shared set were found in expression (A-term < B-term) in
contrast with context (A-term > B-term) (interaction of condition by term:
bÚ ).
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Sll X SlFigure 5.7: Grand mean weighted literal shared set size (W ), using M2. W  (solid) is the
Y Slnumber of weighted literal features that the A-term  shared with the B-term . W  (dashed) is
the number of weighted literal features that the B-term  shared with the A-term .   = literal
expressions,   = metaphors,   = anomalies.
Figure 5.7 provides the grand mean weighted shared set sizes for literal fea-
Slltures (W ). Observe the following effects, validated by Table 5.4
(Appendix).
(I) In single term, smaller literal shared sets were found than in expression
bor context (main effects of condition: Û ). (II) Anomalies rendered the
smallest literal shared sets compared with literal expressions and metaphors,
bwhich were about equal (main effects of expression type: Ü ). The apparent
increase of the literal shared set for metaphors in expression and context was
not manifested in a significant interaction between condition and expression
type.
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Slf X SlFigure 5.8: Grand mean weighted literal-figurative shared set size (W ), using M2. W
(solid) is the number of weighted literal features that the A-term shared with the figurative
Y Sffeatures of the B-term . W  (dashed) is the number of weighted figurative features that the
B-term  shared with the literal A-term  features.   = literal expressions,   = metaphors,   =
anomalies.
For the results in Figure 5.8, the grand means were calculated of the
Slfweighted shared features (W ) categorized as literal for the A-term and figu-
rative for the B-term.
(I) Single term had the smallest shared sets of literal A-term and figurative
B-term features compared with expression or context (main effects of
bcondition: Ý ). (II) Metaphors elicited the largest sets of shared features that
were literal for A-terms and figurative for B-terms (main effects of ex-
bpression type: Þ ). (III) In single term, the literal-figurative shared set was
larger for literal expressions than for metaphors. Reversely, it was larger for
metaphors than for literal expressions in expression (interaction of condition
bby expression type: ß ).
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Sfl X SfFigure 5.9: Grand mean weighted figurative-literal shared set size (W ), using M2. W
(solid) is the number of weighted figurative features that the A-term shared with the literal
Y Slfeatures of the B-term. W  (dashed) is the number of weighted literal features that the B-
term  shared with the figurative A-term  features.   = literal expressions,   = metaphors, 
= anomalies.
SflFigure 5.9 presents the grand means of the weighted shared features (W )
categorized as figurative for the A-term and literal for the B-term. Observe
Slfthat the results are identical to those for W  , except for point (III).
(I) The smallest shared sets of figurative A-term and literal B-term features
were found in single term compared with expression or context (main effects
bof condition: à ). (II) Metaphors invoked the largest sets of shared features
that were figurative for A-terms and literal for B-terms (main effects of ex-
bpression type: á ). (III) In single term, the figurative-literal shared set was a
little larger for literal expressions than for metaphors. Invertedly, it was
larger for metaphors than for literal expressions in expression. Moreover, it
was larger for metaphors than for anomalies in single term, which increased
cin expression (interaction of condition by expression type: Ø ).
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Sff X SfFigure 5.10: Grand mean weighted figurative shared set size (W ), using M2. W  (solid) is
Y Sfthe number of weighted figurative features that the A-term  shared with the B-term . W
(dashed) is the number of weighted figurative features that the B-term shared with the A-
term .   = literal expressions,   = metaphors,   = anomalies.
Figure 5.10 offers the grand mean weighted shared set sizes of figurative
Sfffeatures (W ). The following observation was justified by the significant
cmain effect of condition (Ù ).
(I) Expression and context yielded larger figurative shared sets than single
term.
Most conspicuously, anomalies benefited from expression. However, no ef-
fect concerning expression type was significant. Accordingly, the apparent
rise of shared figurative features for metaphors in context was insignificant. 
As pointed out above, the features x and y could be attributes a or grounds g,
depending on the presence of a relation r or not. If this differentiation is
neglected, relations are just shared with x and y. In other words, the shared
set can be calculated for the following sixteen combinations of set types:
r g a(X 1 Y), (X 1 Y ), (X 1 Y ), (X 1 Y )
r r r r g r a(X 1 Y), (X 1 Y ), (X 1 Y ), (X 1 Y )
g g r g g g a(X 1 Y), (X 1 Y ), (X 1 Y ), (X 1 Y )
a a r a g a a(X 1 Y), (X 1 Y ), (X 1 Y ), (X 1 Y )
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Since X 1 Y was already analyzed for Figure 5.0, it was replaced by the
rg rgintersection of complete relation+ground (rg) combinations: (X  1 Y ).
Examples of relation+ground combinations are found in Table 5.1. 'Sweet' is
a relation to the ground 'nursery', 'death' is a relation to the ground 'spear'.
SgrPreliminary MANOVAs showed that the weighted shared set (W ) be-
X Sg Y Srtween grounds of the A-term ( W ) and relations of the B-term ( W ) ren-
Srr Sxrdered equal or better results than W  and W  (the original interaction
model variables). The other kinds of weighted shared sets obtained fewer ef-
Srr Sxr Sgrfects than W  , W  or W  and were dismissed from further analysis.
Srr X SrFigure 5.11: Grand mean weighted relation shared set size (W ), using M2. W  (solid) is
Y Srthe number of weighted relations that the A-term  shared with the B-term . W  (dashed) is
the number of weighted relations that the B-term shared with the A-term .   = literal expres-
sions,   = metaphors,   = anomalies.
Figure 5.11 exhibits the grand mean weighted set sizes of shared relations
Srr c(W ). The following significant main effect of condition (Ú ) was the only
effect that occurred:
(I) The number of shared relations increased as a function of additional con-
text, because expression and context evoked more shared relations than
single term.
Since this was the only significant effect, the increase of shared relations for
metaphors - with a particular high contribution of the B-term - in context is
unreliable.
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Sxr X SxFigure 5.12: Grand mean weighted feature-relation shared set size (W ), using M2. W
(solid) is the number of weighted features that the A-term  shared with the B-term  relations.
Y SrW  (dashed) is the number of weighted relations that the B-term  shared with the A-term
features.   = literal expressions,   = metaphors,   = anomalies.
Figure 5.12 shows the grand mean weighted shared set of the A-term fea-
tures - not differentiated in attributes and grounds - and B-term relations
Sxr(W ). The observations following next were substantiated by the significant
cinteractions of condition by term (Û ).
(I) The shared set between A-term features and B-term relations grew when
contexts were extended. Single term yielded less overlap than expression or
context. (II) The frequencies of shared B-term relations were higher than the
frequencies of the corresponding A-term features. Thus, B-term relations
contributed more to the shared set. This effect was stronger in expression
and context than in single term.
Although metaphoric B-term relations in context augmented the shared set
more than the other term types in whichever condition, no effect containing
expression type was reliable.
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Sgr X SgFigure 5.13: Grand mean weighted ground-relation shared set size (W ), using M2. W
(solid) is the number of weighted grounds that the A-term  shared with the B-term  relations.
Y SrW  (dashed) is the number of weighted relations that the B-term  shared with the A-term
grounds.   = literal expressions,   = metaphors,   = anomalies.
Figure 5.13 shows the grand mean weighted shared set between grounds of
Sgr Sxrthe A-term and B-term relations (W ). The same observations as for W
(Figure 5.12) are valid, according to the interactions of condition by term
c(Ü ).
(I) The set of A-term grounds shared with B-term relations increased with
the extension of context. Expression and context raised larger shared sets
than single term. (II) Shared B-term relations had higher frequencies than
the corresponding A-term grounds, stronger in expression and context than
in single term.
Despite the apparent higher number of metaphoric B-term relations in
context and the drop for anomalies in context compared with expression,
effects involving expression type were insignificant.
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Discussion of feature set size and shared set size
The major issue of this discussion is to confront the predictions of the meta-
phor models with the above results. The comparison model assumes fixed
feature sets for the individual terms, irrespective of condition. Moreover,
subjects decide whether an expression is literal, metaphoric or anomalous on
the basis of the shared set size. Literals should have larger shared sets than
metaphors, which should have larger shared sets than anomalies. To what
extent do these predictions agree with the results?
First, feature set size was not fixed, but depended rather on condition and
expression type (Figure 5.0). Single term evoked significantly more features
than expression and context; terms yielded fewer features when they were
part of anomalies than when part of literals and metaphors, and the sign of
X Ythe ratios between W  and W  reversed relative to these factors. In principle,
this is at odds with the comparison model. However, it could be argued that
although the terms have a fixed feature set, not all features are actually pro-
duced. Although all features might have been activated, not all were written
down by the subjects.
SRelatively good news came from the weighted shared set W  (Figure 5.6).
The comparison model expects main effects of expression type on the
shared set, without interactions with condition. Indeed, no such interaction
was statistically reliable. However, shared sets should be fixed, which was
not the case. The main effect of condition showed that single term shared
fewer features than expression and context. It is essential for the comparison
model that the shared set for literals is larger than for metaphors, which in
its turn is larger than for anomalies. However, the main effects of expression
type demonstrated that differences in shared set size between literals and
metaphors were insignificant, and that only anomalies had smaller shared
sets.
In sum, feature sets and shared sets were not fixed. Single term yield-
ed the most features, but the smallest shared sets. Expression yielded
the smallest feature sets; however, also the largest shared sets. Context
yielded both large feature sets and large shared sets. Although these re-
sults are incongruous with the comparison model, they are not decisive
and may be due to production failures. What is essential is that literal
expressions did not have larger shared sets than metaphors, although
both had larger shared sets than anomalies.
Xl YlThe anomaly model expects that the weighted set sizes of literal (W  , W )
Xf Xfand figurative (W  , W ) features are fixed and that literal expressions do
not activate figurative features. Furthermore, literal expressions share most
literal features and no figurative ones. Metaphors share most figurative
features, whereas anomalies none of either type. Strictly speaking, the
shared sets should also be fixed.
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Thus, the same predictions for feature set size are valid as for the com-
parison model with the same constraint that feature activation does not have
to be identical to reporting features. Main effects of expression type and
term (or their interactions) are permitted, but they are not essential. Main ef-
fects of condition or interactions with condition are evidence against fixed
sets.
Figure 5.1 broadly followed the results of Figure 5.0, so that indeed the
premise on fixed sets should be revised. Again, single term showed more
literal features than expression. Furthermore, significant interactions of term
Xlby expression type demonstrated that the sign of the ratios between W  and
YlW  reversed as a function of expression type. Other interactions were
statistically unreliable, in line with the anomaly model.
The results for figurative feature set size (Figure 5.2) show few effects,
considering that only the main effect of term was significant. A-terms
activated more figurative features than B-terms, which is immaterial for the
anomaly model. All interactions on figurative set size were insignificant,
which is consistent with the anomaly model.
More importantly, the anomaly model demands that literal expressions
Sllhave the largest weighted literal shared sets (W ), whereas metaphors and
anomalies should have smaller ones. Metaphors should have the largest
Sfffigurative shared sets (W ), whereas literal expressions should have none,
and anomalies perhaps small ones. These patterns should be demonstrated in
the main effects of expression type. Since the shared set sizes are supposedly
fixed, no interactions with the condition factor should be significant. Main
effects of term or interactions of term by expression type are irrelevant for
the anomaly model.
The grand mean literal shared sets in Figure 5.7 followed the pattern of
Figure 5.6. Thus, literal set sizes were not fixed. The main effects of con-
Slldition on W  display that single term evoked less literal overlap than other
conditions. The main effects of expression type show that literal expressions
and metaphors yielded about equal literal overlap, which discredits the
anomaly model. In favor are the fact that anomalies yielded the smallest
literal overlap and that none of the interactions were significant.
Evidence argued against anomaly theory in the case of the weighted figu-
Sffrative shared set size (W ). The crucial main effect of expression type was
deficient, since the figurative shared set was not larger for metaphors than
for literals or anomalies.
The good news came from two new variables. Besides the purely figurat-
Sff Slfive shared set W  , Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 exhibit the results of W  and
SflW  . For these mixed kinds of overlap, metaphors did yield the largest
shared sets, as expected by the anomaly model. Only once was an unpre-
Slfdicted pattern found: W  was larger for literal expressions than metaphors in
single term (interaction of condition by expression type). Nevertheless, since
the mixed shared sets contained a figurative component, they may be proper
substitutes for purely figurative shared sets.
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Recapitulating, literal and figurative feature sets were not fixed and
neither were the shared sets. Literal set sizes were about equally large
for literal and metaphoric expressions, and smaller for anomalies. Figu-
rative set sizes and purely figurative overlap did not differentiate the
expression types, which makes them disposable. Purely literal overlap
could distinguish literals and metaphors only from anomalies, which
had smaller sets. Shared sets composed of literal and figurative fea-
tures, however, could distinguish metaphors from literals and anom-
alies, because the latter two expression types had smaller shared sets.
According to the interaction model, a small number of relations is created
for literal expressions, whereas considerably more are created for metaphors
and anomalies. The creation of relations is mainly a quality of the B-term in
response to the context. In single term, no relations are created, because the
expression type cannot be identified. In expression and context, however, it
can, so that in the case of metaphors (and anomalies), many relations are
created. Thus, feature sets are not fixed. In effect, all factors should interact,
so that fewer relations are created in single term than in expression and con-
text. With respect to these latter two conditions, metaphors and anomalies
should stimulate more relations than literal expressions, while the B-term
ought to dominate the A-term. In single term, no such differences should be
found.
Hence, the second-order interaction of condition by term by expression
type should be significant for relation set size. This should be the case,
particularly when contrasting the A- and B-term in single term versus ex-
pression or context, and when contrasting literal expressions versus
metaphors or anomalies (parameters 1, 2, 4, 5, Table 5.3, Appendix).
Second-order interactions contrasting expression versus context or
metaphors versus anomalies may remain insignificant (parameters 3, 6, 7, 8,
9, Table 5.3), because the interaction model does not explicitly predict
differences for these contrasts.
When the parameters 3 and 6 are insignificant, the interaction of term by
expression type (parameters 1 and 2) should be present. When 7 and 8 are
unreliable, condition by term should be operative (parameters 1 and 2).
Parameter 9 is not decisive for the interaction model, nor the underlying
interactions of term by expression type (parameter 3) and condition by term
(parameter 3).
Figure 5.3 shows that for metaphors, most relations were created in
expression and context. However, the main effects of expression type and
the interactions with condition were insignificant. Only the main effect of
condition was reliable. In context, more relations were created than in single
term, while expression was intermediate. This underscores the prediction of
the interaction model that relation creation increases when contexts are ex-
tended. On the other hand, B-terms did not stimulate more relations than A-
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terms, nor did metaphors in comparison with literals and anomalies, which
straightforwardly argues against the interaction model.
Instead, differences among expression types and between terms were due
to features other than relations. One variable that could distinguish among
X Yrexpression types was (W  , W ), which compares the weighted set size of the
features in X with the weighted relation set size in Y. Since this is a variable
rthat contains relations in Y  , it may seem that relations were important for
the expression type differences. Yet, this was not the case. The main effect
Xof expression type and the interaction of term by expression type on (W  ,
YrW ) (Table 5.3) showed that literals and metaphors had larger sets than
Xr Yr Yranomalies. However, another variable (W  , W ) pointed out that W  was
Xr Xrnot significantly different from W  (no effects of term). In other words, W
Yrand W  were identical and their combination yielded no effects for
X Yrexpression type. Thus, the expression type differences obtained by (W  , W )
rwere not due to the relations in Y  , but rather to the features in X.
XaAnother variable that established expression type differences was (W  ,
YaW ), which also does not contain relations. These sets of attributive features
X Yobtained second-order interactions (Table 5.3) similar to (W  , W ). Since
X Y(W  , W ) is a variable defined by the comparison model, the interaction
model prerequisite of completely interactive factors was fulfilled by the
Xa Yacomparison-like variable (W  , W ).
Considering the effects on the shared sets, the interaction model expects
that literal and anomalous expressions have no shared relations, whereas
metaphors have many. Differences between A- and B-term are not required
per se, but expression and context should enlarge relation overlap compared
with single term. Therefore, second-order interactions or interactions of term
by expression type should show that in single term (L = M = A), whereas in
expression and context (L < M > A). In addition, context should elicit equal
or higher numbers of shared relations than expression.
Figure 5.11 suggests that metaphors share most relations, which increases
in expression and context. However, Table 5.4 (Appendix) indicates that for
Srr Sxr SgrW  , W  and W  , the interactions of condition by expression type were
Srrinsignificant, and that the main effects of expression type on W  were just
2,36not below chance (F  = 3.13, p = .055). In other words, no effects
including expression type were significant for shared relations.8
Nonetheless, the Figures 5.11 up to 5.13 show that the number of shared
relations increased when context was added. Solid support for this predic-
tion of the interaction model was found in the main effects of condition on
Srr Sxr SgrW  , W  and W  . Relations intersected more in expression and context
Sxrthan in single term. Moreover, interactions of condition by term on W  and
Sgr X Sx or g Y SrW  showed that in single term ( W  # W ); whereas for expression and
X Sx or g Y Srcontext ( W  << W ). In other words, many relations of the B-term were
linked with fewer features (or grounds) of the A-term, relative to condition,
but not to expression type.
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To summarize, there were certain tendencies that metaphors acti-
vated and joined relations more than other expression types as a
function of context extension. However, except for the main effects of
condition, all these effects were statistically insignificant. In conclusion,
metaphoric B-terms did not activate more relations than other term
types, irrespective of condition. On the contrary, expression type dif-
ferences were established by features that were not relations.
It is obvious that none of the predictions of the models were clearly con-
firmed. Some were found, although never without contradictory evidence.
Regarding the comparison model, literal expressions did not have larger
shared sets than metaphors, although both had larger shared sets than anom-
alies. Concerning the anomaly model, figurative set sizes and purely
figurative shared sets did not show expression type differences. Literal
shared sets could distinguish literal expressions and metaphors only from
anomalies. Shared sets that mixed literal and figurative features
distinguished metaphors from literal expressions and anomalies. With
reference to the interaction model, no more relations were activated or
connected for metaphoric B-terms than for other term types, not even in
context.
Is the shared set identical to the interpretation?
In comparison with literal and anomalous expressions, it seems that meta-
phors are interpreted by mixes of literal and figurative features. However, is
there more to interpreting a metaphor than finding the shared set? The com-
parison and anomaly theory maintain that the C-term - the solution to the
metaphor - is (in) the shared set. The interaction model claims that the
interpretation of metaphors is at least constituted on shared relations,
whereas for the other expression types, it is not. Thus, the features in the
shared set should be identical to those elicited during an interpretation of an
expression. Henceforth, the feature set produced during an interpretation
will be called Z, and according to the comparison and anomaly model, X 1 Y
= Z (cf. Figure 5.14).
As described earlier, subjects in the expression and context conditions,
also generated features for the complete expressions. They were asked not to
associate separately on the A- and B-term, but to interpret the expressions,
in the same way as for their poetry classes. After feature elicitation, subjects
categorized the features in Z as literal and/or figurative, and made relations.
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Figure 5.14: The retrieval of shared features in the interpretation. Is the shared set - either
literal, figurative, relational or undifferentiated - identical to the interpretation of an
expression?
In line with the comparison and anomaly theory, the shared set should be the
same as Z. Although interaction theory does not claim fixed sets, at least one
relation in the shared set should be retrieved in Z. Thus, The C-term should
be one or more features in the shared set T, so that T = X 1 Y 1 Z. The size
of this shared set is #T. The weight w of feature u in T is a function h of the
T X Y Zweight of u in X, Y, and Z: w (u) = h(w (u) , w (u) , w (u)). The weighted set
Tsize (W) of all shared features u in T is the sum of all weights w (u) of every
feature u in T:
T TW  =   3 w (u) .
 u å T
To test the assumptions of the metaphor theories, h was defined as follows:
The unweighted shared set S was compared with the weighted features in Z,
Trendering W  . The features in S were not weighted, because otherwise it
Z Tcould never be the case that W  = W  , which was the prediction of two
models.
ll lf flSimilarly, the overlap was established between the unweighted S  , S  , S
ff l, S  on the one hand and the weighted Z  (the literal features in the
Zl Tllinterpretation) on the other. These comparisons rendered the values W  ,
Zl Tlf Zl Tfl Zl Tff Zl Tll TW  , W  , W  . For clearness' sake, W  means that W  is the result
l ll llof searching the weighted Z  with the unweighted S  . The unweighted S  ,
lf fl ff fS  , S  , S  were also used to search the weighted Z  (the figurative features in
Zf Tll Zf Tlf Zf Tfl Zf Tffthe interpretation), yielding the values W  , W  , W  , W  .
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rr xr grThe unweighted S  , S  , S  were used to calculate the overlap with the
r gweighted Z  (the relations in the interpretation) and the weighted Z  (grounds
Zr Trr Zr Txr Zr Tgrin the interpretation). The respective values are W  , W  , W  and
Zg Trr Zg Txr Zg TgrW  , W  , W  .
It should be recalled that the expression and context condition were pre-
ceded by a single term condition, in which no literal, figurative and relation
distinctions were made. Recall also that one subject group worked in the
sequence 'single term, expression, expression interpretation' and the other in
the sequence 'single term, context, interpretation in context'.  Hence, those9
1shared features S in single term that were also in Z are called T  . Those
2shared features S in expression or context that were also in Z are called T  .
For the test of the comparison model, two between-subject conditions
(expression interpretation vs interpretation in context) were administered,
each containing three expression types (within subjects), incorporating three
T1 T2 Zweighted set sizes: (W  vs W  vs W ). A- and B-term differences were dis-
T1 T2 T1regarded. MANOVAs were executed for the contrasts (W  vs W ), (W  vs
Z T2 ZW ) and (W  vs W ), relative to expression type and condition. Another
ZMANOVA contrasted the expression types for W  in the two conditions
(Table 5.6, Appendix). As mentioned above, literal, figurative and relation
features were not distinguished in the preceding single term conditions, so
that they were discarded for further analysis.
For the test of the anomaly and interaction model, MANOVAs (Table
5.6) were run for the two between-subject conditions (expression
interpretation vs interpretation in context), containing three within-subject
expression types with one of the following two set types:
Zl T2ll Zf T2ll Zl Zf T2ll Zf( W  vs W or W ), ( W  vs W )
Zl T2lf Zf T2lf Zl Zf T2lf Zf( W  vs W or W ), ( W  vs W )
Zl T2fl Zf T2fl Zl Zf T2fl Zf( W  vs W or W ), ( W  vs W )
Zl T2ff Zf T2ff Zl Zf T2ff Zf Zl Zf( W  vs W or W ), ( W  vs W ),  (W  vs W )
Zr T2rr Zg T2rr Zr Zg T2rr Zg( W  vs W or W ), ( W  vs W )
Zr T2xr Zg T2xr Zr Zg T2xr Zg( W  vs W or W ), ( W  vs W )
Zr T2gr Zg T2gr Zr Zg T2gr Zg Zr Zg( W  vs W  or W ), ( W  vs W ), (W  vs W ),
Zl T2ll T2 lwhere W  means that W  is the result of searching the weighted Z
llwith the unweighted S  in expression interpretation or interpretation in
context.
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Results of the shared sets retrieved in the interpretation sets Z
Table 5.5 shows the grand mean weighted feature set sizes of the interpreta-
tion sets Z and the set sizes of the weighted shared features retrieved in Z.
Moreover, MANOVAs are displayed for the effects of condition, expression
type and set type (Appendix Table 5.6).
Regarding the retrieved shared sets, Table 5.6 shows that:
T1 T2 Z d(I) W  and W  were smaller than W  (main effect of set type: Ø ). (II) More
shared features were retrieved in Z for metaphors than for anomalies (main
d T1 T2effect of expression type: Ù ). (III) W  was smaller than W  , the difference
being stronger for metaphors than for anomalies (interaction of set type by
dexpression type: Ú ).
With reference to literal and figurative features, it was found that:
Zf(I) In interpretation in context, more figurative features (W ) were activated
Zf T2lf Zf T2flthan in expression interpretation. However, in the cases W  , W  and
Zf T2ffW  , fewer shared features were retrieved in interpretation in context.
Zf T2llOnly for W  , there was a small increase (interaction of condition by set
d Zl Zftype: Û ). (II) More literal than figurative features were activated: W  > W
d(main effect of set type: Ü ). (III) Purely literal overlap was better retrieved
Zl T2ll Zf T2llin the literal than in the figurative features of Z: W  > W  (main effect
dof set type: Ý ). (IV) The retrieved shared sets - either literal, figurative, or
Zmixed - were significantly smaller than the applicable weighted set sizes W
d lf(main effect of set type: Þ ). (V) More features of the mixed shared set S
were retrieved in the Z-sets of metaphors than in those of literal expressions.
flIn addition, more features of the mixed shared set S  were retrieved in the Z-
sets of metaphors than in those of anomalies (main effect of expression type:
d lf l Zl T2lfß ). (VI) Whereas the mixed shared set S  retrieved in Z  ( W ) was
Zlsmaller for literal expressions than for anomalies, W  was larger for literal
flexpressions. More shared features of S  were retrieved in Zl for literal
Zl T2fl Zlexpressions than for anomalies ( W ), while W  was larger for literal
expressions than for anomalies (interaction of set type by expression type:
dà ).
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Z Zl Zf Zr ZgTable 5.5: Grand means of the weighted feature set size W  (= W  + W ), W  and W  , and
T1 T2 Zl T2ll Zf T2ll Zl T2lf Zf T2lf Zl T2fl Zf T2fl Zl T2ff Zf T2ff Zr T2rr Zg T2rrW  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W  ,
Zr T2xr Zg T2xr Zr T2gr Zg T2grW  , W  , W  , W  .
_________________________________________________________________________
Z Zl Zf Zr ZgGrand mean number of weighted features W  (= W  + W ), W  and W
Condition Literals Metaphors Anomalies
Zl Zf Zl Zf Zl Zf W  W  W  W  W  W
expression interpretation 4.90 1.28 4.23 2.53 2.70 2.31
interpretation in context  4.76 3.65 4.60 3.08 3.08 3.02
Zr Zg Zr Zg Zr Zg W  W  W  W  W  W
expression interpretation .804 .526 1.76 1.47 2.22 2.25
interpretation in context  2.58 2.68 3.20 3.32 2.72 2.15
_________________________________________________________________________
TGrand mean number of weighted shared features (W ) retrieved in Z
Condition Literals Metaphors Anomalies
T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 W W W W W W
expression interpretation .030 .237 .045 .424 .022 .126
interpretation in context .134 .190 .038 .355 .010 .090
Zl T2ll Zf T2ll Zl T2ll Zf T2ll Zl T2ll Zf T2llW W W W W W
expression interpretation .156 .000 .179 .017 .015 .004
interpretation in context .110 .017 .124 .017 .048 .000
Zl T2lf Zf T2lf Zl T2lf Zf T2lf Zl T2lf Zf T2lfW W W W W W
expression interpretation .015 .000 .045 .028 .022 .004
interpretation in context .017 .003 .059 .021 .017 .007
Zl T2fl Zf T2fl Zl T2fl Zf T2fl Zl T2fl Zf T2flW W W W W W
expression interpretation .015 .000 .031 .052 .004 .011
interpretation in context .017 .014 .069 .017 .010 .010
Zl T2ff Zf T2ff Zl T2ff Zf T2ff Zl T2ff Zf T2ffW W W W W W
expression interpretation .007 .022 .041 .031 .000 .070
interpretation in context .017 .021 .038 .048 .003 .007
Zr T2rr Zg T2rr Zr T2rr Zg T2rr Zr T2rr Zg T2rrW  W  W  W  W  W
expression interpretation .000 .011 .034 .003 .093 .048
interpretation in context .017 .003 .034 .007 .038 .014
Zr T2xr Zg T2xr Zr T2xr Zg T2xr Zr T2xr Zg T2xrW  W  W  W  W  W
expression interpretation .000 .011 .034 .014 .022 .000
interpretation in context .028 .007 .052 .041 .031 .010
Zr T2gr Zg T2gr Zr T2gr Zg T2gr Zr T2gr Zg T2grW  W  W  W  W  W
expression interpretation .004 .000 .010 .000 .030 .052
interpretation in context .007 .003 .010 .010 .017 .028
_________________________________________________________________________
Turning to relations and grounds, the following results were found:
Zr Zg(I) In interpretation in context, more grounds and relations (W +W ) were
dcreated than in expression interpretation (main effect of condition: á ). (II)
Zr ZgAlthough fewer relations (W ) and grounds (W ) were created in expression
interpretation than in interpretation in context, more shared relations and
Zr T2rr Zg T2rr Zg T2xr Zg T2grgrounds ( W  , W  , W  , W ) were retrieved in the former than
ein the latter condition (interaction of condition by set type: Ø ). (III) In all
Zr T2rrcases, retrieved shared sets were smaller than the weighted Z-sets: W  <
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Zr Zg T2rr Zg Zr T2xr Zr Zg T2xr Zg Zr T2gr Zr Zg T2gr ZgW  , W  < W  , W  < W  , W < W  , W  < W  , W  < W
e(main effect of set type: Ù ).
Discussion of the shared sets retrieved in Z
Above, the shared set S was found as (X 1 Y). This shared set was used as a
file to search the interpretation sets Z for overlap (S 1 Z). The result of this
search action was the retrieved shared set T. It was argued that if all features
in S were found again in Z, the size of the weighted set T should be equal to
the weighted set size of Z. If Z is (much) larger than T, interpretation should
not be considered identical to finding the shared set.
The comparison model states that the shared set is identical to the inter-
pretation set Z, irrespective of context. In other words, no condition effects
should be found. If the shared set S is exactly the same as Z, comparisons
T1 T2 Zbetween the values (W  , W ) and W  should show no differences. Thus, ef-
fects involving set type should be absent, so that only the main effect of
expression type remains.
Z T1 T2Indeed, no effects involving condition occurred on W  , nor on W  or W
Z(Appendix Table 5.6). For W  , no other effects were significant either. The
sizes of the Z-sets did not differ significantly, so that expression type differ-
ences did not show up in the activation of interpretation features. This is not
expected, because the shared set - and thus the Z-sets - of literal expressions
should be larger than for metaphors, which should be larger than for
anomalies. Since the comparison model assumes that Z is identical to the
shared set, this ordinal pattern should also have been found for Z-sets.
T1 T2Nevertheless, for the retrieved shared sets (W  + W ), the main effect of
expression type did show a pattern in line with the comparison model. In the
Z-sets of metaphors, more shared features were reactivated than in those of
anomalies. The difference with literal Z-sets, however, was lacking.
T1 T2The main effect of set type shows that W  was smaller than W  . Ac-
cording to the interaction of set type by expression type, this difference was
larger for metaphors than for anomalies. Moreover, the main effect of set
T1 T2 Ztype shows that W  and W  were smaller than W  . These results are not
expected if Z consisted only of (reactivated) shared features. In that case, the
T1 T2 Zmain effect of set type would show that W  = W  = W  , with p-values close
to 1. Since the opposite occured (p = .000), interpretation was not at all
identical to finding the shared set. The retrieved shared set size of
metaphors did not differ from that of literal expressions, but only from
that of anomalies.
The anomaly model posits that the shared literal features are the Z-sets of
literal expressions, and the shared figurative features are the Z-sets of
metaphors. Again, context has no effect, so that condition effects should be
llabsent. If the set of shared literal features S  is identical to Zl in literal
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ff Zl T2ll Zlexpressions, and if S  is identical to Zf in metaphors, then W  = W  in
Zf T2ff Zfliteral expressions, and W  = W  in metaphors. Effects of set type should
be absent, and the main effect of expression type should be present.
However, condition effects did occur. The main effect of condition and
the interaction of condition by set type indicate that in interpretation in
context, more figurative features were activated than in expression inter-
pretation.
The main effect of set type shows that more literal than figurative fea-
tures were activated. Additionally, purely literal overlap was better retrieved
in the literal than in the figurative features of Z. More importantly, the re-
trieved shared sets - either literal, figurative, or mixed - were significantly
smaller than the set sizes of the applicable Z-sets. These results are not
expected if the Z-sets of literal expressions exclusively consisted of shared
literal features, and the Z-sets of metaphors of shared figurative features.
Again, the p-values were close to zero, so that the results also militate
against the anomaly view on interpretation.
The main effect of expression type supports the presumption that larger
shared sets are employed to interpret metaphors than anomalies. More fea-
fltures of the mixed shared set S  were retrieved in Z-sets of metaphors than
of anomalies. In comparison with literal expressions, metaphors also re-
lfactivated more features of the mixed shared set S  in Z. This is congruous
with the anomaly model, if the notion of purely figurative overlap is
abandoned. Positive differences for literal expressions compared with
anomalies were found in shared sets retrieved in literal features of Z. Only
lffor S  was this difference reversed in the interactions of set type by
Zl Zl T2lfexpression type: W (L > A) vs W (L < A), which is not a prediction of
the anomaly model.
Again, interpretation was not at all identical to finding the shared set,
either literal, figurative or mixed. Metaphors were different from
flanomalies in that more features of the mixed shared set S  were re-
trieved in the interpretation. Metaphors were different from literal ex-
lfpressions in that more features of the mixed shared set S  were re-
trieved in the interpretation.
The interaction model implies that the Z-sets of metaphors are based on re-
lations, whereas the Z-sets of other expression types are not. Context is im-
portant for the interpretation, so that effects involving expression type
should show more relation overlap for Z-sets of metaphors than of other
expression types. Adding context should increase this effect. If shared
relations and grounds are fully responsible for the interpretation, effects of
set type are missing.
In fact, the main effects of condition indicate that in interpretation in
context, more grounds and relations were activated than in expression inter-
pretation. However, the interactions of condition by set type show that more
shared relations and grounds were retrieved in expression interpretation
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than in interpretation in context. In expression interpretation, shared
relations and grounds contributed more to the interpretation than in
interpretation in context. This cannot be the case, if the retrieved shared sets
are identical to the Z-sets. The main effects of set type also illustrate the
inequality between retrieved shared sets and Z-sets, which were always
larger.
Effects involving expression type did not occur, which is in line with the
finding of Table 5.3 (Appendix), that relation creation is sensitive to condi-
tion, but not to expression type. Since the interaction model advances that in
metaphor interpretation, more relations and grounds are connected than in
literals and anomalies, the absence of effects for expression type refutes the
theory. Thus, interpretation was not at all identical to connecting
relations and/or grounds, and did not distinguish metaphors from other
expression types.
Expression type differences in interpretation were found in the retrieved
shared sets, not in the interpretation set sizes. The features of the shared set
S retrieved in Z could distinguish positively metaphors from anomalies.
fl lfHowever, S  retrieved in Z could do just that, while S  could distinguish
metaphors from literals. Moreover, literal expressions were positively dis-
tinguished from anomalies by the shared sets retrieved in literal features of
Zl T2ll Zl Zl T2fl Zl Zl T2ff ZlZ: ( W +W  , W +W  , W + W ). As shown earlier in Table 5.4
lf fl(Appendix), the mixed shared feature sets S  and S  were the best predictors
of expression type differences, and again, proved to be the best predictors of
interpretation differences as well. The shared sets defined by the interaction
model did not differentiate expression types, which was also inferred by
Table 5.4.
In conclusion, finding shared features was not equal to interpretation,
irrespective of feature type. The anomaly model defined the best shared
sets to distinguish the expression types and their interpretations.
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Serial positions of feature activation
Literal and figurative features at serial positions
Anomaly theory claims that figurative features are activated when subjects
run out of literal features. In that case, the feature lists should have more
literal features in the beginning of a list, followed by a clear shift to figurat-
ive features. In particular, metaphors and anomalies should show this shift,
whereas literal expressions may activate literal features only.
To test this deduction, the literal and figurative features were counted per
line, and averaged over subjects for each literal, metaphoric and anomalous
A- and B-term in each condition. The same happened for the interpretations.
Except for anomalies in expression and context, the results of this analysis
showed a pattern as illustrated by the anomalous B-terms in single term
(Figure 5.15, upper panel).
Figure 5.15: Grand mean literal () and figurative () features per line in the feature lists
of the anomalous B-terms and anomaly interpretations. All other term types and
interpretations in all conditions showed the pattern of the anomalous B-terms in single term .
Standard deviations for literal features are demarcated by rectangulars, and for figurative
features by solid lines.
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Note that the decline of the grand means in Figure 5.15 is due to the fact that
not every subject typed as many lines, so that the mean number of lines in
first position is larger than the mean number of lines in the twelfth position.
Figure 5.15 shows that for anomalous B-terms in single term (and for all
other term types in all other conditions), literal features were more frequent
than figurative features at all positions. This pattern was found also for the
A-terms (independent of expression type), literal and metaphoric B-terms
and interpretations of literals and metaphors.
These results repudiate the anomaly model for two reasons. First, literal
and figurative features appear to be activated together, not after each other.
Although figurative features were less frequent, they were evenly distributed
among positions, even for literal expressions. Second, the shift to higher
frequencies of figurative features failed for metaphors in all conditions, and
for anomalies in single term.
The rise of figurative features between position 3 and 6 seen for every
term type exceeded the literal features only for anomalous B-terms in ex-
pression and context, and for the anomaly interpretations. Here, the figurat-
ive shift did occur, thus corroborating the anomaly model. In each case,
literal features were dominant in the initial activation, whereas the figu-
rative shift was dependent of expression type (anomalous B-terms) and
condition (expression and context).
Relations at serial positions
The interaction model predicts that relations are activated after the normal
features are depleted. This is mainly a trait of the metaphoric and anomalous
B-terms, dependent on the surrounding text. Therefore, relations should not
be found in single term, not for A-terms, not for literal expressions, and not
at the first positions in the feature lists. For metaphoric and anomalous B-
terms in expression and context, a clear augmentation of relations should
occur at second or following positions.
For each A- and B-term, then, in each expression type and condition, and
for each interpretation, the relations were counted per line, and averaged
over subjects. The grand means for metaphoric B-terms and metaphor
interpretations are shown in Figure 5.16. All other term types and
interpretations in all conditions showed similar results.
178
Feature elicitation: Relations at serial positions
Figure 5.16: Grand mean number of relations () and standard deviations per line in the
feature lists of the metaphoric B-terms and metaphor interpretations. All other term types
and interpretations in all conditions showed comparable patterns.
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Indeed, Figure 5.16 indicates that metaphoric B-terms rendered more
relations at the third to sixth positions than at the preceding ones. The same
results applied to anomalous B-terms, but also to all other term types
(including A-terms), to literal expressions, and in all conditions, including
single term. In other words, the interaction model is right about the delayed
activation of relations. However, this was not unique for metaphors,
and developed independent of context.
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Check 1: Asymmetry differences among expression types
Asymmetry of feature sets?
The next issue is the transition from Tversky's focusing hypothesis to feature
sets. Tversky claimed that the A-term is the focus of a comparison, because
it is less salient. As an alternative option, it was suggested that the A-term
was feature-poor. It was also suggested that different frequencies of features
in the shared set may explain the preference in focus. The frequencies of
X Sshared features of the A-term set ( W ) may be lower than the frequencies in
Y Sthe B-term set ( W ). Asymmetry in similarity judgements, then, could be
explained from differences within the shared set.
Knowledge about differences in focusing among expression types is im-
portant, because asymmetry may be part of the differences in processing.
Thus, differences in focusing may influence reaction times, if a focused B-
term is processed 'deeper' - and presumably slower - than a nonfocused B-
term.
In Table 4.1 (Chapter 4), it was found that subjects almost unanimously
chose the A-term as the focus of the expressions. Thus, A-terms should have
X Ysmaller (weighted) feature sets than B-terms (W  < W ), or the frequencies of
X S Y Sthe shared features should be less for the A-term set ( W  < W ).
However, Tables 5.3 and 5.4 indicate that the only cases in which a dif-
ference in the expected direction occurred were the second-order interac-
X Y Xa Yations on (W  , W ) and (W  , W ), the interactions of term by expression
Xl Yltype on (W  , W ). Metaphors in single term and expression had feature rich
X Y Xa YaB-terms: M(W  < W ), M(W  < W ). Metaphors were also sensitive to the
Xl Ylinteraction of term by expression type on literal feature sets: M(W  < W ).
For the shared set, differences into the expected direction were found in
S xr grthe interaction of condition by term on W  , WS  , WS  . In all conditions, it
X Sx Y Sr X Sg Y Srwas found that W  < W  , and in context and expression, that W  < W  .
X S Y SExpression also showed that W  < W  . In all other cases, A- and B-term
yielded equal or inverted ratios.
In conclusion, the number of features for the B-term were only oc-
casionally higher than for the A-term. Metaphors were the only expres-
sion type that occasionally showed more features for the B-term. Other-
wise, feature sets for the A-term were often larger than for the B-term.
There were virtually no differences in frequency of features in the
shared set, so that the shared sets were usually symmetrical.
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Asymmetry in judgements of similarity and figurativeness?
These results are at odds with the findings of Tversky (1977) and Malgady
& Johnson (1980). It could be that the stimulus materials in the present
study differ from those of Tversky and Malgady & Johnson. Alternatively,
feature set size or frequency of features in the shared set might not be the
proper measures to establish asymmetry. To approach the problem from a
different angle, asymmetry was directly estimated from similarity
judgements.
An experiment was administered on estimates of similarity and figurat-
iveness. Malgady & Johnson (1980) found that in similarity judgements,
subjects focused on the nonsalient A-term and in judgements of figurat-
iveness on the salient B-term. If literals are primarily judged for similarity
and metaphors for similarity and figurativeness (from the first stage to the
second), the focus should switch in metaphors, whereas in literal
expressions it should not.
Four groups of 13 subjects served as paid volunteers in a rating task.
They were undergraduates of language and literature, Dutch native speakers,
aged between 18 and 27 years old. Subjects estimated the similarity and
figurativeness of the expression types, either from 'the first term to the
second' (A to B) or 'from the second term to the first' (B to A), either in
expression or in context. Thus, four between-subject cells (expression 'A to
B', expression 'B to A', context 'A to B', context 'B to A') comprised three
within-subject expression types, each incorporating two dimensions
(similarity vs figurativeness).
Similarity was defined as the extent to which the two stimuli were alike
in outer appearance and literal meaning. Figurativeness was defined as the
symbolic or nonliteral correspondence between the stimuli. Subjects used a
7-points scale, where 1 was specified as 'no resemblance', 7 as 'complete
resemblance', and 4 as 'neutral'. They were unaware of the origin or status of
the expressions, nor did they know the aim of the study. Prior to the
experiment, subjects worked on nine training stimuli unconnected to the test
set. Trials were mixed in a pseudo-random order. Variants of an expression
were not presented in succession, and instances of the same expression type
did not occur more than twice in a row. Literal, metaphoric and anomalous
variants appeared first, second and last in their relative order of presentation,
counterbalanced over expression types. Each subject received a different or-
der of presentation. The grand mean scores on similarity and figurativeness
and the results of MANOVA are displayed by Table 5.7 and Table 5.8
(Appendix).
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Table 5.7: Grand mean scores of similarity (SIM) and figurativeness (FIG) for judgements
from 'A to B ' and 'B to A ' of literals (L), metaphors (M) and anomalies (A) in expression and
context (N = 52).
_________________________________________________________________________
Grand mean similarity and figurativeness
dimension
similarity figurativeness
Condition  direction L M A L M A
expression A to B 5.22 2.12 1.48 4.03 4.53 2.69
context A to B 5.02 2.30 1.37 4.15 4.82 2.84
expression B to A 4.05 2.09 1.51 3.71 4.58 3.01
context B to A 3.98 2.36 1.49 3.90 3.89 2.28
_________________________________________________________________________
The interaction of dimension by expression type in Table 5.8 (Appendix)
shows that:
(I) Scores were higher for similarity than for figurativeness, mainly due to
the literal expressions. Similarity was higher for literals than for metaphors,
which was higher than for anomalies. On the other hand, metaphors had the
highest figurativeness, anomalies the lowest, and literal expressions were in
between. (II) No effects of judgement direction (A to B, B to A) were signifi-
cant.
Since the effects of judgement direction were statistically unreliable, asym-
metry was not established. This finding is in line with the absense of
differences between the frequencies of features in the shared set, whereas it
is at odds with the finding that A-terms often had larger feature sets than B-
terms. Thus, Tversky's focusing hypothesis and the switch of focus
proposed by Malgady & Johnson were not confirmed with the present
stimulus materials.
Visual inspection of the grand means, however, suggests that in expres-
sion, similarity in metaphors was highest from A to B and figurativeness
from B to A. Although these differences were minor, metaphors were the
only expression type that showed a trend in line with Malgady & Johnson.
This trend occurred only in expression, which was the same condition as
Malgady & Johnson employed. In other words, the switch of focus to the B-
term for judgements of figurativeness may exclusively apply to metaphors,
and may depend on condition. The higher similarity from A to B for
metaphors in expression agreed with the finding that the feature sets for
metaphoric B-terms were larger than for A-terms in this condition.
Nevertheless, the asymmetry derived from the direct subject estimates was
statistically unreliable.
In brief, asymmetry played no fundamental role in processing the
present stimulus set. The absence of asymmetry may be due to the fact that
the present study did not utilize asymmetry cues, and did not reverse noun
order. However, judgements were contrasted from the first term to the
second with those from the second to the first. In the earlier work, stimuli
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were constructed with inherent asymmetric cues, such as 'the son looks more
like the father' versus 'the father looks more like the son' (Tversky 1977).
Another manipulation reversed the nouns in subject and object position, as
in the above example and in 'mountains are kings' versus 'kings are
mountains' (Malgady & Johnson 1980) or 'lectures are like sleeping pills'
versus 'sleeping pills are like lectures' (Ortony, Vondruska, Foss & Jones
1985).
Cues for asymmetry may actually impose asymmetric judgements that are
not obtained without those cues. Again, judgements from the first term to
the second may induce asymmetry when uncontrolled by judgements from
the second term to the first. Moreover, reversing the nouns changes sentence
meaning, so that the stimuli in a pair may be incomparable with respect to
their asymmetrical effects. 'Mountains are kings' does not mean the same as
'kings are mountains', so that asymmetry is confounded with change in
meaning.
This is in line with the argument of Gleitman, Gleitman, Miller & Ostrin
(1996). They reproduced the asymmetry effect for words such as 'similar to',
but also for 'identical to' and 'equal to'. Nevertheless, they argued that 'A is
similar to B' has a different meaning than 'B is similar to A'. Both are
symmetric statements on similarity, namely 'with respect to'. 'North Korea is
similar to Red China with respect to communism' is as symmetric as 'Red
China is similar to North Korea with respect to political fragmentation'.
Leaving this implicit context out, makes them two different sentences which
seem comparable, but in fact are not. Experimental evidence showed that the
perception of asymmetry - among others - was dependent on the position of
the nouns in the sentence. For instance, asymmetry was found in com-
parisons with nonsense words: 'The ZUM is identical to the GAX' vs 'the
GAX is identical to the ZUM' (cf. note 2).
In addition, Tversky and Malgady & Johnson investigated only one ex-
pression type: Similes and metaphors, respectively. It may be that mixing
with other expression types (literal expressions and anomalies) affects the
asymmetry. For instance, if the additional expression types are asymmetric
in the opposite direction, the asymmetry of metaphors may be drowned by
an increase of noise.
Moreover, the role of context in Malgady & Johnson was quite clear. By
adding or deleting an adjective ('[red] blood poors like rain'), it was known
fairly precisely which feature ('red') was emphasized for which term
('blood'). Malgady & Johnson reported that when the adjective was shared
by both terms, similarity and figurativeness were increased. When the
adjective emphasized a distinctive feature of the (nonsalient) A-term,
similarity was increased, whereas figurativeness decreased. Adjectives that
highlighted a distinctive feature of the (salient) B-term decreased similarity
and increased figurativeness. In the present study, however, the effects of
context were more diffuse, and may not have influenced the direction of
judgement as much as the adjectives of Malgady & Johnson did.
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In conclusion, asymmetry may be an unstable effect, only induced by
specific cues, and limited to similes and metaphors when not mixed with
other expression types. When other factors are added, variability may
be so severe, that effects fail to be significant. The present stimulus set
did not suffer from systematic asymmetry effects.
Check 2: The repetition effect
The feature elicitation experiment in Section 5.4 confounded effects of term
repetition and condition. Terms were not repeated in single term, while they
were in expression and context. A test was designed to control for the effect
of repeating terms in expression and context.
It should be recalled that the subject groups, working in either expression
(N = 10) or context (N = 10), started with a single term condition. Certain
terms (e.g., 'death', 'heart') were repeated more frequently, whereas others
(e.g., 'wall', 'stone') were repeated only once, i.e. the first presentation was in
single term and the second in expression or context.
Hence, potential differences in feature rates from the second presentation
on may be the result of repetitions within a condition. It is possible that the
smaller feature set size in expression and context was due to specific
practice on the terms. It could be that the number of features declines as a
term is seen more often.
The number of weighted features (words) was counted for each repeated
term per subject in expression and context, and contrasted with the number
of weighted features produced for that term in the preceding single term. For
each repetition, the grand means per expression type were calculated (Table
5.9). The analysis was limited to three repetitions, so as to reduce the
number of pairwise comparisons.
Thus, the analyzed terms were presented four times (presentation 1, 2, 3,
4), and six pairwise comparisons were tested by MANOVA. The set-up
combined two between-subject conditions ((single term and expression)
versus (single term and context)) with three within-subject levels for
expression type, and two sub-levels within each level, namely, one of the six
presentation pairs: 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 2-3, 2-4, 3-4. Effects without presentation
pair as factor are not of interest to the analysis, so that the main effects of
condition, expression type, as well as the interactions between condition and
expression type, will not be listed in Table 5.10 (Appendix).
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Table 5.9: The grand mean number of weighted features (words) per term presentation.
Presentation 1 was performed in the preceding single term , whereas presentation 2 up to 4
were the repetitions in either expression or context.
_________________________________________________________________________
Grand mean number of features per term
Condition 1 Presentation Literals Metaphors Anomalies
single term 1 10.61 12.63 11.40
expression 2  9.01 10.37  7.06
expression 3  9.15 10.57  8.00
expression 4  9.20 10.65  7.80
Condition 2
single term 1  12.91 13.22 11.93
context 2  12.35 10.67  8.83
context 3  12.45 10.51  8.53
context 4  12.40 10.00  8.20
_________________________________________________________________________
Observe in Table 5.10 (Appendix), that:
(I) The main effect of presentation was significant for the difference be-
ftween the first and all further presentations (Î ). For the differences between
the second up to fourth presentation, no main effect was found. (II) There
was no systematic interaction between condition and presentation, except for
presentation 2 vs 4 at a liberal á-level. In condition 1, presentation 2 yielded
fless features than presentation 4, reversing the effect in condition 2 (Ï ).
(III) The significant interaction of presentation with expression type
findicated that L(1 > 2), whereas A(1 >> 2) (Ð ). At a liberal á-level (.05 > p
f> .0116), L(1 > 4), whereas M(1 >> 4), and A(1 >> 4) (Ñ ). No significant
higher-order interactions were found for any presentation pair.
The main effect of presentation corroborates that there was a difference be-
tween the number of elicited features for the first presentation of a term in
single term and its first repetition in expression or context. The number of
weighted features for repetitions of these terms, however, did not differ
within a condition. The direction of the main effect suggests that reduction
of features took place, rather than accumulation. When context was added,
the only exception to this pattern was that more features were found for
fpresentation 4 than for 2 (Ï ).
Thus, the first presentation of a term yielded more features than the
next presentations, which may be interpreted as a condition effect,
because all effects of presentation within expression and context were
insignificant. The only exception is that at a liberal á-level, presentation 4
produced more features than presentation 2 in context. However, the check
is not water tight, because the repetition effect might be entirely
situated between the first and second presentation. A better control
would have been to repeat each term several times in single term.
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Check 3: Word frequency effect
Different word frequencies may entail different numbers of elicited features.
An infrequent word indicates that it is rarely used, so that its reference may
be unfamiliar. People know less about unfamiliar things, so that the number
of associated features may be small for infrequent words.
In Chapter 4, Table 4.2 (Chapter 4) showed that anomalous B-terms were
a low word frequency group. It may be, then, that the low feature rates for
anomalous B-terms (e.g., Figure 5.0) are predicated by the low word
frequencies. Thus, word frequency is a covariate of the stimuli. However, an
F2 or quasi-F can only be calculated while using univariate tests.
Unfortunately, SPSS only furnishes a classic multivariate model, in which
varying covariances cannot be estimated. Therefore, it can only calculate
covariances on the subject level (for instance, for age or IQ), not on the
stimulus level.
To survey yet the effects of word frequency, an extra within-factor was
constructed, namely word frequency (high-frequent vs low-frequent) within
term. Terms within a term type (A-term, literal, metaphoric or anomalous B-
term) were ranked according to their word frequencies, and then split half,
resulting in two groups per term type: A high- and a low-frequent group
relative to the term type. MANOVA was performed on this 3*3*2*2 design,
and it was expected that the interactions of expression type by term by word
frequency would show small feature set sizes and small contributions to the
shared set for anomalous B-terms with low word frequencies compared to
X Ythose with high word frequencies. Weighted feature set size (W  , W ) and
Sweighted shared set size (W ) served as the dependent variables (Figure
5.17).
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Figure 5.17: Grand mean weighted feature set size (upper panel) and weighted shared set
size (lower panel) for condition, expression type, term and word frequency.   = literal
expressions,   = metaphors,   = anomalies. Solid lines refer to set X, dashed to Y. Bold
lines are for high-frequent terms, thin lines for low-frequent terms. Measure M2.
Effects in Table 5.11 (Appendix) are indexed by white circled figures with
subscript (g), and they show the following:
(I) High-frequent B-terms activated smaller feature sets than low-frequent B-
terms; for A-terms, the effect was the opposite (interaction of term by word
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gfrequency Î ). (II) In literal expressions, high-frequent terms elicited fewer
features than low-frequent ones; for metaphors, the ratios were equal. For
anomalies, however, high-frequent terms elicited more features than low-
gfrequent ones (interaction of expression type by word frequency Ï ). (III) In
single term, high-frequent terms produced fewer shared features than low-
frequent terms, whereas this difference reversed in context (interaction of
gcondition by word frequency Ð ). (IV) In literal expressions and metaphors,
high-frequent terms elicited fewer shared features than low-frequent ones.
By contrast, high-frequent terms in anomalies elicited more shared features
than low-frequent terms (interaction of expression type by word frequency
gÑ ).
First of all, it should be noted that none of the interactions of expression
type by term by word frequency were significant on weighted feature set size
or weighted shared set size. Thus, anomalous B-terms with low word fre-
quencies did not negatively affect (shared) feature rates, although this was
expected. Second, most of the word frequency effects on feature elicitation
were chaotic: The sign between ratios reversed, often indicating higher
scores for low-frequent than for high-frequent terms.
The only effects that may indicate lower scores for low-frequent terms in
anomalies are found in the interactions of expression type by word
g gfrequency (Ï  and Ñ ). However, these are not effects due to the low-
frequent anomalous B-terms. The grand mean weighted feature set size and
weighted shared set size show that - across conditions - low-frequent
anomalous B-terms evoke more (shared) features than high-frequent ones.
The lower scores for anomalies, thus are the effect of the high-frequent
anomalous B-terms and the low-frequent A-terms in anomalies.
In sum, word frequency may affect feature elicitation, but only in a ran-
dom way. The expected negative effect for low word frequency of
anomalous B-terms was not substantiated. The lower-frequent anom-
alous B-terms rendered larger (shared) set sizes than the higher-fre-
quent ones. Word frequency should be considered noise.
Check 4: Lexical ambiguity effect
Returning to the issue of lexical ambiguity, Table 4.3 (Chapter 4) listed all
ambiguous terms in the expression set of Table 4.1. Lexical ambiguity, it
will be recalled, may influence the number of elicited features, because
features from multiple meanings might be produced. Lexical ambiguity also
is a covariate of the stimuli. The availability of more meanings might
increase feature set size, as well as the size of the shared set. To examine
potential effects of lexical ambiguity, an
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Figure 5.18: Grand mean weighted feature set size (upper panel) and weighted shared set
size (lower panel) for condition, expression type, term and lexical ambiguity.   = literal
expressions,   = metaphors,   = anomalies. Solid lines refer to set X, dashed to Y. Bold
lines are for ambiguous terms, thin lines for nonambiguous terms. Measure M2.
extra within-factor was added, namely ambiguity (ambiguous vs nonam-
biguous) within term. MANOVA was performed on this 3*3*2*2 design
(Appendix Table 5.12). It was expected that ambiguous terms would yield
191
Feature elicitation: Instance-category dominance
higher feature rates and higher feature frequencies in the shared set than un-
ambiguous terms.
Table 5.12 (Appendix) allows the following observations:
(I) Ambiguous terms rendered more (weighted) features than nonambiguous
terms for literal A-terms, metaphoric A- and B-terms in single term and ex-
pression, and for metaphoric B-terms in context. Ambiguous terms rendered
fewer features than nonambiguous terms for literal B-terms in single term
and expression, and in context for literal A- and B-terms and metaphoric A-
terms (interaction of condition by ambiguity by term by expression type:
hÎ ). (II) Ambiguous terms rendered more features than nonambiguous terms
for metaphors and anomalies in single term. The same was valid for
metaphors in context, whereas anomalies showed inverted effects
(interaction of condition by ambiguity by expression type, parameter 8,
hliberal á-level: Ï ). (III) Ambiguous terms rendered more features than
nonambiguous terms for anomalous A- and B-terms and for literal A-terms.
For literal B-terms, however, opposite effects were obtained (interaction of
hambiguity by term by expression type, parameter 2: Ð ). (IV) For literals and
anomalies, ambiguous terms rendered higher frequencies of features in the
shared set than nonambiguous terms. For metaphors, however, ambiguous
terms rendered lower frequencies of features in the shared set than non-
hambiguous terms (interaction of ambiguity by expression type: Ñ ).
Lexical ambiguity did have effect on feature elicitation. However, the
direction of the effect - stimulating or suppressing feature activation -
was rather divergent, and therefore, may be considered a noise factor.
If at all, metaphors benefited most from ambiguous terms in raising the
number of features, while context had a disambiguating effect. Ambiguous
terms contributed features with higher frequencies to the shared set than
unambiguous ones, except for metaphors.
Check 5: Instance-category dominance
The last control concerns instance and category dominance of terms. It
should be recalled that instance dominance (the number of times that the in-
stance is mentioned, given the category) and category dominance (the num-
ber of times the category is mentioned, given the instance) has been found to
speed up sentence verification time (Balota & Chumbley 1984). Since domi-
nance has a pronounced effect on reaction time (RT), feature elicitation data
might shed light on the extent to which a term is dominant.
The relation between instances and categories is different for the ex-
pression types. Literals match an instance as A-term with an appropriate
higher-order category as B-term ('poetry is an art'). Metaphors match two
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inappropriate terms, either instances or categories ('poetry is a beast').
Anomalies match two inappropriate terms, of which the A-term is an
instance of a higher-order category, whereas the B-term is an instance of a
lower-order category ('poetry is a clack').
Since instance and category have a regular relation in literals, it can be
expected that literal A- and B-terms are most associated. Metaphoric A- and
B-terms are less associated, and thus, dominance will be less, whereas it will
be least for anomalies. This pattern should show up in effects with ex-
pression type.
For each term, an index of dominance (associability) was established
(Table 5.13) by counting the frequency of the A-term in response to the B-
dom rterm, including relations (A  = 3 Aå(Yc Y )), and the frequency of the B-
dom rterm in response to the A-term, including relations (B  = 3 Bå(Xc X )).
Table 5.13: Grand means of A- and B-term  dominance for all expression types and
conditions.
_________________________________________________________________________
Grand mean number of times that A- and B-term  are mentioned in response of each
other
L M A
dom dom dom dom dom domA B A B A B
single term .152 .096 .040 .033 .004 .000
expression .231 .276 .714 .907 .452 .521
context .341 .276 .352 .362 .352 .010
_________________________________________________________________________
MANOVA in Table 5.14 (Appendix) suggests that:
(I) In context, A-term dominance was stronger than B-term dominance. At a
liberal á-level, the same occurred in single term, and the reverse in
expression (interaction of condition by term). (II) In expression (and context
at liberal á), A- and B-term dominance was stronger in metaphors than in
literals, whereas in single term, A- and B-term dominance was stronger in
literals (interaction of condition by expression type). (III) A-term dominance
was stronger than B-term dominance in literals and anomalies, whereas B-
term dominance was stronger for metaphors (interaction of term by
expression type, liberal á).
The results of instance-category dominance do not show a clear-cut picture.
The expression types in the present stimulus set do not correlate with
specific dominance distributions. Often, the effects were too weak for a
conservative á-level. Therefore, instance-category dominance was not a
systematic effect, and may only add to the noise.
In conclusion, the checks on the feature elicitation results suggested that (1)
asymmetry hardly played a role in processing the present stimulus set, (2)
repetition may have interfered with differences between conditions (single
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term vs expression and context), although repetitions within condition had
no effect, (3) word frequency probably did not explain the low feature rates
of anomalous B-terms, (4) lexical ambiguity and instance-category
dominance had unsystematic effects. With regard to the RT and EEG
experiments, no systematic bias is expected from the potentially
intervening variables.
5.5 General discussion for psychology
In Section 5.3, three measures were outlined to determine the shared set.
The first (M1) was based on strictly equal lines, the second (M2) compared
words, considering derivations and declensions as equal features. M3 was a
lenient measure, and compared letter clusters irrespective of meaning. It was
found (Appendix Table 5.2) that M2 was most sensitive, suggesting that
subjects usually conceived of features as words, rather than lines or letter
clusters. Lines may contain too much undifferentiated information, whereas
letter clusters may contain too little information. Moreover, a lenient
definition of equality was less effective to calculate the shared set. Features
may only be common when related in meaning.
The metaphor models were investigated with measure M2. The
comparison model was refuted, because literal expressions did not have a
larger shared set than metaphors, although both had larger shared sets than
anomalies. Feature sets and shared sets were not fixed either, although it
could be countered that fixed feature sets were activated, yet not all features
were reported. The shared sets did not correspond with the interpretation of
the expressions. More features of the shared set were reactivated in the inter-
pretation of metaphors than of anomalies. However, the number of
reactivated shared features was a small proportion of the total number of
features in the interpretation.
The interaction model was strongly refuted, because relations were not
created more frequently for metaphoric B-terms than for other term types,
not even in context. Moreover, whatever combination of relation, ground or
attributive sets were used, the number of matches never distinguished
metaphors from other expression types. As a general finding, more relations
were created as more context was added. Additionally, no kind of shared set
- combining relations, grounds or attributive features - that was retrieved in
the interpretations could distinguish expression types. As predicted by the
interaction model, relations were created later in the associative flow. How-
ever, this was not typical for metaphors and occurred independent of con-
dition, i.e. context.
The anomaly model received some support, when assuming two new
shared sets, consisting of literal features for the one term, and figurative
features for the other. Shared sets that consisted merely of figurative features
did not differ among expression types. Shared sets that only contained literal
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features positively distinguished literal expressions and metaphors on the
one hand from anomalies on the other. Metaphors had the largest shared sets
of mixed literal and figurative features. Feature sets and shared sets were not
fixed. Again, this may be due to a difference between activation and report.
With regard to the interpretations of the expressions, the anomaly model
was the best among poor achievers. More features of the shared figurative-
literal set were found in the interpretation of metaphors than of anomalies.
More features of the shared literal-figurative set were found in the in-
terpretation of metaphors than of literal expressions. However, the number
of shared features that recurred in the interpretation was a small proportion
of the total number of features in the interpretation.
At the initial serial positions of feature activation, more literal than figu-
rative features were activated. The expected shift to figurative dominance at
later positions was found only for anomalous B-terms in expression and
context.
Note, however, that certain variables may have interfered with these results.
Differences between single term on the one hand, and expression and
context on the other might also have been due to repetition effects. Certain
effects might have come out better, when noise factors such as word
frequency, lexical ambiguity and instance-category dominance would have
been totally excluded from the stimulus set. On the other hand, when effects
are not robust, the models have little generalizing power.
A parallel two-stage anomaly model?
How can an anomaly model handle the problem that even for literal ex-
pressions, literal and figurative features were combined in the shared set,
although the literal and figurative features are supposed to be activated in
two serial stages? One solution may be that the literal and figurative stage
operate in parallel. The serial two-stage anomaly model assumes that there
are two information accumulators: The literal shared set and the figurative
shared set, which are established in succession. However, it could also be
that both accumulators work simultaneously.
In this case, literal and figurative features are activated in parallel in the
activation phase. In the beginning, literal features may prevail. However,
they are not all elicited before the activation of figurative features starts.
In the comparison phase, literal features may be compared with each
other to calculate the literal shared set. At the same time, however, they are
also compared with figurative features to determine the (mixed) figurative
shared set.
Anomalies establish the smallest shared sets of either feature kind. They
have small literal and small figurative feature sets, so that 'end of file' is
reached soon while looking for shared features.
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Literal expressions accumulate large literal shared sets, whereas the
(mixed) figurative shared sets remain small. Literal expressions have large
literal, but small figurative feature sets, so that 'end of file' is reached soon
for the latter set type while looking for shared features.
Metaphors accumulate equally large literal shared sets. However, they are
not recognized as literal expressions, because they accumulate large (mixed)
figurative shared sets as well. Yet, literal and figurative set sizes for
metaphors equal those for literal expressions, so that the processing speed of
both expressions types may be the same. Thus, decisions between literal
expressions and metaphors depend on the nature of the shared sets (literal vs
literal and mixed figurative), whereas speed depends on the size of the
feature sets.
l fIn the response phase, the criteria q  and q  may be equally checked in
l fparallel. Literal expressions meet the literal criterion q  , but do not meet q  .
lThe process stops, because meeting q  is sufficient to qualify the expression
as literal. Anomalies fail to exceed both criteria, and are dismissed as either
l fliteral or metaphoric. Metaphors satisfy both q  and q  . If so, metaphors are
not reconsidered anomalies as the serial anomaly model presumes. How-
ever, they are expressions that exceed two decision criteria (Figure 5.19).
It may be, then, that anomalies are rapidly recognized, because both kinds
of shared sets are small, quickly ascertained, checked and rejected as literal
nor metaphoric. Literal expressions and metaphors may be equally fast,
because the set sizes of literal and figurative features are equally large and
'end of file' is reached equally soon. Yet, the nature of the shared sets
separates the decisions. In addition, it might be that metaphors are a little
slower than literal expressions, if the accumulation of two large shared sets
asks more effort than the accumulation of one.
Note that the explanation of differences in RT and decisions by the
parallel model is completely different from that by the serial model. In
the serial model, the differences derive only from the fixed order in which
the response criteria are checked. In the parallel version, the speed of pro-
cessing also depends on the size of the feature sets, and thus, on the time to
accumulate shared features. The larger the sets and the more shared features
are found, the slower the process.
Responses in expression may be faster than in context, because context is
a more diffuse primer of the B-term. In expression, only the A-term is the
prime. Chapter 6 will further investigate these possibilities.
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Figure 5.19: Preliminary anomaly model for the parallel processing of two information
sources: Literal versus (mixed) figurative shared features.
5.6 General discussion for the theory of literature
(...) each metaphor can be traced back to a subjacent chain of
metonymic connexions which constitute the framework of the code
and upon which is based the constitution of any semantic field (...).
(Eco 1979: 68; Culler 1981: 199-200)
A metaphor can be invented because language, in its process of un-
limited semiosis, constitutes a multidimensional network of meto-
nymies (...). (...) the subjacent network of arbitrarily stipulated
contiguities. (Eco 1979: 78; Culler 1981: 201)
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Words evoke words, and in doing so, they create a set of related words.
Culler stated that Eco perceived the connections between words (or items)
as a measure of distance (or contiguity):
Eco inverts the Jakobsonian relationship, because he thinks of systems
and codes as spatial. If the system is spatial, then relations between
items in the system may be thought of as relations of contiguity and
hence as metonymic. (Culler 1981: 201)
In other words, Eco stipulated a distance function (the metonymy) between
words in the language system. Since words supposedly have different
contiguities, semantic equivalence or similarity between words is a function
of their relative distances. How can such distances between words be
estimated?
Distance metrics usually define a dimensional space in which similar
stimuli occupy contiguous regions. These dimensions are defined by scaling
the words (or other stimuli) for a number of oppositions (in the sense of
Lotman). However, the choice of oppositions is free. Usually, they contain
dimensions such as 'positive-negative', 'active-passive', and 'powerful-
weak'.  Tourangeau & Sternberg (1982), for instance, used oppositions such10
as 'noble-ignoble' and 'warlike-peaceful' to scale the A- and B-terms of
metaphors.
By means of what are termed 'factor scores', the general determinant in
the scores of these dimensions is deduced. If the A-term is 'shark', it may
score high on 'active', 'bad', and 'strength', whereas the B-term 'butterfly'
would yield low scores for these poles. Thus, 'shark' and 'butterfly' are rather
distant, and make a worse metaphor than e.g., 'seahorse' and 'butterfly'.
In other words, Eco's presumption that words in the system maintain
certain distances can be operated by factor scores derived from preconceived
dimensions, which form the coordinates in a dimensional space. The closer
these coordinates are, the higher the semantic equivalence (or similarity)
between the words.
Nevertheless, there is a problem in envisioning similarity as dimensional
distances. Although stimuli may be closely related, they do not need to be
similar or equivalent. Section 5.2 gave the example of 'death' and 'guilt',
which are part of the same chain of metonymic connections, although they
are not equivalent at all.
Eco's proposal circumvents this problem, if distance is replaced by the
shared feature set. The feature sets generated by subjects in response to a
word are arbitrary in principal, because language is subjective, as Eco stated.
They are infinite, due to the process of unlimited semiosis; each feature may
be a word that evokes features itself.
However, the arbitrariness is not so austere if the feature elicitation re-
sults of a word are averaged over subjects. Certain features are high-
frequent, whereas others are unique. Thus, words activate features more
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closely connected to that word than to other words, which reduces the
'whimsical character' of the set. Moreover, subjects drain their associations
within one minute, so that feature sets hardly ever exceed 15 lines of
associations. Therefore, every feature set is demarcated by the knowledge of
the speech community in question. Although in la langue, the 'chain of
metonymic connexions' (the feature set) is arbitrary and infinite, in la
parole, it is not.
The strength of the connections between word and feature can be ex-
pressed by the frequency that a feature occurs in response to the word. Since
the features themselves are words capable of evoking features, each word
can be activated as a feature of another word. Thus, the strength of the
connections between words can be expressed by the frequency that a word
occurs as a feature of another word. This mechanism is called 'response
availability' or 'associability' and may also be reflected in the reaction time
to recognize or produce a word given another word.
The strength of the connections among words can be established by cal-
culating the overlap between the applicable feature sets. In Section 5.1, it
was stressed that Jakobson's (1981: 27) ideas on syntagma and paradigm can
be translated into terms of set theory. According to Culler (1981: 200),
Jakobson connected metaphor with the paradigmatic axis of phonological,
semantic and syntactic similarity. In other words, A- and B-term activate a
set of features with high 'response availabilities' (the 'within paradigm'
similarity). Metonyms are connected with the syntagmatic axis, and the
possibilities of combining the terms to form sequences are increased when
the set of shared features is large. Thus, the selection from the paradigmatic
axis is based on finding sufficient features that match the features of a word
in another paradigm. Thus, selection is directed towards high 'between
paradigm' similarity in order to establish combination. Accordingly:
Jakobson links metaphor more closely with the linguistic code, since
relations of similarity occur primarily in the code or system. Only in
poetic language are relations of similarity elements of the sequence.
Metaphor is linked with la langue and metonymy with la parole, since
relations of contiguity are manifested in the actual combinations of
speech sequences. (Culler 1981: 200-201)
Eco also suggested that feature overlap between two 'relations of contiguity'
constitutes the metaphor:
Codes connect the notion of 'a beautiful woman' with the feature 'a
long white neck'; they also connect 'swan' with 'a long white neck' and
thus make possible through these two relations of contiguity, the
metaphorical substitution of swan for woman. (Eco in Culler 1981:
201)
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Thus, 'a long white neck' is the shared feature that connects 'swan' with
'woman' and comprises the metaphor. In Section 5.4, this idea initiated a full
scale test of the metaphor models by means of a feature elicitation
experiment. However, establishing meaning (the signifié) - either
heuristically or computational - is based on the analysis of the form (the
signifiant). To calculate the shared set, Section 5.3 defined three measures,
based on different definitions of features and equality.
Measure M1 compared lines like 'a long white neck' for strict equality.
Thus, letter string and position in the line should be equal, before the line
was recognized as a feature shared between 'woman' and 'swan'. The second
measure M2 was defined in compliance with Foucault (1988: 57), who
hinted at a partial resemblance between elements, or 'similitude'. This
measure was word-oriented, and recognized that 'white neck' was partly
equal to 'whitened necks'. Shared features thus could formally differ in
inflection or derivation, as long as their dictionary meaning was related. M3
was based on the formal-semantic equivalence theory of Jakobson, and com-
pared letter clusters independently of meaning connectedness. In other
words, 'white' was equal to 'whit', 'hit' and 'it', thus magnifying the shared
set.
Although the Jakobsonian criterion found the most overlapping features,
Table 5.2 shows that it was not the most sensitive measure. Since every
formal equivalence was counted as a semantic equivalence (a matching fea-
ture), the differences between expression types faded. Thus, anomalies
yielded as many shared features as literals and metaphors. The formal-
semantic equivalence premise, thus blurred the differences among
expression types with semantically unrelated shared features, although
subjects indicated in Table 4.1 (Chapter 4) that these differences were
relevant.
The measure derived from Foucault (M2) was a more sensitive measure.
Subjects contrived of features as words, and less as lines or letter clusters. In
other words, lines were probably split into more informational units,
whereas letter clusters carried too little information to be of interest for a
natural reading situation. Moreover, a strict formal equality (M1) was too
severe, since subjects apparently combined words and their derivations or
declensions as matching features.
How were metaphors distinguished from literals and anomalies, ac-
cording to the results in Figure 5.0 up to 5.13? Culler stated that metaphor is
hard to distinguish from literal expressions, because metaphor is an
exemplification of creative cognitive processes.
(...) metaphor [is located] in the gap between sense and reference, in
the process of thinking of an object, event, or whatever, as something
(...). (...) one can argue that cognition itself is essentially a process of
seeing something as something. Metaphor thus becomes an instance of
general cognitive processes at their most creative or speculative.
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However, precisely because this approach assimilates metaphor to
general cognitive processes, it makes it difficult to establish any firm
distinction between the literal and the metaphorical. (Culler 1981:
202) 
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 indicate that a firm distinction between the literal and
the metaphorical was found in the mixed set of shared literal and figurative
features. Certain literal features of the A-term were figurative for the B-term,
and certain literal B-term features were figurative for the A-term. These
mixed shared sets were the largest for metaphors. Literal expressions had
small mixed shared sets. Large sets were obtained for purely literal overlap
and for the undifferentiated shared set defined by the comparison model.
Anomalies had the smallest shared sets for all feature kinds. 
Moreover, when metaphors were interpreted, it was found that the mixed
shared sets were reactivated, and that they differentiated metaphors from
other expression types (cf. Appendix Table 5.6). Since the mixed shared sets
seem so important for distinguishing metaphors, a mechanism may be as-
sumed that transformed literal features into figurative and vice versa from
the one term to the other:
In the case of the literal versus the figurative, the terms in which the
figurative is defined so as to be distinguished from the literal lead one,
paradoxically, to recognize the primacy of the figurative, either by
identifying it with general cognitive processes and seeing the literal as
figures whose figurality has been forgotten, or else by focusing on
cases of catachresis where the figure seems to work without being
contrasted with the literal. (Culler 1981: 206-207)
However, the reactivated shared sets were never equally large as the feature
sets generated as interpretation. On the contrary, they were so small, that
interpretation cannot be explained merely by finding the shared features.
Culler is correct in asserting that:
(...) there is no reason to claim that any particular similarities are part
of the meaning of the sentence; the sentence says simply that there is
similarity. In the case of a metaphor, however, (...) theorists usually
insist that to give the meaning of the metaphor is to identify the
similarities in question (...). (Culler 1981: 207)
Surprisingly, metaphors were not different for the purely figurative overlap.
Nor did they stand out in creating more relations or forming more relation
connections in the sense of M. Black. Other kinds of relation, ground or
attributive connections did not yield the expected results either. Thus,
expression type differences always reserved a role for literal or un-
differentiated features. Since the mixed shared sets were prevalent in meta-
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phors, Lotman's (1976: 100) postulate should be subscribed that 'this series
of meanings' (the figurative) 'does not abolish linguistic meanings' (the
literal) 'but co-exists with them forming a mutually correlated pair'.
In the experiment on judgements of similarity and figurativeness (Table
5.7), it was found that literal expressions were the highest in similarity,
followed by metaphors and anomalies. As expected, metaphors had the
highest figurativeness. Combined with the results of the feature elicitation
experiment, the following picture emerged.
Metaphors had the largest mixed shared sets, which corresponded with a
high figurativeness, whereas literal expressions were high in similarity.
Since mixed overlap for the literal expressions was small, similarity
probably corresponded with the large literal or undifferentiated overlap.
Anomalies had small shared sets, regardless of feature type, thus receiving
the lowest rates of similarity and figurativeness. 
For that matter, Lotman's (1976: 100) statement should be reiterated that
a poetic phenomenon such as metaphor activates linguistic associations
(literal features), which are opposed to 'integrating' (figurative) and
relational features. Lotman posited that the latter two feature types follow a
'different synthetic principle and are not analyzable into the mechanical sum
of meaningful units'.
However, the results discussed above show that there probably is a cor-
relation between the perceived similarity and figurativeness and the size of
the assorted shared sets. Although the results were administered in a
between-subject design, the mechanical sum of meaningful units may yet be
established in a within-subject design. Subjects may elicit features for a
sample of stimuli, and rate the similarity between the pairs. Semantic
equivalence or similarity (SIM), then, is a function of the number of
Sweighted shared features (W ), which may be literal, figurative or relational:
SSIM = á W  + â, where á is the tangent or slope between the scores for SIM
Sand W  , and â is the interception from regression line to the origin. Thus,
equivalence (or similarity) can be expressed by a 'mechanical sum of
meaningful units'.
Another point of investigation was the potential asymmetric trait in meta-
phor processing. Tversky (1977) found that judgements of similarity are not
necessarily symmetric. Sometimes, subjects judge that the A-term is more
similar to the B-term than reversely. Tversky argued that asymmetry was
predicated by the focus of attention. Subjects would prefer the unsalient (or
feature-poor) A-term as the focus of comparison, and the salient (or feature-
rich) as the frame of reference.
Since Tversky's findings, asymmetry has been investigated for metaphors
and similes by, among others, Malgady & Johnson (1980) and Ortony,
Vondruska, Foss & Jones (1985). In the present study, however, no
asymmetry was found in judgements of similarity and figurativeness. The
judgements from A- to B-term were not reliably different from B- to A-term
judgements. The general discussion for psychology suggests that the studies
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that found asymmetry used biasing stimuli, and sometimes performed a
weaker form of statistics.
In conclusion, the comparison model was repudiated, because the distinc-
tion in shared set size between literals and metaphors failed. Despite the
finding that anomalies had the smallest shared set, literals and metaphors did
not differ. The feature sets were not fixed. However, it could be said that all
features may be activated, yet not written down by the subjects. The features
in the interpretation of the expressions were not identical to the shared set.
When the shared sets were used to search the interpretation sets, only one
expression type difference occurred. More shared features were present in
the interpretation of metaphors than in that of anomalies.
The interaction model was even less successful, because metaphoric B-
terms did not stimulate the creation of relations more than the other
expression types, not even in context. As a general finding for all expression
types, more relations were created when more context was added. However,
the number of matches between all possible combinations of relation,
ground or attributive sets never differed among expression types. Moreover,
these matches were not equal to the interpretation of the expressions, and
those that were retrieved made no distinctions among expression types. Re-
lations were created at later positions in the associative flow, as expected by
the interaction model. However, this was not typical for metaphors and
occurred independent of condition, i.e. context.
The anomaly model was partly affirmed, however, only because a new
shared set was defined of features that were literal for the one term and
figurative for the other. Purely figurative shared sets could not discriminate
the expression types. Purely literal shared sets failed to distinguish literal
expressions from metaphors. Both had large literal overlap, larger than for
anomalies. Only the shared sets of mixed literal and figurative features could
detect metaphors, which were larger than for the other expression types.
Again, feature sets and overlap were not fixed. As indicated earlier,
however, activated features may not have been reported by the subjects.
The shared sets did not correspond with the interpretation. Compared
with anomalies, more features of the shared figurative-literal set of
metaphors were found in the interpretation. Compared with literal ex-
pressions, more features of the shared literal-figurative set of metaphors
were found in the interpretation.
 Literal features were dominant over figurative features at the first po-
sitions in the feature list. Figurative features accumulated at later positions
and dominated literal features only for anomalous B-terms in expression and
context.
Apparently, the anomaly model is the best among poor performers. More-
over, when the serial anomaly model is changed into a parallel model, it can
account for most of the feature elicitation results. 
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In the activation phase, literal and figurative features are activated in
parallel by A- and B-term. At first, literal features arise in the associative
flow, while figurative features rise to their peak somewhat later.
In the comparison phase, literal expressions and metaphors find equally
large literal overlap. Yet, metaphors are not categorized as literal
expressions. This can only be explained when a parallel comparison for
literal and figurative overlap is conjectured. In this case, literal expressions,
metaphors and anomalies establish literal as well as figurative overlap.
Literal expressions find many shared literal features and few shared
figurative features. Anomalies find the least shared features of either kind.
Metaphors, however, find literal as well as figurative overlap. According to
the results, the figurative overlap is composed of features that are literal for
the one term and figurative for the other. In other words, the decision
between literal expressions and metaphors depends on the nature of the
shared sets (literal vs literal and mixed figurative). 
Processing speed depends on the size of the feature sets. Anomalies have
small sets, so that an exhaustive search for shared features ends quickly.
Literal expressions and metaphors have equally large literal and figurative
sets, so that the search for shared features takes equally long. Metaphors
may be understood slightly slower if the accumulation of two large shared
set requires more effort than the accumulation of one.
In the response phase, two threshold criteria are at work. The criterion for
l fliteral overlap q  and for figurative overlap q  . Literal expressions satisfy the
l f lliteral criterion q  easily, but q  is not reached. Yet, meeting q  is sufficient to
be judged as literal, so that the process stops. Anomalies fail to exceed both
criteria, and terminate all further processing. Therefore, metaphors are not
reconsidered anomalies, but expressions that exceed two decision criteria.
Moreover, context may influence the process. Ricœur's (1974: 104) view
of the role of contextual c(l)ues was quite apt. His statement purported that
'a clue is a kind of index for a specific construction, both a set of
permissions and a set of prohibitions; it excludes some unfitting
constructions and allows some others that make more sense of the same
words'.
This is illustrated by the three conditions in the experiment. In single
term, personal associations could be generated freely; however, this
condition also prohibited ample semantic connections. Many features were
activated, whereas only small shared sets were found. Expression prohibited
the free elicitation of features, because the terms settled the limits within
which the activated features were meaningful. However, since merely
appropriate features were activated, many of them intersected. Both terms
evoked a small number of mainly identical features, so that the shared sets
were large. Context permitted the activation of many associations in re-
sponse to the terms and the clues; however, the clues also primed the
semantic connections, so that a large overlap was found.
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In other words, if the parallel anomaly model holds, the RT experiments
should show that anomalies are the most quickly identified, followed by
literals and metaphors. Moreover, the priming of the B-term in expression is
less cryptic than in context. In context, 'ambiguity is an intrinsic, inalienable
character of any self-focused message, briefly, a corollary feature of poetry'
(Jakobson 1981: 42). In expression, only the A-term primes the B-term,
whereas in context, the priming is by many (ambiguous) words. Thus,
decisions in expression may be quicker than in context.
Regardless of all this, Ricœur (1974: 104) was again right when he at-
tested that 'a literary work is more than a linear succession of sentences. It is
a cumulative, holistic process'. None of the theories can explain
interpretation, because none of the shared sets formed a major part of the
interpretation feature set. Thus, finding shared features or perceiving
similarity is inadequate as an explanation for the interpretation of
expressions. Hoorn & Veldman (in preparation) studied the compounds of
interpretation sets, to ascertain the percentage of shared, distinctive and
newly activated features in the interpretation.
Notes:
1. It could be objected that salience is attributive to intensity, so that a loud tone is more
salient than a soft tone, thus making the argument unfeasible that familiarity or communality
are good alternatives. Although intensity may well be an indicator of salience in the case of
sound and light, for words - i.e. feature elicitation data - intensity is hard to make operative,
because it is not a factor that can be additively increased as sound or light. A word cannot
be made 'more intense' by turning a control knob.
2. Gleitman, Gleitman, Miller & Ostrin (1996) showed (experiment 5) that asymmetry may
be found while using comparisons with nonsense words ('the ZUM is identical to the
GAX'), thus demonstrating that even the position of the noun in the sentence may contribute
to asymmetry perception.
3. In the original paper, a minus sign is in front of U(A), which must be a misprint.
4. Cf. 'The green sea is my girl friend'. Charles, J.B. (1987). Een suite van de zee. De
groene zee is mijn vriendin, gedichten 1944-1982, De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam.
5. It may be argued that a feature is not added by an adjective, but that it is selected from
the set of the noun, thus making the feature more salient.
6. Steen (personal communication) objected to the idea that the relations shown in Table
5.1 are identical to the relations that M. Black drove at. They should be analogies.
However, subjects were instructed beforehand with an analogy used by interaction theory
(Tourangeau & Sternberg 1982), saying that teachers have power over their classes as kings
have over their empires. They were urged to make relations similar to 'power' among
features and terms. After that, it is not for the researcher to decide whether these are proper
instantiations of Black's theory or not, unless theory provides a characteristic that
distinguishes an analogical relation from any other relation.
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7. An objection may be that Clark assumes the variance-covariance matrix to be equal. He
uses univariate tests, which demand a compound symmetry (equal variances and equal
correlations). Data that meet this demand are empirically almost nonexistent. Therefore, it
should be recommended that multivariate tests with more variance components become
available for standard statistical packages on PC.
8. Steen (personal communication) emphasized that there may be an interfering effect of
time pressure during the creation of relations. Since the production of relations is an
effortful procedure, subjects might have created fewer relations than under more natural
circumstances. This may explain the absence of differences among expression types for
relation set size and shared relation set size.
It could be countered, however, that subjects had no time pressure in creating relations.
After feature elicitation (one minute), they were allowed to make relations at their own
speed, exactly to avoid this 'ceiling effect' for the harder task.
9. Interpretation was designed as a within-subject factor level, because it is implausible
that the shared features found for subject 1 will be retrieved in the interpretation of subject
2. A within-subject design will stimulate the size of X 1  Y 1  Z. Yet, the size of this shared
set was so small, that interpretation could not be explained by it, not even in a within-
subject design.
10. Following in the wake of Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum (1957), such a bipolar scale
is also called a semantic differential e.g., in Hauptmeier, H. & Schmidt, S. J. (1985). Ein-
führung in die Empirische Literaturwissenschaft. Vieweg & Sohn, Braunschweig, Wies-
baden, 154.
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Table 5.2: F-tests on the effects of condition, expression type and term on the grand means
X Y Sof weighted feature set size (W  and W ) and weighted shared set size (W ), using the
measures M1, M2, M3. Features (x, y) could be literal (l) or figurative (f), and could be fol-
lowed by relations (r). Coeff. = the standardized discriminant function coefficients, corr. =
correlations between M1, M2, M3 and discriminant functions. Coefficients and correlations
are tabulated only for the significant effects. Measures with the highest distinctive power for
an effect are labeled with an asterisk.
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of condition: Single term  vs expression vs context
dep. Pillai's M1 M2 M3
6,72variable Trace F    p coeff. corr. coeff. corr. coeff. corr.
X YW +W .75 7.29 .000  .66 -.90 - .88 -.96 * - .75 -.99
Xl YlW +W .56 4.77 .000 7.41  .59 * -7.46  .50   .61  .49
Xf YfW +W .56 4.69 .000 8.90 -.25    -12.59 -.35 *  3.42 -.35
Xr YrW +W .41 3.10 .009 1.15 -.56 -6.44 -.74 *  4.62 -.68
X YrW +W .67 6.16 .000 5.31  .23 -6.37  .05 *  1.25  .06
SW .58 5.02 .000 1.23 -.75 -2.48 -.92 *   .41 -.88
SllW .38 2.86 .015  1.62 -.58 -3.85 -.77 *  1.64 -.63
SffW .35 2.60 .024 1.64 -.70   .80 -.83 -3.25 -.87 *
SrrW .51 4.12 .001 - .06 -.67  4.83 -.88 -5.69 -.91 *
SxrW .76 7.46 .000 - .13 -.77  1.16 -.94 -2.02 -.98 *
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition by expression type:
dep. Pillai's M1 M2 M3
12,66variable Trace F    p coeff. corr. coeff. corr. coeff. corr.
X YW +W .80 3.70 .000 -1.37 -.23  4.62 -.22 * -3.73 -.48
- .03  .02   .69 -.13 - .21 -.02
Xl YlW +W .39 1.33 .221
Xf YfW +W .31 1.02 .436
Xr YrW +W .72 3.09 .002 -3.13 -.35 *  8.87 -.08 -5.68 -.08
 2.15  .11 -7.88  .05  5.68  .05
X YrW +W .65 2.67 .006  3.46  .54 -4.82  .42 *  2.41  .44
  .89 -.26 -1.49 -.21 - .10 -.18
SW .47 1.73 .079
SllW .26  .83 .619
SffW .39 1.34 .213
SrrW .52 1.93 .046 - .11 -.22     11.73  .17     -11.17  .14
- .42 -.25    -10.34 -.25 *  10.03 -.21
SxrW .40 1.40 .188
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_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of expression type: Literals vs metaphors vs anomalies
dep. Pillai's M1 M2 M3
6,32variable Trace F    p coeff. corr. coeff. corr. coeff. corr.
X YW +W .69 12.38 .000 -2.00 -.63  1.96 -.60 * - .80 -.74
- .15 -.33 -1.69 -.50  1.64 -.36
Xl YlW +W .60 8.15 .000 -3.01 -.68  2.17 -.63   .44 -.66
  .71 -.39 -5.60 -.51 *  4.67 -.42
Xf YfW +W .14  .89 .510
Xr YrW +W .37 3.24 .013 -1.50 -.00 13.66 -.01    -11.85 -.04
 1.58 -.26 -7.97 -.29 *  5.53 -.28
X YrW +W .35 2.94 .021 -2.61 -.66  4.67 -.56 * -2.99 -.67
- .29 -.12 - .28 -.35   .80 -.33
SW .66 10.61 .000   .21 -.36  1.05 -.34 -2.05 -.42
 1.84 -.36 -3.85 -.48 *  1.32 -.47
SllW .59 7.78 .000 -1.17 -.61  2.79 -.58 -2.54 -.69 *
-1.00 -.30  1.48 -.34 -1.16 -.31
SffW .20 1.33 .270
SrrW .31 2.48 .044  1.06  .22 13.23  .28 *    -13.02  .25
- .97 -.20 -5.71 -.33  5.34 -.32
SxrW .35 2.89 .023  1.60   .41  8.30  .22 -9.11  .18 *
- .83  -.11   .74 -.23 - .82 -.25
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition by term:
dep. Pillai's M1 M2 M3
6,72variable Trace F    p coeff. corr. coeff. corr. coeff. corr.
X YW  - W .74 7.06 .000   .62  .47 -1.85  .48  1.95  .82 *
Xl YlW  - W .12  .79 .574
Xf YfW  - W .14  .90 .494
Xr YrW  - W .24 1.64 .147
X YrW  - W .55 4.63 .000  1.43  .98 * - .83  .90   .40  .83
SW .29 2.10 .063
SllW .21 1.41 .220
SffW .29 2.05 .070
SrrW .16 1.07 .385
SxrW .39 2.91 .013 - .61 -.94 * - .09 -.91 - .38 -.85
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of term: A-term  vs B-term
dep. Pillai's M1 M2 M3
3,35variable Trace F    p coeff. corr. coeff. corr. coeff. corr.
X YW  - W .78    41.54 .000   .47 -.93 -1.79 -.98 *   .39 -.80
Xl YlW  - W .37 6.86 .001  2.26  .96 * - .65  .92 - .68  .84
Xf YfW  - W .41 8.14 .000  1.79  .98 * - .49  .94 - .33  .91
Xr YrW  - W .15 2.19 .106
X YrW  - W .96   290.98 .000 -1.08 -.93  1.20 -.91 -1.15 -.94 *
SW .13 1.79 .166
SllW .01  .12 .946
SffW .19 2.78 .055  1.03  .25 -1.05 -.50 * - .33 -.59
SrrW .10 1.31 .284
SxrW .53    13.16 .000 - .62 -.96 * - .20 -.92 - .25 -.81
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_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition by term by expression type:
dep. Pillai's M1 M2 M3
12,66variable Trace F    p coeff. corr. coeff. corr. coeff. corr.
X YW  - W 1.10 6.72 .000 - .26  .27  2.01  .26 * -1.98 -.04
- .03  .25 -1.02  .24  1.62  .44
Xl YlW  - W .27  .87 .571
Xf YfW  - W .34 1.16 .328
Xr YrW  - W .48 1.77 .071
X YrW  - W .37 1.28 .251
SW .44 1.57 .121
SllW .35 1.18 .309
SffW .40 1.39 .189
SrrW .42 1.50 .147
SxrW .50 1.86 .055  2.26  .02 -2.60 -.31 * - .09 -.27
  .84  .15 -1.03  .14   .50  .22
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of term by expression type:
dep. Pillai's M1 M2 M3
6,32variable Trace F    p coeff. corr. coeff. corr. coeff. corr.
X YW  - W .85    31.72 .000 - .74 -.30  1.81 -.24 -1.39 -.48
- .92 -.69 * - .75 -.68  1.28 -.48
Xl YlW  - W .79    20.14 .000 - .03 -.39  1.52 -.35 -1.22 -.44
-1.60 -.85 * - .90 -.82  1.55 -.71
Xf YfW  - W .25 1.78 .133
Xr YrW  - W .26 1.90 .110
X YrW  - W .35 2.90 .023   .68  .96   .73  .92 *   .44  .86
- .37 -.16   .35 -.10 - .17 -.07
SW .14  .90 .507
SllW .10  .61 .716
SffW .17 1.14 .360
SrrW .13  .86 .531
SxrW .25 1.78 .134
_________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5.3: MANOVAs for the effects of condition, expression type and term on the grand
X Y Xl Yl Xf Yf Xr Yr Xg Yg Xamean weighted feature set sizes (W  , W  ; W  , W  ; W  , W  ; W  , W  ; W  , W  ; W  ,
YaW ). Only the significant parameters are tabulated. Figures in black circles followed by
asubscript letters (for example, Ø ) refer to important effects discussed in the text.
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of condition:
1 = single term vs expression
2 = single term vs context
3 = expression vs context
2,37dep. variable F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
X Y a 2,37W +W ß 3.70 .034  3.70   .045 1 13.73  2.70 .010**
Xl Yl a 2,38W +W Ù 4.63 .016   4.54   .020 1 15.77  2.60 .013**
Xf YfW +W 2.07 .141
Xr Yr a 2,40W +W Ü 6.12 .005   5.91   .008 2 -9.85 -3.35 .002**
Xg Yg a 2,39W +W Ý 5.12 .011   4.99   .009 2 -7.18 -2.89 .006**
Xa Ya 2,37W +W        11.94 .000  11.80   .000 1 19.31  4.59 .000**
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition by term:
1 = (single term vs expression) vs (A- vs B-term)
2 = (single term vs context) vs (A- vs B-term)
3 = (expression vs context) vs (A- vs B-term)
2,37dep. variable F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
X Y 2,26W  - W 9.73 .000   7.00   .005 1  3.68  4.40 .000**
3 -2.57 -2.67 .011**
Xl YlW  - W 1.75 .188
Xf YfW  - W 1.73 .191
Xr YrW  - W 1.64 .208
Xg YgW  - W  .13 .882
Xa Ya 2,40W  - W 8.39 .001   7.68   .006 1  3.78  4.09 .000**
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of term:
1 = A- vs B-term
1,37dep. variable F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
X Y a 1,10W  - W à  126.87 .000  74,26   .000 1  4.05 11.26 .000*
Xl Yl 1,7W  - W        18.63 .000    8.90   .024 1  2.11  4.31 .000*
Xf Yf a 1,20W  - W Û            23.15 .000  16.95   .000 1  1.94  4.81 .000*
Xr YrW  - W  .94 .339
Xg YgW  - W  .02 .888
Xa Ya 1,14W  - W  102.64 .000  67.46   .000 1  4.03 10.13 .000*
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_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition by expression type:
1 = (single term vs expression) vs (literals vs metaphors)
2 = (single term vs context) vs (literals vs metaphors)
3 = (expression vs context) vs (literals vs metaphors)
4 = (single term vs expression) vs (literals vs anomalies)
5 = (single term vs context) vs (literals vs anomalies)
6 = (expression vs context) vs (literals vs anomalies)
7 = (single term vs expression) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
8 = (single term vs context) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
9 = (expression vs context) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
dep. Pillai's
4,74variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
X Y 4,79W +W .36 4.18 .004   4.39   .005 2     -6.19 -3.92 .000***
3 -6.00 -3.29 .002***
5 -5.92 -3.00 .005***
Xl YlW +W .22 2.28 .068
Xf YfW +W .08  .81 .519
Xr YrW +W .04  .42 .789
Xg YgW +W .15 1.49 .214
Xa YaW +W .22 2.29 .067
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of expression type:
1 = literals vs metaphors
2 = literals vs anomalies
3 = metaphors vs anomalies
dep. Pillai's
2,36variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
X Y a 2,74W +W á .56    23.66 .000  24.70   .000 2  4.72  5.57 .000**
3  5.00  6.79 .000**
Xl Yl 2,76W +W .43    13.89 .000  17.32   .000 2  3.84  4.75 .000**
3  4.48  5.07 .000**
Xf YfW +W .03  .56 .571
Xr YrW +W .05  .99 .380
Xg YgW +W .05 1.01 .373
Xa Ya 2,76W +W .46    15.93 .000  15.62   .000 2     4.67  5.55 .000**
3  4.22  4.37 .000**
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_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition by term by expression type:
1 = (single term vs expression) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs metaphors)
2 = (single term vs context) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs metaphors)
3 = (expression vs context) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs metaphors)
4 = (single term vs expression) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs anomalies)
5 = (single term vs context) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs anomalies)
6 = (expression vs context) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs anomalies)
7 = (single term vs expression) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
8 = (single term vs context) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
9 = (expression vs context) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
dep. Pillai's
4,74variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
X Y a 4,72W  - W Ø .45 5.46 .000   7.47   .000 4 -1.92 -3.57 .001***
7 -2.68 -4.15 .000***
8 -2.70 -4.17 .000***
Xl YlW  - W .14 1.45 .225
Xf YfW  - W .12 1.18 .322
Xr YrW  - W .14 1.43 .230
Xg YgW  - W .18 1.88 .123
Xa Ya a 4,47W  -W Þ .37 4.27 .004   4.72   .005 4 -2.06 -3.98 .000***
7 -2.61 -3.70 .001***
8 -2.20 -3.11 .004***
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of term by expression type:
1 = (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs metaphors)
2 = (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs anomalies)
3 = (A- vs B-term) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
dep. Pillai's
2,36variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
X Y 2,19W  - W .73    49.86 .000  33.93   .000 1  1.73  8.71 .000**
2  -.83 -3.60 .001**
3 -2.56 -9.21 .000**
Xl Yl a 2,10W  - W Ú .73    50.02 .000  20.20   .000 1  1.78  9.71 .000**
2 -1.16 -4.24 .000**
3 -2.95 -8.40 .000**
Xf YfW  - W .04  .94 .399
Xr YrW  - W .10 2.17 .128
Xg YgW  - W .14 3.08 .058
Xa Ya 2,29W  - W .69    41.85 .000  40.67   .000 1  1.60  7.56 .000**
2 -1.15 -5.17 .000**
3 -2.76 -9.07 .000**
_________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5.4: MANOVAs for the effects of condition, expression type and term on the grand
S Sll Slf Sfl Sff Srr Sxr Sgrmean weighted shared set sizes (W  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W ). Only the sig-
bnificant parameters are tabulated. Black circled figures followed by a subscript (e.g., Ø ) re-
fer to important effects discussed in the text.
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of condition:
1 = single term vs expression
2 = single term vs context
3 = expression vs context
2,37dep. variable F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
S b 2,17W Ø        22.61 .000  12.48   .000 1 -3.02 -6.14 .000**
2 -2.27 -4.61 .000**
Sll b 2,31W Û 6.86 .003   5.16   .011 1 -1.08 -3.39 .002**
2 -.81 -2.53 .016**
Slf b 2,35W Ý            15.27 .000  12.30   .000 1 -.38 -4.33 .000**
2 -.41 -4.67 .000**
Sfl b 2,41W à            13.19 .000  12.10   .000 1 -.47 -3.99 .000**
2 -.51 -4.37 .000**
Sff c 2,20W Ù 6.83 .003   4.17   .030 1 -.83 -3.09 .004**
2 -.79 -2.93 .006**
Srr c 2,41W Ú        10.27 .000   9.40   .000 1 -1.10 -2.66 .011**
2 -1.79 -4.34 .000**
Sxr 2,27W        26.69 .000  18.59   .000 1 -1.54 -4.46 .000**
2 -2.39 -6.94 .000**
Sgr 2,40W        11.86 .000  10.28   .000 1 -.69 -3.38 .002**
2 -.91 -4.42 .000**
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition by term:
1 = (single term vs expression) vs (A- vs B-term)
2 = (single term vs context) vs (A- vs B-term)
3 = (expression vs context) vs (A- vs B-term)
2,37dep. variable F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
S b 3,37W Ú 3.33 .047   4.60   .009 3 -.06 -2.57 .014**
SllW 1.71 .195
SlfW 1.95 .156
SflW  .61 .547
Sff 74,37W 4.79 .014   .50  >.50
SrrW 1.29 .288
Sxr c 2,37W Û 9.16 .001   9.26   .000 1  .13  3.09 .004**
2  .17  3.81 .000**
Sgr c 2,37W Ü 5.80 .006   5.59   .010 1  .07  2.66 .011**
2  .08  2.88 .006**
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_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of term:
1 = A- vs B-term
1,37dep. variable F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
S cW Ý 1.28 .265
SllW  .11 .739
SlfW  .33 .570
SflW  .65 .424
SffW 2.21 .146
SrrW 2.63 .113
Sxr 1,37W            35.87 .000  35.90   .000 1 -.11 -5.98 .000*
Sgr 1,37W       18.50 .000  17.36   .000 1 -.05 -4.30 .000*
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition by expression type:
1 = (single term vs expression) vs (literals vs metaphors)
2 = (single term vs context) vs (literals vs metaphors)
3 = (expression vs context) vs (literals vs metaphors)
4 = (single term vs expression) vs (literals vs anomalies)
5 = (single term vs context) vs (literals vs anomalies)
6 = (expression vs context) vs (literals vs anomalies)
7 = (single term vs expression) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
8 = (single term vs context) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
9 = (expression vs context) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
dep. Pillai's
4,74variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
SW .20 2.06 .094
SllW .11 1.10 .362
Slf b 5,46W ß .32 3.56 .010   3.20   .019 1  .27  3.70 .001***
Sfl c 4,68W Ø .33 3.65 .009   5.48   .001 1  .39  4.15 .000***
7 -.31 -3.60 .001***
SffW .18 1.87 .124
SrrW .11 1.13 .345
SxrW .06  .61 .656
SgrW .08  .78 .541
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_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of expression type:
1 = literals vs metaphors
2 = literals vs anomalies
3 = metaphors vs anomalies
dep. Pillai's
2,36variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
S b 2,16W Ù .48    16.84 .000    7.26   .007 2  .48  2.97 .005**
3  .98  5.61 .000**
Sll b 2,26W Ü .48    16.77 .000    6.85   .009 2  .40  4.29 .000**
3  .50  4.47 .000**
Slf b 2,14W Þ .33 9.11 .001   5.35   .021 1 -.13 -4.19 .000**
3  .11  3.36 .002**
Sfl b 2,47W á .47    16.23 .000  17,76   .000 1 -.18 -4.65 .000**
3  .21  5.77 .000**
SffW .08 1.70 .196
SrrW .14 3.13 .055
SxrW .07 1.42 .253
SgrW .08 1.71 .194
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition by term by expression type:
1 = (single term vs expression) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs metaphors)
2 = (single term vs context) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs metaphors)
3 = (expression vs context) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs metaphors)
4 = (single term vs expression) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs anomalies)
5 = (single term vs context) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs anomalies)
6 = (expression vs context) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs anomalies)
7 = (single term vs expression) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
8 = (single term vs context) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
9 = (expression vs context) vs (A- vs B-term) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
dep. Pillai's
4,74variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p
S 9,18W .28 3.04 .022   2.00   .100
SllW .22 2.32 .064
SlfW .18 1.85 .127
SflW .13 1.36 .253
SffW .21 2.20 .077
Srr 6,17W .25 2.74 .034   1.44   .291
SxrW .10 1.01 .406
SgrW .10  .98 .420
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_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of term by expression type:
1 = (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs metaphors)
2 = (A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs anomalies)
3 = (A- vs B-term) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
dep. Pillai's
2,36variable Trace F    p
SW .02  .55 .581
SllW .07 1.49 .239
SlfW .10 2.04 .144
SflW .12 2.58 .090
SffW .11 2.35 .109
SrrW .07 1.41 .255
SxrW .03  .57 .570
SgrW .05 1.10 .343
_________________________________________________________________________
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Z Zl ZfTable 5.6: MANOVAs for the grand means of the weighted feature set size W  (= W +W ),
Zr Zg T1 T2 Zl T2ll Zf T2ll Zl T2lf Zf T2lf Zl T2fl Zf T2fl Zl T2ff Zf T2ffW  and W  , and of W  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W
Zr T2rr Zg T2rr Zr T2xr Zg T2xr Zr T2gr Zg T2gr, W  , W  , W  , W  , W  , W  . Except for
ZW  , only the significant effects are exposed. Black circled figures followed by a subscript
dletter (e.g., Ø ) direct to important effects discussed in the text.
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of condition:
1,18dep. variable F    p df   quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
ZW 3.27 .087
Zr Zg d 1,18W +W á 5.73 .028 5.69  .029    -3.81 -2.39 .028*
Zf T2ll Zf 1,19W +W     10.01 .005 9.24  .006    -2.44 -3.16 .005*
Zf T2lf Zf 1,19W +W 9.89 .006 9.08  .007    -2.43 -3.14 .006*
Zf T2fl Zf 1,19W +W 9.67 .006 8.99  .007    -2.42 -3.10 .006*
Zf T2ff Zf 1,19W +W 9.53 .006 8.71  .008    -2.41 -3.08 .006*
Zg T2rr Zg 1,18W +W 5.32 .033 5.22  .034    -1.93 -2.30 .033*
Zg T2xr Zg 1,18W +W 5.41 .032 5.30  .035    -1.97 -2.32 .032*
Zg T2gr Zg 1,18W +W 5.41 .032 5.29  .035    -1.95 -2.32 .032*
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition by set type:
1,18dep. variable F    p df   quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
Zf T2ll Zf d 1,19W  - W Û 9.88 .006 9.07  .008     2.42  3.14 .006*
Zf T2lf Zf d 1,19W  - W Û    10.88 .005 9.23  .007     2.43  3.16 .005*
Zf T2fl Zf d 1,19W  - W Û    10.22 .005 9.31  .007     2.44  3.19 .005*
Zf T2ff Zf d 1,19W  - W Û    10.35 .005 9.59  .006     2.45  3.21 .005*
Zr T2rr Zr e 1,18W  - W Ø 4.49 .048 4.47  .048     1.87  2.11 .048*
Zg T2rr Zg e 1,18W  - W Ø 5.55 .030 5.43  .031     1.97  2.35 .030*
Zg T2xr Zg e 1,18W  - W Ø 5.47 .031 5.35  .034     1.93  2.33 .031*
Zg T2gr Zg e 1,18W  - W Ø 5.46 .031 5.34  .034     1.96  2.33 .031*
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_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of set type:
1,18dep. variable F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
Zl Zf d 1,19W  - W Ü 9.24 .007    8.92   .007 4.19  3.03 .007*
T1 T2 1,17     W  - W    55.08 .000   36.71 .000 -.57 -7.42 .000*
Zl T2ll Zf T2ll d 1,14     W  - W Ý    21.94 .000   16.09 .002  .28  4.68 .000*
Zl T2lf Zf T2lf 1,4W  - W    15.32 .001    4.42   .100
Zr T2rr Zg T2rr 1,18     W  - W    12.49 .002   12.91 .005  .06  3.53 .002*
Zr T2xr Zg T2xr 1,18      W  - W 6.40 .021    7.99 .015  .04     2.52 .021*
T1 Z d 2,18W  - W Ø   306.25 .000  303.45  .000  -19.97   -17.49 .000*
T2 Z d 1,18W  - W Ø   303.06 .000  297.87  .000  -19.40   -17.40 .000*
Zl T2ll Zl d 1,19W  - W Þ   160.58 .000  147.13  .000  -12.47   -12.67 .000*
Zl T2lf Zl d 1,19W  - W Þ   157.02 .000  143.92  .000  -12.70   -12.53 .000*
Zl T2fl Zl d 1,19W  - W Þ   156.58 .000  143.77  .000  -12.71   -12.51 .000*
Zl T2ff Zl d 1,19W  - W Þ   156.21 .000  144.12  .000  -12.73   -12.49 .000*
Zf T2ll Zf d 1,19W  - W Þ   123.11 .000  111.52  .000    -8.57   -11.09 .000*
Zf T2lf Zf d 1,19W  - W Þ   123.81 .000  112.28  .000    -8.56   -11.12 .000*
Zf T2fl Zf d 1,19W  - W Þ   124.89 .000  112.19  .000    -8.54   -11.17 .000*
Zf T2ff Zf d 1,19W  - W Þ   123.62 .000  111.92  .000    -8.49   -11.11 .000*
Zr T2rr Zr e 1,18     W  - W Ù    54.41 .000   44.66 .000    -6.53    -7.37 .000*
Zg T2rr Zg e 1,19     W  - W Ù    53.97 .000   47.80 .000    -6.15    -7.34 .000*
Zr T2xr Zr e 1,18     W  - W Ù    55.44 .000   45.38 .000    -6.56    -7.44 .000*
Zg T2xr Zg e 1,19     W  - W Ù    55.26 .000   48.58 .000    -6.16    -7.43 .000*
Zr T2gr Zr e 1,18     W  - W Ù    55.21 .000   45.69 .000    -6.60    -7.43 .000*
Zg T2gr Zg e 1,19     W  - W Ù    53.82 .000   47.64 .000    -6.15    -7.33 .000*
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition by expression type:
dep. Pillai's
2,17variable Trace F    p
ZW .04  .41 .668
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of expression type:
1 = literals vs metaphors
2 = literals vs anomalies
3 = metaphors vs anomalies
dep. Pillai's
2,17variable Trace F    p df  quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
ZW .23 2.55 .107
T1 T2 d 2,23W +W Ù  .50 8.53 .003 4.04  .031 3  .30  4.12 .001**
Zl T2ll Zf T2ll 2,38W + W .39 5.46 .015 3.24  .060
Zl T2lf Zf T2lf d 2,36W + W  ß  .43 6.47 .008 8.03  .003 1 -.05 -3.68 .002**
Zl T2fl Zf T2fl d 2,26W + W  ß  .41 5.96 .011 5.32  .012 3  .06  3.48 .003**
Zl T2ll Zl 2,39W + W .30 3.71 .046 3.91  .026 2 2.14  2.80 .012**
Zl T2fl Zl 2,38W + W .30 3.65 .048 3.79  .041 2 2.05  2.78 .012**
Zl T2ff Zl 2,39W + W  .30 3.68 .047 3.78  .032 2 2.05  2.79 .012**
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_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of set type by expression type:
2 = set type vs (literals vs anomalies)
3 = set type vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
dep. Pillai's
2,17variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
T1 T2 d 2,37W  - W Ú  .43 6.56 .008 5.18  .032 3 -.25 -3.69 .002**
Zl T2ll Zf T2ll 2,39W  - W .36 4.79 .022 2.86  .072
Zl T2lf Zl d 2,38W  - W à .30 3.68 .047 3.75  .037 2    -2.05 -2.78 .012**
Zl T2fl Zl d 2,39W  - W à  .29 3.59 .050 3.65  .038 2    -2.03 -2.75 .013**
_________________________________________________________________________
219
Appendix: Table 5.8
Table 5.8: MANOVA on grand mean similarity (SIM) and figurativeness (FIG) for judge-
ments from 'A to B ' and 'B to A ' of literals (L), metaphors (M) and anomalies (A) in expres-
sion and context (N = 52).
_________________________________________________________________________
1,48F    p
Main effect of direction 2.16 .148
Main effect of condition  .06 .806
Direction by condition  .34 .561
Direction by dimension  .05 .831
Condition by dimension  .24 .629
Direction by condition by dimension 1.89 .175
Pillai's
2,47Trace F    p
Direction by condition by expression type .02  .52 .594
Condition by expression type .01  .41 .661
Direction by expression type .08 2.18 .124
Direction by condition by dimension by
 expression type .01  .40 .670
Condition by dimension by expression type .02  .71 .492
Direction by dimension by expression type .08 2.31 .110
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effect of dimension:
1,48dep. variable F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
1,49SIM  - FIG      56.35     .000   54.91  .000 1     -2.86  -7.50 .000*
_________________________________________________________________________
Dimension by expression type:
1 = (SIM  vs FIG) vs (literals vs metaphors)
2 = (SIM  vs FIG) vs (literals vs anomalies)
3 = (SIM  vs FIG) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
dep. Pillai's
2,47variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
2,47SIM  - FIG .67     48.76 .000   55.61  .000 1 2.86 9.66 .000**
2 1.86 7.30 .000**
3 -.99   -7.05 .000**
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effect of expression type:
1 = literals vs metaphors
2 = literals vs anomalies
3 = metaphors vs anomalies
dep. Pillai's
2,47variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
2,10SIM+FIG .81   102.25 .000   49.44  .000 1 1.83 7.00 .000**
2 4.35  13.44 .000**
3 -.99   12.18 .000**
_________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5.10: MANOVA on the grand mean number of weighted features (words) per term
presentation. Presentation 1 was performed in the preceding single term , whereas presenta-
tion 2 up to 4 were the repetitions in either expression or context. Main effects of condition,
expression type, and interactions of expression type by condition are not printed. Figures in
fwhite circles followed by subscripts (e.g., Î ) refer to effects discussed in the text.
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of presentation:
1,18F    p coeff.   t   p
1-2 fpres Î    47.29 .000 7.20 6.87 .000*
1-3 fpres Î    64.36 .000 6.74 8.02 .000*
1-4 fpres Î    61.25 .000 7.23 7.82 .000*
2-3pres  .61 .444
2-4pres  .00 .948
3-4pres 1.45 .245
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition by presentation:
1,18F    p coeff.   t   p
1-2cond*pres  .90 .356
1-3cond*pres  .04 .844
1-4cond*pres  .07 .793
2-3cond*pres 1.98 .177
2-4 fcond*pres Ï 5.12 .036    -1.23  -2.26 .036
3-4cond*pres 1.01 .329
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of presentation by expression type:
Pillai's expr.
2,17Trace F    p type coeff.   t   p
1-2 fpres *type Ð .36 4.85 .021 L-M -1.32 -1.60 .125
L-A -2.63 -3.15 .006**
M-A -1.31 -1.89 .074
1-3pres *type .26 3.13 .069
1-4 fpres *type Ñ .33 4.25 .032 L-M -1.63 -2.21 .040
L-A -2.70 -2.59 .018
M-A -1.06 - .98 .339
2-3pres *type .02  .24 .783
2-4pres *type .01  .11 .888
3-4pres *type .02  .18 .835
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition by presentation by expression type:
Pillai's
2,17Trace F    p
1-2cond*pres *type .07  .64 .536
1-3cond*pres *type .07  .72 .500
1-4cond*pres *type .10  .99 .391
2-3cond*pres *type .17 1.85 .187
2-4cond*pres *type .10  .97 .398
3-4cond*pres *type .01  .11 .895
_________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5.11: The significant effects of condition, expression type, term and word frequency
X Y Son the grand means of (W  , W ) and W  (measure M2). White circled figures with sub-
scripts index important effects discussed in the text.
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effect of word frequency:
1 = high vs low
1,37dep. variable F    p coeff.   t   p
SX SYW +W 5.19 .029 1 -.36 -2.28 .029*
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of condition by word frequency:
2 = (single term vs context) vs (high vs low)
2,37dep. variable F    p coeff.   t   p
SX SY gW +W Ð 6.02 .005 2 -1.21 -3.33 .002**
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of term by word frequency:
1 = (A-term vs B-term) vs (high vs low)
1,37dep. variable F    p coeff.   t   p
X Y gW  - W Î 5.13 .029 1 1.03 2.27 .029*
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of expression type by word frequency:
1 = (literals vs metaphors) vs (high vs low)
2 = (literals vs anomalies) vs (high vs low)
3 = (metaphors vs anomalies) vs (high vs low)
dep. Pillai's
2,36variable Trace F    p coeff.   t   p
X Y gW +W  Ï .28 6.97 .003 1 -.74 -2.40 .022U
2 -1.07 -3.74 .001**
SX SY gW +W     Ñ .30 7.58 .002 2 -.33 -3.49 .001**
3 -.27 -2.69 .011**
_________________________________________________________________________
U  = not significant at á . .0166
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X YTable 5.12: MANOVAs for the grand means of weighted feature set size (W  , W ) and
S y nweighted shared set size W  , evoked by either ambiguous (amb ) or nonambiguous (amb )
hterms, in all expression types. White circled figures with subscripts (e.g., Î ) direct to
effects discussed in the text.
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition by ambiguity:
y n2 = (single term vs context) vs (amb  vs amb )
2,37dep. variable F    p coeff.   t   p
X YW +W 3.76 .033 2 5.51  2.61 .013**
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of ambiguity by expression type:
y n1 = (amb  vs amb ) vs (literal vs metaphor)
y n3 = (amb  vs amb ) vs (metaphor vs anomaly)
dep. Pillai's
2,36variable Trace F    p coeff.   t   p
X YW +W .31 8.42 .001 1    -1.39 -4.06 .000**
3      .72  2.56 .014**
S hW Ñ  .17 3.91 .029 1      .29  2.57 .014**
3    - .27 -2.51 .016**
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition by ambiguity by term by expression type:
2 = (single term vs context) vs (amb) vs (term) vs (literal vs metaphor)
3 = (expression vs context) vs (amb) vs (term) vs (literal vs metaphor)
dep. Pillai's
4,74variable Trace F    p coeff.   t   p
X Y hW  - W Î  .31 3.41 .013 2    -2.04 -2.97 .005***
3    -2.75 -3.47 .001***
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of ambiguity by term by expression type:
y n1 = (amb  vs amb ) vs ( A- vs B-term) vs (literal vs metaphor)
y n2 = (amb  vs amb ) vs ( A- vs B-term) vs (literal vs anomaly)
dep. Pillai's
2,36variable Trace F    p coeff.   t   p
X Y hW  - W Ð  .33 9.08 .001 1 1.03  3.51 .001**
2  .88  3.45 .001**
_________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5.14: MANOVA on the grand means of A- and B-term  dominance for all expression
types and conditions.
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effect of condition:
1 = single term vs expression
2 = single term vs context
3 = expression vs context
2,37dep. variable F    p coeff.   t   p
dom domA +B    13.80 .000 1 -2.75 -5.18 .000**
2 -1.36 -2.55 .000**
3  1.40  2.27 .029U
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of condition by term:
1 = (single term vs expression) vs ( A- vs B-term)
2 = (single term vs context) vs ( A- vs B-term)
3 = (expression vs context) vs ( A- vs B-term)
2,37dep. variable F    p coeff.   t   p
dom domA  - B 8.22 .001 1   .37  2.48 .018U
2 - .33 -2.19 .034U
3 - .70 -4.05 .000**
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of condition by expression type:
1 = (single term vs expression) vs (literals vs metaphors)
3 = (expression vs context) vs (literals vs metaphors)
dep. Pillai's
4,74variable Trace F    p coeff.   t   p
dom domA +B .44 5.27 .001 1  1.28  4.30 .000***
3 -1.01 -2.93 .006Y
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effect of expression type:
1 = literals vs metaphors
dep. Pillai's
2,36variable Trace F    p coeff.   t   p
dom domA +B .17 3.75 .033 1 - .34 -2.67 .011**
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of condition by term by expression type:
dep. Pillai's
4,74variable Trace F    p
dom domA  - B .15 1.55 .195
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_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of term by expression type:
1 = ( A- vs B-term) vs (literals vs metaphors)
3 = ( A- vs B-term) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
dep. Pillai's
2,36variable Trace F    p coeff.   t   p
dom domA  - B .17 3.94 .028 1   .09  2.40 .021U
3 - .15 -2.27 .029U
_________________________________________________________________________
U  = not significant at á . .0166
Y = not significant at á . .0055
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CHAPTER 6: REACTION TIME*
6.0 The time course of metaphor processing
This is going to be a sad Chapter. Sad for those who are interested in meta-
phors, happy for those who are interested in methods. The metaphor models
presented in the Chapters 1, 2, and 3 are not just a neat way to organize the
activation and comparison of features, they also reflect assumptions on the
order of processing. They are designed as serial phases (encoding, com-
paring, responding) and as serial stages. To understand a metaphor, the com-
parison model expects one stage and the anomaly model two stages (literal
before figurative), just as the interaction model (normal features before rela-
tions). However, stages do not necessarily have serial orders. The results of
the previous Chapter suggest that figurative features, for example, are pro-
duced in parallel with literal features (Figure 5.15, Chapter 5), and that
response criteria may be checked synchronously. This Chapter is devoted to
such issues as the order of processing the expression types, in one or two
stages, serial or in parallel.
Whereas Chapter 5 researched the contents of the first two phases (en-
coding and comparing), Chapter 6 focuses on the response phase. According
to the models, certain criteria for the size of the shared sets decide whether
an expression is literal, metaphoric or anomalous. Literal expressions are
supposed to be processed faster than metaphors, which are equally fast as
anomalies.
Section 6.1 puts forward that reaction time (RT) experiments may be rel-
evant for the study of literature, while Section 6.2 reviews such experiments
on metaphor in psychology. This Section is also a minute and exhaustive
review of methods and statistics, since Section 6.3 will argue that metaphor
processing may be highly dependent of the experimental setting. Effects of
metaphor on RT may be overpowered by nonlinguistic variables. In Section
6.4, an RT experiment is conducted that controls for various design artifacts,
and that contrasts metaphors with simile variants. By interjecting the
preposition 'like' ('als' in Dutch), subjects have the opportunity to make
faster decisions for metaphors than for literals, which is not expected by any
of the models. For metaphors, this should facilitate the process (faster and
more correct decisions), whereas for literals and anomalies, it should be
inhibited (slower decisions, tending to be 'metaphor'). Section 6.5 and 6.6
draw conclusions for psychology and the theory of literature on the purpose
of RT in metaphor research.
Notes are on page 258. Appendix with statistics on the pages 259-264.*
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6.1 What could reaction time say about literature?
Reading is time-consuming. Reading poetry is even more time-consuming
than reading a paper article. Why? Poetry is more difficult. Poetry opens
more options for polyvalence (Steen 1994: 142-143), due to greater lexical
ambiguity, more metaphors, and a greater instance of novel words. A poetic
context does not prime the meaning as much as a paper article does, so that
readers search their memory more extensively, and exploit higher cognitive
activity to create meaning.
The technique of art is to make objects 'unfamiliar', to make forms
difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the
process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be
prolonged. (Šklovskij 1965: 12, originally 1917; Zwaan 1993: 41)
The prolonged process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself, in which
the duration of processing a poetic phrase is longer. Since the understanding
of what a poetic phrase means really takes time, real time is the relevant
variable to study poetic meaning.
Two modes of language processing can be explored by measuring the
time frame of sense creation: Automatization and foregrounding. According
to Mukaøovský (1964: 51-54), poetry needs the standard language - with its
highly automatized phrasing - to make certain text elements conspicuous, to
make them foregrounding. The automatized language forms the background
to arrive at salient semantic deviations.
Understanding automatized language, then, should be a fast process.
Most words are expected on the basis of the context (the selection from the
paradigm is facilitated), so that the sequence becomes fluent and is easily
understood.
By contrast, foregrounding elements are not primed by the surrounding
text, and do not follow from the well-developed skilled behaviors of inter-
preting standard language. In a manner of speaking, readers 'stumble' over
semantic deviations, are more aware of them, and invest more effort to
integrate them in a meaningful frame. Of course, this reader-regulated
processing mode is at the cost of spending more time on foregrounding
elements.
The novel or inconsistent information that is characteristic for poetry thus
should be represented by longer time intervals for meaning creation. Con-
sider an example on foregrounding. A capitalized heading of a paper article
is a backgrounding element for the genre, and its position at the top of the
text is correct. Put in the middle of a poetic text, however, the same line
becomes a foregrounding element, and its meaning will be contemplated
longer. Thus, the dependency of foregrounding of genre specific contexts is
reflected in the time to create meaning. Conversely, the time to give
meaning to a texual element is sensitive to the interaction between genre and
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deviateness, between foregrounding versus backgrounding in paper articles
versus poetry. Studying the understanding of poetry thus is the study of time.
Consider also the following. Anomalies hardly exist for sophisticated
readers, if they are given enough time for sense creation. During this extra
time, they can generate so much context that the anomaly becomes a meta-
phor. Thus, in single expression conditions, the anomaly takes more time to
become a metaphor than in contexts that prime a metaphoric meaning of that
anomaly. Again, time reflects the interaction between text condition and
expression type, because anomalies become metaphors after contemplation,
and contemplation takes time.
The problematic can be reduced to the following two positions. Poetry
demands more control processing, because more concept-driven analysis is
performed. Readers exhaust more long-term resources with respect to word,
genre and world knowledge. Standard language involves more 'shallow'
control processing. The data-driven analysis of text properties such as
phonology, orthography and syntax is less disrupted by deviations, which do
not need to be recovered by more knowledge based effort. From this
perspective, the remark by Zwaan is most notable:
One of the basic assumptions behind theories of literary reading is that
contextual factors impinge upon meaning construction. It is perhaps
no overstatement to say that most theorists of literary comprehension
assign more weight to top-down processes in reading than to bottom-
up processes. However, psycholinguistic studies of real-time
processing show that the role of data-driven processes should not be
undervalued. (Zwaan 1991: 169-170)
Thus, concept-driven analysis in poetry cannot be studied without taking
account of data-driven analysis. It is precisely the deviant text properties in
poetry which induce the higher activity of concept-driven analysis. In other
words, a theorist of literary comprehension does not know what the concept-
driven processes are, unless the effects of the text properties are captured.
Measuring the real time of comprehension may be the way to do just that.
Two approaches for time measurement in literary comprehension are
available: Reading times and reaction times. Reading time is the time to read
a text from the first to the last word. They are expressed as milliseconds
(ms) per word. Reaction time (RT) is the time from the onset of the stimulus
(reading the B-term) to the initiation of the response ('it's a metaphor!'). Both
variables may be informative for literary discourse analysis, as illustrated by
the following example.
The first reaction time study by a literary theorist stems from Zwaan
(1993). Reading times and reaction times were utilized to study the dif-
ferences between processing literary and expository texts. Zwaan supposed
that literature demands 'deep' processing, so that the reading times
(ms/word) should slow down. Since they spent more time on the literary
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text, Zwaan supposed that readers paid more attention to the stylistics of the
text, in other words, its surface form. Zwaan presumed that RTs for word re-
cognition would be faster in the literary than in the nonliterary condition,
since in the former, readers acquired more knowledge about the words
themselves.
To test these deductions, Zwaan (1993: 51) presented two groups of sub-
jects with 14 lines from a previously read text. The first group received a lit-
erary text, the second a journalistic text. Each line contained a capitalized
word, which could be the original word from the previously read text or a
synonym. Subjects pushed the response button 'correct' for the original
words, whereas they pushed 'incorrect' for synonyms. The stylistic aspects
were supposedly less indifferent to reading literature than to reading
newspapers, so that the RTs for the literary group should be faster than for
the journalistic group. However, no reliable differences in RT were found
between the groups (Zwaan 1993: 56).
In other words, no evidence was found that the stylistic aspects were
processed 'more deeply' in literature than in newspapers. It may be, then, that
the theory was incorrect, or that the experiment should be devised
differently. At least, by translating text differences into reaction time dif-
ferences, a controllable variable was created for explicit assumptions on lit-
erary text processing, making the discussion more concrete. In psychology,
reaction time experiments are common practice, also for the inquiry into (lit-
erary) metaphor processing.
6.2 RT studies on metaphor in psychology
This Section reviews a sample of RT experiments on metaphors, which are
key studies in the area. They are usually referred to as 'valid claims' on meta-
phor processing. Since the quality of an argument depends on the quality of
the experiment, the emphasis will be on designs and statistics. Potential
critique will be presented in Section 6.3, so as to design a new RT experi-
ment in Section 6.4. A more inclusive and less technical review was given
by Hoffman & Kemper (1987). Gibbs (1994) provided a comprehensive
review of the area. Note that most RT-studies are concerned with tests of the
serial two-stage anomaly model.
Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds & Antos (1978) carried out two RT experi-
ments, in which contexts primed the literal or metaphoric meaning of meta-
phoric and idiomatic expressions. Idioms (e.g., 'a pain in the neck') are meta-
phors that have become so conventional that their literal meaning is sub-
ordinate. In experiment 1, the time was recorded to understand an
expression. Context length (short vs long) was compared with prime type
(cuing the literal or metaphoric meaning of an expression). According to a
serial two-stage anomaly model, expressions primed as metaphors were sup-
posed to be processed more slowly than those primed as literals. Moreover,
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it was expected that this difference would only occur in short contexts.
Longer contexts were supposed to provide so many cues, that the relevant
stage was evoked directly and, hence, any difference would be eliminated.
Thus, the seriality of the two-stage model was supposed to be confirmed in
short contexts, not in long ones.
The design combined two lists of expressions, two presentation orders
and two contexts (short vs long) as between-subject factors. Literal or meta-
phoric priming was a within-subject factor.
Presentation order had no effect, and was excluded from further analysis.
Unfortunately, a potential effect of expression list was not reported.
Analysis of variance of the remaining factors indicated that metaphoric in-
terpretations took longer than literal interpretations in the short contexts,
whereas they took about equal time in the long contexts. As will be clear at
the end of this Section, this is virtually the only RT experiment on metaphor
processing that can bear the scrutiny of criticism.
Ortony et al. (1978) conducted a second experiment in which the
manipulation was more evasive (cf. Hoorn, in press). Again, the time taken
to understand an expression was recorded. Three between-subject factors of
expression type order (idioms first or last), expression list and presentation
order were employed in combination with two within-subject factors:
Context type (long vs short) and expression type (idioms vs literal). The be-
tween-subject factors proved insignificant, and need not concern us here.
The number of expressions in the two within-subject factors of context
type and expression type were not counterbalanced, so that their effects were
confounded with practice. Two stories served as contexts (story A and B),
while expressions could be idiomatic or literal. However, the idioms were
connected to both stories, whereas the literal expressions were connected to
story A only. Thus, the missing cell was literal expressions in story B. The
metaphoric or literal priming was also unbalanced. Story A was constructed
such that it primed the metaphoric meaning of the idioms, and the literal
meaning of the literal expressions. Story B, however, only primed the literal
meaning of the idioms. In other words, apart from prime type, another factor
of story type should have been devised, so that story A and B would have
primed the literal or metaphoric meaning of idioms and literal expressions.
Another solution would have been to omit one of the stories, or to weigh the
results of story A as half.
These studies by Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds & Antos (1978) initiated a
series of RT experiments on metaphor and idiom processing. For instance,
Gibbs (1980) conducted an experiment on idioms ('he's singing a different
tune'). As mentioned above, idioms are ambiguous stimuli, because they
have a literal and a metaphoric meaning. The metaphoric meaning has be-
come conventional in the standard language, whereas the literal meaning is
hardly ever used. Gibbs investigated whether the conventional metaphoric
meaning was processed faster than the unconventional literal meaning, even
when the literal meaning was primed by the context.
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In one subject group, idioms were used as prime, which were followed by
literal or metaphoric paraphrases of these idioms. In the second subject
group, idioms were embedded in contexts, cueing either the literal or meta-
phoric meaning of the idiom. Here also, literal or metaphoric paraphrases
followed the idioms.
To make sure that the first group would not interpret the idioms only in
their metaphorical sense, the idioms were mixed with literal expressions,
which also received literal or metaphoric paraphrases. RT was registered for
true-false decisions after paraphrase presentation. The results suggested that
conventional (metaphoric) uses of idiom were processed faster than uncon-
ventional (literal) uses, despite their metaphoric origin and despite priming
the literal meaning.
To summarize, idioms and literal expressions without context preceded
paraphrases that could be either literal or metaphoric, and idioms in a literal
or metaphoric context preceded paraphrases that could be literal or
metaphoric. Gibbs analyzed this design as a standard 2*2 of condition (con-
text vs no-context) and paraphrase (literal vs metaphoric). Yet, the design
was a 2*2*2 of condition, paraphrase (literal vs metaphoric), and prime type
(literal prime vs metaphoric prime).
To know whether the prime type of the contexts was literal or meta-
phoric, a new group of subjects rated the priming of the contexts, whereas
the priming of the idioms and literal expressions was not rated. Thus, the
prime type in no-context might not have been the same as the prime type in
context. Yet, they were treated as comparable in the design, whereafter only
the effects of idioms - not of the literal expressions - were analyzed.
Important information was lost concerning idioms with literal primes and
metaphoric paraphrases, and those with metaphoric primes and literal para-
phrases. These could have told the power - within subjects - of the literal
and metaphoric primes in the interaction of (condition by) prime type by
paraphrase.
Glucksberg, Gildea & Bookin (1982) administered a within-subject ex-
periment on metaphors and literals in a standard sentence verification task
(true/false). Literals could be correct ('Standard True') or incorrect ('Standard
False'); accordingly, metaphors could be correct ('Metaphors') or incorrect
('Scrambled Metaphors'). The latter can be viewed as instantiations of anom-
alies. Subjects judged the truth value of the expressions, and the RT from
expression onset to button press was measured.
It was argued that if the figurative meaning of correct metaphors can be
ignored, 'false' decisions should be equally fast for correct and incorrect
metaphors. Conversely, if the figurative meaning is accessed automatically,
'false' decisions for correct metaphors should be slower than for incorrect
metaphors, because an extra figurative check is needed. It was found that RT
for correct literals was fastest - followed by incorrect literals and incorrect
metaphors - whereas correct metaphors were slowest. It seemed that meta-
phors were evaluated on their figurative truth, which is consistent with the
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two-stage model. Incorrect literals and incorrect metaphors were perceived
as equally anomalous and could be rejected as not literal.
However, the study has a number of pitfalls. The number of literals and
metaphors were not balanced. The correct literal expressions had 80 items,
the incorrect 40, the incorrect metaphors had 20 items, and the correct meta-
phors also 20. As indicated above, incorrect literals and incorrect metaphors
took about an equal time to be rejected as 'false'. In other words, the
incorrect expressions may all have been perceived as anomalies. If so, it
could be that subjects perceived 80 literals, 60 anomalies and 20 metaphors.
This range coincides with the ordinal pattern that was found in the mean
RTs. Thus, reactions may become slower as expressions occurred less
frequently.
The authors suggested that the semantic relationship between A- and B-
term was probably less strong for metaphors than for literals, so that meta-
phors were processed more slowly. If so, the authors argued, the RT pattern
should remain unchanged even in different contexts.
In experiment 2, expressions were provided with context by introducing
the quantifiers Some and All. 'Some surgeons are butchers' was supposed to
be more plausible than 'All surgeons are butchers'. The more plausible or
'correct' metaphors were rated for 'goodness', whereas the other expression
types were not. In the interaction of expression type (literal vs metaphor) by
quantifier, the Some metaphors (rated as 'good') showed the pattern of ex-
periment 1 that RT for correct literals was fastest - followed by incorrect lit-
erals and incorrect metaphors - whereas correct metaphors were slowest.
The All metaphors (rated as 'less good') did not show this pattern. Thus, con-
text had effect, and it was inferred that metaphor comprehension was not
merely a matter of semantic relatedness.
This experiment was analyzed as two quantifiers with four expression
types. The expression types (Standard True, Standard False, Metaphors,
Scrambled Metaphors) were treated as four independent conditions. Yet, an
important interaction with correctness was overlooked. Standard True and
False are literally correct and incorrect expressions. Metaphors and
Scrambled Metaphors are figuratively correct and incorrect. Thus, the design
is a 2*2*2 MANOVA for quantifier ( vs  ) by expression type (literal vs
metaphor) by correctness (correct vs incorrect). Differences attributed to
expression type may be due to correctness in the interaction. The same is
valid for experiment 3, which duplicated this design and analysis.
Gildea & Glucksberg (1983) administered three variations on the above
study, which combined three prime types (literal prime, figurative prime, no-
prime) with four expression types (Standard True, Standard False, Meta-
phors, Scrambled Metaphors). Despite this 3*4 design, Standard True and
False were not analyzed in experiments Ia, Ib and II, while the remaining
3*2 was analyzed only by planned comparisons (t-tests). Ib was analyzed in
a 2*2 ANOVA, ignoring the higher-order interactions outlined earlier.
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Estill & Kemper (1982) surveyed idioms (e.g., 'climbing the walls') for
effects on RT with three cue types and four context types. Subjects were
asked to identify the last word ('walls') in an expression, given a particular
precue. Cues could be words ('walls') identical to the last word in the
expressions, they could be rhyming ('falls') with the last word or they formed
the semantic category ('part of a building') of the last word. The idioms
appeared in literal, figurative, or ambiguous contexts. Expressions that were
not idioms but did use the idiom's last word ('knocking out the walls') were
presented in nonidiomatic contexts. Subjects reacted as soon as the last word
of an expression was encountered in the context.
This 3*4 design was properly analyzed and it was found that the main ef-
fects of cue type and context type were significant, whereas the interactions
were not. The Word Identity cue yielded faster responses than the Rhyme
cue, which was faster than the Semantic Category cue. More importantly,
nonidiomatic contexts slowed down RT, compared with all other contexts.
Thus, the last word was differently processed when it was part of an idiom
than when it was not. The authors suggested that idioms were processed as
discrete lexical entries.
There is a slight inconvenience, however, concerning the last words of
the expressions. In the nonidiomatic context, the last word came from an id-
iom - but was not used in an idiom - as opposed to the other contexts. Thus,
the stimulus ratios were not counterbalanced, since three idioms were con-
trasted with one nonidiom. This may explain the slower RTs for nonid-
iomatic contexts. Since the argument of automatic access of idiomatic
meaning was entirely based on this RT difference, the effects should have
been treated more carefully.
Unfortunately, the authors did not provide the exact p-values for the t-
tests on context types. However, the definition of the á-level is critical for
the acceptance of - in this case - automatic access of idiomatic meaning.
Context type had four levels (literal, figurative, ambiguous, non-idiomatic),
and thus established six related main effects. In other words, the p-value
should not have been tested with á = .05, but rather with á = 8.33  (cf.-03
Hoorn in press). Likewise, if the interactions had been significant, three cue
types by four context types would have resulted in 18 related interactions,
and should have been tested with á = .05 / 18 = 2.77 .-03
Gerrig & Healy (1983) examined within-subject effects of prior and
ensuing contexts on reading time for metaphors. Metaphors rated as 'good'
were contrasted with 'bad' metaphors in active and passive voice sentences,
which coincided with prior and ensuing context: 'The train followed the par-
allel ribbons' vs 'The parallel ribbons were followed by the train'. Subjects
pushed a button as soon as they understood the sentence. Only the main ef-
fect of context was significant, indicating that prior context yielded faster
reading times than ensuing contexts, or - as a confounded alternative -
confirming the classic finding that active voices were processed faster than
passive voices.
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Each cell in the analysis contained 8 metaphors. However, the experiment
also employed 16 fillers. In other words, the stimuli were not counter-
balanced (32 metaphors against 16 fillers). Fillers were not rated on
potential metaphoricalness, so that their effects were unpredictable. Filler ef-
fects were not analyzed together with the metaphor effects in a (weighted)
MANOVA. Since only one random order was used for the stimuli, all
subjects received stimuli in fixed order, which may easily affect the data.
The same applies to the second experiment.
As indicated by the authors, the manipulation confounded ensuing con-
text with passive voice. Therefore, another within-subject design contrasted
literals with metaphors in active and passive voice. It was argued that if slow
reading was induced by passive voices rather than ensuing contexts, this ef-
fect should equally occur for metaphors and literals. If, on the other hand,
metaphors increased reading times in passive voice - whereas literals would
remain equal - the effects in experiment 1 could be attributed to ensuing
context, not to passive voices. Significant interactions between (literal-
metaphor) and (active-passive voice) that increased metaphor reading times
would underscore the idea that ensuing context played a special role in
metaphor comprehension.
Indeed, such a significant interaction was found. However, the authors in-
dicated that the literal expressions had shorter sentences than metaphors.
They asserted that this might have influenced the relative speed with which
literals and metaphors were read, but that this was immaterial for their
argument. Thus, the main effect of expression type was irrelevant, and only
the interaction counted. Nonetheless, the significant interaction may not only
indicate that reading times for metaphors were increased by the ensuing con-
texts, but also that short sentences (literals) canceled the elongating effect of
passive voices. If so, the interaction of expression type and context is
confounded again.
Inhoff, Lima & Carroll (1984) verified the results of Ortony et al. (1978)
with three experiments. In experiment 1, short contexts primed either the lit-
eral or metaphoric meaning of metaphors, whereas in experiment 2, long
contexts did. Both experiments also employed unrelated contexts, which
were inappropriate combinations of context and metaphor. Sentence reading
time and total viewing time on critical words were measured with an eye
tracker. The authors claimed that metaphorical meanings were understood as
quickly as literal ones in long contexts, but slower in short contexts.
Stimulus lists were varied between subjects, while related vs unrelated
context was varied within subjects. Context could prime the literal or meta-
phoric meaning. Moreover, short and long contexts were compared across
experiments. Thus, the complete design was a 2*3*2*2 MANOVA for ex-
periment by list by relatedness by prime type. Yet, two separate analyses for
experiment 1 and 2 merely tested three means for the main effects of prime
type: Literal vs metaphoric vs unrelated. The discussion suggested that there
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was an interaction of prime type with context, but without any supporting
statistical tests.
Additionally, the metaphors were presented in the same serial order for
each list, so that practice or boredom effects were not recognized. Further-
more, the priming effect of literal and metaphoric contexts was scored for
the appropriate metaphors. However, it was not for the inappropriate ones.
Experiment 3 investigated the thematic relatedness between context and
metaphor on reading time. The short contexts of the previous experiments
served as the thematically related condition, whereas newly created
'associated-words' contexts served as the unrelated condition. Prime type
was literal or metaphoric in both conditions, while expression type could be
literal or metaphor. Six lists were a between-subject factor, whereas
relatedness, prime type and expression type were varied within subjects.
Thus, the design was a 6*2*2*2 MANOVA for list by relatedness by prime
type by expression type.
Nonetheless, the design was diagnosed as 6 lists by 3 prime types (literal
vs metaphoric vs associated-words) by 2 expression types, and was yet
analyzed by 2*2 ANOVAs for e.g., prime type (literal vs metaphoric) versus
expression type (literals vs metaphors).
Paivio & Clark (1986) explored the importance of imagery and in-
telligibility for the processing time of metaphors. Three prime types were
used between subjects: A cue for the A-term, a cue for the B-term, and no
cue. Metaphors were scored within subjects for the imagery value of the A-
term, of the B-term, and for the intelligibility of the metaphor. Subsequently,
these metaphors were orthogonally distributed over high or low A-term
imagery, B-term imagery, and intelligibility. Subjects read the metaphors
after the presentation of a prime, and released a button when they were ready
to paraphrase the metaphor. 
In principle, this is a 3*2*2*2 MANOVA for prime type by A-term
imagery by B-term imagery by intelligibility. Yet, prime type was analyzed
as a main effect of three individual means, separately from the three scale
factors, which were analyzed as a second-order interaction. The main effect
of prime type was only significant with stimuli as random factor, so that it
was merely an idiosyncrasy of the subject group.
The authors noticed that the results were paradoxical. Since the B-term is
the image in which the A-term is perceived, B-term imagery should be and
actually was a stronger correlate of metaphor comprehension time than A-
term imagery. However, the expected superiority of priming the B-term over
priming the A-term or no priming did not appear. This remark seems
curious, given the fact that the third-order interaction was never analyzed.
Janus & Bever (1985) also verified the results of Ortony et al. (1978). Lit-
eral contexts primed literal meanings, whereas metaphoric contexts primed
metaphoric meanings of idioms. The time was measured that subjects indi-
cated that the idiom was understood. RT was slower for metaphoric than for
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literal meaning, which was interpreted as support for the two-stage anomaly
model.
Nonetheless, idioms are ambiguous expression types. Actually, they con-
sist of two expression types, i.e. a literal expression and a metaphor, which
are easily activated by the appropriate context. The authors indicated that the
idioms in the metaphoric contexts were consistently judged as less
predictable than the idioms in the literal contexts. They attributed this effect
to the literal meaning of the idioms. However, it was overlooked that the
metaphoric meaning was systematically correlated with one set of texts,
whereas the literal meaning was systematically correlated with another set of
texts. In other words, since they used two different text sets to prime one of
the meanings, they could not determine whether the effects were due to di-
vergent idiom meaning or to different success in priming.
Glucksberg, Brown & McGlone (1993) studied whether conceptual anal-
ogies motivated the use and comprehension of idioms in discourse. Two
reading time experiments were performed, in which two contexts were com-
bined with two idiom types. Contexts indicated which person (S or C) in the
story was the referent of the idiom. The idioms differed for their consistency
with the stories (consistent vs inconsistent). Subjects read the stories for
comprehension and indicated that they finished reading by pressing a key.
However, the actual manipulation looked different. Their Appendix B
lists two different contexts, two different idioms ('blew top' vs 'bit head off'),
two different actors ('S blew top' - 'S bit head off' vs 'C blew top' - 'C bit
head off') and two different referents ('S blew S's top' - 'S bit C's head off' vs
'C blew C's top' - 'C bit S's head off'). Obviously, this is not the 2*2
ANOVA that the authors suggested, but rather a 2*2*2*2 MANOVA of
context, idiom, actor and referent. Moreover, context 1 was systematically
correlated with the combination SS and SC, whereas context 2 was
systematically correlated with CC and CS. Thus, the reading time effects for
context by idiom were biased by the systematically correlated interaction
with actors and referents.
As a general remark, the studies reviewed above mainly explored the two-
stage anomaly model with idioms. However, idioms are both literal and
metaphoric expressions that share the surface form, which makes them
improper stimuli to test the two-stage model. First, using idioms pre-
supposes that the two-stage model is context-dependent, otherwise the
manipulation with literal and metaphoric primes would be ineffective. Sec-
ond, any outcome based on idioms is congruous with a context-dependent
two-stage model. If idioms are fast with literal primes, they were supposedly
perceived as a literal expression, so that a second figurative stage was not
necessary. If idioms are slow in literal contexts, they were perceived as
metaphors, so that figurative interference took place. If fast in metaphoric
contexts, they were metaphors, the figurative stage of which was entered
immediately. If they are slow in metaphoric contexts, it mainly shows that
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context was unimportant to the two-stage model, since the literal stage was
completed before the second was initiated.
Thus, before including idioms in the stimulus set, it should be demon-
strated that the two-stage model is sensitive to context. This could be done
by crossing purely literal and purely metaphoric expressions with literal and
metaphoric contexts.  If the two-stage model is context-independent, one ef-1
fect should be significant: A main effect of expression type should
underscore that literals are always faster than metaphors. If the model is con-
text dependent, the literal context shows that literals are faster than meta-
phors, which effect should change in metaphoric contexts. The direction of
the change in the metaphoric context is the interesting part. If metaphors are
less slow in metaphoric than in literal contexts, then indeed there are two
stages, the second of which is facilitated by the proper prime. If metaphors
are as fast as literals in metaphoric contexts, then the two serial stages in lit-
eral contexts become parallel in metaphoric ones. If metaphors are faster
than literals in metaphoric contexts, there are not two stages within one
process, since either a literal stage or a figurative stage was executed,
dependent on the context prime. All other patterns are also evidence against
the two-stage model.
Idioms can be used only in combination with purely literal and purely
metaphoric expressions. They are not suitable to test a metaphor model,
because they are ambiguous. Idioms may only be used to investigate the
conventionality of their literal or metaphoric meaning. Dependent of the
pattern they follow in literal and metaphoric contexts, they may be processed
as literal or metaphoric expressions and pass through one or more stages. If
they behave as literal expressions, idioms have become conventional uses of
figurative meaning. If they behave like metaphors (perhaps in metaphoric
contexts), the conventional use is affected by figurative interference.
Similes (comparisons with the preposition like) are a more suitable ex-
pression type. In contrast with metaphors (A is B), the preposition (A is like
B) may immediately launch the figurative or relation stage, so that the fixed
seriality of stages is limited by the linguistic indicator like. In that case,
decisions for literal expressions in simile version ('the sun is like a star')
should be more confusing and should take longer than normal. Decision er-
rors for literals and anomalies with the preposition should be directed to
'metaphor' more than without. These ideas will be tested in Section 6.4.
In this Section, leading reaction-time studies on metaphor processing
were evaluated. It was found that most of the results are unreliable, owing to
design artifacts and careless analysis. It was also argued that similes rather
than idioms should be exploited to examine the metaphor models.
Ultimately, claims such as those made by the review of Hoffman & Kemper
(1987), that much is known about the time aspects of metaphor processing
are over-optimistic. Their observation that much has yet to be learned is
more appropriate. Since what is known about metaphor processing is based
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on weak experiments and inaccurate analysis, the conclusions of these
studies remain highly speculative.
6.3 What should an RT study on metaphor provide?
Theoretical discrimination
The reaction time research reviewed above concentrated on the two-stage
anomaly model. However, the comparison and interaction models have dis-
parate explanations for the order of processing, so that RT results should not
be interpreted solely from the standpoint of the anomaly model. Ex-
periments should provide a possibility to compare the rival models.
A big problem in this matter is that the models do not allow for different
RT patterns. They all predict that literal expressions are fastest, followed by
metaphors and anomalies. If the inference rule is applied that criterion
checks on the size of the shared set are serial (fixed order), and faster than
the summated durations of activation and comparison, the comparison
model does differ from the anomaly and interaction model. The time span
between literal expressions and metaphors should be much longer in the
latter two models, because the corresponding decisions are separated by a
new stage, not just by a criterion check. However, how much longer this
difference should be, is an empirical question and cannot be derived from
the models.
It is undesirable to have identical predictions for competing models. For-
tunately, the anomaly model offers possibilities for differentiation. When
expressions do not satisfy the criterion for the literal shared set, a covert
effect of anomality occurs - the shock effect - which invokes the second
stage. In Figure 2.1, Chapter 2, this was represented by the box 'conclude
anomaly'. This covert effect may be replaced by another overt criterion re-
sponse. If an expression is not literal, it may be checked whether the shared
literal set is so small that further processing is abandoned and the decision
becomes 'anomaly'. On the other hand, if this lower boundary is surpassed,
the anomalous moment remains covert and the second stage is entered. In
this case, two different mean reaction times for anomalies can occur: A fast
one, situated between decisions for literals and metaphors, and a slow one,
equal to metaphors.  Thus, the anomalies may stop the process after they2
have been dismissed as literals, or they stop the process, when reconsidered
as metaphors and yet rejected.
Controls on design artifacts
To enable theoretical conclusions, literals and metaphors ought to be con-
trasted with anomalies. Anomalies are decisive, because their position in the
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ordinal RT pattern sets apart the anomaly model (literal < anomaly <
metaphor . anomaly) from the comparison and interaction model (literal <
metaphor . anomaly). The latter two models cannot be distinguished,
because the duration difference between literal expressions and metaphors
remains unknown.
The introduction of anomalies induces a major problem that has never
been recognized in metaphor research, namely the choice of choice task. If
the three expression types are tested in combination, a 3-choice task (literal-
metaphor-anomaly) causes difficulties that are not found in a 2-choice task,
in that subjects may decide to ignore one option and concentrate on the other
two. A 2-choice task for three decisions requires three experimental runs: L-
M, L-A, M-A. In that case, metaphors may be faster or slower simply as an
effect of the combination with literals or anomalies, whereas they would not
if they were accompanied by literals and anomalies, as in the 3-choice task.
Moreover, three 2-choice tasks repeat stimuli, whereas the 3-choice task
does not. If repetition affects processing time, the 2-choice tasks may fail to
show evidence for a certain model, whereas the 3-choice task does.
Either kind of choice task is arbitrary. The results of an experiment may
be fully limited to the specific design, which could count as a reproach
leveled at the RT studies on metaphor thus far. Choice task should be treated
as a factor in the analysis. Metaphor research has devoted a great deal of
attention to context effects, which requires a baseline condition of no-
context (i.e. expression). However, little attention has been paid to the
effects of condition order (presenting context before expression or vice
versa). The same applies to the order of choice task (3-choice before 2-
choice and vice versa). When repeated presentation infringes on metaphor
processing, the models can be discharged from their claims on the time
relations, or it may simply be that RTs are not the best means to investigate
them.
Thus, precise evaluation of the designs and statistics in metaphor research
is not just a drill in methodological hair-splitting. The metaphor models
structure the mental chronometry of figurative information processing,
which is a highly sensitive operation. It could easily be wiped out by effects
of repetition, order of presentation or choice task.
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6.4 RT experiments for metaphors and similes
Twenty-four undergraduates of language and literature, Dutch native
speakers, aged between 18 and 28 years took part in a classification decision
task (cf. Hoffman & Kemper 1987: Table 1). They were paid volunteers
who had never previously participated in an experiment, and were unin-
formed about stimuli or research aims. Subjects were seated 50 centimeters
in front of a computer screen and all had normal or corrected to normal eye
sight. The experiment was programmed with the software package ERTS
(Beringer 1992), running on a 486DX2.
Stimuli were the expressions of Table 4.1 (Chapter 4) from which an ex-
tra set of simile variants were constructed. Thus, 'the sun is a grape' had a
simile counterpart 'the sun is like a grape'. The same was done for literal and
anomalous expressions.
Trials consisted of a sequence of prime - fixation line - target. In the ex-
pression condition, the prime consisted of an expression without B-term (the
sun is a ), after which a fixation line was projected (the sun is a ____). The
width of the fixation line had four or five underscores, corresponding to the
number of B-term letters. Targets were B-terms, completing the expression
(the sun is a grape). Trials in the context condition were composed of similar
sequences, except that the prime was extended with the original poem.
Reading the primes was self-paced and finished by pressing the space bar
of a standard key board. The fixation line was presented for one second,
whereupon it was substituted by a two-second presentation of the B-term. B-
terms could be either literal, metaphoric or anomalous. Upon B-term
presentation, subjects made a speeded decision on the status of the
expression: Literal, metaphor or anomaly.
Two choice tasks were explored: A two and a three choice decision task.
For either choice task, the space bar functioned as the home key, carrying a
green mark for the index finger to be returned to after response execution.
The decision keys were the d, the 7 and the l, on equal distances from the
green mark. All other keys were removed from the keyboard. Decision keys
were marked with either an L, M or A, conform the choices 'literal', 'meta-
phor' and 'anomaly'. In the three-choice task, subjects received all expression
types and decided among the three keys. The two-choice task implemented
three combinations of two keys (e.g., L-M, L-A and M-A) by removing the
superfluous key and mixing the two suitable expression types per key com-
bination.
Subjects were instructed to handle home key and decision key only with
the index finger of their preferred hand. They were instructed to release the
home key when their decision was completed. Anticipatory releases
automatically aborted the trial, and subjects received a warning. The trial
was repeated later in the session. Decision times longer than two seconds
also triggered a warning, and were discarded from analysis.
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Prior to the experiments, subjects practiced in the three-choice task with
stimuli unrelated to the test set, until the standard deviation of the reaction
times was less than 10% to 15% of the mean (Sanders 1980). The practice
trials were repetitions of 9 prototypical exemplars from each expression type
(e.g., 'love is a rose'), according to a norm group. Errors were fed back by a
warning and the correct answer. Decisions on practice trials that exceeded
two seconds after B-term presentation also received warning feedback. Con-
sequently, subjects were trained to react fast in the hardest choice procedure,
and were stipulated by the prototypes for expression type definition.
Decision corrections were not provided in the actual experiments.
The design had four between-subject factors, and three within-subject
factors. The between-subject factors were preposition ('without like' vs 'with
like'), task order (3-choice before 2-choice vs 2-choice before 3-choice),
condition order (expression before context vs context before expression) and
decision key distribution (LMA vs ALM vs MAL vs MLA vs AML vs
LAM). The presentation orders of decision key combinations in the 2-choice
task were for LMA: LM-LA-MA and MA-LM-LA; for ALM: AL-AM-LM
and LM-AL-AM; for MAL: MA-ML-AL and AL-MA-ML; for MLA: ML-
MA-LA and LA-ML-MA; for AML: AM-AL-ML and ML-AM-AL; for
LAM: LA-LM-AM and AM-LA-LM. Note that the decision key distribution
in the 3-choice task and the presentation order in the 2-choice task were not
analyzed as separate factors, because zero degrees of freedom would remain
for the residual error term. Since these were counterbalanced variables, they
were pooled over subjects.
The three within-subject factors were choice task (3-choice vs 2-choice),
condition (expression vs context) and expression type (literals vs metaphors
vs anomalies), thus yielding 18 values per subject. Choice task and con-
dition were blocked, whereas expression types were mixed within blocks.
All factors were counterbalanced over subjects.
For the 3-choice task, 27 trials were distributed over 9 expressions per
expression type, whereas the 2-choice task distributed 18 trials over two
expression types of 9 expressions each. Each subject received different
variants of the expression types. Variants of the same root were never
clustered, so that in the overall design, each expression was used four times
in different constellations. Within subjects, the stimuli in 2- and 3-choice,
expression and context were the same, whereas they differed between sub-
jects. No repetitions of B-terms occurred in a block of trials. Stimuli were
presented pseudo-randomly, never offering more than two stimuli from the
same expression type in a row. Upon B-term onset, RT was measured to the
nearest millisecond, the dependent variables being release time from the
home key (RT), movement time from home to decision key (MT) and deci-
sion accuracy.
MANOVA was run on the grand mean RT and RT+MT for correct deci-
sions in a 2*2*2*2*2*3 design of preposition, task order, condition order,
choice task, condition and expression type. Since the 3-choice task used two
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times 27 trials, whereas the 2-choice task used two times 54 trials, the
transformation matrix weighted the values for the 2-choice task but half.
Univariate tests were performed to calculate quasi-F values, for which - in
view of the different weighing - the transformation matrix was submitted to
Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization.
The problem arose that the effects of preposition, expression type, and
condition on RT differed from RT+MT, which should not have been the
case when subjects indeed released the home key after completion of the
decision. MT is supposed to be a time constant needed only for motor ex-
ecution. Thus, despite urgent instructions, the movement time between
home key release and pressing the decision key was used to complete the
decision. Therefore, only the results of RT+MT shall be reported, referred to
aas RT  (arrival time). Nevertheless, the objection remains that MT may
reflect cognitive processing in certain conditions, whereas in others, it might
not.
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Results for arrival times
Figure 6.0: Grand mean arrival times in milliseconds (ms) for correct responses to literal ex-
pressions (), metaphors () and anomalies () with or without the preposition 'like'. Bold
lines indicate 3-choice before 2-choice task, thin lines 2-choice before 3-choice. Solid lines
symbolize expression before context, dashed lines context before expression. In each cell, N
= 3.
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Figure 6.0 shows the grand mean arrival times for the correct responses to 'A
is B' (upper panel) and 'A is like B' constructions (lower panel). It is evident
that the results are quite contradictory and sensitive to various kinds of ma-
nipulation.
Table 6.0 (Appendix) shows that the only effects significant for both sub-
jects and stimuli as the random factor are the main effect of expression type,
the interaction of task order by expression type, and the interaction of task
order by choice task by expression type. As a summary of Figure 6.0, Figure
6.1 depicts this higher-order interaction, from which the following might be
construed:
(I) The overall response time was longer when 3-choice was presented be-
fore 2-choice than when 2-choice was presented before 3-choice. (II) Both
3- and 2-choice were slower when presented first than when presented last.
(III) Anomalies were responded to faster than literals and metaphors, except
for literals when 2-choice preceded 3-choice. In that case, literals were faster
than anomalies. (IV) Literals tended to be faster than metaphors (cf. main
effect of expression type). However, this difference was not significant. (V)
Condition effects were only significant for subjects as the random factor.
(VI) No effects of preposition were significant.
Figure 6.1: Grand mean arrival times (ms) for the interaction of task order by choice task by
expression type (literal expressions () vs metaphors () vs anomalies ()). Results are
pooled over the insignificant factors: Preposition, condition order, and condition. Bold lines
denote 3-choice before 2-choice task, thin lines 2-choice before 3-choice.
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Results for decision accuracy
Figure 6.2 shows the proportions of correct and incorrect decisions per
choice task, condition and expression type.
Figure 6.2: Percentages of (in)correct decisions for expressions with or without 'like' in two
choice tasks.
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Table 6.1 (Appendix) provides the measure of agreement of the subjects for
the correct decisions.
(I) For 'A is B' constructions (upper panel), the 3-choice task in context
rendered the lowest percentages correct responses and the 2-choice task in
expression the highest. Correct responses ranged from 67.6%-97.3% for
literals, 83.4%-99.2% for metaphors and 88%-96.4% for anomalies. (II)
Most errors occurred for literals judged as metaphors in the 2-choice task in
context (25.8%). The lowest number of errors occurred for anomalies seen
as literals, ranging from zero to a maximum of 4.6% in the 2-choice task in
context. (III) For all expression types of the form 'A is like B' (lower panel),
more errors occurred in the 3-choice than in the 2-choice task. For literals,
the best and worst results were obtained in context. Metaphors scored lowest
in expression and highest in context, whereas for anomalies, the reverse was
valid. Correct decisions for literals ranged from 71.4%-93.6%, for meta-
phors from 61.2%-85.2% and for anomalies from 88.9%-99.1%. (IV) The
highest error rates were found for metaphors judged as anomalies in the 2-
choice task in expression (22.2%, lower panel). The highest proportion of
literals judged as metaphors were found in the 3-choice task in context
(14.8%). In none of the conditions, anomalies were judged as literals (0%).
(V) Table 6.1 shows that the best results were found in the 2-choice task for
'A is B' constructions (expression: ê = .908, context: ê = .828), whereas the
most errors occurred in the 3-choice task for 'A is like B' (expression: ê =
.698, context: ê = .665).
Discussion of arrival times
An important barrier for evaluating the metaphor models was the strong
order effect. Although the interaction of task order by condition order by
choice task by condition was only significant for subjects as the random fac-
tor, its discussion may yet be elucidating. In the top panel of Figure 6.0,
responses were fast when presentation was repeated (except for one case).
Let 3-choice be abbreviated as 3, 2-choice as 2, expression as e, context as c,
'before' as -, and let I, II, III, and IV represent the first up to fourth
presentation. Then, the interaction of task order by condition order by choice
task by condition showed the following pattern for 'A is B' constructions
a(grand mean RT s are subsequent):
 I    II    III  IV  I  II     III     IV
abold solid (3-2, e-c): 3e > 3c > 2e > 2c RT  : 1093 > 984 > 853 > 813
abold dash (3-2, c-e): 3c > 3e > 2c > 2e RT  : 1057 > 929 > 800 > 720
athin solid (2-3, e-c): 2e > 2c > 3e < 3c RT  :  894 > 803 > 718 < 728
athin dash (2-3, c-e): 2c > 2e < 3c > 3e RT  :  971 > 817 < 831 > 777
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aPut differently, RT  decreased as a function of repeated presentation of the
stimuli for each task manipulation. The exception is the 3-choice task in
acontext when presented last, in which case RT  increased (bold signs).
Although less clear, these patterns were found also for 'A is like B' con-
structions. Figure 6.1 shows that this repetition effect was stronger in the 3-
choice than in the 2-choice task (bold vs thin).
Thus, differences between expression types were overthrown by or-
der. As a serious methodological consideration for future research,
then, expressions should not be repeated within subjects! Consequently,
tests of the metaphor models are limited to the first reading of an ex-
pression.
To inspect the effects of expression type in the first presentation, another
MANOVA was performed with a design that deleted the factors of task
order and condition order. Instead, only those values were analyzed that
were obtained during the first presentation of an expression (cf. Figure 6.0:
3e bold solid, 3c bold dash, 2e thin solid, 2c thin dash). The only significant
effects were the interaction between choice task and expression type, and the
main effect of expression type (Appendix Table 6.2). The interaction is
exemplified by Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3: Grand mean arrival times (ms) for the interaction of choice task by expression
type (literal expressions () vs metaphors () vs anomalies ()) during the first
presentation of stimuli (correct responses only). Results are pooled over the insignificant
afactors: Preposition and condition. ~   indicates the grand mean RT  for those literal expres-
sions in the 3-choice task that were judged as metaphors no more than once.
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It may readily be seen that literal expressions and metaphors did not differ
much in the 3-choice task. However, this result may be obscured by the
following phenomenon. As shown by Figure 6.2, literal expressions were
often erroneously judged as metaphors, which may indicate two things:
Subjects sometimes made incorrect responses, or they occasionally
perceived a literal expression as 'metaphorical'. Incorrect reactions should be
recognizable by fast responses (speed-accuracy trade-off). Errors arising
from doubtful cases, on the other hand, should slow down the grand mean of
aliteral expressions. Indeed, RT  for literal expressions that were judged as
metaphors were slower than for correct decisions, sometimes more than 100
ms. Therefore, the incorrects were probably not due to speed-accuracy trade-
off. Moreover, literal expressions that rendered few 'metaphor-errors' were
afaster than those with many. Figure 6.3 also shows the grand mean RT  for
literal expressions that were judged no more than once as metaphors (white
block). Following this correction, the patterns for literals (white block),
metaphors and anomalies in the 3- and 2-choice task become quite similar.
aIn sum, Figure 6.3 shows that RT  was fastest for anomalies, and did
usually not differ between literals and metaphors. Literal expressions that
were hardly ever interpreted as metaphors differed most from real meta-
phors. No differences were found between expression and context. However,
achoice task affected RT  most. In 2-choice, the overall response time was
faster, while literals and anomalies differed less than in 3-choice.
None of the metaphor models are confirmed by these results, because
none of them predicts that anomalies are faster than literals and metaphors.
Although literals inclined to be faster than metaphors, this effect did not
reach significance. According to the models, such a difference should have
been found. Thus, none of the metaphor models did well in accounting
for the time course of metaphor processing.
Check on word frequency
Low word frequencies of the anomalous B-terms might have been re-
sponsible for the great velocity of anomalies. Therefore - analogous to
Check 3 on word frequency in the previous Chapter - an extra level of high
and low word frequency within B-term types was deviced as a within-
subject factor. MANOVA was run on the grand mean arrival times for
correct decisions in this 2*2*2*2*2*3*2 design of preposition, task order,
condition order, choice task, condition, expression type and word frequency
(high vs low). Figure 6.4 displays the grand mean arrival times, and Table
6.3 (Appendix) the relevant statistics.
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Figure 6.4: Grand mean arrival times (ms) for task order, choice task, condition, expression
type and word frequency. Results are pooled over the insignificant factors: Preposition and
condition order. Bold lines indicate 3-choice before 2-choice task, thin lines 2-choice before
3-choice. Solid lines are high-, dashed lines low-frequent B-terms.   = literal expressions,
  = metaphors,   = anomalies.
The results of Table 6.3 (Appendix) allow the following deductions:
(I) For 3-choice before 2-choice, high-frequent B-terms were slower than
low-frequent ones in context, whereas in expression, the effect was the
opposite. However, for 2-choice before 3-choice, the differences in context
disappeared, whereas in expression, they reversed (interaction of task order
by condition by word frequency). (II) In both the 3- and 2-choice task, high-
frequent metaphoric B-terms were slower than low-frequent ones. For literal
expressions, however, high-frequent B-terms were faster than low-frequent
terms in the 3-choice task, and slower in the 2-choice task (interaction of
task by expression type by frequency). (III) No interaction of anomalous B-
terms with word frequency was significant.
In conclusion, the low-frequent anomalous B-terms did not interfere
awith processing speed, and when word frequency affected RT  , the ef-
fects were unsystematic. Word frequency was not more than a noise
factor.
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Check on lexical ambiguity
aTable 6.4: Grand means for arrival times (RT ) of nonambiguous (n) vs ambiguous (y) B-
terms. 3-2 = 3-choice before 2-choice, 2-3 = 2-choice before 3-choice, e-c = expression
before context, c-e = context before expression.
_________________________________________________________________________
_
Grand mean arrival time (ms) for (non)ambiguous terms
expression
                 3-choice task        *                     2-choice task                     
n y n y n y n y n y n y n y n y n y L   L    M   M   A   A    L   L   M  M    L   L   A   A   M  M   A   A
A is B
3-2
e-c 1008  985 1269 1124 1048  930 847  907  876  865  842  755  926  816  888  899  890  837
c-e 1029 1073  991  956  858   803 743  958  687  759  652  697  673  676  712  761  786  738
2-3
e-c  676  659  729   781  752   736 884  848  896 1104  897  866  818  792  966  961  860  843
c-e  709  757  810   798  791   773 784  773  884  861  809  895  845  770  794  864  843  825
A like B
3-2
e-c 1258 1396 1064 1353  970 1035 875  883 1013  992  875  766  841  832  948 1028  772  794
c-e 1053  956 1041 1025   891  961 832  763  965   986  838  774  728  828  894  730  862  752
2-3
e-c  810  770   984  908   789  816 854  844  939   958  999  892  906  918 1024  995  902  922
c-e  847  797   896  973   829  820 845  816  949   908  750  788  820  791  878   904  825  805
context
                 3-choice task        *                       2-choice task                      
n y n y n y n y n y n y n y n y n y L   L    M   M   A   A    L    L    M  M   L   L    A   A    M  M   A   A
A is B
3-2
e-c  936   995  965  993   932 1002  801   960  839  732  822  785   826  845   772  699  804  859
c-e 1205 1017 1107  947 1152  965  789   768  729  857  860  899   846  770   737  727  791  782
2-3
e-c  690   742  733  682   764  733  754   812  800  822  852  750   775  780   740  845  899  897
c-e  843   833  818  880   835  817 1005 1166  916 1149  954 1041  906  949   869  915  874  920
A like B
3-2
e-c 1156 1132 1197 1021 1020 1045  867   815  783  832  841  843   899  970   942  861  888  899
c-e 1171 1106 1127 1065 1031 1114  920   872  920  843  831  880   875  825   790  995 1103  856
2-3
e-c  739   752  631  669   808  807  812   895  808  973  912  758   943  875   720  920  920 1015
c-e  883   860  935  806   876  866 1015 1018 1016  989  924  901   952  907 1121 1120  910  895
_________________________________________________________________________
_
Lexical ambiguity may affect RT, because the availability of multiple mean-
ings may lead to a conflict in selecting among the options. Thus, the RT for
ambiguous terms may be elongated in comparison with nonambiguous
terms.
To test the effects of lexical ambiguity, an extra within-subject factor of
lexical ambiguity of the B-term was included in the analysis. MANOVA
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was run on the grand mean arrival times for correct decisions in a
2*2*2*2*2*3*2 design of preposition, task order, condition order, choice
task, condition, expression type and lexical ambiguity (no vs yes). Table 6.4
shows the grand means and Table 6.5 (Appendix) the statistics.
The results of Table 6.5 show the following:
(I) For all significant interactions, lexical ambiguity increased and decreased
aRT  about as often. (II) For literals and metaphors in the 3-choice task, am-
biguous terms were faster than nonambiguous terms. In the 2-choice task, no
difference was found for literals, whereas the effect for metaphors reversed,
making ambiguous terms slower. In comparison with metaphors, anomalies
showed that ambiguous terms were faster than nonambiguous terms, which
increased from the 3-choice to the 2-choice task (liberal á-level).
aThus, ambiguity affected RT  in an inconsistent way, so that it may be
considered noise.
Discussion of decision accuracy
Although the expression categorization experiment in Chapter 4, Table 4.1
suggested a strong consensus on the status of the expressions, the decisions
presented in Figure 6.2 showed otherwise. It is well-known that judgements
may be unanimous, whereas the actual decisions in a forced decision RT
paradigm show hesitation and a nonnegligible percentage of errors (Sanders,
in press). This was particularly the case with literal expressions that were
aoccasionally perceived as metaphors. In these cases, RT  for the errors was
longer than for the correct choices, which is usually the case when stimuli
can be discriminated poorly (Sanders, in press). In other words, the errors
were not so much due to speed-accuracy trade-off, as to a poor dis-
crimination of the stimuli.
This may be evidence for a continuum between literal expressions and
metaphors, with an overlapping 'twilight' zone in between. It should follow
that metaphors which are occasionally interpreted as literal expressions are
also slower than clear metaphors, although the decision data show that this
type of error is seldom made. The longer reaction times for literal
expressions with a metaphoric bias may also suggest that the criterion for
deciding between the two has no fixed value. Instead, it may be an area with
a lower and upper limit, leading to hesitations and long response times.
Nonetheless, the error rates were high. It may be inferred that the nine
prototypical expressions used in the 90 training trials were not diverse
enough to distinguish the expression type of new instances. Therefore, it
may be advisable to train subjects first with a limited set of repeated
prototypes to stipulate the different expression types, and then to train them
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with a larger number of unrepeated (unique) expressions - not related to the
experimental set - until the errors are less than 10% of the total number of
responses (Sanders 1980).
6.5 General discussion for psychology
Could the metaphor models be adjusted post hoc in order to obtain cor-
arespondence with the RT  data? Comparison models (either serial or
parallel) cannot adequately account for the fast anomalies in combina-
tion with the about equal processing times for literals and metaphors.
The first point - fast anomalies - is not fatal if the order of checking the
criteria is inverted. The first criterion checks whether too many shared
features are found to call the expression an anomaly. Then, metaphors and
literal expressions are differentiated by a second criterion, asking whether
too many shared features are found to decide for metaphor. In that case,
processing speed is regulated by the order of checking the criteria (fast
anomalies, equal literals and metaphors), while the decision itself is based
on the shared set size.
However, the results of weighted shared set size (Chapter 5) showed that
literal expressions and metaphors did not have different shared set sizes.
This means, that subjects should not have been able to decide between literal
expressions and metaphors. Although, indeed, most of the mix-up occurred
between these two expression types, broadly speaking, the corresponding
decision accuracy was between 60% and 95%.
A principal problem for the interaction model (either serial or paral-
lel) is that the effects of context appear to be ineffective. In all cases, dif-
ferences between expression and context were insignificant. Again, fast
anomalies can be explained by reversing the order of checking the response
criteria. In the first stage, anomalies are judged on the shared set size of
normal features. If there are too many shared features, the expression is not
an anomaly, and a second criterion is checked for literal expressions. If the
shared set size is not large enough to make the expression literal, a second
stage is commenced, in which sufficient fitting relations make the
expression a metaphor. However, in that case, metaphors should have taken
much more time to process than literal expressions, which was not the case -
although a trend was present.
Equal processing times can only be explained by a parallel model, in
which the establishment of shared normal features and shared relations is
equally fast. The distinction between literal expressions and metaphors,
then, would be based on the type of information that is accumulated: Shared
normal features for literals, shared relations for metaphors. On the other
hand, the feature elicitation results showed no significant differences among
expression types for the accumulation of any form of relation overlap.
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No serial anomaly model can explain the fast anomalies in com-
bination with the approximately equal processing times for literals and
metaphors. Again, the latter point is crucial, because literal overlap was
supposed to be checked before figurative overlap (or perhaps reversely),
which should have been reflected in different processing times. However, a
parallel anomaly model perfectly explains the results of feature
elicitation and reaction times. In the feature elicitation experiments, it was
found that anomalies yielded the smallest shared sets, either literal or
figurative. Literal expressions established large literal shared sets and small
figurative ones. Metaphors established equally large literal shared sets.
However, they also established large shared sets of features that were literal
lf flfor the one term and figurative for the other (S  and/or S ). Taken in unison
these results and the reaction time pattern that anomalies were fastest -
whereas literal expressions were only insignificantly faster than metaphors -
the following axioms would underlie a parallel anomaly model:
ll1. There are two parallel accumulators: The literal shared set (S ) and
lf flthe figurative shared set (S  and/or S )
2. The shared set is completed before response execution
l f3. The criterion q  for 'literal' is checked simultaneously with q  for
'metaphor'
l fSince q  and q  can be checked at the same time, expression type differences
ll lf flare due to a race between the two accumulators S  and (S  and/or S ). Thus,
response speed is not limited by the response phase, but rather by the
parallel activation phases and parallel comparison phases.
Expressions with small feature sets and little overlap are processed most
l fquickly, so that anomalies are rejected almost instantly by q  and q  at the
llsame time. Literal expressions accumulate mainly literal overlap (S ),
whereas the small figurative overlap is unimportant. Metaphors accumulate
ll lf flliteral (S ) as well as figurative overlap (S  and/or S ). Literal expressions
may be reacted to faster than metaphors, when the figurative sets are
exhausted quickly, and time is only spent on establishing the shared literal
set. Metaphors may be slower, when the accumulation of two sorts of in-
formation (literal and figurative) takes more time than accumulating one
kind (literal).
In other words, anomalies are processed in a short literal and a short
figurative stage. Literal expressions are processed in a long literal stage and
a short figurative one, and metaphors in a long literal and a long figurative
astage. This model explains the low RT s for anomalies, and the tendency for
literals to be faster than metaphors. It is also possible that the literal ex-
pressions and metaphors tie. In that case, literal and figurative information is
accumulated equally fast, and accumulating two sources of information is
not more time consuming than accumulating one source. Consequently, the
categorization of expressions is based purely on different types of informa-
254
Reaction time: General discussion for literature
tion. When metaphors yet are slower, it may be due to the accumulation of
two information types, or that the activation of figurative features starts a
little later, as illustrated in the previous Chapter (Figure 5.15, Chapter 5).
It should be recognized, however, that this account only applies to the
first presentation of expressions. At repeated presentation, all differences
tend to deteriorate. Subjects probably recognize an earlier judgement, so that
the matching of features becomes unnecessary. Furthermore, differences be-
tween literals and metaphors may have been drowned by noise factors such
as word frequency and lexical ambiguity.
With regard to the next Chapter, the serial anomaly model of Figure 2.1,
Chapter 2, envisioned a covert effect of 'conclude anomaly' when the
lcriterion q  for literal expressions was not met. This anomalous moment
would be the catalyst of the second, figurative, stage. Chapter 7 investigates
whether this covert effect is materialized in the evoked potential N400.
Moreover, if the parallel rather than the serial anomaly model is operative,
can the N400 be considered a part of the process, is it a surprise effect, or a
supplementary after effect?
6.6 General discussion for the theory of literature
What could reaction time say about literature? Not very much, as long as the
interference of preliminary variables is little-known. The RT results showed
that the method of experimentation had strong effects, from which the
factors of interest (preposition, condition, expression type) suffered a lot.
The effects of preposition and condition were negligible, indicating that
metaphor and simile constructions were not processed differently, and that
the poetic context did not help to identify an expression type. The
preposition like may cue the interpretation into the direction of metaphor;
however, the (in)appropriate combination of terms seemed more important
when making a correct judgement. The interjection of the preposition is
probably a subordinate aid. Since context did not yield important differences
in comparison with expression, it may be inferred that expressions are
judged on sentence level, without relying too much on the poetic context.
This result agrees with the feature elicitation, where differences between
expression and context usually were insignificant.
As far as expression type is concerned, it was found that anomalies were
processed the most quickly, whereas literal expression and metaphors hardly
differed. Literals tended to be faster than metaphors, although this effect was
not statistically reliable. That literals and metaphors were processed equally
fast was also found by Glucksberg, Gildea & Bookin (1982), Gerrig &
Healy (1983), Gildea & Glucksberg (1983), Inhoff, Lima & Carroll (1984)
band Gerrig (1989 ). However, it should be noted that in the present
experiments, these differences among expression types were a limited
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result, because they were sensitive to choice task (3-choice vs 2-choice) and
task order (3-choice before 2-choice and vice versa). Moreover, when the
expressions were repeated, the differences among expression types faded
out. In other words, the range of situations that a metaphor model can cover
is very restricted, unless it accounts for various effects of task manipulation.
From these observations, it follows that the earlier RT experiments in
psychology (see also the previous paragraph) are strongly circumscribed by
the experimental set up. Moreover, Section 6.2 demonstrated that almost all
designs were liable to substantial flaws and were usually analyzed
improperly.
With respect to the time course of metaphor processing, then, we may
start from scratch. Before all else, the expressions should be matched on the
relevant variables (cf. Chapter 4) even better than in the presently-used
stimulus set. Lexical ambiguity and word frequency may conjure too much
noise, while repetitions of stimuli overshadow the effects of interest. Also
the kind of choice task should be considered as a forceful factor. Obviously,
readers process expression types differently, when they know beforehand
that all options are available (literals, metaphors, anomalies) or that the
choice is narrowed down to, for example, metaphors and anomalies.
The last remark may have interesting consequences for the effects of
genre. When paper articles are contrasted with poetry, it may be that in the
journalistic text, readers expect fewer metaphors than literals, and probably
no anomalies. In the poem, however, they may expect more metaphors and
perhaps even more anomalies than literal expressions. In other words,
reading papers is a 2-choice task between literals and metaphors, with a
higher probability for the first expression type (no counterbalance). Reading
poetry is a 3-choice task among metaphors, anomalies and literals, with a
corresponding decrease in probability (no counterbalance). Differences
between the two genres, then, may be explained not only by the mix of more
and more difficult expression types in poetry, but also by the fact that to
perform a 3-choice task simply is a tougher job than to do a 2-choice task.
Given the limitations outlined above, Section 6.5 revised the serial anom-
aly model as a parallel anomaly model. Taking together the results of
feature elicitation and reaction times, this model has the most explanatory
power. It will be recalled that the feature elicitation results indicated that
anomalies found the smallest literal and figurative shared sets, that literal
expressions found large literal shared sets and small figurative ones, where-
as metaphors found large literal as well as figurative shared sets. Note that
the figurative shared sets were composed of features that were literal for the
one term and figurative for the other. The reaction times showed that
anomalies were fastest, whereas literals and metaphors were processed
equally fast, with a slight advantage for literals. The parallel anomaly model
postulates that:
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ll1. There are two parallel accumulators: The literal shared set (S ) and
lf flthe figurative shared set (S  and/or S )
2. The shared set is completed before response execution
l f3. The criterion q  for 'literal' is checked simultaneously with q  for
'metaphor'
l fThe threshold criteria q  and q  are checked synchronously, so that ex-
pression type differences are the result of a race between the two accu-
ll lf flmulators S  and (S  and/or S ). Thus, the activation phases for literal and
figurative features are working in parallel, just as the two comparison
phases.
The feature elicitation results showed that anomalies established small
shared literal and figurative sets. Thus, activation and comparison finish
l fquickly, and the anomaly is rejected simultaneously by q  and q  as literal or
llmetaphor. Literal expressions accumulate literal overlap (S ), whereas the
llfigurative overlap remains small. Metaphors accumulate literal (S ) as well
lf flas figurative overlap (S  and/or S ). Thus, literal expressions may be faster
than metaphors, when they only establish literal shared sets, whereas the
figurative shared set is so small that it does not take much time. Metaphors
may be slower, when they accumulate a literal as well as a figurative shared
set.
Thus, anomalies are processed in two short stages, literals in a long literal
stage and a short figurative stage, and metaphors in a long literal and a long
l ffigurative stage. If q  and q  are checked in parallel, it is also possible that no
differences in processing speed are found between literal expressions and
metaphors. In that case, literal and figurative information is accumulated
equally fast. Although metaphors have equally large shared literal sets, they
fare not categorized as 'literal', because they also exceed q  . Metaphors may
be slower when the accumulation of two information types takes longer than
the accumulation of one type, or when the activation of figurative features
begins later in the associative flow, as represented by Figure 5.15, Chapter
5.
In the serial anomaly model, the transition from the literal to the figurative
stage was accompanied by a 'shock at the clash of meanings' (Beardsley
1982: 267). This shock was supposed to be an inalienable part of the pro-
cess, and was supposed to be an incentive to advance into the second stage.
The next Chapter surveys whether this shock can be measured inside the
brain itself. The psychophysiological literature suggests that certain
potentials in the brain are sensitive to semantic deviations. Since the serial
anomaly model does not seem as powerful as the parallel version, the status
of the electrocortical shock as part of the metaphor process is questioned. Is
it the impetus to enter the second stage, merely an additional surprise effect,
and if not, what is it?
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1. An extra level of no-context would be even better.
2. Actually, this implies two anomaly types, distinguished by smaller or larger literal
shared sets.
Notes:
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Table 6.0: MANOVA for the effects of preposition, task order, condition order, choice task,
acondition and expression type on the grand mean arrival time (RT ) for correct responses.
Only effects at least significant for subjects as the random factor are tabulated.
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of task order by condition order by choice task by condition:
1,16dep. variable F    p df quasi-F p
a 6,2RT    10.69 .005    .02   >.50
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of task order by choice task:
1 =  ((3 before 2) vs (2 before 3)) vs ((3-choice) vs (2-choice))
1,16dep. variable F    p df quasi-F p
a 20,2RT   196.45 .000    .05   >.50
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of condition order by condition:
1 = ((expression before context) vs (context before expression)) vs
   (expression vs context)
1,16dep. variable F    p df quasi-F p
a 2,2RT    19.00 .000    .22   >.50
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of task order by choice task by expression type:
2 = ((3 before 2) vs (2 before 3)) vs ((3-choice) vs (2-choice)) vs
  (literals vs anomalies)
3 = ((3 before 2) vs (2 before 3)) vs ((3-choice) vs (2-choice)) vs
  (metaphors vs anomalies)
dep. Pillai's
3,14variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
a 3,7RT .51 4.93 .015  7.15   .015 2    177.48  3.80 .002**
3    140.60  3.03 .008**
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of task order by expression type:
2 = ((3 before 2) vs (2 before 3)) vs (literals vs anomalies)
dep. Pillai's
2,15variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
a 2,33RT .39 4.83 .024  46.68  .000 2    181.54  3.10 .007**
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of condition order by condition by expression type:
dep. Pillai's
2,15variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p
a 2,4RT .52     8.13 .004    .31   >.50
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_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of condition by expression type:
dep. Pillai's
2,15variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p
a 2,4RT .67    15.36 .000    .33   >.50
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of expression type:
1 = literals vs metaphors
2 = literals vs anomalies
3 = metaphors vs anomalies
dep. Pillai's
2,15variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
a 2,4RT .48     7.06 .007  33.88   .009 1    -90.56 -1.49 .155
2    111.78  1.91 .074
3    202.34  3.86 .001**
_________________________________________________________________________
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Table 6.1: Cohen's Kappa for the correct decisions of each subject in two choice tasks for
expressions with or without like in expression and context.
_________________________________________________________________________
A is B A is like B
3-choice 2-choice 3-choice 2-choice
expr. context expr. context expr. context expr. context
subject   ê      ê   ê    ê subject   ê     ê   ê   ê
01  .89  .60  .86  .86 13  .45  .63  .86  .81
02  .56  .22  .80  .69 14  .46  .57  .80  .86
03  .54  .47  .94  .86 15  .27  .46  .67  .78
04  .72  .78  .86  .92 16  .79  .50  .83  .87
05  .51  .39  .94  .74 17  .29  .27  .77  .69
06  .94  .68 1.00  .86 18 1.00  .74  .97 1.00
07  .95  .94  .94  .94 19  .79  .73  .69  .69
08 1.00  .94  .83  .81 20  .83  .67  .81  .94
09  .89  .78  .92  .78 21  .67  .73  .83  .68
10  .94 1.00  .97  .86 22  .94  .89  .92  .78
11  .78  .83  .92  .86 23  .89  .79  .94  .81
12  .88  .89  .92  .75 24 1.00 1.00 1.00  .69
0 .800 .710 .908 .828 .698 .665 .840 .800
_________________________________________________________________________
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Table 6.2: MANOVA for the effects of preposition, choice task, condition and expression
atype on the grand mean arrival time (RT ) in the first presentation of stimuli. Only signifi-
cant effects are tabulated.
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of choice task by expression type:
1 = ((3-choice) vs (2-choice)) vs (literals vs metaphors)
2 = ((3-choice) vs (2-choice)) vs (literals vs anomalies)
3 = ((3-choice) vs (2-choice)) vs (metaphors vs anomalies)
dep. Pillai's
2,15variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
a 2,4RT .48 6.87 .008 34.27   .008 1     31.55   .87 .396
2     71.37  3.16 .006**
3     39.82  1.61 .128
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of expression type:
1 = literals vs metaphors
2 = literals vs anomalies
3 = metaphors vs anomalies
dep. Pillai's
2,15variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
a 2,4RT .80    29.76 .000  35.31   .005 1    -39.83 -1.10 .287
2    102.05  4.52 .000**
3     66.62  2.68 .016**
_________________________________________________________________________
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aTable 6.3: MANOVA for arrival times (RT ) of high-frequent vs low-frequent B-terms.
Only significant effects are listed.
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of condition by word frequency:
1 = (expression vs context) vs (high vs low)
1,16dep. variable F    p coeff.     t   p
aRT 6.01 .026 1   -355.72  -2.45 .026*
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of task order by condition by word frequency:
1 = (3-2 vs 2-3) vs (expression vs context) vs (high vs low)
1,16dep. variable F    p coeff.     t   p
aRT 9.73 .007 1   -452.55  -3.12 .007*
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of task by expression type by frequency:
1 = (3-choice vs 2-choice) vs (literals vs metaphors) vs (high vs low)
Pillai's
3,14dep. variable Trace F    p coeff.     t   p
aRT .99   526.99 .000 1  -3492.48  -42.00 .000**
_________________________________________________________________________
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aTable 6.5: MANOVA for the grand mean arrival times (RT ) of nonambiguous (n) vs
ambiguous (y) B-terms. Only significant effects are listed.
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of preposition by task order by condition order by condition by
ambiguity:
1 = (with like vs without like) vs ((3 before 2) vs (2 before 3)) vs ((expression before con-
n ytext) vs (context before expression)) vs (expression vs context) vs (amb  vs amb )
1,16dep. variable F    p coeff.     t   p
aRT    15.27 .001 1    665.93   3.91 .001*
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of preposition by condition order by task by condition by ambiguity:
1 = (with like vs without like) vs ((expression before context) vs (context before ex-
n ypression)) vs (3-choice vs 2-choice) vs (expression vs context) vs (amb  vs amb )
1,16dep. variable F    p coeff.     t   p
aRT 4.88 .042 1    396.18   2.21 .042*
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of task by expression type by ambiguity:
n y1 = (3-choice vs 2-choice) vs (literals vs metaphors) vs (amb  vs amb )
n y2 = (3-choice vs 2-choice) vs (literals vs anomalies) vs (amb  vs amb )
n y3 = (3-choice vs 2-choice) vs (metaphors vs anomalies) vs (amb  vs amb )
Pillai's
3,14dep. variable Trace F    p coeff.     t   p
aRT .99   362.94 .000 1  -3557.61  -33.70 .000**
2 -8.93    -.15 .880
3   131.24    2.23 .040U
_________________________________________________________________________
U  not significant at á = .0166
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CHAPTER 7: ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY*
7.0 Psychophysiological traces of metaphor
One of the exciting endeavors in psychology is to explain functional models
from physiology. The anomaly model in particular employs a physical
incident as the marker of extra cognitive processing. In the theory of
literature, this 'shock' of metaphor can be seen as an indicator of
foregrounding. In Section 7.1, the sparse examples of physiologically
oriented ideas on literary reception are attended, and Berlyne's arousal
theory for artistic stimuli is discussed. In Section 7.2, studies are reviewed
on the linguistically interesting N400-effect in the electroencephalogram
(EEG). This N400 - a potential supposedly susceptible to semantic
anomalies - is opted for by Section 7.3 to experimentally investigate the
'shock' effect of metaphor in Section 7.4. Section 7.5 and 7.6 discuss the
importance of the N400 for metaphor research in psychology and the theory
of literature.
7.1 Theory of literature: Prudent allusions at psychophysiology
Intuitively, the connoisseur of literature is reluctant to accept that something
so subtle as poetry is done justice to by apparatus such as voltmeters and
electrodes, and rightly so. Personal heuristics can never be replaced by
measuring electric brain activity at the scalp to reveal what the poem means.
On the contrary, using the tangle of amplitude shifts that arises from such
measurements for the interpretation of a text is a worse case of soothsaying
than the empiricists blame the hermeneutics for. In addition, it would be far
easier to ask people what the poem means than to measure their brain sig-
nals while reading. Else, nature would have supplied us with electrodes
instead of a tongue.
What personal heuristics cannot do, however, is to give a controllable
account of what happens in the brain. When a scholar of literature asserts
that certain text elements are put at unexpected positions in the clause -
'scintillating this poem with wit' - we have to take this claim for granted. It
remains unclear whether a real reading experience was described, or whether
the statement came from a learned book on stylistics. In other words, the
empirical investigator of literature will be reluctant to believe that the
scholar's claim was not a result of consensus, entailed by the academic en-
vironment rather than the text itself. In addition, surprise effects may be so
subtle that personal heuristics is too coarse a measure as to access them.
Notes are on page 304. Appendix with statistics on the pages 305-310.*
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In this respect, an often made mistake is that introspection would not be
an indirect accessment of knowledge, even about oneself. In Politeia, Plato
stressed that the complex inner world can only be captured through
imperfect representations, the puppet players' shadows on the wall.
Neurophysiological measures are no different from introspection for that
matter (Kok 1988: 3), except that they are sensitive to text effects at the
micro-level of processing and that they provide a controllable means to
study those effects.
Much of the unwillingness in scholars of literature may be explained by
neuropsychology's reconciliation of two apparently opposite modes: Mind
and matter. For the scholars of literature, the article of faith 'mind over
matter' holds, whereas for neuropsychology the creed is that 'mind is matter'.
Changeux (1985) indicated that as early as the Church Fathers (fourth and
fifth century), this dichotomy dominated Western philosophy of the mind.
Nemesius and Augustinus placed the functions defined by Aristotle such as
ratio, perception, memory and imagination not inside the brain itself, but in
its hollow ventricles (cf. Kok 1988: 5). Descartes thought that cognition was
not spatial, whereas physiological processes were. This was perhaps the
most influential idea for the persistent separation of mind and matter in the
present day, although modern physics tried to avoid the issue in postulating
that 'all is energy'.
Despite the possibility of a false distinction between mind and matter or
of totally interacting energies, the fact remains that information is
transmitted via physical entities such as sound (speaking, hearing), light
(reading, seeing) and pressure (touching). Thus, if there is a rift between
mental and brain processes, something must be bridging the gap in
translating the physical impulses into mental meaning, and vice versa. In
Passions de l'âme, Descartes also found this transition to be self-evident.
Unless the transition is completely chaotic, certain physical regularities
correlate with psychological phenomena, including reading poetry.
Positively, the theory of literature sometimes meditated the potentiality of a
'biomechanics of language'.
(...) speech is a universally human and exclusively human property
imperatively call[ing] for an attentive inquiry into the biological
prerequisites of human language. Bloomfield's reminder that among
the special branches of science, linguistics "intervenes between
biology, on the one hand, and ethnology, sociology, and psychology,
on the other" (...) is most opportune. (Jakobson 1971: 675)
Jakobson specified his recommendation in explicitly stating that:
This research becomes particularly productive when results of lin-
guistic analysis are matched with the PSYCHOPHYSICAL data.
(Jakobson 1971: 689)
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Primary, Jakobson imagined the study of language impairments to fulfill the
need of neurolinguistic knowledge:
The deepest discernment of the relation between the human organism
and its verbal abilities and activities is achieved by the mutual help of
NEUROBIOLOGISTS and linguists in a comparative inquiry into the
various lesions of the cortex and the resulting aphasic impairments.
(...) when we confront this strictly linguistic framework with the
anatomical data, it proves to coincide with the topography of the
cerebral lesions responsible for the diverse impairments (...). The
prospective development of such interdisciplinary, "neurolinguistic"
research in aphasic and psychotic speech (...) will undoubtedly open
new vistas for a comprehensive study of the brain and its functions as
well as for the science of language and other semiotic systems. A
deeper insight into the biologic foundations of language may be
expected from the ongoing experience with split-brain operations.
(Jakobson 1971: 688)
And indeed, studies on dyslexic and aphasic patients unravelled new in-
sights into language processes, evolving in, for instance, the Wernicke-
Geschwind model of reading (Benson 1981: 69-90, Hynd 1989: 123-148).
Even with regard to metaphors, research was performed with brain-damaged
subjects (Winner & Gardner 1977, next Section).
Whereas Jakobson suggested the cooperation between psychophysiology
and linguistics, his pupil Abernathy connected the study of literature (the
'other semiotic systems') with the recording of EEGs. Abernathy speculated
that the development of a dream described in a poem by the Russian poet
Blok might be retraceable in the brain waves of sleep-wake states recorded
by an EEG. First, he outlined that:
(...) we happen to be unusually well-informed about the origins of this
poem: its subtitle "A dream" is meant literally, since by Blok's own
testimony it is based on an actual dream he experienced in November
1905 and on his written notes made a day and a half later, still under
the influence of the powerfull dream-impression. This preliminary
sketch of the poem survives, and comparison of it with the final
published text makes plain that the latter is directly founded on this
'dream-stuff' only as far as line 249. Lines 250-304 lack such
antecedents, and in their content reflect quite a different mood,
dispelling the nightmare atmosphere of the swamp (...). It is
reasonable to see in this a product of the artistic reworking, (...), of the
original dream-nucleus. (...) from a formal analysis (...) this 'nucleus'
appears as a recognizable structural whole, embedded in a framework
- which, for the rest, reproduces the nuclear pattern in such a way that
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the same characterization of the total effect, as one of form gradually
emerging from chaos. (Abernathy 1967: 8-9)
Abernathy analyzed that in the dream poem, form gradually emerged from
chaos, and added in a footnote that this formal aspect might be represented
in the EEG:
Given the poem's dream-ancestry, it is tempting though probably fan-
ciful to try to correlate this progressive regularization of its form more
or less directly with features of hypnoidal (hypnopompic) states - say
with the behavior of electroencephalograph tracings during gradual
awakening, showing replacement of the slow irregular delta waves of
deep sleep first by more or less random bursts of activity and finally
by the waking alpha rhythm. (Abernathy 1967: 9)
Notwithstanding this nice metaphor on dream description and electrocortical
effects of dreaming, EEGs can be exploited seriously to examine the theory
of literature.
Mukaøovský (1964: 17-30), for instance, suggested that although
phonological and semantic deviations are not absent in standard language,
their degree and mode are different than in literature. In certain respects,
these observations were confirmed by Hoorn (1996). Particular components
of the EEG - the so called event-related brain potentials - appeared to be
sensitive to semantic and phonological deviations in reading four-lined
verses in alternating rhyme. The last word of each verse either rhymed or not
and was a semantically correct completion or not. Confirming Mukaøovský,
the brain potentials were smaller for rhyming and semantically correct com-
pletions (the more standard language) as opposed to nonrhyming and sem-
antically deviant endings, which evoked higher amplitudes. Likewise, such
differences in degree of deviateness - reflected in the height of ERP ampli-
tudes - may be found also when literal expressions are compared with meta-
phors.
Here is where the theory of literature converges with the theory of psy-
chophysiology. Both disciplines are interested in the effects of semantic
unexpectedness and surprise. As indicated by the previous Chapter,
Šklovskij (1965: 12) based the theory of foregrounding on the transgression
of automatized language processing. Art made objects unfamiliar and dif-
ficult, a position subscribed also by Striedter:
First, defamiliarization impedes the kind of perception automatized by
linguistic and social conventions (...). Second, in a kind of
countermovement, by impeding perception, defamiliarization directs
perception to the estranging and impeding from itself. (Striedter 1989:
23-24; Zwaan 1993: 41)
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Thus, what could be more promising than a tool that distinguishes impedi-
ment from satisfaction of expectations in language perception? One
particular kind of event-related brain potential (ERP) seems most sensitive
a bto semantic deviateness. Kutas & Hillyard (1980  , 1980  , 1981) presented
words that completed sentences in diverse degrees of nonsensicality ('he
took a sip from the transmitter', 'he mailed the letter without a check') as
opposed to normal completions ('he took a sip from the coffee', 'he mailed
the letter without a stamp'). During the presentation of the completing word,
the EEG was sampled at various locations on the scalp. The EEG averaged
over subjects showed that a negative polarity (N) was found, 400 millisec-
onds after presentation of the anomalous word. The height of the amplitude
of this ERP labeled N400 varied systematically with the degree of
anomality. In the next Section, a review of the N400-literature is provided,
in which various stimulus types and manipulations are discussed for their
relation with N400-elicitation, along with some critical notes on brain signal
interpretation.
For the theory of literature, however, study of the N400 in response to
literary stimuli would be a giant leap forward, since it would provide a
hypersensitive utensil to investigate the real effects of stylistics, reviving the
long neglected inheritance of the Russian Formalists and Prague
Structuralist School.
To go straight to the point, investigating brain potentials could provide a
solution to the conflict about whether and to which extent metaphoric cre-
ations are deviations or regular processes of certain stylistic varieties. For
instance, Jakobson took the position that metaphors are no different from
regular expressions.
Metaphoric creations are not deviations but regular processes of cer-
tain stylistic varieties, which are subcodes of an overall code, and
within such a subcode there is nothing deviant in Marvell's figural
assignment of a concrete epithet to an abstract noun (properly a
'hypallage') - "a green Thought in a green shade" - or in Shakespeare's
metaphoric transposition of an inanimate noun into the feminine class
- "the morning opens her golden gates" - or in the metonymic use of
"sorrow" instead of "sorrowful while", which Putnam's paper excerpts
from Dylan Thomas ("A grief ago I saw him there"). In
contradistinction to the agrammatical constructions as "girl sleeps" the
quoted phrases are meaningful, and any meaningful sentence may be
submitted to a truth test exactly in the same way as the statement
"Peter is an old fox" could lead to a reply "It's not true; Peter is not a
fox but a swine, while John is a fox." Incidentally, neither ellipses nor
reticence or anacoluthon could be considered as deviant structures;
they, and the slurred style of speech, a brachylogical subcode to which
they belong, are merely lawful derivations from the kernel forms
embedded in the explicit standard. (Jakobson 1961: 252)
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Jakobson opposed the view that metaphors are deviant structures. They are
not agrammatical and can be submitted to a truth test, so that they are
meaningful expressions. Therefore, metaphor is not a deviant form of
language use. Culler on the other hand, advanced that metaphor is deviant,
not as a matter of structure, but as a matter of effect, owing to its false
assertion of identity. In line with Jakobson, Culler subscribed that
metaphoric structures are no different than literal expressions, not even in
meaning. In advocating the philosopher Davidson, however, Culler
accentuated the difference in effect:
By denying that metaphors have any special meaning (they assert lit-
eral equivalences which are false) [Davidson] makes necessary an
elaborate account of the effect of metaphorical assertions, a complex
analysis of the way readers and listeners respond to these false
assertions of identity. (...) It is not a matter of structure but of effect,
and the study of metaphor should be a study of response.
This might well be a fruitful line of inquiry. It would involve
treating the notion of metaphor as a description of certain interpre-
tative operations performed by readers when confronted by a textual
incongruity, such as the assertion of a patently false identity. (...) the
figurative is the name we give to effects of language that exceed,
deform, or deviate from the code; codifications of previous excesses,
deformations, and deviations only create opportunities for new turns.
(Culler 1981: 208-209) 
After Culler, it would seem in order to leave aside for the present the
linguistic study of metaphor, and make it into a study of response. The
electrocortical effects of textual incongruity, deformations and deviations
would promptly highlight the predictions of the anomaly model that meta-
phor evokes a kind of shock effect. Recall that 'the poet must arouse a
reaction and yet impede it, creating a tension in our nervous system suf-
ficient and rightly calculated to make us completely aware that we are living
something-and no matter what' (Eastman, The Literary Mind: 205, quoted in
Richards 1965: 124).
The anomaly model is different from the comparison and interaction
model in that metaphor processing supposedly involves an 'anomalous
moment', materialized by a form of cognitive tension (the 'shock' at the
'clash of meanings', Beardsley 1982: 267). Thus, the shift from literal to
figurative interpretation could be accompanied by the aforementioned ERP
called N400, which is susceptible to anomalous sentence completions. Since
in the Kutas & Hillyard studies, the N400-effect enhanced when the
anomaly became more severe, literal expressions should evoke the smallest
N400 amplitude, anomalies the highest and metaphors something in
between.
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If N400 marks the shift to the activation of figurative features, it may be a
lfunction of the distinctive literal features. Since the response criterion q  is
not met, too small a literal shared set leaves too many literal features
distinctive. It could be inferred that a potential N400-effect is a function of
too-large distinctive literal sets, remaining when the comparison phase
(nearly) ends.
So far almost nothing is known about the internal network of verbal
communication and, in particular, about the neural stage in the output
and input of distinctive features; let us hope that in the near future
neurobiology will provide an answer to this question of primary
interest for the comprehension and further study of the ultimate
linguistic units. (Jakobson 1971: 688-689)
Twenty-five years have passed since Jakobson hoped for neuropsychological
evidence on language processing. During this period, the neuropsychological
research field has broadened to include normal readers, thereby refining its
methods. For instance, Miall is quite optimistic when he reviews
neuropsychological research to:
ground (...) reader response issues on a firmer basis, on functions of
the cognitive and emotional system about which reasonably clear
neuropsychological evidence is now available. (...) the aim [is] to draw
an outline of those aspects of current neuropsychological thinking that
may illuminate the nature of literature and literary response. (...)
Where reliable indicators of [foregrounding] exist, their neurological
correlates can be assessed using EEG and EMG (electromyographic)
measures. (Miall 1995)
Hopefully not overweeningly optimistic, an EEG-experiment was conducted
in Section 7.4 on the N400-effect of literary metaphor processing. However,
to appraise the import of the results, the indexing status of the N400-effect
should be reviewed first, which is critically done in the next Section. One
point that needs to be clarified before the N400-literature is discussed is the
relation between cognitive brain potentials and arousal.
Berlyne's arousal theory in literature
In the theory of literature, Berlyne's (1960, 1971) arousal theory on artistic
stimuli is often cited to illustrate the difference between literary and
nonliterary reading on a physiological level.
When a stimulus pattern fails to agree with an expectation that was
aroused by what preceded it, we call it 'surprising'. (Berlyne 1971:
145)
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The literary theorist Šklovskij (1965, originally 1917) influenced Berlyne's
formulation of his surprise theory for artistic stimuli. Šklovskij argued that
artistic texts are harder to process, owing to the higher frequencies of
linguistic deviations (rhyme, semantics), which increase the complexity of
the text or surprise the reader. Berlyne transformed these ideas into a theory
of arousal states, in which the level of arousal would correlate with the
hedonistic feelings of the subject.
Any diminution of arousal due to temporary liberation from the
restrictions of rationality can, we must suppose, counteract the
arousal-raising potentialities of the anomalies that result. Consequent-
ly, the necessary conditions for the arousal boost or the arousal boost-
jag can be realized. When we come across absurdities and
incoherences in situations that are not clearly labelled artistic, playful,
or humorous, we are apt to find them not enjoyable but profounding
disquieting. The attendant arousal increment is too strong for an
arousal boost, and there is no prompt relief to make possible an
arousal jag. (Berlyne 1971: 171)
Berlyne's theory is an example of a psychological theory of cognitive-
energetic processes. Studies on alertness in relation to the function of the
recticular formation in the brain prompted the notion of a unidimensional
arousal system, in which an optimum of arousal - not too little, not too much
- would lead to optimal performance (see for an review of arousal studies
Sanders, in press, ch. 10).
Berlyne envisioned the relation between level of arousal and aesthetic
experience as an 'inverted-U' curve. One postulate underlying this view is
that the relation between arousal and cognition is aspecific. In the
unidimensional arousal theory, energetic and cognitve aspects of
information processing are strictly separated (Sanders, in press, ch. 10). As a
consequence, arousal may be evoked by all kinds of 'surprising' stimuli,
without specific relevance for the processes involved. Among the various
proposed measures of arousal are background EEG, muscle tension,
galvanic skin response, heart rate, blood pressure, and pupil diameter
(Sanders, in press, ch. 10). These measures - although sometimes yielding
contradictory results - may reflect energetic aspects of stimulus processing.
However, they are not informative with regard to the computational aspects
of a process, as in the case of metaphor comprehension.
To conceive of the energetic effect of metaphor in terms of a 'shock'
(Henle 1966: 182), then, might be a misconception. Instead, these effects
may reflect computational procedures of metaphor processing. Metaphor is
thought to be a simple mismatch of features, the effect of which is not an
emotionally tinged arousal effect or 'shock'. Instead, the effect may depend
on the outcome of computational procedures, so that arousal is not the
proper measure.
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This objection may also be advanced against other ideas on the effects of
literary devices. It is common practice both in the theory of literature and in
the psychology of aesthetics not to make a distinction between energetic and
computational aspects of processing. Kreitler & Kreitler (1972), for in-
stance, posited that an organism strives for an equilibrium (homeostatis).
The reduction of psychophysiological tension is a satisfying experience, so
that moderately deviating stimuli are optimal for anticipating tension relief,
and are supposedly much appreciated in the perception of art and literature.
However, despite the ample speculations on arousal effects for aesthetic
stimuli, there is no experimental evidence that in literature, arousal is
experienced as 'more pleasant' than in trivial prose.
Presumably, most of the aesthetic pleasure in literature is given by stylis-
tic deviation. Berlyne called these the 'short-term novelties', which concern
phenomena such as metaphor, synaesthesia, polyvalence (ambiguity),
rhyme, and orthography. However, the deviateness of these stimuli is para-
mountly based on computational processes, not on different levels of
energetics. Muscles do not contract when encountering a metaphor. The
heart does not pound in the throat because of synaesthesia. Blood vessels do
not widen when confronted with a lexical ambiguity. One does not get
sweaty due to a surprising rhyme, so that arousal states are noninformative
on the functioning of these literary devices.
Therefore, the electrocortical effect of metaphor processing is in-
vestigated with the cognitive ERP called N400. In the next Section, a review
is offered on the sensitivity of the N400 to semantic stimuli. Moreover, the
limitations of ERPs for language research are pointed out.
7.2 Psychophysiology: Studies on semantic deviations
Since the original EEG research of Berger (1929) and Adrian & Matthews
(1934), the idea has been elaborated that electrical brain activity corresponds
with the processing of internal and external events. The so called 'evoked
response potentials' (ERPs) are supposed to reflect brain activity brought
about by a stimulus. The ERP is thought to provide a continuous record of
information processing in the brain, whereas behavioral measures (e.g., RT)
are the end product of such processing. It can be deduced from a
combination of RT and ERP that systematic changes take place in both
processing duration and brain activity as a result of systematic manipulation
of variables. The precise nature of the electrocortical activity is unknown.
However, the observed effects can be used to formulate hypotheses about
the processes involved.
On the other hand, the predicted modification of an ERP is not
necessarily a direct manifestation of the presumed process. There is no way
of telling whether an ERP reflects one or more processes, or which process
it reflects. It is also unclear which part of the morphology (onset, flank or
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peak) of an ERP waveform is most relevant to the processes under study.
Thus, results are correlative rather than causal, and should be treated as de-
scription rather than explanation (cf. Meyer, Osman, Irwin & Yantis 1988).
Despite these complications, recording EEG at different scalp locations
may help in suggesting different functional areas of the brain involved in the
variations of the stimulus (cf. Nunez 1981). Therefore, ERPs may form a
complement to gain insight into the organization of mental processes. The
analysis of ERPs has been useful in the study of stimulus detection and
recognition, memory, reaction processes, attention and language (Hillyard &
Kutas 1983).
a bWith respect to language, Kutas & Hillyard (1980  , 1980  , 1981, 1983)
dealt with ERP components in response to semantic anomalies. Words that
were semantically incongruent with the sentence context ('he spread the
warm bread with socks') evoked negative electrical activity (N) around 400
ms after onset at centro-parietal locations. The N400-amplitude rose in
response to words that were rated as highly anomalous, whereas moderately
anomalous words elicited a lower amplitude. Kutas & Hillyard stated that
N400 is probably susceptible to the relation of a word with the priming by
its context. Kutas, Lindamood & Hillyard (1984) claimed that amplitude and
latency of the N400 varied as a function of factors such as presentation time,
reading competence and sentence context. Boddy & Weinberg (1981),
Bentin, McCarthy & Wood (1985) and Rugg (1985) confirmed that the
height of the N400-amplitude was sensitive to the mismatch of semantic ex-
pectations, although phonological mismatches were affecting the amplitude
as well.
Fischler, Bloom, Childers, Roucos & Perry (1983) tested appropriate and
inappropriate instance-category comparisons that were stated affirmatively
or negatively: 'A sparrow is a bird', 'a sparrow is a vehicle', 'a sparrow is not
a bird', 'a sparrow is not a vehicle'. Subjects responded 'true' or 'false', while
RT and EEG were recorded. When categories mismatched, a large negative
going wave was found between 300-500 ms. This N400 occurred
irrespective of the truth value of the proposition (cf. 'a sparrow is not a vehi-
cle'). False propositions about matching semantic categories ('a sparrow is
not a bird') evoked less N400-activity. According to Fischler et al.,
comparison of semantic categories occurred prior to a conclusion about the
truth value. This pattern was also found in the RTs. False propositions with
matching categories were processed faster than true propositions with mis-
matching categories.
Chwilla, Brown & Hagoort (1995) investigated whether N400 is a re-
flection of automatic or controlled processing. In a semantic priming
paradigm, word pairs were presented, the second of which was a real word
or a nonword, written in lower or upper case. Moreover, word pairs could be
related or not. Two tasks were performed: A lexical decision task
(word/nonword?) and a typographical discrimination task
(lower/uppercase?). It was expected that a lexical decision task would
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involve automatic lexical access (is it a word?) as well as controlled lexical
integration (do words match?), whereas a typographical task would only in-
volve automatic lexical access. Therefore, if N400 is a reflection of
controlled processes, it should be present in the lexical decision task, and
not in the typographical discrimination task. To vary the depth of semantic
processing, two stimulus lists were exploited, one with a high proportion
(80%) of related word pairs, and one with a low proportion (20%). The
high-proportion list was thought to encourage deeper semantic processing of
the first word, because this would lead more often to successful predictions
of the second word than in the low-proportion list. Accordingly, N400
should be higher in the high-proportion list than in the low-proportion list.
Three subject groups joined an RT/ERP experiment. The first group per-
formed a lexical decision task (is it a word/nonword?), and the second a
typographical discrimination task (lower/upper case?). The third group per-
formed a passive reading task. This was done to control for unwanted side-
effects of performing a decision task, which are not present in a natural
reading situation.
In the typographical task, no RT differences were found between words
and nonwords, nor between related versus unrelated word pairs. In the
lexical decision task, RTs to words were faster than to nonwords, and
related word pairs were faster than unrelated, especially in the high-
proportion list. N400 occurred in the lexical decision task as well as in the
silent reading task, whereas it remained absent in the typographical task.
Larger amplitudes were observed for unrelated than for related word pairs.
The high-proportion list yielded higher N400-amplitudes than the low-
proportion list.
It was concluded that N400 reflects controlled lexical integration rather
than automatic lexical access, because in the typographical task - which as-
sumingly only required lexical access - the N400 was not evoked. Moreover,
N400 may be sensitive to deeper forms of processing, because in the lists
with high proportions of related word pairs, the N400 to unrelated word
pairs was higher than in the low-proportion list.
Thus far, it seems that the N400 was connected to semantic mismatches in a
relatively unproblematic way. It was insensitive to typographical entities of
the words (lower/upper case), to logical constraints (affirmative or negative
sentences), or to the position of the aberrant word in the sentence. In
addition, N400 seemed to be susceptible to semantic relatedness of words on
a deeper level of processing (lexical integration).
However, other evidence suggested that N400 is also evoked by non-
linguistic stimuli (pictures), and sometimes by word properties that are not
necessarily semantic (phonology, orthography). Rugg (1984) designed a
rhyme-matching task in which rhymes attenuated the N400-amplitude,
whereas nonrhymes increased it. Additional evidence was found by Hoorn
(1996). Rugg & Nagy (1987) found that nonwords with incorrect
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orthography for the standard language evoked smaller N400-amplitudes than
orthographically correct nonwords. Stuss, Picton & Cherri (1986) identified
N400-activity for naming pictures, Nigram, Hoffman & Simons (1992) for
sentence endings with unexpected pictures, and Stuss, Sarazin, Leech &
Picton (1983) for mental rotation of geometrical figures. Although it may be
argued that these are also semantic stimuli, these findings call for careful
consideration of the linguistic status of the N400.
7.3 A moderate electrocortical effect for metaphors? Right hemi-
spheric?
Section 7.1 ended with the observation that electrocortical effects of meta-
phor processing are presumably related to computational procedures. There-
fore, the 'shock' effect of metaphor should not be seen in the light of a
unidimensional arousal theory of surprise, but rather as a modulation of the
N400-amplitude, which is measured in response to semantic mismatches
(Section 7.2).
If the N400-effect is the manifestation of semantic mismatch on a con-
trolled level of cognitive processing, an increase of the amplitude should be
found when words are less related, as in the case of metaphors. Thus, literal
expressions should show less N400-activity than metaphors, whereas
anomalies should show most.
Moreover, there may even be a hemispheric specialization for processing
the diverse expression types. Danesi (1989) was among the first to
hypothesize about the locus of metaphor processing in the neurological
anatomy. He speculated that different stages in metaphor processing are
connected with different hemispheric specializations. Danesi claimed that
processing the B-term of a metaphor is a right-hemispheric activity, whereas
the A-term is processed in the left hemisphere. These views were based
mainly on the results of two studies: Goldberg & Costa (1981) and Winner
& Gardner (1977).
Goldberg & Costa suggested that the anatomy of the right hemisphere is
better fit for processing novel stimuli, because the neural-synaptic
connections supposedly are more numerous and intertwined. The
organization of the left hemisphere was viewed by these authors as a more
sequential neural-synaptic structure, which is better equipped for processing
overlearned patterns.
Inspired by the literary theorist Jakobson (1960), Winner & Gardner
questioned whether the left hemisphere was specialized for figurative
language. They presented metaphors to a group of subjects with left-
hemisphere damage, a group with right-hemisphere damage, and a normal
control group. For paraphrasing the metaphors, subjects could choose from
four pictorial interpretations. It was concluded that normal controls and left-
hemisphere damaged patients could discriminate better between literal and
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metaphoric interpretations than right-hemisphere damaged patients. As
Danesi put it, this was 'for the first time in neuropsychology [that] an experi-
mental link was established between the right hemisphere and the con-
tent-structure of a metaphor.'1
Based on these studies, Danesi suggested that metaphor may be viewed
among the class of novel stimuli, given the fact that the B-term is an
unexpected completion of the A-term. In other words, the A-term could be
conceived as an automatically activated pattern, which is encoded in the left
hemisphere; the B-term, on the other hand, as a novel stimulus, which is
encoded in the right hemisphere. The C-term, then, is the synthesis of A- and
B-term, in which probably both left and right hemisphere are involved.
If a metaphoric B-term is a novel stimulus in combination with the A-
term, it follows that there should be asymmetrically distributed N400-
bactivity (cf. Kutas & Hillyard 1980  , 1982). If novel stimuli are pre-
dominantly processed in the right hemisphere, the N400-activity for meta-
phors and anomalies should be foremost at right scalp locations, whereas for
literals, N400 should be biased towards left scalp locations.
aKutas & Hillyard (1980 ) found that the N400 was larger for strong than
for weak anomalies; hence literal expressions should evoke small effects,
metaphors medium effects and anomalies large N400-effects. In line with
Danesi, the effects should be left-hemispheric for literals and right-hemi-
spheric for metaphors and anomalies.
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7.4 ERP experiment on the N400-effect of literary metaphor
Subjects were female undergraduates of language and literature (N = 24),
Dutch native speakers, aged between 19 and 27 years old. They received pay
for volunteering in a three-choice classification decision task as described in
Section 6.4, Chapter 6. To avoid the repetition effects observed in the RT
experiments of Chapter 6, the 3-choice task - with the least repetitions of
stimuli - was preferred to the 2-choice task.  However, Chapter 6 indicated2
that results depend highly on the design, so that the outcomes of this
experiment should be valuated in this light.
Subjects were tested during the second week following the first day of
their monthly period. They had never participated in an experiment, and re-
ceived no information about stimuli or research aims. They were right-
handed and had normal or corrected to normal vision.
Stimuli were the expressions of Table 4.1, Chapter 4. Trials were built
up, according to the RT experiment in the previous Chapter. They consisted
of a sequence of prime - fixation line - target. In the expression condition,
the prime consisted of an expression without B- term (the child is a ) ,  a f t e r
which a fixation line was projected (the child is a ____). The width of the
fixation line had four or five underscores, corresponding to the number of B-
term letters. Targets were B-terms, completing the expression (the child is a
moon). Unlike the RT experiment of Chapter 6, reading the prime was not
self paced, because the software package (InstEP, Campbell & Bell 1992)
furnished no options to interact with the subject. In the expression condition,
the prime was presented two seconds, followed by a one-second fixation
line, which was replaced by the B-term for two more seconds. The inter-
trial-interval was also two seconds.
The duration of the primes in the context condition was based on a mean
reading time of two words a second. The build up of the trials in context was
different from the RT experiment in Chapter 6. Since the readers could not
indicate when they finished reading the text, it might be that the B-term was
projected while being in the middle of a sentence. Therefore, the context
without the B-term was presented during the mean reading period,
whereafter the screen was cleared for one second, and the context returned.
This indicated that they should read the expression that preceded the B-term,
for which they had two seconds. Then, the fixation line (1 second) and B-
term (2 seconds) were projected in the context. Warning feedback was
provided acoustically by the session leader.
Before starting the experiment, subjects received 10 practice trials on 3
prototypical instances of each expression type, so as to define literal
expressions, metaphors, and anomalies. Subsequently, subjects had 20
practice trials of unrepeated expressions per expression type in both
conditions, until the standard deviation of the reaction times was less than
15% of the mean, and errors were less than 10% of the total number of
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responses (Sanders 1980). The practice stimuli were unrelated to those of
the actual test set.
Regarding apparatus and recordings, the software package InstEP
(Campbell & Bell 1992) ran on a 368SX slave and 486DX2 master com-
puter, controlling stimulus presentation and data acquisition (EEG, VEOG,
HEOG, movement time (MT), RT and decisions). Subjects were lying on a
bed in a sound-attenuated dimly lit (15 lux) cubicle. A response-button box
with three decision keys and a home key was positioned at an optimal
distance for each subject, half the trial block at the left side, half at the right
side of the subject. Each decision key was assigned to one of the options: L
(literal), M (metaphor) or A (anomaly). Stimuli were presented on a screen
placed at a distance of 75 cm from the subject. HEOG and VEOG were
measured by two tin electrodes placed at the outer canthus of each eye and
by two tin electrodes placed infra-orbital and supra-orbital in line with the
pupil. EEG was recorded from nonpolarizable tin electrodes mounted in an
elastic cap (Electro Cap International) and located at standard left and right
hemisphere positions, spanning the surface of the scalp (Figure 7.0: Inter-
national 10/20 System names (Jasper 1958): Fz, Cz, C3, C4, Pz, T3, T4,
O2). Linked ear electrodes were used as reference electrodes.
Figure 7.0: Electrode locations at the scalp, according to the International 10/20 System.
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EEG was sampled continuously, because InstEP could not sample single
trials that incorporated more than two stimuli. The signals were sampled
with a lowpass filter of 30 Hz and a time constant of five seconds, and were
digitized at 100 Hz. Electrode impedance never exceeded 3 kÙ.
Since InstEP could not sample two response times (MT and RT) for one
trial, MT was recorded directly from the decision keys, while releases from
the home key were registered via an extra EEG-channel. The latency from
B-term onset to the polarity shift at home key release was considered to
reflect RT.
The design consisted of three between-subject factors of condition order
(expression before context vs context before expression), decision key order
(LMA, LAM, MLA, MAL, ALM, AML) and index finger order (right
before left vs left before right) with two within-subject factors of condition
(expression vs context) and expression type (literals vs metaphors vs
anomalies). Condition was blocked and all expressions of Table 4.1 were
pseudo-randomly mixed within blocks.
In the same way as in Chapter 6, Section 6.4, RT did not represent com-
pleted decisions. Subjects probably used all time available to make their
decisions. Therefore, all further analysis was performed on MT+RT, or
aarrival time (RT ) for short.
Results for arrival times
Analysis of the 2*6*2*2*3 design would result in N = 1 for each cell, so
that within-cell variation is absent. Therefore, it was first investigated
whether certain factors could be excluded from the analysis. The previous
aChapter showed that condition order affected RT  , so that two preliminary
MANOVAs were carried out, one excluding decision key order, and one
excluding index finger order.
MANOVA without decision key order showed that effects of index finger
order were insignificant (e.g., index finger order by condition order by
2,19condition by expression type: Pillai's Trace = .07, F  = .80, p = .462; main
1,20effect of index finger order: F  = .43, p = .521). MANOVA excluding
index finger order showed that effects of decision key order were
insignificant (e.g., decision key order by condition order by condition by
10,24expression type: Pillai's Trace = .52, F  = .86, p = .576; main effect of
5,12decision key order: F  = 1.34, p = .313). Since factors were
counterbalanced, order of decision key and index finger were pooled over
subjects, so that the design was reduced to a 2*2*3 of condition order,
condition and expression type.
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Figure 7.1: Grand mean arrival times (ms) in a 3-choice task for literal expressions (),
metaphors () and anomalies ( ) in expression and context (correct responses). Solid lines
signify expression before context, dashed lines context before expression. In each cell, N =
12.
Figure 7.1 displays the grand means for the arrival times. The appropriate
statistics are found in Table 7.0 (Appendix), and underscored the next state-
ments:
(I) Performing expression as the first condition (solid) resulted in slow re-
sponses, while performing expression last resulted in fast responses
(dashed). In context, the order effects faded (interaction of condition order
by condition). (II) Expression was performed faster than context (main effect
of condition). (III) Anomalies were reacted to fastest - followed by literals -
whereas reactions to metaphors were slowest (main effect of expression
type).
Identification of ERPs
For EEG-analysis, InstEP files were converted to the STPBS format (Woes-
tenburg 1994). Horizontal and vertical eye movement artifacts were
removed by a regression analysis in the frequency domain.  The presence of3
eye movement was tested in a covariance analysis and significant parts were
deleted. Clipped trials were detected and replaced by an interpolation
between two adjacent trials of the same category. The lower limit of outliers
was set by the mean plus two times sd. Trials exceeding this lower limit
were interpolated. Subsequently, the Orthogonal Polynomial Trend Analysis
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(OPTA: Woestenburg, Verbaten, Van Hees & Slangen 1983; Woestenburg
1994) was performed for each subject. A complex variance analysis in the
frequency domain tested which frequencies were obscured by noise and
which frequencies contained strong ERPs. Upon these statistics, it was
decided which insignificant frequency bands were filtered. Although the
OPTA permits trend analysis, no trend was expected, so that only the mean
was used for filtering.
Time slice analysis
Next, statistical analysis was performed over all subjects by dividing the
ERPs elicited by the B-term into subsequent time slices (Woestenburg, Das-
Smaal, Brand & Kramer 1992). A sample period of 20 ms was used for a
window extending 0-800 ms after B-term onset with a 150 ms baseline. A
priori, it was expected that N400 occurred in the time span between 265-445
ms after B-term onset. The 10 time slices of 20 ms each in this area were
tested for significant amplitude differences, all having to meet an á-level of
.05. To arrive at a more conservative rejection area, .05 was divided by 10
(the number of time slices). Hence, * = p < .05, ** = p < .005. The time slice
analysis was used as an explorative analysis to identify the amplitude differ-
ences at each time interval for the effects of condition and expression type
only. This led to selecting the amplitudes of two time intervals (concerning
the P300 and the N400), on which data a MANOVA was run for the com-
plete design.
Results of the time slice analysis
Figure 7.2 up to 7.3 show the main effects of condition and expression type
and their interaction, while Table 7.1 (Appendix) shows the maximal ampli-
tude differences between 265 and 445 ms after B-term onset.  Notice that the4
maximal differences occurred at the rising flank of the N400, rather than at a
fixed moment in time. This raises the problem that it is uncertain whether or
not the same ERP was measured for each factor or factor level. This issue
will be elaborated in the MANOVA analysis.
Taken together the results of Figures 7.1 up to 7.3 and Table 7.1 (Appen-
dix), the following effects emerged 265-445 ms after B-term onset:
(I) Expression evoked larger negative deflections than context at Fz, Cz, C3,
C4 (Figure 7.2, main effect of condition). (II) Anomalies and metaphors
elicited larger negative shifts than literals at all electrode locations.
Particularly at Fz, anomalies raised stronger amplitudes than metaphors,
although this trend remained insignificant (Figure 7.3, main effect of
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expression type). (III) At Fz, anomalies in expression yielded larger negative
shifts than metaphors, which yielded much larger amplitudes than literals.
Context merely mitigated these differences. At the other locations, however,
metaphors in expression invoked larger negative shifts than anomalies,
which showed larger negative shifts than literals. Context not only had a
mitigating effect, it also caused anomalies to show stronger negative
deflections than metaphors (Figure 7.4). However, these effects were only
significant at a liberal á-level, particularly for comparisons containing lit-
erals and metaphors at Fz, Pz, C3, C4, literals and anomalies at Pz, and
metaphors and anomalies at OZ and C4 (Table 7.1: interaction of condition
by expression type).
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Figure 7.2: Main effect of condition on the grand mean EEG. Solid lines exemplify ex-
pression, dashed lines context. Negativity up. See also next page.
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Figure 7.3: Main effect of expression type on the grand mean EEG. Literals are dashed,
metaphors solid, and anomalies dotted. Negativity up. See also next page.
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Figure 7.4: Interaction of condition by expression type on the grand mean EEG. Literals are
dashed, metaphors solid, anomalies dotted. Two panels are shown per electrode location.
Upper panel: Results for expression. Lower panel: Results for context. Negativity up. See
also next pages.
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To look into the topography of the interaction in more detail, the amplitude
of the grand mean ERP at 385 ms after B-term onset was scored at the
midline as shown in Figure 7.5.
Figure 7.5: Grand mean amplitude, 385 ms after B-term onset at midline locations.
Negativity up.
Figure 7.5 shows that (I) in expression, the smallest negative shifts were
found at posterior locations (Pz, O2), whereas the largest were found at
anterior locations (Fz, Cz). (II) In context, the smallest negative shifts were
found anteriorly (Fz), and the largest posteriorly (cf. condition by lead,
Appendix Table 7.3). (III) For both conditions, expressions reached their
maximal amplitude at Cz.
MANOVA on P300 and N400
The time slice analysis covered a broad range of time intervals, in which
different ERPs may be identified. Maximal amplitude differences were
found for the rising flank of the N400, which were overlapping the P300
area. In other words, P300 also could be sensitive to processing the B-term.
Physiological data are repeated measures. If a factor has more than two
degrees of freedom, MANOVA should be carried out (O'Brien & Kaiser
1985; Vasey & Thayer 1987). Since the N400 was evoked by linguistic
stimuli, F-values with stimuli as the random factor should also be calculated
(Clark 1973). Otherwise, generalizations are limited to the presently used
stimulus set. However, the ERP method has the disadvantage that an ERP
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cannot be estimated for single stimuli, due to the unfavorable signal-noise
ratio. Thus, the ERP is always a (grand) mean value that needs at least 20
observations. F-values with stimuli as the random factor, therefore, have to
be cancelled, so that generalizations are limited to the stimulus set in
question. In fact, the complete N400-literature suffers from this restriction.
For the same reason, it is impossible to analyze the effects of, for ex-
ample, lexical ambiguity. Since the estimation of an ERP needs a minimum
number of observations, even more inconveniences arise. Amplitude differ-
ences for the complete window (0-800 ms) may be computed for the main
effects and first-order interactions. However, for implicit factors (decision
key order, condition order, index finger order) too few observations remain
to establish a stable ERP. Preferably, then, one would select the maximal
amplitude differences to investigate the higher-order interactions in a MAN-
OVA. However, this maximal amplitude difference should be fixed at one
time interval for all factor levels, otherwise it is impossible to tell whether
the same ERP applies. Unfortunately, in the present data, the maximal am-
plitude differences occurred at different moments of processing the B-terms.
It was decided, therefore, to carry out the analysis on the time intervals
305 ms (P300) and 385 ms (N400) after B-term onset, rather than on
maximal amplitude differences. MANOVA was run on the 6*2*2*6*2*3*2
design of the between-subject factors: Decision key order (LMA vs ALM vs
MAL vs MLA vs AML vs LAM), condition order (expression before context
vs context before expression), index finger order (left before right vs right
before left) and the within-subject factors of electrode lead (Fz vs Cz vs Pz
vs O2 vs C3 vs C4), condition (expression vs context), expression type
(literal vs metaphor vs anomaly) and time slice (305 ms vs 385 ms). The
analysis of effects of decision key order by condition order by index finger
order was prohibited by too few subjects. Therefore, three separate analyses
were performed for the effects of decision key order by condition order, de-
cision key order by index finger order, and condition order by index finger
order, thereby gaining 5 df. When certain variables were linearly dependent
on preceding ones (e.g., in the case of electrode leads), the within-error
matrix became singular, so that univariate tests were performed.
The main effects and interactions among condition order, index finger or-
der, condition and time slice were tested against á = .05 (*). T-tests ac-
cording to Bonferroni were performed for the main effect of expression
type, and the interactions of expression type with condition order, index
finger order, condition and time slice: á = .0167 (**). The main effect of
electrode lead was tested against á = .0033 (***), along with its interactions
with condition order, index finger order, condition and time slice. Inter-
actions of key order with expression type or electrode lead with expression
type, possibly embedded in (combinations of) condition order, index finger
order, condition and time slice handled á = .0011 (****). Interactions
involving key order and electrode lead, but not expression type, yielded 225
contrasts, so that á = .05/225 = 2.22  (*****). Interactions of key order by-04
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electrode lead by expression type rendered 675 contrasts, so that á = .05/675
= 7.41  (******). Only those effects that were better than these chance-05
levels will be reported.
Results of MANOVA on P300 and N400
Figure 7.6, Table 7.2 and Table 7.3 (Appendix) suggest the following con-
clusions:
(I) Expression elicited more negative going deflections than context. When
expression was presented first, amplitudes were more negative than when
presented last. Beginning with the right index finger rendered larger
negative amplitudes than beginning with the left, except for the comparison
between literals and anomalies in context, when context was presented last.
In this case, the difference reversed. Metaphors and anomalies evoked
stronger negative shifts than literals, except that literals yielded stronger
negative shifts than metaphors when context was presented last and the left
hand was used first (interaction of index finger order by condition order by
condition by expression type). (II) Expression raised the largest negative
shifts at fronto-central locations, whereas context showed the largest
negative deflections at Pz (interaction of condition by lead - see also Figure
7.5). (III) Expression affected the amplitudes at 305 and 385 ms equally
strong, whereas context primarily affected the amplitude at 385 ms (interac-
tion of condition by time slice). (IV) For literal expressions, the amplitude at
385 ms was more negative than that at 305 ms at Pz and C3. For metaphors,
however, the amplitude at 305 ms was more negative than that at 385 ms,
indicating that the difference between literals and metaphors was centrally
left and parietally oriented. For metaphors at Fz and anomalies at Pz, larger
negative shifts were elicited at 385 ms than at 305 ms, suggesting that
differences between metaphors and anomalies were frontally and parietally
oriented (interaction of electrode lead by expression type by time slice).
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Figure 7.6: Grand mean amplitudes for literal expressions (), metaphors () and
anomalies () at 305 ms (solid) and 385 ms (dashed) after B-term  onset. O2 rendered no
significant effects. Negativity up.
Table 7.2: Grand mean amplitudes (ìV) for the interaction of index finger order by
condition order by condition by expression type.
_________________________________________________________________________
expression before context 
right before left finger
expression context 
literals 2.08 5.53
metaphors 1.17 4.13
anomalies 1.45 2.80
left before right finger
expression context 
literals 4.34 4.56
metaphors -.36 5.67
anomalies -.24 3.41
context before expression 
right before left finger
expression context 
literals 6.12 5.05
metaphors 2.14 4.76
anomalies 1.84 2.67
left before right finger
expression context 
literals 8.68 9.61
metaphors 5.62 5.22
anomalies 5.39 6.34
_________________________________________________________________________
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Results for decision accuracy
Figure 7.7 shows the proportions of (in)correct decisions in a 3-choice task
in expression and context. Table 7.4 (Appendix) shows the measure of
agreement (Cohen's Kappa) of each subject for the correct decisions, the
means of which were .762 for expression and .726 for context.
(I) Anomalies were recognized best throughout conditions (about 95%) and
errors tended to 'metaphor'. (II) Metaphors were recognized slightly better in
context (74.1%) compared with expression (69.4%), whereas the opposite
occurred for literals: 85.9% in expression and 73.7% in context. However,
MANOVA on the number of correct decisions indicated that the interaction
between condition and literals versus metaphors was insignificant (Table
7.4). (III) In context, literals tended to be judged more as metaphors.
Figure 7.7: Percentages of (in)correct decisions in a 3-choice task (N = 24).
Discussion of arrival times
Analogous to the RT experiments in Chapter 6, repetition effects affected
aresponse times. When expression was presented last, RT  was fastest.
However, the differences among expression types remained unchanged. This
is different from Chapter 6, where these differences tended to vanish,
presumably due to repetition. Similar to the findings in the previous Chap-
ter, anomalies were processed fastest, metaphors slowest, whereas literal ex-
pressions were in between. Context did not change this pattern. The only
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adifference with the earlier RT  results is that the trend was significant that
literal expressions were reacted to faster than metaphors.
Therefore, the parallel anomaly model may be maintained, stating that
anomalies are processed in two short stages, literals in a long literal stage
and a short figurative one, and metaphors in a long literal and a long
figurative stage. It should be noted, however, that repetition of expression
types limits this model to the first presentation. Subjects probably recog-
nized earlier judgements, and disregarded the special metaphor processes.
Discussion of the N400
The grand mean EEG showed negative deflections with a peak amplitude at
385 ms after presentation of the B-term, which were identified as the N400.
Anomalies evoked the highest N400 amplitude, although the difference with
metaphors was insignificant. Literal expressions elicited the lowest
amplitudes.
It turned out, however, that these differences may change as a function of
complex task manipulations. For instance, literals in context evoked more
negativity than metaphors when context was presented last, while the left
index finger was used first. Any explanation of this result is merely a wild
guess.
Furthermore, it seemed that expression types may be differentiated ac-
cording to the location of processing. The difference between literals and
metaphors took place most prominently at central left and parietal locations,
whereas the difference between metaphors and anomalies was most
prominent at frontal and parietal locations. Danesi (1989) suggested that
processing the B-term of a metaphor - as a novel unexpected completion - is
a right-hemispheric activity, whereas the A-term is processed in the left
hemisphere. From this idea, it was inferred that literal B-terms - not being
novel completions - would be processed left-hemispheric, just as the A-
terms. The present data show that metaphor processing was obviously not
right-hemispheric. No effects that were specific for C4 occurred. Left-
hemispheric processing of the literal B-terms obtained some support, in that
C3 was involved in distinguishing literals from metaphors.
In comparison with other expression types, metaphors affected the
moment at which the negative amplitude shifts were strongest. A compari-
son of metaphors with literals showed that metaphors had their negative
peak at 305 ms after B-term onset, whereas literals did at 385 ms. Metaphors
and anomalies, however, both showed the highest negative shifts at 385 ms.
This may suggest that metaphors are earlier separated from literal
expressions than from anomalies. In other words, metaphors remain similar
to anomalies for a longer period than they do to literals.
The amplitude at 305 ms after B-term onset was probably not the re-
flection of the P300, but of the rising flank of the N400. The rationale is that
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at Pz and C3, the amplitude at 305 ms for metaphors was even more nega-
tive going than at 385 ms, whereas the P300 is supposed to be a positive
shift.
Except for the anomaly model, none of the models mentioned different
electrocortical effects for the diverse expression types. As expected by the
anomaly model, literal expressions yielded least N400 activity, whereas
anomalies yielded most. Since metaphors were less different from
anomalies than from literals, it could be concluded that metaphors were
intially processed as anomalies, which is a straightforward prediction of
the anomaly model.
aHowever, note that the ordinal pattern of RT  (A < L < M) is not
congruent with the ordinal pattern of the N400 amplitude (A $ M > L).
Thus, response speed as a function of calculating more feature overlap
was not related to higher amplitudes. It may be reasoned that N400 is
not part of the processing stages. Probably, it is an additional effect
based on a mismatch of semantic categories.
This, of course, is not a prediction of the anomaly model, which pre-
sumes that the electrocortical effect is a functional aspect of the process. In
the serial version of the anomaly model, the electrocortical effect was
supposed to mark the commencement of the figurative stage. Based on the
aRT  results, this is obviously not the case.
In the parallel version, N400 may only have an initial 'signaling' function.
In the case of literal expressions, the A-term is an instance of the B-term
category ('their house is a premises'), so that no mismatch occurs. In the case
of metaphors ('their house is a grave') or anomalies ('their house is a jerk'),
the A-term is not an instance of the B-term category. Therefore, the A-term
cannot be integrated into the B-term feature set. Here, the N400 effect
occurs, which might signal that 'this is probably not a literal expression'.
What tips the scale, however, is the success in calculating literal and
figurative shared sets, which is a time-consuming control process, launched
after the N400-effect.
Eventually, metaphors did not resemble anomalies in the way they were
processed. Metaphors established large literal and figurative shared sets,
whereas anomalies did not. Therefore, anomalies were processed faster than
metaphors. However, metaphors did resemble anomalies in the sense that
both provided a category mismatch, evoking similar N400 amplitudes.
The (poetic) context reduced the differences among expression types. It
might be that poetry is such a diffuse primer that subjects did not know
which stimulus category to expect for the B-term, so that the expression
types became exchangeable.
It is not likely that N400 was evoked by lower word frequencies for the
anomalous B-terms, because the metaphoric B-terms - which had high word
frequencies - elicited similar amplitudes, whereas the literal B-terms - with
high word frequencies - did not.
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Discussion of decision accuracy
Parallel to the results in Chapter 6, error rates were quite high, except for
anomalies. For literals in context, decisions tended more to 'metaphor' and
for metaphors more to 'literal' than compared with expression. However, this
interaction remained insignificant (Appendix Table 7.4). Despite the extra
set of 20 unrepeated practice trials for each expression type in both
conditions, the confusion was not resolved.
7.5 General discussion for psychology
Fischler in Rugg, Kok, Barrett & Fischler (1985) has already suggested that
ERPs may be used to explore metaphor processing. She speculated that
ERPs could distinguish literal from metaphoric language, which appears to
be valid for the N400. Yet, N400 probably was not part of the metaphor
process, but rather the indication of a category mismatch, not present for
literal expressions. Some support for this interpretation of the N400 may be
found in Boddy & Weinberg (1981), who made an inquiry into the N1-P2
complex in response to category mismatches. Upon visual inspection, their
Figure 1 and 2 show larger N400 amplitudes for negative instances of a cat-
egory than for positive instances. Furthermore, Polich (1985) reported that
while subjects performed a semantic categorization task, inappropriate in-
stance-category combinations in a sentence elicited larger N400 amplitudes
than appropriate ones.
The idea of category mismatch also converges with the indexing status
attributed to N400 by Chwilla, Brown & Hagoort (1995). They saw N400 as
a reflection of lexical integration (do words match?), which is congruent
with the idea of matching categories. The N400-effect does not seem to be
part of the special metaphor process, so that its manifestation may be limited
to the less complex forms of semantic processing.
Moreover, various task-induced effects violated the clear-cut semantic
relatedness of the N400. Effects of index finger order and condition order
intruded upon the N400-effects of condition and expression type. Quite
powerful trends of decision key order could only be rejected by handling an
extremely conservative á-level. Chwilla, Brown & Hagoort claimed that
such side-effects of task requirements can be avoided by installing a passive
reading task, which obtained similar results to their lexical decision task.
However, this is a trade-off between one dilemma and another. Certainly,
task effects are excluded from the data, but all controls over decision errors
and constant attention are also lost. This may perhaps not be a problem for a
relatively simple task such as lexical decision - indeed, the authors provided
evidence for comparable results - but for a complex decision among literals,
metaphors and anomalies, errors do frequently occur, so that ERPs should
not be calculated across all exemplars of a stimulus category. In addition, by
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not employing a task in an experiment, the danger of circularity is ever-
present. In that case, N400 is not only the reflection of perceiving a semantic
unexpectedness, but the unexpectedness is deduced from the manifestation
of the N400.
7.6 General discussion for the theory of literature
and he, whom the fire of the spirit en hem, wien het vuur van den geest
with the bite of a scorpion met den beet van een schorpioen
pierced the smooth labyrinth of the cortex door het glad labyrinth van de schors
into the weak of the brain in het weke der hersenen drong
as poison in a greedy sponge, als gif in een gulzige spons,
breaks by night in a crown of thorns breekt bij nacht in een doornenkroon
into the sweat of thought het zweet der gedachten uit
(Own translation)
Marsman, H. (1975). De dierenriem, VI. Verzamelde gedichten. Querido, Amsterdam, 149.
This fragment is one of the contexts used to explore metaphor processing. It
speaks about 'the fire of spirit, piercing the cortex, into the brain', and with
ample poetic license, it may remind us of the words by Breton that poetry -
and specifically metaphor - creates that 'higher unity of fire' or 'the energy of
the shot' (Richards 1965: 125), provoked by the collision of semantically
deviant words.
The anomaly theory of metaphor processing started exactly from this
point, subscribing the surrealist proclamation (Breton 1955) that any two
things put on a par make good poetry, no matter how remote or trivial they
are. They may not have any symbolic value in themselves, yet, by stating
that they are like each other, any two randomly chosen objects become art.
They form a formal opposition that evokes an effect not present when they
are presented in isolation:
(...) tout [fait image] et que le moindre objet, auquel n'est pas assigné
un rôle symbolique particulier, est susceptible de figurer n'importe
quoi. L'esprit est d'une merveilleuse promptitude à saisir le plus faible
rapport qui peut exister entre deux objets pris au hasard et les poètes
savent qu'ils peuvent toujours, sans crainte de tromper, dire de l'un
qu'il est comme l'autre: la seule hiérarchie qu'on puisse établir des
poètes ne peut même reposer que sur le plus ou moins de liberté dont
ils ont fait preuve à cet égard. (...) Comparer deux objets aussi
éloignés que possible l'un de l'autre, ou, par toute autre méthode, les
mettre en présence d'une manière brusque et saissisante, demeure la
tâche la plus haute à laquelle la poésie puisse prétendre. En cela doit
tendre de plus en plus à s'exercer son pouvoir inégalable, unique, qui
est de faire apparaître l'unité concrète des deux termes mis en rapport
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et de comuniquer à chacun d'eux, quel qu'il soit, une vigueur qui lui
manquait tant qu'il était pris isolément. Ce qu'il s'agit de briser, c'est
l'opposition toute formelle de ces deux termes. (...) Plus l'élément de
dissemblance immédiate parâit fort, plus il doit être surmonté te nié.
(...) Ainsi deux corps différents, frottés l'un contre l'autre, atteignent,
par l'étincelle, à leur unité suprême dans le feu. (Breton 1955: 148-
149)
It is this 'higher unity of fire' that was investigated in the current Chapter. It
was supposed that metaphors and anomalies would evoke certain
electrocortical effects, not present, or at least less powerful for literal expres-
sions.
Indeed, such effects were found. A brain potential called N400 was ex-
amined, which - in previous psychological studies - was found to be sensi-
tive to the frustration of semantic expectations. Literal expressions appeared
to elicit smaller N400 amplitudes than metaphors and anomalies. 
The question posed by Danesi (1989) whether the brain has specialized
areas to process metaphors was partly confirmed. Danesi stated that the B-
term of a metaphor is a novel completion of the A-term and that the
physiological structure of the right hemisphere was most suitable to process
novel stimuli. It was deduced that normal completions, such as literal B-
terms, would be processed by the left hemisphere, which - as Danesi
suggested - was better equipped to process overlearned language patterns.
However, metaphor processing was not a right-hemispheric activity. No
N400-effects occurred for expression type that were specific for the
electrodes put at the right side of the skull. More evidence was found for the
idea that literal B-terms were processed by the left hemisphere. The
distinction between literals and metaphors took place particularly at the
electrodes placed on the left side of the skull.
Yet, it was inferred that the N400-effect was not part of the processing of
the expressions, but that it was an additional effect based on a category
amismatch. The reason was a dissociation between the pattern of RT s and
athe pattern of the N400. The RT s showed that anomalies were fastest,
followed by literals, which were faster than metaphors. If a brain potential is
part of a process, it is supposed to follow the pattern of RTs. Thus, N400
should have been largest for anomalies, followed by literals, and smallest for
metaphors, which was obviously not the case.
A feasible alternative was that metaphors and anomalies provided a
mismatch between the category of the A- and the B-term, which was not
present for literal expressions. Literal expressions matched an instance with
an appropriate category ('their house is a premises'), whereas metaphors
('their house is a grave') and anomalies ('their house is a jerk') did not (cf.
Instance-category distribution per expression type, Chapter 4).
In sum, Breton's idea that a formal opposition is formed by nonliteral
expressions was correct in that metaphors and anomalies both contain a
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category mismatch, which is probably responsible for the strong N400-
effects. In this respect, the anomaly model, which states that metaphors and
anomalies resemble each other is also correct, in evoking a larger
electrocortical effect than literal expressions. However, this effect is not an
inalienable part of the process that distinguishes metaphors from other
aexpression types (cf. the RT  pattern), but is rather an additional category
mismatch effect. This, of course, was not foreseen by the anomaly model.
In other words, if N400 is the reflection of a formal opposition in sem-
antics - such as a category mismatch - Barthes' question - whether the struc-
turalist principle of opposition should be reduced to terms of binarism - be-
comes most germane. Barthes envisioned the communication in binary
codes as a general human phenomenon, thereby referring to the drum codes
of tribal man, as well as the automatic digital information processing and
cybernetics. According to Barthes, binarism expresses itself most strongly in
artificial systems and is less profound in natural communication. Barthes
wondered if binarism is a universal phenomenon; and on the other hand,
given it's universality, if it has a natural foundation:
Questioned in phonology, unexplored in semantics, binarism is the
great unknown in semiology, whose types of opposition have not been
outlined. (...) It is very tempting to found the general binarism of the
codes on physiological data, inasmuch as it is likely that neuro-
cerebral perception also functions in an all-or-nothing way (...).
(Barthes 1970: 82)
The latter remark is not really pertinent. Neuro-cerebral perception does
function in an all-or-nothing way at the level of the cells. At the synaps,
electrons are either fired or not. Certain cells even await a preset number of
signals before starting to fire, which, in a way, may be seen as a binary
procedure. However, this is not the level that Barthes wanted to study,
because the semantic oppositions occur at the level of cognitive processing.
Here, the concept of binary systems is not so self-evident. In Donders
(1868) and in the earlier work of Sternberg (1969), the supposition was that
information accumulated within a stage, before it was transmitted to the next
stage in an all-or-nothing way. By contrast, later models allowed a gradual
build up and constant flow of information between stages (e.g., McClelland
1979). Ratcliff (1988) proposed that decisions between two options (e.g., is
the word pair an opposition or a synonym?) are liable to gradual stochastic
mutations in strength among the various response options. These latter two
theories are definitely not binary models. Since the stage output is not 'on' or
'off', the time to execute a process is not the sum of its stages, as in a binary
model.
It may even be questioned whether the oppositions and semiological
codes are binary at all. A binary code knows no overlap between the onset or
offset of an electric switch. The opposition in a binary code is formed by the
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presence or absence of a signal. Oppositions in meaning are not the presence
or absence of one word or code, but the presence of two words or codes with
strong distinctive meanings. Yet, because oppositions emerge from the
comparison of two meanings, they hardly ever come without semantic
overlap. In other words, the biological signal is analogue rather than binary.
What emerges is that metaphors combine literal and figurative features in
the shared set. This is the most time-consuming operation compared with
literal expressions, which share literal features, and anomalies which share
hardly any features. Metaphors and anomalies evoke special electrocortical
effects, but these are probably established by the category mismatch that is
inherent in these expression types, not by the size of the shared feature set.
These findings agree best with a parallel anomaly model, which will be
elaborated in the next, concluding Chapter.
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1. However, the results cannot be interpreted as straightforwardly as suggested by Winner
& Gardner. Instead of analyzing all subject groups and factors in one analysis, subsets of
subjects and factors were selected, thereby discarding the inherent interactions, and
unintentionally increasing the degrees of freedom. In the original design, eight groups of
subjects were tested: 10 normal controls, 4 left-anterior aphasics (Broca), 10 left-anterior
aphasics (no Broca), 7 left-posterior aphasics (Wernicke), 6 left-posterior aphasics (no
Wernicke), 8 patients with anterior and posterior lesions, 7 demented patients, 22 right-
hemisphere patients.
These subjects were confronted with 18 adjective-noun metaphors ('a heavy heart'), half
of which were synaesthetic ('colourful music'). Although the aim was to investigate left- and
right-hemisphere sensitivity for literal versus figurative language, no contrast was provided
with literal expressions. According to the authors, the results for the two metaphor types did
not differ, and were pooled, without, however, providing the statistics that grounded this
decision. 
For each expression, four pictures served as interpretation of the metaphors. They could
depict the metaphoric meaning, the literal meaning, the adjective or the noun. Actually, the
latter two were not interpretations, but rather direct pictorial representations of one word,
the recognition of which is not comparable with interpreting a metaphor.
Subjects chose which picture best expressed the meaning of the metaphors, and two
scores were obtained: The number of first and the number of second choices. Although
nominal data demand a ÷  statistics, analysis of variance was performed. Instead of one 2
overall analysis, separate analyses were performed: A ONEWAY analysis of variance for
the four pictures in four subject groups, a t-test (expressed in F-values) for left- versus right-
hemisphere patients, and an analysis of variance on right-hemisphere patients versus
anterior versus posterior aphasics. The complete design, however, was an 8*2*4*2
MANOVA of subject group by metaphor type by picture type by score type. Moreover, it is
doubtful whether different receptiveness between left- and right-hemisphere patients was
measured for metaphor understanding, or that right-hemisphere patients had more difficulty
in transforming a linguistic text into a pictorial representation.
2. Repetition effects on the N400 were reported by Rugg (1985, 1987), Rugg & Nagy
(1987), Rugg, Furda & Lorist (1988), Nagy & Rugg (1989), Roth & Boddy (1989).
3. The frequency domain is a decomposition of sinus waves of different frequencies. In
other words, a time series is analyzed as the frequencies {0, .... , n}, such that 3  (ù) results
into the original time series. In the frequency domain, however, time does not exist, only
frequencies.
4. Note that it is common practice in encephalography to reverse the polarity in the pres-
entation of the data. Therefore, negativity is up.
Notes:
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Table 7.0: MANOVAs for the effects of condition order, condition and expression type on
athe grand mean arrival time (RT ) for correct responses. Insignificant effects are not
tabulated.
_________________________________________________________________________
Interactions of condition order by condition:
1 = ((expression before context) vs (context before expression)) vs
   (expression vs context)
1,22dep. variable F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
a 1,24RT    17.52 .000  15.80   .001 1    244.46  4.19 .000*
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of condition:
1 = expression vs context
1,22dep. variable F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
a 1,22RT    26.72 .000  26.81   .000 1   -301.93 -5.17 .000*
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effects of expression type:
1 = literals vs metaphors
2 = literals vs anomalies
3 = metaphors vs anomalies
dep. Pillai's
2,21variable Trace F    p df quasi-F p coeff.   t   p
a 2,30RT .84    53.45 .000  41.12   .000 1   -157.71 -4.13 .000**
2    225.70  7.73 .000**
3    383.41  9.75 .000**
_________________________________________________________________________
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Table 7.1: F-values for the minimal and maximal amplitude differences at 10 intervals
between 265 and 445 ms after B-term onset. Temporal locations are neglected, due to
extensive numbers of outliers. N = 24.
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effect of condition:
expression vs context
electrode min. amp. diff. max. amp. diff.
1,23 1,23location F   p F   p
Fz 17.44 .0004** 27.35 .0000**
Cz  1.31 .2634  22.29 .0001**
Pz   .00 .9609    .99 .3312 
Oz   .46 .5021   3.62 .0697 
C3  3.47 .0752  13.18 .0014**
C4  6.91 .0150*  27.67 .0000**
_________________________________________________________________________
_
Main effect of expression type:
literals vs metaphors
electrode min. amp. diff. max. amp. diff.
1,23 1,23location F   p F   p
Fz 11.36 .0026** 28.34 .0000**
Cz  1.34 .2588  24.34 .0001**
Pz   .00 .9632  25.28 .0000**
Oz   .27 .6104  10.70 .0034**
C3  2.65 .1170  26.05 .0000**
C4  1.38 .2523  25.52 .0000**
literals vs anomalies
electrode min. amp. diff. max. amp. diff.
1,23 1,23location F   p F   p
Fz 13.06 .0015** 29.58 .0000**
Cz  4.44 .0461*  24.33 .0001**
Pz  2.54 .1244  25.37 .0000**
Oz   .20 .6598  21.33 .0001**
C3  7.09 .0139*  27.01 .0000**
C4  6.42 .0186* 34.25 .0000**
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metaphors vs anomalies
electrode min. amp. diff. max. amp. diff.
1,23 1,23location F   p F   p
Fz   .53 .4753   1.78 .1948 
Cz   .23 .6354   2.00 .1707 
Pz   .01 .9042   3.45 .0761 
Oz   .04 .8371   3.38 .0790 
C3   .42 .5224   3.18 .0877 
C4   .91 .3493   3.59 .0707 
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of expression type by condition:
literals (expression - context) vs metaphors (expression - context)
electrode min. amp.  diff. max. amp. diff.
1,23 1,23location F   p F   p
Fz  1.06 .3145   5.70 .0256*
Cz  1.51 .2315   2.92 .1009 
Pz   .96 .3371   6.60 .0172*
Oz   .60 .4449   3.78 .0643 
C3  1.98 .1728   9.42 .0054*
C4   .94 .3417   5.12 .0334*
literals (expression  - context) vs anomalies (expression  - context)
electrode min. amp. diff. max. amp. diff.
1,23 1,23location F   p F   p
Fz  1.03 .3211   2.44 .1316 
Cz   .32 .5780   1.67 .2086 
Pz   .14 .7128   4.92 .0367*
Oz   .00 .9636   1.08 .3101 
C3   .62 .4403   3.97 .0582 
C4   .00 .9646    .47 .5016 
metaphors (expression  - context) vs anomalies (expression  - context)
electrode min. amp. diff. max. amp. diff.
1,23 1,23location F   p F   p
Fz   .00 .9734   1.67 .2094 
Cz   .28 .6040   2.08 .1628 
Pz   .02 .8924   2.47 .1294 
Oz   .71 .4093   4.45 .0461*
C3   .08 .7800   2.41 .1340 
C4  2.83 .1062   9.48 .0053*
_________________________________________________________________________
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Table 7.3: MANOVA for the effects of condition order (expression before context vs
context before expression), index finger order (left before right vs right before left), lead (Fz
vs Cz vs Pz vs Oz vs C3 vs C4), condition (expression vs context), expression type (literal
vs metaphor vs anomaly) and time slice (305 ms vs 385 ms). Effects of decision key order
were never better than a conservative á-level.
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effect of condition:
1 = expression vs context
1,5dep. variable F    p coeff.   t   p
ìV    16.81 .009 1    -64.46 -4.10 .009*
_________________________________________________________________________
Main effect of expression type:
1 = literals vs metaphors
2 = literals vs anomalies
3 = metaphors vs anomalies
dep. Pillai's
2,4variable Trace F    p coeff.   t   p
ìV .96    54.04 .001 1    -52.85 11.20 .000**
2     66.98  6.21 .002**
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of condition order by condition:
1,5dep. variable F    p coeff.   t   p
ìV    6.93 .046    -41.37 -2.63 .046*
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of index finger order by condition order by condition by expression type:
1 = literals vs metaphors
2 = literals vs anomalies
3 = metaphors vs anomalies
dep. Pillai's
2,4variable Trace F    p coeff.   t   p
ìV .78     7.04 .049 1    -33.98 -3.58 .016**
2    -22.24 -3.85 .012**
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of condition by electrode lead:
1 = (expression vs context) vs (Fz vs Pz)
2 = (expression vs context) vs (Cz vs Pz)
3 = (expression vs context) vs (Pz vs C4)
dep. Pillai's
5,1variable Trace F    p coeff.   t   p
ìV 1.00   419.85 .037 1   -19.78 -6.39 .001***
1,5dep. variable F    p coeff.   t   p
ìV   102.66 .000 2   -10.96  -10.13 .000***
   31.93 .002 3    12.24  2.65 .002***
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_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of condition by time slice:
1 = 305 ms vs 385 ms
1,5dep. variable F    p coeff.   t   p
ìV    15.33 .011 1   -14.02   -3.92 .011*
_________________________________________________________________________
Interaction of electrode lead by expression type by time slice:
1 = (Pz vs C3) vs (literals vs metaphors) vs (305 ms vs 385 ms)
2 = (Fz vs Pz) vs (metaphors vs anomalies) vs (305 ms vs 385 ms)
1,5dep. variable F    p coeff.   t   p
ìV    42.65 .001 1  2.11   6.53 .001****
   73.16 .000 2  1.78   8.55 .000****
_________________________________________________________________________
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Table 7.4: Cohen's Kappa and MANOVA for the correct decisions of each subject in a 3-
choice task in expression and context.
_________________________________________________________________________
expr. context expr. context
subject   ê    ê subject   ê    ê
01  .70  .55 13  .65  .56
02  .57  .79 14  .79  .81 interaction of condition by
03 1.00  .84 15  .96  .81 expression type:
04  .71  .65 16  .71  .61 Pillai's Trace = .32
2,2205  .80  .83 17  .86  .68 F  = 5.23, p = .014
06  .58  .88 18  .84  .93
07  .80  .77 19  .80  .59 cond. by (literals vs metaphors):
08  .85  .72 20  .86  .76 coeff. = 3.16, t = 1.88, p = .073
09  .74  .80 21  .62  .58 cond. by (literals vs anomalies):
10  .76  .64 22  .70  .81 coeff. = 3.33, t = 3.29, p = .003
11  .55  .81 23  .86  .52 cond. by (metap. vs anomalies):
12  .81  .76 24  .89  .79 coeff. =  .17, t =   .12, p = .909
0 .762 .726
_________________________________________________________________________
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The parallel two-stage anomaly race model
Three principal findings form the underpinning of the new anomaly  model.
First, metaphors accumulate a literal and (mixed) figurative shared set. Lit-
eral expressions accumulate only a literal shared set,
Figure 8.0: Parallel anomaly model for a four sets feature overlap in literal, metaphoric and
anomalous expressions.
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and anomalies hardly any shared set at all. Second, the time for accumu-
lating the shared set is shortest for anomalies, whereas accumulating the
shared set for metaphors takes a time that is equal to or longer than for
literal expressions. The reason is that anomalies activate smaller numbers of
features and accumulate small shared sets, so that processing stops quickly.
For literals and metaphors, more features are activated and larger shared sets
are accumulated, so that processing time increases. Thus, the time to decide
among expression types not only depends on the serial order of criterion
checks for sufficient overlap, but primarily on an 'end of file' criterion. The
third finding is that metaphors and anomalies evoke a more negative N400
amplitude than literal expressions, which may be ascribed to category mis-
matches for the former two.
Figure 8.0 shows the Venn diagrams for the feature sets of literal, meta-
phoric and anomalous expressions, according to the parallel anomaly model.
Only functionally important shared sets are depicted. Literal expressions
accumulate large literal shared sets. Metaphors accumulate shared sets
consisting of literal and figurative features as well. Anomalies do not
accumulate a considerable number of shared features. Context does not
seriously affect this configuration. Unlike Figure 2.0, Chapter 2, Figure 8.0
suggests that the A- and B-terms activate equal set sizes, except for anom-
alous B-terms, which have considerably smaller shared sets.
Figure 8.1 shows a parallel anomaly model. The activation of features in
the encode phase is similar to that in the comparison model (Figure 1.1,
Chapter 1). The A-term activates feature set X and the B-term feature set Y.
The features are words, rather than lines or letters. In this phase, it is unim-
portant whether features are literal or figurative, and in which order they
arrive. The chance that the first feature is literal may be high, but figurative
features intermingle. Yet, the features are already indexed as literal and/or
l f l ffigurative: X = X  c X  and Y = Y  c Y  . This is quite different from the serial
anomaly model (Figure 2.1, Chapter 2), in which literal features were
activated and processed before the figurative features.
Moreover, a check for category membership is introduced in the encode
phase, which may lead to the N400-effect that accompanies 'lexical in-
tegration' (Chwilla, Brown, & Hagoort 1995). After the B-term generated
feature set Y, it is verified whether the A-term is an instance of set Y.
(Evidently, it may also be checked whether the B-term is part of X). In other
words, it is assumed that appropriate instance-category combinations are
more likely to be activated by each other than inappropriate ones. In the case
of literal expressions, the A-term is an appropriate feature of Y, so that no or
less N400-activity occurs. This may lead to a facilitation for calculating the
lliteral shared set S  , in that the route to arrive at a decision for 'literal' is
elevated to a higher level of activation than the route for 'metaphor' or
'anomaly'. If the A-term is not a part of Y, the category mismatch may evoke
N400-activity and facilitate the calculation of the (mixed) figurative shared
fset S  . In that case, the route to arrive at a decision for 'metaphor' or
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'anomaly' is activated more strongly than the route for 'literal'. Due to the
category mismatch, N400 would form a preliminary indication whether the
expression is 'literal or not'.
Beware, however, that with the facilitation of the literal or figurative
route, N400 is attributed a functional role in the metaphor process, which
may in fact not be present. Since the status of this process module is
questionable, it is represented by broken lines.
l fIn the comparison phase, two information accumulators (#S  and #S )
operate in parallel, and race each other to satisfy the response criteria. Each
i jfeature x  is compared with each feature y  , using an intermediate criterion
i j of equality (x  . y ?). Thus, derivations, inflections, singular and plural are
counted as equal to each other and to word stems. For the accumulation of
l i j#S  , only those shared features that are literal (x  . y  = l ?) are counted.
fMeanwhile, the calculation of #S  asks whether a shared feature is literal for
i jthe one set and figurative for the other: x  . y  = l v  f ? . With this
procedure, shared features that are figurative for both feature sets are
filtered.
The information accumulator that reaches 'end of file' first is the first to
enter the response phase. Anomalies will be fast for both accumulators,
because smaller feature sets are activated by the B-term and few shared
f lfeatures are found. Literal expressions may be fast for #S  and slower for #S
, for which many literal shared features are found. Metaphors are slow for
l fboth #S  and #S  , because they establish literal as well as (mixed) figurative
lshared sets. Yet, the comparison phase allows that the race between #S  and
f#S  ends in a draw, so that the high speed of processing anomalies should be
regulated by the response phase.
The response phase is a combination of serial and parallel criterion
checks. The check for 'anomaly' precedes that for 'literal' and 'metaphor'.
However, the decision for anomality inspects two criteria in parallel. A
minimum number of literal shared features should be found along with a
minimum number of (mixed) figurative shared features before an expression
lcan be considered literal or metaphoric. The criterion q  is the number of
literal shared features needed to become 'literal' and corresponds with the
fupper panel of Figure 8.0. The criterion q  is the number of (mixed)
figurative shared features needed to become a metaphor, and corresponds
l fwith the middle panel of Figure 8.0. If an expression satisfies q  nor q  , it is
l l f f l fan anomaly: (#S  < q ) v (#S  < q )? . If an expression exceeds q  or q  , it only
needs to be checked whether sufficient (mixed) figurative shared features
f f f fhave been accumulated. If #S  is smaller than q  , (#S  < q )? , the expression
fis literal. If q  is met or exceeded, the expression is a metaphor.
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Figure 8.1: Parallel two-stage anomaly race model for metaphor understanding during the
first encounter in expression or context.
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Modeled in this way, the response phase allows for a continuum from lit-
eralness to metaphoricity to anomality (cf. note 5, Chapter 1). Suppose that
l fthe critical values of q  and q  are 10 shared features each. If an expression
l faccumulates 9 shared features for both #S  and #S  , the expression is an
l fanomaly. If #S  is 9 features, while #S  is 100, the expression is a metaphor
l fthat tends to anomality. If #S  is 100, while #S  is 9, the expression is literal.
l fIf #S  is 100, while #S  is 11, it is a metaphor with a literal trend. In other
l fwords, there may be fast metaphors (0 for #S  , 10 for #S ) and slow literals
l f(100 for #S  , 9 for #S ). In a categorization task as performed in Table 4.1
(Chapter 4), the expressions with strong trends for other expression types
would probably not reach significance.
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Implementation of the parallel anomaly model would require the following
computational procedures:
l f 1 n1. encode A-term: X = X  c  X  = {x .....x }
l f 1 m2. encode B-term: Y = Y  c  Y  = {y .....y }
l3. if A-term å Y 6 facilitate #S
felse facilitate #S
l l l f l f f l4. compute #S  = (X  1 Y ) v  #S  = (X  1 Y ) c  (X  1 Y )
l l f fif (#S  < q   v  #S  < q ) 6 respond 'anomaly' and stop
else go to 5
f f5. if #S  < q  6 respond 'literal'
else respond 'metaphor'
6. stop
l l lq  = number of literal elements in X  1 Y  needed to respond 'literal'
f l f f lq  = number of literal and figurative elements in (X  1 Y ) c  (X  1 Y ) needed
to respond 'metaphor'
The model may employ weighted features, which means that certain literal
and figurative features of a term may be more important than others (e.g.,
more salient, more prototypical, more frequently mentioned). The weighing
of the features could lead to a preferred order of comparison. In that case,
l Sl f Sf#S  should be rewritten as W  and #S  as W  , which is the weighted set size
lW of all shared features u, or the sum of all weights w of all features u in S
fand S  (cf. Section 2.3, Chapter 2).
The predictions in accordance with the parallel anomaly view are:
1. A metaphor activates four feature sets: Each term activates literal
and figurative features without a fixed order
2. the set sizes of these four feature sets are not always fixed: Single
term raises more features than expression or context
3. A literal expression has more shared literal features than a meta-
phor and an anomaly; a metaphor has shared features that are lit-
eral for the one term and figurative for the other more than a lit-
eral and an anomalous expression
4. The shared sets are not fixed, and cannot be predicted from the
isolated words: Expression and context raise larger shared sets than
single term
5. The response time for understanding an anomaly is less than for
literals and metaphors. Literals may have a slight advantage, how-
ever, they may end in a draw with metaphors
6. Metaphors and anomalies show large electrocortical effects for
category mismatches, not or less present for literal expressions
7. Between the two, context and expression usually show no significant
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differences. When they do, context nullifies the effects obtained
in expression
8. From the second presentation on, expression type differences will
be dissolved
Take into consideration that the parallel anomaly model only applies to the
first presentation of expressions. Repetitions of identical expressions wipe
out all expression type differences, because subjects probably recognize the
stimuli. Thus, the special metaphor processes may be ignored in favor of a
simple replication of an earlier judgement.
Moreover, basic linguistic properties such as word frequency and lexical
ambiguity may disrupt the process. Different word frequencies and lexical
ambiguity may increase the noise of the data. The effects of these variables
reiterate the point that stimulus sets should be as consistent as possible.
Thus far, and including this study, metaphor research has not streamlined
the stimuli sets rigorously enough, so that the results are open to unwanted
side-effects. Putting much effort into the stimulus sets is rewarded by a
higher resolution of the observed effects (see last Section).
Furthermore, Steen (personal communication) hesitated to accept that the
feature elicitation during one minute (Chapter 5) would reflect the feature
activation (and comparison) during the first seconds of processing (Chapter
6 and 7). Indeed, this is a major problem in testing the on-line processing of
metaphors. At the moment, however, there is no alternative. Therefore, it
should be kept in mind that the model in Figure 8.1 is a reconstruction,
rather than a finding.
On MIDAS
The parallel anomaly model has certain traits that correspond with an earlier
computational approach, called MIDAS (Metaphor Interpretation,
Denotation, and Acquisition System: Martin 1992). As in the above
proposed model, MIDAS is subject to the 'total time constraint' (Gerrig
a1989 ), which means that literal expressions and (conventional) metaphors
(e.g., idioms) are processed with roughly equal rapidity.
Unlike the parallel anomaly model, MIDAS works with a semantic net-
work of hierarchically organized concepts. In the parallel anomaly model,
two feature sets are compared, and the shared sets determine the expression
type. In MIDAS, the search strategy is to ask whether the B-term is part of
the A-term concepts. Thus, MIDAS essentially asks for category
membership. For instance, when MIDAS encounters a conventional
metaphor such as 'to kill a process', it checks whether the B-term ('process')
is part of the concepts of the A-term ('kill') that are available in the memory
base. Such a network of concepts differs from a feature set, in that it already
knows the fixed relations among its members. Thus, 'kill' presumes 'killer'
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and 'kill-victim'. MIDAS checks whether 'process' can perform the same role
as 'victim', which is predefined in the semantic network. In this respect,
MIDAS more closely resembles an interaction model than an anomaly
model.
However, the total time constraint is abandoned when MIDAS en-
counters a (conventional or innovative) metaphor about which no knowl-
edge is stored. Then, an additional, serial stage is executed in the form of a
search for the closest related associate (MES: Metaphor Extension System).
The difficulty with the search for the most closely related associate -
which is nice as a problem-solving tool for its own sake - is that novel meta-
phors may be processed equally quickly as literals, whereas in MIDAS's
conception, extra time is needed to execute the MES. The nice thing about
the MES is that metaphors stored in the memory base may be used to reason
what the solution to an unknown metaphor might be. Suppose that 'to kill a
process' is the unknown metaphor, whereas MES knows that 'to kill a
conversation' means 'to terminate a conversation'. MES also knows that a
process can be terminated. Thus, the match ('terminate') is established by
opening the semantic network of an A-term concept ('kill conversation') and
to compare its concepts with concepts (e.g., 'terminate') in the B-term net-
work (the network of 'program'). Such a device is not implemented in the
parallel anomaly model; however, if it is allowed that features also activate
feature sets, a similar mechanism could be applied.
On the other hand, MIDAS cannot really distinguish literals from meta-
phors, because it interprets each expression by checking all available
concepts, literal or metaphoric. If the memory base is not sufficient, MIDAS
presumes that it has encountered a metaphor, which need not be the case. In
principal, if MIDAS attempted to interpret a literal expression of which it
has no knowledge, it would treat it as a metaphor by starting the MES. In
MIDAS, every use of an expression is predefined, without a criterion to
decide between literalness or metaphoricity.
MPC: A neural net for metaphors
Another approach to metaphor comprehension is the use of a neural network
system. With a neural net, it may be accounted for that subjects learn from
repeated presentations, although the sudden disappearance of expression
atype differences in RT  from the second presentation on is harder to explain.
Neural nets suppose a gradual learning curve, which is described by
changing the weights for a stimulus. However, if the sudden disappearance
aof expression type differences in RT  is a matter of recognition, then the
agradually changing weights loose their explanatory power. The equal RT s
for repeated presentations indicate 'one trial learning', whereas neural nets
presume that such extraordinary changes of weights are established by a
more gradual knowledge build up. The weakness of a neural net approach is
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that it has problems accounting for abrupt changes in weights, so that
outliers become problematic.
A neural net approach to metaphor was advanced by Thomas &
Mareschal (in press). The Metaphor by Pattern Completion (MPC) model
conceives of simple 'A is B' metaphors as a semantic vector representation of
the A-term to a connectionist network storing the knowledge base of the B-
term. The MPC model accounts for how the semantic features of the A-term
are transformed by the semantic features of the knowledge base of the B-
term.
'A is B' metaphors were formed among three terms: Apples, Balls, and
Forks. These were defined by a set of prototypical tokens, representing
different kinds of apples, balls, and forks, which functioned as the
knowledge base. In the case of 'the Apple is a Ball', the output would be an
Apple transformed so as to make it more consistent with the prototypical
Ball representation stored in the network. The nature of the transformation
depends on the relationship between the Apple and Ball features.
After the network was run for 'the Apple is a Ball', certain features of
Apple were weighted less (edibility), whereas others were enhanced (e.g.,
round and hard). Asymmetric comparisons ('the Ball is an Apple') were
handled by reducing or enhancing the weight of other features than for
'Apple is Ball', although the similarity between Apple and Ball - viewed as a
distance measure - remained equal. The MPC model was also sensitive to
context, in that 'the brown Apple is a Ball' resulted in even smaller weights
for 'edibility', and an increase in, for example, 'softness'. However, this
happened only under the condition that the relation was specified in the
knowledge base that brown apples have different features from red apples,
i.e. that they are not edible. Furthermore, the MPC model could account for
variants such as 'the Apple is a Baseball', or 'the Apple is a Beachball',
enhancing or reducing the weights of the relevant features.
Most of the characteristics of the MPC model may be equally well repre-
sented by a conventional feature-matching model. The fact that certain
features receive more weight than others is easily established if features in
the shared set are weighted heavier than the distinctive features. Context
sensitivity is accounted for if the feature sets are enriched with relations
among features. For example, when 'soft' is a shared feature between Apple
and Ball, it may have a relation ('brown') under Apple that is connected to
the feature 'not edible'. Thus, the uneatable status of Ball is increased by the
shared feature 'soft', which maintains a relation ('brown') with 'inedibility' for
Apple. That other features for 'Apple is Baseball' receive more weight than
for 'Apple is Beachball' is also not a problem, because Baseball and Beach-
ball activate different feature sets, with different sets of (perhaps heavier
weighted) shared features.
The issue of asymmetric comparisons is somewhat different. The MPC
model assumes that 'Apple is Ball' has a different meaning than 'Ball is
Apple', because the weights of the shared features change, thus causing the
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asymmetry. However, this explanation overlooks the confounding that the
reversed metaphor also makes a category shift. 'Apple is Ball' actually states
that apples belong to the category of balls, and thus, that 'apple' is a feature
of Ball. Vice versa, 'Ball is Apple' states that balls are elements of the
category of Apples, and thus, that it is a feature of Apple. In other words, it
is not only the different weights of the shared features that may play a role in
the asymmetry effect, but also the response availability of 'Apple' as an
instance of 'Balls' and 'Ball' as an instance of 'Apples'. In other words, the
frequency with which one term is mentioned as a feature of the other may
determine the crucial difference in meaning.
Moreover, if shared features that belong to the A-term (the focus) of the
comparison are weighted heavier that those belonging to the B-term, a
feature matching model may account for the same results. However, as
shown in Chapter 5, there was no evidence for asymmetry effects of the
(shared) feature sets, so that the matter of asymmetric comparisons may turn
out to be purely academic.
The mechanism for making a distinction between metaphors and literal
expressions is problematic in the MPC model. The problem is dealt with in
the following way. An expression is recognized as literal if only small
semantic changes occur in the output. For 'this [apple-like] item is an apple',
little change is produced in the weights of the item's features. However, for
'this [apple-like] item is a ball', the weights will change drastically. The
criterion that determines the shift from literal expression to metaphor is
detected by matching the network error score against a value for the reader's
expectation of meaning change. The lower the error score, the more literal
the expression. Metaphors are anomalous if no shared features are found
(i.e. if the semantic representation vectors are orthogonal).
Nevertheless, this criterion may work for extreme cases of literal expres-
sions (such as tautologies) or extreme anomalies, but not for metaphors. In
the case of a tautology ('the apple is an apple'), indeed, the feature sets
intersect completely, so that no different weights arise, and the error is
probably about zero. Anomalies that share no feature at all are also easily
detected, because the error will probably be about one. All cases in between
- such as metaphors - are problematic. Certain expressions are literal with a
strong metaphorical bias. In that case, error scores increase strongly,
whereas readers still may judge them as literal (cf. Figure 6.2, Chapter 6).
There are even metaphors with literal tendencies that may obtain smaller
error scores than literal expressions with metaphoric tendencies, which is
not expected by the MPC model.
What the MPC models misses is the determination of the nature of the
error. The MPC model cannot tell what the optimal error value for
metaphors is, because the features are not categorized as literal or figurative.
Chapter 5 showed that this was crucial for the distinction between literal
expressions and metaphors. Thus, two error scores could decide the
expression type. Literal expressions would have a low error score for literal
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shared features, and a high one for (mixed) figurative shared features.
Metaphors would have low scores on both dimensions, whereas anomalies
would have two high scores.
Afterthoughts: Vivisection of the reader
Psycholinguistics and the theory of literature form a genuine cross-over.
When literary theorists speculate on the effects of poetical devices or the
identification of genres, they unavoidably assume a process that is
responsible for that effect. Hence the need for psycholinguistics in the theory
of literature. On the other hand, psycholinguistics cannot claim the validity
of any language theory, as long as it cannot account for creative language
processing. Hence the need for literary knowledge in psycholinguistics.
When hermeneuticians are entangled in the interpretation of poems, they
convey nothing more than their psychological interaction with the text on an
intuitive basis. When hermeneuticians want to escape from intuition as
epistemological basis, they become empiricists.
An oft-repeated complaint from the hermeneuticians is that empiricists
may succeed in avoiding sheer personal intuition as epistemological basis,
but only at the cost of generalizing to an average interpretation of a work,
while the really interesting part of literature is the unique reading
experience. This is the opposition of 'mean versus variance'. The focus of
the classic empiricist is on the mean value of a response, whereas the focus
of the classic hermeneutician is on the variance of the mean, and particularly
on the outliers (cf. Martindale 1991: 381-385). What is highly appreciated
by the hermeneutician is the original insight of the brillant outlier, the new
interpretation of an old text. What is highly appreciated by the empiricist is a
smooth normal distribution. However, neither of them is right.
The validity of a general trend (the mean) in the reading population may
only be derived from deviations from that mean trend (the variance).
Reversely, a unique experience cannot be described if there is no implicit
knowledge about the average. In other words, hermeneuticians do reckon
with the mean. However, their assessment is unreliable, because it is not
based on systematic analysis of random samples.
Tunnel vision on the mean is equally undesirable. Empiricists are predis-
posed to delete outliers from their data, supposedly 'belonging to another
reading population', without ever returning to that 'other population' again.
Variance is seen as a nuisance, and interactions that are insiduous in the
experimental design are ignored to reduce it. However, interaction and
variance are the supreme nuclei of human behavior.
Psycholinguists are not so much preoccupied with the covariates of the
stimuli as they are with that of the subjects. This is already illustrated by the
standard statistical packages, which provide the means of calculating the
effects of covariates on the subjects level (e.g., for age or education), but not
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on the stimulus level (for word frequency or lexical ambiguity). In literature,
the focus is the opposite, and this is what psycholinguistics can learn from
literature. It is improper to match a stimulus set on, for example, word
frequency in the language population and then to assume that it will be equal
to word frequency in the subject group.
A more sensitive approach is needed, one which manages potential co-
variates as a measure of the subject itself. In this vivisection of the reader, it
is not assumed that a mean word frequency is applicable to every other
subject from that population. What may be a high-frequent word in the
population may be low-frequent for a specific subject, and vice versa. A
word that is supposed to be ambiguous according to the dictionary may have
such old meanings or infrequent uses that, de facto, it is an unambiguous
word in the subject group. A psycholinguistic experiment, then, should start
with pilots on subject-specific word frequencies, lexical ambiguity,
similarity, and other relevant variables for the stimulus set, and investigate
which stimuli have which particular problems for which subject.
Afterwards, these measures can be used to correct the signal for that
particular subject and stimuli. On the one hand, the suspicion that certain
variables may interfere with a process is controlled less crudely than by
correcting each subject with the same mean. On the other hand, effects may
now be saved that - without the subject-specific correction - would have
been regarded as too noisy.
This approach demands much more emphasis on the individual subject,
who should be monitored during a longer period. It would also be advisable
to keep different dependent variables within subjects (e.g., feature
elicitation, scale value, RT, EEG), so that conclusions on their
interrelationship can be drawn with more rigor. This would lead to the
methodological requirement that the order of performing the tasks
(including those performed in the pilots) are balanced across subjects and
treated as a separate factor.
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Chapters 1, 2 and 3 introduce the pre-eminent schools of metaphor theory,
thereby modeling the theories such that they become comparable. This is
done by using a set theoretical approach, assuming that the A- and B-term in
an expression activate one or more sets of semantic features, which should
be seen as a sequence of associations.
The comparison model states that literal expressions have more shared
features than metaphors, which in their turn have more shared features than
anomalies. The size of the shared set was supposed to be checked in a one-
stage process to determine the decision (Chapter 1).
The anomaly model (Chapter 2) states that one stage is needed for a
literal expression, and two successive stages for a metaphor or anomaly. In
stage 1, the A- and B-term would activate only literal features, which are
then checked for the size of the shared set. If it turns out that the number of
shared literal features is insufficient to make the expression literal, it would
momentarily be perceived as an anomaly, which is accompanied by an
electrocortical effect of semantic unexpectedness. An ensuing second stage
would be needed to decide whether the expression is a metaphor. In stage 2,
figurative features would be activated by the A- and B-term, and the size of
the figurative shared set would determine whether the expression is actually
a metaphor or yet an anomaly.
Chapter 3 introduces the interaction model, which also states that two
stages are needed for a metaphor, and one for a literal expression. Literals
would be processed as described for the comparison model, whereas
metaphors would require a second stage in which relations are created for
the B-term features. These relations would then be transferred to the A-term
features, and if sufficient links are established, the expression would be a
metaphor; otherwise, an anomaly. Moreover, interaction theory claims that
adding context to the expressions would affect the process of creating
relations.
To select a stimulus set that was natural for literary texts and yet fulfilled
the demands of uniformity, Chapter 4 drew metaphors of the form 'the A is a
B' ('the harbor is a mouth') from Dutch and Flemish poems. From these
metaphors, literal ('the harbor is a place') and anomalous ('the harbor is a
know-nothing') expressions were constructed. All B-terms met a host of
constraints, so that expectations about spelling and rhyme were attenuated,
numbers of syllables and letters were equal, word frequency differences and
lexical ambiguity were avoided as far as possible, and syntactical form and
function were standardized. In addition, these expressions were experi-
mentally tested for category membership (is it literal, metaphoric or anom-
alous?) and for A- and B-term distribution (which is the focus, which is the
referent?).
Chapter 5 tested the predictions on the elicited feature sets. Subjects pro-
duced features on the A- and B-terms in three conditions: On the isolated
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terms in single term, on the terms in the isolated expression in expression,
and on the terms in context (the original poem). Moreover, subjects
interpreted the expressions in expression and context. Subsequently, they
categorized the elicited semantic features as literal and/or figurative, and
created relations among features and between features and terms. The
predictions of the models as formalized in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 were
compared with the results on feature production, and statistical inquiry
determined which type of (shared) feature set had distinguished best among
the expression types. It turned out that the shared sets defined by the
comparison model could distinguish literals and metaphors from anomalies,
but not from each other. Neither the number of created relations nor the
number of shared relations could distinguish among expression types, which
was not expected by the interaction model. The anomaly model did a little
better in that literals and metaphors differed from anomalies for the size of
the shared literal features, while literals and anomalies were different from
metaphors for the size of the shared set of features that were literal for the
one term and figurative for the other (mixed figurative, for short). Context
and expression differed from single term, but not from each other. Single
term evoked more features - yet smaller shared sets - whereas the opposite
occurred for the other conditions.
Although certain shared sets were capable of determining the expression
type, it was never the case that the interpretation of the expressions was
identical to the shared sets. In other words, the interpretations contained
many more features than merely the shared set.
Chapter 6 investigated the mental chronometry of metaphor processing.
A two- and three-choice task were exploited to determine the speed with
which literal expressions, metaphors and anomalies were processed in
expression and context. Anomalies were processed fastest, followed by
literal expressions and metaphors. The latter two could tie, with a slightly
higher speed for literal expressions. There were no systematic differences
between expression and context. It was concluded that these results can only
be explained if the literal and figurative shared set are assumed to be
established in parallel.
The main problem in this study was that severe interactions occurred with
the order of presenting the expressions. The above was only valid for first
presentations, whereas repetitions of the expressions erased all differences
among expression types. Subjects probably recognized earlier judgements.
Differences between the two- and the three-choice task also affected the
processing. Subjects found it easier to decide between two choices than
among three. Despite exhaustive practice, many errors occurred, due to poor
discrimination among expression types rather than speed-accuracy
problems.
Chapter 7 explored the electrocortical effects of reading a metaphor in
expression and context. The anomaly model assumed that metaphor pro-
cessing would be accompanied by a 'shock', due to the deviant meanings of
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the A- and B-term. This 'shock' was envisioned as the N400, an amplitude in
the EEG that is supposed to reflect semantic mismatch. Indeed, the N400
occurred in the expected ordinal pattern, indicating that literal expressions
evoked least N400-activity, metaphors intermediate, and anomalies the
largest N400-activity, although the difference between the latter two was not
statistically reliable. Context merely mitigated these differences.
However, the ordinal pattern for processing speed - anomalies < literal
expressions # metaphors - did not match the ordinal pattern for the N400-
amplitude: Anomalies $ metaphors > literal expressions. It was deduced that
N400 could not be part of the special metaphor processes. Instead, it might
reflect an additional mismatch effect, based on category expectancy. Literal
expressions match an instance with an appropriate category, whereas the cat-
egories for metaphors and anomalies are inappropriate. It might be, then,
that the presence or absence of the N400 informs the reader about the literal
status of an expression, which is confirmed by calculating the shared sets,
thereafter.
In the conclusions, a new model of metaphor processing was proposed:
The parallel two-stage anomaly race model. In this model, A- and B-term
elicit a mix of features - not strictly serial - which are indexed as literal
and/or figurative. Instances and categories are checked to see whether they
match. If they do, the calculation of the literal shared set may be facilitated;
if they do not, the N400 is evoked and the calculation of the (mixed)
figurative shared set is facilitated. Subsequently, the literal shared set and
the mixed figurative shared set are established in parallel by comparing each
feature of the one term with each feature of the other. This is a race between
the literal and mixed figurative shared set to satisfy the decision criteria. The
expression type that meets 'end of file' first is the first to enter the response
phase. In the response phase, expressions are first checked for a minimal
size of the shared literal set, synchronously to a check for the minimal size
of the shared mixed figurative features. If an expression remains below these
minima, it is an anomaly. If the expression exceeds one of the minima, the
next check asks whether the minimum for the shared mixed figurative set is
met. If it is not, the expression is literal; if it is, the expression is a metaphor.
Ultimately, no model is definitive, and no experiment is the final test.
Therefore, if the Tables and Figures turn out to be nothing more than
rhetoric, then at least I hope that they may serve as a captatio for better
researchers.
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Hoofdstuk 1, 2 en 3 van De Metafoor en het Brein: Gedragsmatig en Psy-
chofysiologisch Onderzoek naar Literaire Metafoorverwerking behandelen
de belangrijkste scholen in de metafoortheorie; de theorieën zo modellerend
dat ze vergelijkbaar werden. De verzamelingstheoretische aanpak veronder-
stelde dat de A- en B-term van een expressie één of meer verzamelingen se-
mantische kenmerken activeren, wat moet worden opgevat als één of meer
reeksen associaties.
Het vergelijkingsmodel stelt dat letterlijke expressies meer gedeelde ken-
merken hebben dan metaforen, die op hun beurt meer gedeelde kenmerken
hebben dan anomalieën. De grootte van deze doorsnede wordt geacht
gecontroleerd te worden in een één-stadiumproces ten einde tot een oordeel
te komen (hoofdstuk 1).
Het anomaliemodel (hoofdstuk 2) stelt dat één stadium vereist is voor een
letterlijke expressie en twee opeenvolgende stadia voor een metafoor en een
anomalie. In stadium 1 zouden de A- en B-term alleen letterlijke kenmerken
activeren, die vervolgens worden gecontroleerd op de grootte van de
doorsnede. Als blijkt dat het aantal gedeelde letterlijke kenmerken
onvoldoende is om de expressie letterlijk te maken, zou deze even opgevat
worden als anomalie, begeleid door een electrocorticaal effect van
semantische onverwachtheid. Een daaropvolgend tweede stadium zou nodig
zijn om te beslissen of de expressie een metafoor is. In stadium 2 zouden
figuurlijke kenmerken geactiveerd worden door de A- en B-term en de
grootte van de figuurlijke doorsnede zou bepalen of de expressie
daadwerkelijk een metafoor is of toch een anomalie.
Hoofdstuk 3 introduceert het interactiemodel, dat eveneens stelt dat twee
stadia benodigd zijn voor een metafoor en één voor een letterlijke expressie.
Letterlijken zouden verwerkt worden zoals beschreven in het
vergelijkingsmodel, terwijl metaforen een tweede stadium zouden vergen
waarin relaties gecreëerd worden voor de kenmerken van de B-term. Deze
relaties zouden dan overgeheveld worden naar de kenmerken van de A-term
en als er genoeg verbanden zijn gelegd, zou de expressie een metafoor zijn;
anders een anomalie. Bovendien beweert de interactietheorie dat het
toevoegen van context aan de expressies het proces van relatiecreatie zou
beïnvloeden.
Om een stimulusverzameling te selecteren die natuurlijk was voor li-
teraire teksten en toch voldeed aan de eisen van uniformiteit, onttrok
hoofdstuk 4 metaforen van de vorm 'de A is een B' ('de haven is een mond')
aan Nederlandse en Vlaamse gedichten. Uit deze metaforen werden
letterlijke ('de haven is een plek') en anomale ('de haven is een snars')
expressies geconstrueerd. Alle B-termen voldeden aan een reeks eisen,
zodanig dat verwachtingen over spelling en rijm werden gematigd, het
aantal lettergrepen en letters gelijk was, verschillen in woordfrequentie en
lexicale ambiguïteit zoveel mogelijk werden vermeden en grammaticale
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vorm en functie werden gestandaardiseerd. Daarenboven werden deze
expressies experimenteel getoetst op hun categoriebepaaldheid (letterlijk,
metaforisch of anomaal?) en op A- en B-term-distributie (wat is de focus,
wat is de referent?).
Hoofdstuk 5 testte de voorspellingen over de opgeroepen kenmerkver-
zamelingen. Proefpersonen produceerden kenmerken voor de A- en B-
termen in drie condities: voor de geïsoleerde termen in losse term, voor de
termen in de geïsoleerde expressie in expressie en voor de termen in context
(het oorspronkelijke gedicht). Bovendien interpreteerden de proefpersonen
de expressies in expressie en context. Vervolgens categoriseerden zij de
gegenereerde semantische kenmerken als letterlijk en/of figuurlijk en
creëerden relaties tussen kenmerken en tussen kenmerken en termen. De
voorspellingen van de modellen zoals geformaliseerd in de hoofdstukken 1,
2 en 3 werden vergeleken met de resultaten van de kenmerkproductie en
statistische analyse bepaalde welk type verzameling het best de expressiety-
pen kon onderscheiden. Het bleek dat de doorsneden gedefinieerd door het
vergelijkingsmodel, letterlijken en metaforen konden onderscheiden van
anomalieën, maar niet van elkaar. Het aantal gecreëerde relaties noch het
aantal gedeelde relaties konden expressietypen onderscheiden, wat niet
verwacht werd door het interactiemodel. Het anomaliemodel deed het iets
beter, omdat letterlijken en metaforen verschilden van anomalieën in de
grootte van de letterlijke doorsnede, terwijl letterlijken en anomalieën
verschillend waren van metaforen in het aantal gedeelde kenmerken dat
letterlijk was voor de ene term en figuurlijk voor de andere (afgekort als
'gemengd figuurlijk'). Context en expressie verschilden van losse term, maar
niet van elkaar. Losse term wekte meer kenmerken op, maar de doorsneden
waren kleiner, terwijl het omgekeerde gebeurde voor de andere condities.
Hoewel bepaalde doorsneden in staat waren het expressietype te de-
termineren, was het nooit zo dat de interpretatie van de expressies identiek
was aan de doorsneden. Met andere woorden, de interpretaties bevatten veel
meer kenmerken dan alleen de doorsnede.
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzocht de mentale chronometrie van metafoorverwer-
king. Een twee- en driekeuzentaak werden benut om de snelheid te bepalen
waarmee letterlijke expressies, metaforen en anomalieën verwerkt werden in
expressie en context. Anomalieën werden het snelst verwerkt, gevolgd door
letterlijke expressies en metaforen. De laatste twee konden gelijk eindigen,
met soms een iets hogere snelheid voor letterlijke expressies. Er waren geen
systematische verschillen tussen expressie en context. Er werd
geconcludeerd dat deze resultaten alleen te verklaren zijn wanneer de
letterlijke en figuurlijke doorsnede verondersteld worden parallel tot stand te
komen.
Het grootste probleem in deze studie was dat ernstige interacties optraden
met de volgorde van presentatie van de expressies. Bovenstaande was alleen
geldig voor eerste presentaties, terwijl herhalingen van de expressies alle
verschillen tussen de expressietypen uitwisten. Waarschijnlijk herkenden de
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proefpersonen hun eerdere beslissingen. Verschillen tussen de twee- en
driekeuzentaak beïnvloedden eveneens de verwerking. Proefpersonen
vonden het eenvoudiger te beslissen tussen twee keuzen dan tussen drie.
Ondanks langdurige oefening traden vele vergissingen op, eerder door de
slechte discrimineerbaarheid van de expressietypen dan door snelheid-
accuraatheids-problemen.
Hoofdstuk 7 exploreerde de electrocorticale effecten van het lezen van
een metafoor in expressie en context. Het anomaliemodel veronderstelde dat
metafoorverwerking zou worden begeleid door een 'schok', veroorzaakt door
de afwijkende betekenissen van de A- en B-term. Deze 'schok' werd
voorgesteld als de N400, een amplitude in het EEG die verondersteld wordt
semantische ongelijkheid te representeren. Inderdaad trad de N400 op
volgens het verwachte ordinale patroon, uitwijzend dat letterlijke expressies
de minste N400-activiteit uitlokten, metaforen gematigde en anomalieën de
grootste N400-activiteit, hoewel het verschil tussen de laatste twee
statistisch niet betrouwbaar was. Context verkleinde slechts deze
verschillen.
Echter, het ordinale patroon voor de verwerkingssnelheid (anomalieën <
letterlijke expressies # metaforen) kwam niet overeen met het ordinale
patroon voor de N400-amplitude: anomalieën $ metaforen > letterlijke
expressies. Gededuceerd werd dat N400 geen onderdeel van het speciale
metafoorproces kon zijn, maar dat het een toegevoegd effect van
ongelijkheid kan zijn, gebaseerd op een categorieverwachting. Letterlijke
expressies combineren een exemplaar met een toepasselijke categorie,
terwijl de categorieën van metaforen en anomalieën niet toepasselijk zijn.
Het kan aldus zijn dat de aan- of afwezigheid van de N400 de lezer
informeert over de letterlijke status van een expressie, die bevestigd wordt
door daarna de doorsnede te berekenen.
In de conclusies werd een nieuw model voor metafoorverwerking voor-
gesteld: het parallelle twee-stadia anomalie wedloopmodel. In dit model
wekken A- and B-term een mengsel van kenmerken op, niet strikt serieel, die
geïndiceerd worden als letterlijk en/of figuurlijk. Gecontroleerd wordt of
exemplaren en categorieën overeenstemmen. Als dat zo is, kan de
berekening van de letterlijke doorsnede gefaciliteerd worden; wanneer niet,
wordt de N400 opgewekt en de berekening van de (gemengd) figuurlijke
doorsnede gefaciliteerd. Vervolgens komen de letterlijke en gemengd
figuurlijke doorsnede parallel tot stand door elk kenmerk van de ene term te
vergelijken met elk kenmerk van de andere. Dit is een wedloop tussen de
letterlijke en gemengd figuurlijke doorsnede om te voldoen aan de de-
cisiecriteria. Het expressietype dat het eerst 'einde bestand' bereikt gaat het
eerste de responsfase in. In de responsfase worden expressies eerst gecontro-
leerd op een minimumomvang voor de letterlijke doorsnede synchroon aan
een controle op de minimumomvang van de gemengd figuurlijke doorsnede.
Als een expressie beneden deze minima blijft, is het een anomalie. Als een
expressie één van deze minima overstijgt, vraagt de volgende controle of het
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omvangsminimum voor de gemengd figuurlijke doorsnede wordt gehaald.
Als dat niet het geval is, is de expressie letterlijk; wanneer wel, dan is de ex-
pressie een metafoor.
Uiteindelijk is geen model definitief en geen experiment de doorslagge-
vende test. Mochten derhalve de tabellen en figuren niet meer dan retorica
blijken te zijn, dan hoop ik tenminste dat ze als een captatio mogen dienen
voor betere onderzoekers.
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GLOSSARY - INDEX OF KEY WORDS
Amplitude: The height of the voltage of the ERP - 269, 273, 275, 278, 280, 286, 296-
298, 301, 302, 310, 316, 330, 333
Arrival time: The amount of time (including release time) needed to arrive at the
decision key after stimulus onset - 247, 256, 263, 266, 284, 309
Asymmetric similarity: Subjects may perceive that two stimuli are not equally
similar. One of the stimuli may look more like the other than reversely, although
logically, this is impossible - 132, 133, 135-141, 143-145, 148, 186-190, 198, 207,
210, 324, 325
Category dominance: Number of times a category name is mentioned in response to
an instance - 78, 81, 82, 85, 97, 102, 103, 128, 196-199
Dependent variable: Measure (e.g., RT or EEG) that fluctuates as an effect of the
independent variables or factors
Dissimilarity: The extent to which two or more stimuli do not look alike, probably
sensitive to a measure of shared and distinctive features - 29, 34, 37, 47, 120,
124-126, 130, 132
Distinctive features: Those features not present in the shared set, supposedly
increasing the perception of dissimilarity between two stimuli - 34, 39, 42, 61, 87,
123, 130, 134, 135, 137-139, 142, 143, 275, 324
Effect: Influence of a factor on the dependent variable, determined by the
difference between the means of factors or factor levels - 7, 11, 16, 17, 20, 26, 29,
30, 32-38, 42, 44, 50, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, 76, 79-82, 85, 86, 94-96, 101-103, 125,
140, 142, 145, 148, 151-157, 163-165, 167-170, 174-177, 189-194, 196, 198, 210,
212, 225, 227, 229, 235, 237, 239-242, 244, 249, 250, 252-255, 257, 260, 261, 263,
269, 272, 274, 275, 277, 280, 282, 284-288, 290, 297, 302-306, 310, 312, 316, 325,
326, 328, 330, 331, 333
Electroencephalogram (EEG): Recording at the scalp of electrical activity in the
brain during the presentation of stimuli - 63, 78, 79, 101, 198, 269, 271-273, 275-
278, 283-285, 288, 290, 292, 301, 327, 330, 333
Equality: Cf. formal equality and semantic equality - 144, 146, 147, 151, 152, 198,
204, 205, 317
Equivalence: In logics, a synonym for identity. In the theory of literature, a synonym
for similarity - 66-68, 76, 77, 119, 120, 125, 129-134, 147, 202, 204, 206, 207
Event-related potential (ERP): Fast voltage oscillations produced by the neural
tissue in response to a stimulus. The ERP is established by calculating the mean
EEG for a factor level - 7, 63, 272, 273, 275, 277-279, 282, 286, 296, 297
Evoked potential (EP): Cf. event-related potential - 260
Exemplar: Cf. Instance - 81, 85, 128
Factor: An independent variable that is not directly measurable (it is latent) and is
supposed to be manipulated by the common aspect (shared feature) in a stimu-
lus set, subject group or task. Examples of factors are intelligence, gender, pho-
nology and word frequency. In the present study, they are, for example, condi-
ion, expression type and term - 16, 20, 33, 70, 72, 81, 87, 139, 144, 145, 153, 168,
190, 192, 196, 202, 210, 235, 240, 241, 245, 249, 250, 252, 254-256, 261, 263, 286,
296, 297, 327
Factor level: To measure its impact, a factor should have at least two contrastive
levels, for example, 'present' vs 'absent', 'correct' vs 'incorrect', 'male' vs 'female',
'high' vs 'low'. In the present study, they are e.g., single term , expression and con-
text for the factor of condition, literals, metaphors and anomalies for the factor
of expression type, and A- and B-term  for the factor of term - 210, 286
Feature: Cf. feature set - 3, 4, 10, 14-23, 25, 26, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37-39, 42-44, 47-55,
58, 59, 61, 62, 73, 78, 80-88, 95-97, 101-103, 119-121, 123-131, 133-156, 158, 159,
165, 167-169, 171, 172, 174, 175, 178, 179, 182, 183, 186-190, 192-201, 203-210,
212, 215, 222, 228, 259-262, 302, 307, 315-317, 321-325, 327, 329, 330
Feature frequency: The number of times a feature is mentioned in response to a
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stimulus - 135, 142-145, 159
Feature set: A number of associations summed up in response to a stimulus - 10,
18-20, 22, 25, 35, 37, 39, 42, 48-50, 52, 54, 58, 59, 61, 82, 85, 87, 95, 96, 102, 120,
121, 126-128, 130, 133-138, 140-142, 145, 147, 148, 150, 153-155, 158, 167, 168,
171, 174, 175, 187, 190, 192-195, 203, 209, 212, 215, 222, 228, 302, 307, 316, 323,
329
Figurative features: Those features in the set that are judged as imaginative, meta-
phoric or symbolic - 30, 35, 39, 42, 43, 147, 155, 168, 169, 200
Figurativeness: The nonliteral resemblance between stimuli, supposedly based on a
measure of their figurative and nonfigurative features - 120, 135, 141, 142, 187-
189, 206, 207, 225
Foregrounding: Textual elements that are deviant from expectation, evoking surprise
effects - 72, 232, 233, 269, 272
Formal equality: The exact identity of two letter strings - 146, 147, 205
Grand mean: The mean of individual means across subjects - 153-166, 168, 174, 175,
179, 183, 187, 188, 191, 193-195, 197, 215, 218, 225, 226, 247-250, 252-256, 263,
266, 268, 285, 288, 290, 292, 296, 299, 301, 309
Home key: Reaction time device to make comparable the multidirectional decisions
of one finger. Since the home key must be released before a decision key is
pressed, the spatial or motor preparation differences are attenuated that may be
predicated by the position of the decision keys - 246, 247, 283, 284
Homonymy: Cf. lexical ambiguity - 73, 78, 82, 101
Idiom: Metaphor that is incorporated in the standard language, and has lost its
literal meaning - 236, 238, 241, 242
Independent variable: A preferably stable phenomenon that is manipulated to study
its effect on the dependent variable. Cf. factor.
Instance: Member of a category of objects - 9, 14, 19, 25, 31, 36, 37, 51, 52, 61, 65,
74-76, 78, 81-86, 88, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 119, 122, 128, 132, 134, 140, 141,
189, 192, 196-199, 202, 205, 232, 236, 271-273, 275, 277, 278, 301-303, 306, 316,
322, 325, 330
Instance-category verification: Experimental task in which subjects judge whether
instances and categories match - 81, 82, 85, 102, 103, 128, 196
Instance dominance: Number of times an instance is mentioned in response to the
category - 81, 82, 85, 102, 103, 128, 196
Isotope: Group of words in the text with strong semantic relationships among its
members - 75, 119, 129, 130, 132
Latency: The time between stimulus onset and the beginning of the ERP - 278, 284
Lexical ambiguity: Word with meanings that are highly disparate, because they often
are more words that are written alike - 6, 62, 65, 66, 73, 74, 78, 82-84, 87, 95, 96,
101, 102, 194-196, 198, 199, 232, 256, 257, 260, 261, 277, 297, 322, 327, 328
Literal features: Those features in the set that are judged as descriptive, realistic or
lifelike - 34, 37, 39, 43, 154, 186
Oppositions: Antonyms that are supposed to structure a text, such as 'good' vs 'evil',
'lively' vs 'dull', 'vigor' vs 'frailty'. They could easily be transformed into factor
levels - 32-34, 119, 120, 123-125, 129, 130, 304, 306, 307, 326
Orthography: Factor that concerns the visual side of spelling (the word perceived as
picture) - 61, 65, 67-69, 78, 79, 87, 233, 277, 280
Overlap: Cf. shared set - 16, 21-23, 30, 32, 34, 37-39, 42, 51, 54, 55, 58, 119, 127,
128, 134, 143, 144, 147, 151, 165, 168-170, 173-174, 176, 177, 203-206, 208, 209,
259, 262, 302, 307, 315, 316
Paradigm: More or less similar words of one syntactic class (e.g., nouns or verbs),
which are selected to be combined in a syntagma (the sentence) - 75, 79, 119,
125-128, 131, 203, 232
Prime stimuli: Stimuli that (usually) precede the target stimuli, supposedly affecting
them factorially - 11, 52, 73, 81-84, 201, 232, 233, 235, 236, 238, 240-242, 245, 282
Reaction time (RT): The amount of time needed to respond to a stimulus - 7, 26,
35, 58, 63, 78, 79, 81, 82, 85, 86, 97, 103, 197, 198, 200, 203, 209, 231-238, 241,
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243-245, 247, 256, 257, 259, 260, 261, 278, 279, 282-284, 300, 327
Reading time: The amount of time needed to read a sentence - 233, 239-242, 282
Relations: Feature type that clarifies the link among other features or with the
stimulus - 8, 10, 14, 17, 47-54, 58, 59, 68, 69, 76, 77, 122, 123, 130, 132, 147, 149-
151, 156, 163-166, 169, 170, 172, 173, 177, 178, 197, 198, 206, 207, 210, 243, 259,
271, 273, 275, 276, 278, 324
Release time: Time between stimulus onset and leaving the home key to execute a
decision - 247
Salience: The extent to which a feature is prominent or conspicuous in the feature
set, expressed by a numerical weight - 51, 63, 72, 119, 135-145, 210
Semantic equality: The exact identity of meaning of two letter strings - 146, 147
Semiotics: The study of the cultural function of signs, such as symbols and icons - 4,
7, 122, 130, 132
Shared set: The number of features that two or more stimuli have in common - 14-
21, 23, 25, 34, 37, 51, 52, 59, 61, 95, 119, 127, 134, 138, 139, 141-146, 148, 159-
168, 171, 172, 174, 176-178, 186-188, 192-196, 198-200, 204, 205, 207, 208, 210,
212, 218, 228, 243, 244, 258, 259, 262, 275, 307, 315-317, 324, 328-330
Significance: The probability that an effect is greater than chance, not that it is
'highly important', 'rich in meaning' or 'meaningful' as a word in a poem can be
meaningful - 87, 89, 90, 254, 320
Similarity: The resemblance between stimuli, supposedly based on a measure of
their shared and distinctive features - 7, 13-18, 20, 21, 23, 29, 31, 35, 37, 39, 47,
48, 50-52, 54, 63, 68, 76-79, 85, 87, 120, 122, 124-126, 129-144, 146, 148, 186-189,
202, 203, 206, 207, 209, 225, 324, 327
Simile: A comparison with the preposition 'like', for example, 'man is like a
machine' as opposed to the metaphor 'man is a machine' - 
Speed-accuracy trade-off: When subjects are instructed to make rapid decisions in
an RT experiment, this will be at the cost of making more errors - 254, 257
Syntagma: Sentence build up by matching words from different syntactic classes
(e.g., 'child' and 'sleeps'). Cf. paradigm - 120, 131, 203
Target stimuli: The imperative stimuli, which are supposed to evoke the expected
effect; in the present study, the B-terms - 3, 71, 82, 83, 245, 282
Trial: Experimental sequence of stimuli, for example, a prime followed by a target -
10, 149-151, 246, 282-284, 324
Variability: The extent to which values differ from the mean and differ among each
other - 144, 190
Variance: Cf. variability
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Samenvatting proefschrift:
Metaforen zijn dagelijks taalgebruik. "Die jongen is een ezel", "zij vocht als een leeuw" en
"wat een rat is die man" worden niet letterlijk opgevat en zijn toch geen onzin. Zelfs de
moeilijke metaforen in een gedicht worden begrepen ("de dood is een muur"). Welke
processen benutten de hersenen om de moeilijke metaforen in een gedicht te interpreteren?
Hoe zit dat met letterlijke varianten ("de dood is het einde") of onzin ("de dood is een
snars")?
Allereerst heeft dit te maken met de soort associaties die zij opwekken (de figuurlijke of
symbolische associaties), de hoeveelheid associaties die gelijk zijn tussen de twee termen
"dood" en "muur", de snelheid waarmee ze verwerkt worden (ze tenderen langzamer te zijn
dan letterlijke zinnen en onzin-zinnen) en de hoogte van de amplitude die zij opwekken in
de hersenen wanneer het EEG wordt gemeten. Het blijkt namelijk dat metaforen een hoger
onverwachtheidspotentiaal opwekken dan letterlijke zinnen en op andere locaties in de her-
senen worden verwerkt dan onzin-zinnen, een vondst die nog nooit eerder gedaan is. Het
procesmodel dat uit het onderzoek voortvloeide heeft consequenties voor de computerlin-
guïstiek en het onderwijs.
Persbericht:
WAT DOEN JE HERSENEN MET EEN METAFOOR?
Johan F. Hoorn
Een metafoor is een zin die je niet letterlijk kunt interpreteren, maar die ook geen onzin is.
We gebruiken metaforen de hele dag: "de computer moet even nadenken", "nu loop ik over
het pad met de muis" en "o, o, wat een ezel is dat ding toch". Niemand maakt er bezwaar
tegen dat computers niet na kunnen denken (ze schakelen slechts), dat er helemaal niet
gelopen wordt over een pad (probeer je schoenen maar eens in het beeldscherm te krijgen),
dat het besturingsapparaatje geen muis en de machine geen ezel is. Het is zelfs zo dat als we
alleen de technische woorden zouden gebruiken en de computer alleen in wiskunde zouden
aanspreken, wij er geen barst meer van zouden begrijpen. Metaforen zijn essentieel voor
menselijke communicatie en blijven niet beperkt tot het werken met computers; denk maar
eens aan spreekwoorden en gezegden, gedichten en romans. Ook het onderwijs maakt er
veel gebruik van: "opgelet, het atoom is een bouwsteen der materie".
Hoe doen die hersenen dat? Welke processen onderscheiden metaforen ('de man is een
zwijn') van letterlijke zinnen ('de man is een mens') van onzin ('de man is een gros')?
Onderzoek aan de Vrije Universiteit werd verricht naar de verschillende soorten associaties
die door metaforen, letterlijken en onzin worden opgewekt bij proefpersonen, de verhou-
ding van de A-term ("man") met de categorie van de B-term ("man" hoort niet tot de
categorie "zwijnen" en "snarsen", maar wel tot de categorie "mensen"), de snelheid
waarmee de diverse zinstypen verwerkt worden (reactietijden) en naar het effect van de di-
verse zinstypen op de hersenen, door het meten van breinpotentialen (EEG).
De resultaten waren als volgt. Woorden wekken zowel letterlijke als figuurlijke
associaties op. 'Vuist', bijvoorbeeld, wekt de letterlijke associaties 'vingers, hand, kootje,
nagels' op en de figuurlijke (symbolische) associaties 'woede, verzet, staking, demonstratie'.
Voor letterlijke zinnen werd de connectie tussen A- en B-term (gezien als het aantal gelijke
associaties tussen bijvoorbeeld "man" en "mens") alleen gevormd met letterlijke associaties.
Voor metaforen was dit net zo. Echter, de connectie voor metaforen werd ook nog gelegd
tussen associaties die letterlijk waren voor "man" en figuurlijk voor "zwijn". En andersom:
figuurlijke associaties voor "man" waren letterlijk voor "zwijn". Voor de onzin-zinnetjes
werden er nauwelijks connecties gelegd. Er waren nauwelijks associaties gelijk voor zowel
"man" als "gros".
Uit de reactietijden bleek dat onzin het snelst verwerkt werd. Dat is te begrijpen als je
bedenkt dat er nauwelijks enige associatie gelijk is en je dus zo klaar bent met het
opbouwen van de connecties. Letterlijken en metaforen gingen even snel, hoewel metaforen
ernaar negen het langzaamst verwerkt te worden. Dit is te begrijpen als je bedenkt dat
letterlijke zinnen maar één soort connectie opbouwen (de gelijke letterlijke associaties) en
metaforen twee soorten connecties (de gelijke letterlijke associaties én de gelijke associaties
die letterlijk zijn voor het ene woord, maar figuurlijk voor het andere). Dat kost meer moei-
te, dus word je langzamer.
Het meten van breinpotentialen tijdens het lezen van metaforen was een novum. Nooit
eerder was het gebeurd (bij Letteren noch bij Psychologie) dat er EEG werd gemeten tijdens
de verwerking van metaforen. Wel was er al onderzoek gedaan naar de effecten van onzin-
zinnetjes, zoals "hij belegde zijn brood met boter en sokken". Het woord "sokken" liet een
amplitude in het EEG zien die niet aanwezig was voor een normale afsluiting als "kaas". Dit
onverwachtheidseffect werd benut om te zien of de hersenen net zoveel moeite hadden met
metaforen als met onzin, of dat ze net zo makkelijk waren als letterlijke zinnen. Het bleek
dat metaforen ongeveer hetzelfde onverwachtheidseffect opwekten als onzin. Letterlijke
zinnen deden dat niet. Bovendien werden metaforen op iets andere locaties in de hersenen
verwerkt dan onzin en letterlijken. Dit resultaat was te verklaren uit het feit dat letterlijken
een A-term  "man" benutten die behoort tot de categorie van de B-term  ("mens"), maar dat
metaforen en onzin dat niet doen ("man" behoort niet tot de "zwijnen" en "snarsen").
Het procesmodel dat hieruit voortvloeide ziet er als volgt uit. Als een zin met een A- en
een B-term gelezen wordt, bekijken de hersenen eerst of de A-term  tot de categorie van de
B-term  behoort. Dit vindt plaats gedurende de eerste 400 milliseconden nadat de B-term  is
gelezen. Als ze bij elkaar horen, wordt er geen onverwachtheidspotentiaal opgewekt. Horen
ze niet bij elkaar, dan geven de hersenen een klein alarmsignaaltje af. Ze weten nu dat ze
een metafoor of onzin kunnen verwachten. De volgende 1 tot 1,5 seconden worden benut
om letterlijke associaties van de A-term  te combineren met letterlijke associaties van de B-
term , en parallel daaraan, om letterlijke met figuurlijke associaties te combineren. Wanneer
dat in beide gevallen te weinig gelijke associaties oplevert, wordt de zin beoordeeld als
'onzin'. Levert dat voldoende gelijke letterlijke maar onvoldoende gelijke letterlijk-
figuurlijke associaties op, dan wordt de zin beoordeeld als 'letterlijk'. Levert dat zowel veel
gelijke letterlijke als veel gelijke letterlijk-figuurlijke associaties op, dan wordt de zin
beoordeeld als 'metafoor'.
Wat kan zo'n procesmodel beteken voor uw computergebruik? Op dit moment kunnen
computers nog niet zo goed overweg met metaforen. Ze zijn slechts in staat die commando's
te interpreteren die ze al van tevoren hebben ingevoerd gekregen ("openen", "opslaan",
"sluiten"). Mensen kunnen heel goed omgaan met creatief taalgebruik. Als computers weten
hoe mensen dat doen (namelijk, kijk naar de categorieverwantschap van woorden en
genereer zoveel mogelijk bijbehorende woorden - de associaties - om die te vergelijken op
letterlijkheid en figuurlijkheid), dan zou het kunnen dat als u in de toekomst spontaan tegen
uw computer zegt "wat ben je toch een ezel!", de computer antwoordt met: "neem me niet
kwalijk, ik zal de fout herstellen, ik moet beter leren nadenken". De mogelijkheden voor
computergebruik door leerlingen en niet-exact aangelegde mensen worden schier oneindig.
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